ANTHONY REEVES, III v. STATE OF FLORIDA

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S IXTH D ISTRICT C OURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 6D2025-1713
Lower Tribunal No. 2024-CF-009344
_____________________________
A NTHONY REEVES , III,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF F LORIDA ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County.
Cassandra L. Denmark, Judge.
October 9, 2026
PRATT, J.
Appellant challenges his conviction of burglary of a conveyance with an
assault and a battery, as well as his sentence enhancement under the prison releasee
reoffender (“PRR”) statute.1 We reject all of Appellant’s arguments and affirm, but
we write to explain why Appellant’s conviction for burglary of a conveyance with
1 The jury instructions and verdict form make clear that Appellant was
convicted of burglary of a conveyance with an assault and a battery.

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an assault and a battery is a qualifying offense under the catch-all provision of the
PRR statute.2
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining his conviction for
burglary of a conveyance with an assault and a battery is a qualifying offense under
the PRR statute and that he should therefore be resentenced. He asserts that the trial
court improperly focused on the offense of which he was convicted rather than the
offense with which he was charged. He further asserts that because he was charged
with burglary of a conveyance with an assault or a battery, and because a battery
does not necessarily involve the use or threat of physical force or violence, his charge
and by extension his conviction cannot fall within the PRR statute’s catch-all
provision. We disagree.
The PRR statute contains a number of enumerated felonies and the following
catch-all 	provision 	which 	is 	preceded 	by 	fourteen 	enumerated 	felonies 	and
succeeded by three enumerated felonies:
(9)(a)1. 	“Prison 	releasee 	reoffender” 	means 	any 	defendant 	who
commits, or attempts to commit:
a. 	Treason;
b. 	Murder;
c. 	Manslaughter;
d. 	Sexual battery;
e. 	Carjacking;
2 However, we note in passing that any potential Erlinger issue regarding
Appellant receiving a sentencing enhancement pursuant to the PRR statute was
rendered moot by the jury making findings of fact consistent with Erlinger prior to
sentencing. See generally Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024).

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f. 	Home-invasion robbery;
g. 	Robbery;
h. 	Arson;
i. 	Kidnapping;
j. 	Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;
k. 	Aggravated battery;
l. 	Aggravated stalking;
m. 	Aircraft piracy;
n. 	Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device
or bomb;
o. 	Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against an individual;
p. 	Armed burglary;
q. 	Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure; or
r. 	Any felony violation of s. 790.07, s. 800.04, s. 827.03, s. 827.071,
or s. 847.0135(5);
within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility
operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor, a county
detention facility following incarceration for an offense for which the
sentence pronounced was a prison sentence, or a correctional institution
of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any
possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction,
following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is
punishable by more than 1 year in this state.
§ 775.082(9)(a)1.a.-r., Fla. Stat. (2024) (emphasis added).3
3 We note that the forcible felony statute similarly contains a number of
enumerated felonies—including burglary—and the following catch-all provision
which is preceded by fifteen enumerated felonies and succeeded by none:
“Forcible 	felony” 	means 	treason; 	murder; 	manslaughter; 	sexual
battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson;
kidnapping; 	aggravated 	assault; 	aggravated 	battery; 	aggravated
stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of
a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the
use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.

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The PRR statute’s catch-all provision in section 775.082(9)(a)1.o. is virtually
identical to the catch-all provision of the forcible felony statute, which reads, “any
other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against
any individual.” § 776.08, Fla. Stat. The two are slightly different insofar as the
former refers to “[a]ny felony . . . .” whereas the latter refers to “any other felony . .
. .” and insofar as the former is placed in the middle of a list of enumerated felony
offenses whereas the latter is placed at the end of a list of enumerated felony
offenses. See State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 217 (Fla. 2007) (acknowledging that
the PRR statute’s catch-all provision “contains the same language as the final clause
of section 776.08”). Compare § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat., with § 776.08, Fla. Stat.
As such, we interpret the PRR statute’s catch-all provision to have the same meaning
as the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision unless there’s a good textual or
contextual reason not to. See State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 95 (Fla. 2012)
(acknowledging that “where the Legislature uses the exact same words or phrases in
two different statutes, we may assume it intended the same meaning to apply”
(quoting Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 217)); see also Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 217 (“Because
the two statutes use identical [catch-all provision] language, whether [battery on a
law enforcement officer] BOLEO is a qualifying offense must be answered
consistently under both the VCC statute and the PRR statute.”).
§ 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2024) (emphasis added).

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And 	we 	recently 	explained 	how 	the 	forcible 	felony 	statute’s 	catch-all
provision generally operates:
“Section 776.08 enumerates several forcible felonies and also
includes 	a 	catch-all 	provision 	covering 	‘any 	other 	felony 	which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any
individual.’” State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 95 (Fla. 2012) (quoting §
776.08, Fla. Stat.). In State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007), the
Florida Supreme Court reviewed and applied the test articulated in
Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991), for determining whether
a criminal offense is a forcible felony that falls within the meaning of
the catch-all provision of section 776.08. Consistent with Perkins, the
Hearns court held among other things that a court may not “look
beyond the statutory elements of an offense and analyze the evidence
in a particular case”; that “the only relevant consideration is the
statutory elements of the offense”; and that “[i]f the use or threat of
physical force or violence against any individual is not a necessary
element of the crime, then the crime is not a forcible felony within the
meaning of the final clause of section 776.08.” Hearns, 961 So. 2d at
216 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Dunlap v. State, 435 So. 3d 224, 227 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). It follows then that the
catch-all provision of the PRR statute works the same way.
Here, Appellant contends that the trial court should not have focused on
whether his conviction falls within the ambit of the PRR statute’s catch-all provision
and that therefore the sentencing enhancement applied by the trial court pursuant to
the PRR statute should not be upheld. He insists that the trial court should have
instead inquired whether the offense with which he was charged as opposed to the
offense of which he was convicted—i.e., burglary of a conveyance with an assault
or battery as opposed to burglary of a conveyance with an assault and a battery—

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fell within the ambit of the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, and that if it had so
inquired he would have been ineligible for the sentencing enhancement because
burglary with a battery was a possibility and battery is not a qualifying offense under
the PRR statute’s catch-all provision. But Appellant’s argument fails.
Appellant’s argument is foreclosed by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
in Hackley. Under Hackley, it’s not the charged offense that matters for purposes of
PRR enhancement; it’s the offense of which the defendant is convicted. In Hackley,
the Florida Supreme Court “consider[ed] whether a conviction for burglary of a
conveyance with an assault qualifies a defendant for sentencing as a prison releasee
reoffender (PRR) under section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes.” Hackley, 95 So.
3d at 93 (emphasis added). The Hackley court determined that a conviction for
burglary of a conveyance with an assault falls within the ambit of the PRR statute’s
catch-all provision and therefore qualifies for a sentencing enhancement under the
PRR statute:
The plain language of the burglary, assault, and PRR statutes
leads us to conclude that [a conviction for] burglary of a conveyance
with an assault is a qualifying PRR offense. Because burglary of a
conveyance with an assault is a felony that necessarily involves [under
the assault statute] the “threat by word or act to do violence to the
person of another,” it falls within [section 775.082(9)(a)1.o., the catch-
all provision] of the PRR statute, which covers “[a]ny felony that
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an
individual.”

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Id. 	at 94. The Florida Supreme Court’s focus in 	Hackley 	upon whether the
defendant’s conviction was a qualifying offense as opposed to whether his charge
was a qualifying offense was consistent with its prior decision in Hearns. See
Hackley, 95 So. 3d at 95 (“In Hearns, we held that a conviction for BOLEO did not
qualify a defendant for sentencing as a violent career criminal (VCC).” (citing
Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 219) (emphasis added)). Hackley’s and Hearns’s focus upon
a defendant’s conviction instead of a defendant’s charge is consistent with the text
of the PRR and VCC statutes, as well as the commonsense notion that sentencing
enhancements are based on established convictions rather than unproven charges.
See, e.g., § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (“‘Prison releasee reoffender’ means any
defendant who commits, or attempts to commit . . . .” (emphasis added)); §
775.084(1)(d)3., Fla. Stat. (“‘Violent career criminal’ means . . . [t]he primary felony
offense for which the defendant is to be sentenced is a felony enumerated in [section
775.084(1)(d)1.] and was committed . . . .” (emphasis added)); § 775.084(1)(d)5.,
Fla. Stat. (“A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the
operation of this paragraph . . . .” (emphasis added)). In this case, Appellant was
convicted of burglary of a conveyance with both an assault and a battery. Therefore,
at a minimum, his conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an assault was
sufficient to unlock the PRR statute’s enhancement pursuant to the PRR statute’s

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catch-all provision and the trial court properly enhanced his sentence under the PRR
statute.
Appellant cannot evade the consequences of his actions by asserting that
because he was charged with burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery
that he cannot receive a PRR enhancement for being convicted of burglary of a
conveyance with an assault and a battery. It is true that, under the reasoning of
Hearns, battery in and of itself is not a forcible felony, as simple battery is not a
felony at all, and BOLEO and by extension battery is also not a “forcible” offense
within the meaning of the forcible felony statute. See generally, e.g., Hearns, 961
So. 2d at 214, 218-19 (“The underlying conduct required for simple battery and
BOLEO is identical. . . . We must determine whether intentionally touching a law
enforcement officer necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence as described in the final clause of section 776.08. If it does not, then
BOLEO cannot be a forcible felony. . . . The felonies enumerated in section
776.08 include 	murder, 	treason, 	carjacking, 	home-invasion 	robbery, 	arson,
kidnapping, discharging of a destructive device or bomb, and aircraft piracy. Merely
touching a law enforcement officer is not in the same league. . . . [S]imple battery is
a misdemeanor offense and can never be a forcible felony. BOLEO involves the
exact same conduct as misdemeanor battery, the only difference being the victim’s
status. . . . BOLEO is not a forcible felony [within the meaning of the forcible felony

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statute].” (citations omitted)). But it is also true under the reasoning of Hackley that
burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a felony that necessarily involves the use
or threat of physical force or violence against an individual. See generally, e.g.,
Hackley, 95 So. 3d at 94, 96 (“The plain language of the burglary, assault, and PRR
statutes leads us to conclude that [a conviction for] burglary of a conveyance with
an assault is a qualifying PRR offense. . . . [B]attery—at least when committed in
the course of another felony such as burglary of an occupied conveyance—is in the
nature of things likely to be preceded by conduct that constitutes an assault.”).
By relying upon the actual offense of conviction to determine whether the
PRR statute applied to Appellant, the trial court did precisely what 	Hackley
requires—basing its PRR determination on the statutory elements of the offense of
conviction—and in doing so did not impermissibly “look beyond the statutory
elements of an offense and analyze the evidence in a particular case” within the
meaning of Hearns. To be clear, Appellant was not convicted of burglary of a
conveyance with an assault or battery. He was convicted of burglary of a conveyance
with an assault and a battery. His conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an
assault was a legally sufficient basis for the PRR statute to apply.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
BROWNLEE and KAMOUTSAS, JJ., concur.
PRATT, J., concurs specially with opinion.

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_____________________________
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
_____________________________
PRATT, J., specially concurring.
We have before us another appeal involving a sentencing enhancement issue
that implicates the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision—this time under the
prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) statute instead of the violent career criminal
(“VCC”) statute. See generally Dunlap v. State, 435 So. 3d 224 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026).
I fully concur in the majority’s opinion. I write separately to provide an additional
reason why I believe we should affirm.
I agree with the majority that Appellant’s argument is foreclosed by State v.
Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012). But even assuming arguendo that the trial court
should have considered whether Appellant’s charge of burglary of a conveyance with
an assault or battery could have constituted a qualifying offense under the PRR
statute as Appellant argues, or that Appellant had instead been convicted of burglary
of a conveyance with an assault or battery, Appellant would still be unable to show
any error. That’s because under either scenario, Appellant’s charge or conviction
would still fall within the PRR statute’s catch-all provision by way of the forcible
felony statute’s catch-all provision. Recall that the PRR statute’s catch-all provision
“[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an

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individual” and the forcible felony statute’s virtually identical catch-all provision
“any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence
against any individual” are interpreted to have the same meaning. See Hackley, 95
So. 3d at 95 (quoting State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 217 (Fla. 2007)); see also
Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 217. Compare § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat., with § 776.08,
Fla. Stat. Recall also that the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision is preceded
by 	a 	list 	of 	statutorily 	enumerated 	offenses—including 	burglary—that 	the
Legislature has statutorily determined constitute forcible felonies. In my view, the
forcible felony statute thus makes clear that the statutorily enumerated felony of
“burglary” constitutes a “felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any individual.” § 776.08, Fla. Stat.; see Dunlap, 435 So. 3d at 229
(acknowledging that the “phrase ‘any other felony which involves the use or threat
of physical force or violence against any individual’ refers back to the immediately
preceding enumerated felonies” (quoting § 776.08, Fla. Stat.)).1 And in my view,
1 In Dunlap, our Court acknowledged that the forcible felony statute’s catch-
all provision contains a list of statutorily enumerated felonies that the Legislature
has determined necessarily involve the use or threat of physical force or violence
against any individual. See Dunlap, 435 So. 3d at 229 (acknowledging that the
“phrase ‘any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence 	against 	any 	individual’ 	refers 	back 	to 	the 	immediately 	preceding
enumerated felonies” (quoting § 776.08, Fla. Stat.)). See generally Hackley, 95 So.
3d at 95 (“Section 776.08 enumerates several forcible felonies and also includes a
catch-all provision covering ‘any other felony which involves the use or threat of
physical force or violence against any individual.’”). As noted by the majority, one

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because “burglary” is a “felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against any individual” for purposes of the forcible felony statute’s catch-
all provision, it necessarily follows that “burglary” is a “felony that involves the use
or threat of physical force or violence against an individual” for purposes of the PRR
statute’s virtually identical catch-all provision. Compare § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla.
Stat., with § 776.08, Fla. Stat. To be sure, a charge of or conviction for burglary of a
conveyance with an assault or battery is still a conviction for burglary. It’s just a
specific type or subset of burglary that falls within the broader enumerated forcible
felony of burglary. And because burglary is a statutorily enumerated felony under
the forcible felony statute that falls within the PRR statute’s catch-all provision by
way of the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision, we need not determine
whether burglary would otherwise meet the Florida Supreme Court’s statutory
elements test, which governs whether a non-enumerated felony falls within one of
the aforementioned catch-all provisions.
In Gorham v. State, 988 So. 2d 152, 153-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), our sister
district reasoned that reading the PRR statute’s catch-all provision as incorporating
all of the enumerated forcible felonies listed in the forcible felony statute’s catch-all
provision is “illogical and would lead to absurd results,” would “essentially overrule
of those statutorily enumerated felonies is “burglary.” See Dunlap, 435 So. 3d at 227
(quoting § 776.08, Fla. Stat.).

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the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
2001),” and would be contrary to the Legislature’s intent in light of the expressio
unius canon because the PRR statute “explicitly names only burglary of a dwelling,
burglary of an occupied structure, and armed burglary as qualifying offenses.” I
respectfully disagree and take each point in turn. First, the absurdity canon—a canon
that must be viewed with caution and employed with restraint—has no purchase
here.2 The plain language of the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision
demonstrates that all of the enumerated offenses contained in the forcible felony
statute—including burglary—are felonies that necessarily involve the use or threat
of physical force or violence against any individual. § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (“‘Forcible
felony’ means . . . burglary . . . and any other felony which involves the use or threat
2 The absurdity canon may be applied “only under rare and exceptional
circumstances.” State v. Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793, 800 (Fla. 2018) (citation omitted).
It is “not to be used as a freewheeling tool for courts to second-guess and supplant
the policy judgments made by the Legislature.” Id. (citation omitted). Under the
absurdity canon, “[a] provision may be either disregarded or judicially corrected as
an error (when the correction is textually simple) if failing to do so would result in a
disposition that no reasonable person could approve.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 234 (2012). It has two
limitations: (1) “[t]he absurdity must consist of a disposition that no reasonable
person could intend” and (2) “[t]he absurdity must be reparable by changing or
supplying a particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a
technical or ministerial error.” Scalia & Garner at 237-38; see also Lewars, 259 So.
3d at 801 (explaining that the absurdity canon may only be applied to correct a
“technical or ministerial error,” not to “rewrite the statute” (citation omitted)).
Adherence to these limitations is “necessary” to “absolve the doctrine of the charge
that it is an application not of textualism but of purposivism.” Scalia & Garner at
238.

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of physical force or violence against any individual.” (emphasis added)); see
Dunlap, 435 So. 3d at 229 (acknowledging that the “phrase ‘any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual’ refers
back to the immediately preceding enumerated felonies” (quoting § 776.08, Fla.
Stat.)); see also, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 826 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
(“[T]he definition [of forcible felony under the forcible felony statute] includes all
enumerated felonies, plus any additional felony which involves the use or threat of
physical force or violence against an individual.”). See generally, e.g., Ali v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (acknowledging that “[r]ead naturally,
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of
whatever kind’” (citation omitted)); Shepard v. Thames, 251 So. 2d 265, 267-68 (Fla.
1971) (“The words ‘other’ or ‘any other’ following the enumeration of particular
classes are to be read ‘as other such like,’ and include only others of like kind or
character.” (citation omitted)). Because the PRR statute’s catch-all provision uses
virtually the same language as the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision, it
should be given the same effect as and should be interpreted consistently with the
forcible felony statute and its catch-all provision. See Hackley, 95 So. 3d at 95
(quoting Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 217); see also Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 217. As such,
the PRR statute’s catch-all provision clearly imports “burglary” into the PRR statute
via 	the 	forcible 	felony 	statute’s 	nearly 	identical 	catch-all 	provision. 	Second,

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incorporating all of the enumerated felonies contained in the forcible felony statute
into the PRR statute by way of the two statute’s virtually identical catch-all
provisions does not “overrule” or conflict with Huggins. Huggins neither discussed
the PRR statute’s catch-all provision nor the forcible felony statute’s catch-all
provision, so it had no occasion to determine whether the former imports from the
latter the enumerated felonies contained therein—including burglary. See generally
Huggins, 802 So. 2d at 276-79.3 Third, the negative-implication canon expressio
3 Hackley considered whether a conviction for burglary of a conveyance with
an assault is a qualifying offense under the PRR statute in light of the PRR statute’s
catch-all provision and the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision. However, it
also did not address whether the enumerated felonies contained in the forcible felony
statute—including burglary—are imported into the PRR statute via the two statutes’
virtually identical catch-all provisions. See generally Hackley, 95 So. 3d at 93-96. I
am unaware of any Florida Supreme Court decision addressing this issue.
Although Hackley stated its agreement with the First District that “burglary of
a conveyance with a battery is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute,” id.
at 95, arguably that statement is dicta because the issue presented in Hackley was
whether a conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a qualifying
offense under the PRR statute—not whether burglary of a conveyance with
a battery is a qualifying offense under the PRR statute. That being said, since
Hackley made this statement before refuting the erroneous reasoning of the First
District regarding the absurdity doctrine, the statement could perhaps be viewed as
a holding.
In 	any 	event, Hackley’s 	statement—dicta 	or 	holding—only 	focused 	on
whether burglary of a conveyance with a battery is a qualifying offense by way of
the statutory elements test in light of Hearns, not whether burglary is a statutorily
enumerated felony under the forcible felony statute that falls within the PRR statute’s
catch-all provision by way of the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision.

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unius est exclusio alterius does not tip the scale in favor of Gorham’s reading of the
PRR statute. The negative-implication canon is a useful tool but it must be employed
with caution, lest its focus upon a textual omission miss the textual and contextual
forest for the trees. See, e.g., Nichols v. State ex rel. Bolon, 177 So. 2d 467, 469 (Fla.
1965) (“The principle of the maxim, ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,’ should
be applied with great caution to the provisions of an organic law relating to the
legislative department . . . .” (citation omitted)); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012) (“Virtually all the
authorities who discuss the negative-implication canon emphasize that it must be
applied with great caution, since its application depends so much on context.”). See
generally Scalia & Garner at 107 (explaining that under the “negative-implication
canon” that “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others (expressio
unius est exclusio alterius)”). That caution finds good purchase here, as the PRR
statute enumerates a number of qualifying offenses, then enumerates a broad catch-
all that captures “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence against an individual,” § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat., and then enumerates
several 	qualifying 	offenses. Applying 	the 	negative-implication 	canon 	here—
In other words, Hackley did not address whether the enumerated felonies
contained in the forcible felony statute—including burglary—are imported into the
PRR statute via the two statutes’ virtually identical catch-all provisions. Therefore,
that analytical lane remains wide open and undecided by any binding Florida
Supreme Court precedent.

17
particularly when the PRR statute’s catch-all provision is located in the middle of a
list of items rather than at the end of a list of items—would improperly render the
catch-all provision mere surplusage. See, e.g., Berman Constr. & Dev., Inc. v.
Carnaval Home, LLC, 434 So. 3d 729, 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026) (“Where the text
‘contains a broad catchall provision at the end of a list of specific items,’ expressio
unius cannot be applied without rendering the catchall mere surplusage.” (citation
omitted)); Scalia & Garner at 107 (“The [negative-implication canon] properly
applies only when the unius (or technically, unum, the thing specified) can
reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the grant or prohibition
involved.”). It would also improperly suggest that the PRR statute’s catch-all
provision cannot overlap with the expressly enumerated preceding and succeeding
offenses contained in the PRR statute. The point of a catch-all provision is to capture
a category of offenses without requiring the enumeration of all such offenses. See
generally, e.g., Houston v. City of Tampa Firefighters & Police Officers’ Pension
Fund Bd. of Trs., 303 So. 3d 233, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (explaining that a statutory
provision was “sometimes referred to as the [statute’s] catch-all provision because it
does not identify a specific crime but rather reaches ‘any felony’ bearing certain
characteristics” (citation omitted)). That the Legislature deemed it appropriate to
engage in a belt-and-suspenders approach by enumerating a number of offenses in
the PRR statute that would also fall within the PRR statute’s catch-all provision,

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including murder, sexual battery, and more, does not mean that the enumerated
offenses thereby limit the textual breadth of the catch-all provision’s reach. See
generally § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat. (PRR statute’s catch-all provision capturing
“[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an
individual” (emphasis added)). I respectfully submit that that result would be
inconsistent 	with 	the 	text 	and 	context 	of 	the 	PRR 	statute, 	which 	textually
demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to enumerate certain offenses and to also
capture a broad category of offenses via the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, even
though most if not all of the preceding and succeeding enumerated offenses already
overlap with or fall within the ambit of the catch-all provision. And I believe that my
reading the PRR statute is consistent with several other longstanding principles of
interpretation, including the presumption of consistent usage and the related statutes
canons. See Scalia & Garner at 170 (explaining that under the “presumption of
consistent usage” that “[a] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning”);
Scalia & Garner at 252 (explaining that under the “related-statutes canon” that
“[s]tatutes in pari materia are to be interpreted together, as though they were one
law”).4
4 In addition to the foregoing, I have further considered the potential relevance
of the expressio unius, ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, and lenity canons—none
of which the Florida Supreme Court mentioned or applied to the PRR statute in

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Hackley and none of which change my conclusion regarding what I believe to be the
clear meaning of the PRR statute and its catch-all provision in light of the forcible
felony statute and its catch-all provision. See generally Scalia & Garner at 59
(explaining that under the “principle of interrelating canons” that “[n]o canon of
interpretation is absolute” and “[e]ach may be overcome by the strength of differing
principles that point in other directions”).
First, I do not believe that the expressio unius canon applies here. In Hearns,
the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	acknowledged 	that 	“the 	forcible 	felony 	statute
specifically enumerates two types of battery: aggravated battery and sexual battery.”
Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 219 (citing § 776.08, Fla. Stat.). It went on to explain that
under the expressio unius canon “BOLEO’s absence from the list of enumerated
felonies [in the forcible felony statute] lends further support to the conclusion that
BOLEO is not a forcible felony.” Id.; see id. (“Under the canon of statutory
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another.”). As an initial matter, respectfully, Hearns’s assumption
that expressio unius can apply to a catch-all at the end of a list is inconsistent with
what I believe is the correct view, namely, that expressio unius is not so applicable.
See generally Berman, 434 So. 3d at 735; Scalia & Garner at 107. In any event,
accepting the premise, I note that the Hearns court first acknowledged that “[h]ad
the Legislature intended to include all types of battery as forcible felonies, it would
have listed simply ‘battery’ rather than only the specific types enumerated.” Hearns,
961 So. 2d at 219. In the forcible felony statute, the Legislature did just that by listing
“burglary” rather than only specific types of burglary. § 776.08, Fla. Stat. And as I
have explained, the PRR statute’s catch-all provision clearly imports “burglary” into
the PRR statute via the forcible felony statute’s nearly identical catch-all provision.
But unlike the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision, which is located at the
end of the forcible felony statute’s list, the PRR statute’s catch-all provision is
located in the middle of the PRR statute’s list rather than at the end of its list.
Therefore, although the PRR statute enumerates “[a]rmed burglary” and “[b]urglary
of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure,” § 775.082(9)(a)1.p.-q., Fla. Stat.,
and could perhaps be read in isolation to call for an application of the expressio unius
canon to the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, when the forcible felony statute and
its catch-all provision are fairly read together with the PRR statute and its catch-all
provision, I do not believe that the expressio unius canon applies to render the PRR
statute’s catch-all provision as mere surplusage or to mean something narrower than
or different from the forcible felony statute’s nearly identical catch-all provision.

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Moreover, in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s subsequent decision
in Hackley, I conclude that the Hearns decision’s unique, perhaps one-of-a-kind
application of the expressio unius canon to a catch-all provision—i.e., the forcible
felony statute’s catch-all provision—does not support applying the expressio unius
canon 	beyond 	the 	circumstances 	of 	Hearns 	to 	the 	PRR 	statute’s 	catch-all
provision. Hackley neither mentioned nor applied the expressio unius canon to the
PRR statute’s catch-all provision, even though Hackley acknowledged that the PRR
statute enumerates “armed burglary” and “burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an
occupied structure” and even though Hackley discussed 	Hearns. See generally
Hackley, 95 So. 3d at 93-96. Hackley instead held that a conviction for “burglary of
a conveyance with an assault”—a non-enumerated felony—is a qualifying offense
under the PRR statute via the PRR statute’s catch-all provision. Id. (“Because
burglary of a conveyance with an assault is not an enumerated offense under the PRR
statute, it is a qualifying offense only if it falls under [section 775.082(9)(a)1.o.]—
‘[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an
individual.’ We conclude that it does.”). Accordingly, Hackley’s holding forecloses
any possibility of applying the expressio unius canon to the PRR statute’s catch-all
provision.
Second, I do not believe that the ejusdem generis canon applies here. See
generally Scalia & Garner at 199 (explaining that under the “ejusdem generis canon”
that “[w]here general words follow an enumeration of two or more things, they apply
only to persons or things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned
(ejusdem generis)”). This dovetails with my point above. In Hearns, the Florida
Supreme Court’s discussion of the expressio unius canon was preceded by its
discussion of the ejusdem generis canon. See Hearns, 961 So. 2d at 219. The Hearns
court explained that under the ejusdem generis canon the forcible felony statute’s
catch-all provision “any other felony involving the use or threat of physical force or
violence” was a “general phrase” that “should be interpreted to include only offenses
which involve a level of physical force or violence comparable to that of the
enumerated 	felonies.” 	Id.; 	see 	id. 	(“[Under] 	the 	canon 	of 	statutory
construction ejusdem generis, which states that when a general phrase follows a list
of specifics, the general phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same
type as those listed.”). The Hearns court’s application of the ejusdem generis canon
to the forcible felony statute and its catch-all provision makes sense. See generally
Shepard, 251 So. 2d at 267-68. However, unlike the forcible felony statute which
contains a list of specifics followed by a general phrase, the PRR statute does not.
See generally CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Rev., 562 U.S. 277, 294-95 (2011)
(concluding ejusdem generis was “not relevant” where “something of a catchall”

21
was “not a general or collective term following a list of specific[s]” but instead “one
of . . . several distinct and independent prohibitions” (citations and emphasis
omitted)). The PRR statute contains a list of eighteen; the first fourteen are specifics,
the fifteenth is the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, and the sixteenth thorough
eighteenth are specifics. Moreover, unlike the forcible felony statute’s catch-all
provision, the PRR statute’s catch-all provision is ever so slightly different insofar
as it does not refer to “any other felony that involves the use or threat of physical
force or violence against an individual”—it refers to “[a]ny felony that involves the
use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” Compare §
775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat., with § 776.08, Fla. Stat. This shows that the PRR
statute’s catch-all provision is not subject to the ejusdem generis canon; it is a
standalone catch-all that broadly captures anything that fairly falls within its text and
it is not limited by the fourteen enumerated felonies that precede it or the three
enumerated felonies that succeed it under the ejusdem generis canon. And for all the
reasons 	I 	have 	explained, 	the 	PRR 	statute’s 	catch-all 	provision 	catches 	the
enumerated felony of “burglary” contained in the forcible felony statute by way of
the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision, which refers back to “any other
felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an
individual.” § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
Third, although not addressed in Hearns or Gorham, I do not believe that the
noscitur a sociis canon changes the calculus here. See generally Scalia & Garner at
195 (explaining that under the “associated-words canon” that “[a]ssociated words
bear on one another’s meaning (noscitur a sociis”). Ejusdem generis and noscitur a
sociis are related canons; the former is a specific application of the broader principle
of the latter. See generally, e.g., State v. Weeks, 202 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2016) (“A related
canon of statutory [interpretation to ejusdem generis] is noscitur a sociis, which
instructs that ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’” (citation omitted)); State
ex rel. Wedgworth Farms, Inc. v. Thompson, 101 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1958) (“The
[ejusdem generis canon] is merely an application of a phase of the broader maxim
noscitur a sociis which simply means that general and specific words capable of
analogous meaning when associated together take color from each other so that the
general words are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general.”). Assuming
arguendo that noscitur a sociis applies here, my conclusion that the PRR statute’s
broad catch-all provision includes “burglary” is not inconsistent with noscitur a
sociis. To the contrary, the offense of burglary rests comfortably within the company
it keeps, including the PRR statute’s enumerated forms of burglary; at the very least,
burglary is analogous to the enumerated forms of burglary. 	See generally 	§
775.082(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. In any event, as I have explained, the forcible felony

22
Stated differently, it is true that “burglary” is an enumerated offense under the
forcible felony statute but not the PRR statute; the narrower offenses of “[a]rmed
burglary” and “[b]urglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure” are
enumerated offenses under the PRR statute. Compare § 775.082(9)(a)1.p.-q., Fla.
Stat., with § 776.08, Fla. Stat. But that doesn’t change the fact that the PRR statute
statute’s catch all provision plainly demonstrates that the forcible felony statute’s
enumerated offense of “burglary” necessarily involves the use or threat of physical
force or violence against any individual, and the PRR statute’s catch-all provision
clearly imports “burglary” into the PRR statute via the forcible felony statute’s
nearly 	identical 	catch-all 	provision. 	This 	conclusion 	is 	consistent 	with 	the
presumption of consistent usage and the related statutes canons, which cut against
using noscitur a sociis to render the PRR statute’s catch-all provision to mean
something narrower than or different from the forcible felony statute’s nearly
identical catch-all provision.
And fourth, although not addressed in Hearns or Gorham, I do not believe
that the rule of lenity applies here. See generally Scalia & Garner at 296 (explaining
that under the “rule of lenity” that “[a]mbiguity in a statute defining a crime or
imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor”). Because the
meaning of the forcible felony statute and its catch-all provision is plain, and because
the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision clearly imports the forcible felony
statute’s enumerated offense of “burglary” into the PRR statute via the PRR statute’s
nearly identical catch-all provision, the rule of lenity does not come into play. See
generally Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 603 (Fla. 2022) (explaining that
“the rule of lenity is a default rule that comes into play at the end of the interpretive
process” and that it only applies “if the statute remains ambiguous after consulting
traditional canons of statutory construction” (citation omitted)).
Having carefully considered the text of the PRR statute and its catch-all
provision, the text of the forcible felony statute and its catch-all provision, and all of
the canons I have mentioned, I adhere to my interpretation of the text of the PRR
statute and its catch-all provision in light of the text of the forcible felony statute and
its catch-all provision.

23
also contains a catch-all provision that incorporates the forcible felony of “burglary”
enumerated in the forcible felony statute by way of the forcible felony statute’s
catch-all provision. Compare § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat., with § 776.08, Fla. Stat.
In other words, the specific enumeration of “[a]rmed burglary” and “[b]urglary of a
dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure” in the PRR statute does not displace
the broad meaning and reach of the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, which
incorporates the specific enumeration of “burglary” from the forcible felony statute
into the PRR statute via the forcible felony statute’s catch-all provision.5,6
5 The PRR statute’s catch-all for “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat
of physical force or violence against an individual” thus accomplishes the same thing
as the VCC statute’s enumeration of “[a]ny forcible felony, as described in
s[ection] 776.08,” which includes section 776.08’s catch-all “any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.”
Compare § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat., with § 775.084(1)(d)1.a., Fla. Stat., and §
776.08, Fla. Stat.
6 Sections 775.082 and 775.084 collectively contain the PRR statute, the VCC
statute, the habitual felony offender (“HFO”) statute, the habitual violent felony
offender (“HVFO”) statute, and the three-time violent felony offender (“3VFO”)
statute. See generally § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (PRR statute); § 775.084(1)(d),
Fla. Stat. (VCC statute); § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (HFO statute); § 775.084(1)(b),
Fla. Stat. (HVFO statute); § 775.084(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (3VFO statute). The Legislature
may wish to re-examine sections 775.082 and 775.084 to consider whether the
enumerated offenses listed in the PRR statute, the VCC statute, the HFO statute, the
HVFO statute, and the 3VFO statute as written—some of which incorporate the
forcible felony statute and its catch-all provision for “any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual” and
some of which do not—align with the Legislature’s intent. Sections 775.082 and
775.084 were last amended in 2019, and section 776.08—the forcible felony
statute—was last amended in 1995. See generally § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (refer to

24
I acknowledge that my interpretation of the PRR statute conflicts with the
interpretation of the PRR statute reached by our sister districts in Smith v. State, 338
So. 3d 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022), Crosley v. State, 247 So. 3d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018),
Suffield v. State, 132 So. 3d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), Santiago v. State, 76 So. 3d
1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011),
Williams v. State, 2 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and Gorham. In all of those
cases, the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Districts were presented with scenarios
in which a defendant was convicted of burglary of a conveyance with an assault or
battery. And in all of those cases, the district courts erroneously determined that a
defendant was ineligible for PRR enhancement because the either-or possibility of a
conviction of burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery meant that the
defendant could have been convicted of an offense that does not necessarily involve
the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual—i.e., battery.
See, e.g., Crosley, 247 So. 3d at 70 (“Since a battery can be committed merely by
the intentional touching of another person, which may not involve the use or threat
of force or violence, the crime of burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery
can be committed without the use or threat of physical force or violence.”).
Respectfully, I believe our sister districts erred because they failed to acknowledge
history line following statutory text listing statutory amendments); § 775.084, Fla.
Stat. (same); § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (same).

25
that “burglary”—the featured offense in a charge of or conviction for burglary of a
conveyance with an assault or battery—is an enumerated offense under the forcible
felony statute that necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force or violence
against an individual by virtue of its statutory enumeration as a forcible felony, and
that burglary is a qualifying offense under the PRR statute because the PRR statute’s
catch-all provision imports burglary into the PRR statute via the forcible felony
statute’s catch-all provision. See § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat. (“‘Prison releasee
reoffender’ means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit . . . [a]ny
felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an
individual. . . .”); § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (“‘Forcible felony’ means . . . burglary . . . and
any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence
against any individual.”). It is for this reason that I reach the opposite conclusion
reached by our sister districts and would make the reasoning of my concurrence our
second 	holding 	in 	this 	case. 	See 	generally 	Bank 	of 	New 	York 	as 	Tr. 	for
Certificateholders CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-BC4 v. Henry,
No. 6D2024-2168, 2026 WL 1998614, at *7 n.6 (Fla. 6th DCA July 10, 2026)
(“Though we could affirm on either point without deciding the other, both
justifications are holding.” (citing Parsons v. Fed. Realty Corp., 143 So. 912, 920

26
(Fla. 1931); Crecelius v. Rizzitano, 430 So. 3d 268, 286 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026)
(Gannam, J., concurring))).7
For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm.
However, I would also affirm for the additional reason addressed in this concurring
opinion and, consistent with the reasoning of my concurrence, I would certify direct
conflict 	with 	Smith, 	Crosley, 	Suffield, 	Santiago, 	Wilson, 	Williams, 	and
Gorham. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
7 I respectfully reject the reasoning of our sister districts in Ellis v. State, 135
So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), and Tumblin v. State, 965 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA
2007), which relied on the same erroneous reasoning I’ve identified above regarding
the PRR statute’s catch-all provision. However, because Ellis and Tumblin involved
burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery rather than burglary of a conveyance
with an assault or battery, I would decline to certify conflict in this case.
I separately note that Ellis and Tumblin are also inconsistent with the PRR
statute’s enumerated felony offense “[b]urglary of a dwelling or burglary of an
occupied structure,” which necessarily includes burglary of a dwelling with an
assault or battery. § 775.082(9)(a)1.q., Fla. Stat. Burglary of a dwelling with an
assault or battery is still burglary of a dwelling. It’s just a specific type or subset of
burglary of a dwelling.

27
_____________________________
Ama N. Appiah, of Law Office of Ama N. Appiah, P.A., St. Petersburg, for
Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.