J.P., a Juvenile v. State of Florida

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 15, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D26-0845
Lower Tribunal No. J25-1466
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J.P., a Juvenile,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Orlando A.
Prescott, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender and Deborah Prager, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General and Joseph C. Burns, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before GORDO, LOBREE and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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Affirmed. 	See § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (2026) (“Whoever shall resist,
obstruct, or oppose any officer . . . legally authorized to execute process in
the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty,
without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor of the first degree[.]”); Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285,
295 (Fla. 2008) (“We conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.”); State v. D.F., 92 So. 3d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
(“The determination whether a seizure has occurred by a show of authority
requires the application of an objective test, and not whether the citizen
perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement. This objective
standard is not concerned with the officers’ subjective intent, but with what
the officers’ words and actions would have conveyed to a reasonable,
innocent 	person.” 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted) 	(first 	quoting
California v. Hodari 	D., 	499 	U.S. 	621, 	628 	(1991); 	and 	then 	quoting
Caldwell v. State, 	41 	So. 3d 	188, 	195–97 	(Fla. 	2010))); 	United
States v. Mendenhall, 	446 	U.S. 	544, 	554 	(1980) 	(holding 	“the 	use 	of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request
might be compelled” is indicative of a seizure); J.C. v. State, 15 So. 3d 870,

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872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“We conclude that a reasonable person would not
feel free to walk away but rather would feel compelled to comply with a police
officer’s 	command, 	‘I’ve 	got 	to 	talk 	to 	you 	for 	a 	minute. 	Hang 	on.’”);
Neeley v. State, 112 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (finding “‘stand by’
was a detention because a reasonable person under the circumstances
would not feel free to leave or to disregard the instruction”); Popple v. State,
626 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1993) (finding an officer’s directive restraining
freedom of movement “constituted a show of authority” irrespective of
“[w]hether characterized as a request or order”—“because a reasonable
person under the circumstances would believe that he should comply”).