Steven Edward Stein v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2022-1787
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STEVEN EDWARD STEIN,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

September 19, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Steven Edward Stein, a prisoner under sentence of death,

appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his third

successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851 of

the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 We affirm.

I

In 1991, Stein was convicted of murdering two Pizza Hut

employees, Dennis Saunders and Bobby Hood. Stein v. State, 632

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
So. 2d 1361, 1364-65 (Fla. 1994). We have described the events

surrounding the murders as follows:

Stein, Marc Christmas, and Kyle White were roommates.
Stein was employed as a cook at a Lem Turner Road
Pizza Hut in Jacksonville, Florida. . . . On the day of the
murders, Christmas, Stein, Stein’s girlfriend, and White
were home together. About 9:30 p.m. Stein and
Christmas left, taking with them Stein’s .22 caliber rifle.
They stated that they were going to see Christmas’ father
about selling him the rifle. They returned home around
11:30 to 11:45 p.m.
The next morning, Dennis Saunders and Bobby
Hood were found shot to death at the Edgewood Avenue
Pizza Hut and the sum of $980 was missing from the
restaurant. The victims were shift supervisors of the
restaurant and their bodies were found in the men’s
restroom. . . . Hood had suffered five gunshot wounds—
four to the head and one to the chest. The medical
examiner testified that the shots had been fired from four
to six inches away and that Hood was sitting at the time
he was shot. Saunders had suffered four gunshot
wounds—one through the neck, one in the right
shoulder, one in the chest, and one in the right thigh. . . .
Ronald Burroughs was an employee of the
Edgewood Avenue Pizza Hut. He testified that on the
night of the murders, he left the restaurant at 11:15 p.m.
When he left, Hood and Saunders were still inside the
restaurant and only two customers remained at the
restaurant. Burroughs later identified those two
customers as Stein and Christmas. Additionally, an
unpaid guest check on a table in the restaurant
contained a fingerprint belonging to Christmas.
Additional testimony revealed that three expended
.22 caliber casings were found at the residence of Stein
and Christmas.

Stein, 632 So. 2d at 1363.

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The State charged Stein with two counts of first-degree murder

and one count of armed robbery. Id. At trial, “[a] ballistics expert

testified that the casings found at the scene and the casings found

at the residence were fired from the same firearm. Additionally,

Christmas’s father testified that Stein and Christmas did not come

to his house on the night of the murders.” Id. Following trial, a

jury found Stein guilty as charged and recommended death

sentences for the murder convictions. The trial court sentenced

Stein to death for each murder and to life imprisonment for the

robbery.

On direct appeal, we affirmed Stein’s convictions and

sentences, id., which became final in 1994, see Stein v. Florida, 513

U.S. 834 (1994) (denying petition for writ of certiorari from direct

appeal); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(A). Since then, Stein has

sought postconviction relief in state and federal court, but he has

not succeeded in either forum. 2

2. Stein v. State, 995 So. 2d 329, 342 (Fla. 2008) (affirming
denial of initial postconviction motion); Stein v. State, 91 So. 3d 784
(Fla.) (affirming summary denial of first successive postconviction
motion), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1034 (2012); Stein v. Jones, No.
SC16-0621, 2017 WL 836806 (Fla. Mar. 3, 2017) (denying state
habeas petition); Stein v. State, 237 So. 3d 919 (Fla.) (affirming

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Before us now is the circuit court order denying Stein’s third

successive postconviction motion. Stein’s claims involve Kyle

White, a state witness who testified at trial that Stein and

Christmas planned to kill a Pizza Hut manager. The facts

supporting Stein’s claims, he tells us, were discovered by an

investigator assisting in his pending federal habeas case. That

investigator interviewed Sandra Sidas, who was engaged to White at

the time of Stein’s trial. According to Stein, Sidas said that White

expected a deal with the State in exchange for testifying at trial.

Based on those allegations, Stein asserted that the State committed

a Brady 3 violation by not telling the defense about White’s

expectation of the alleged deal. Stein also claimed that White’s

expectation of a deal constituted newly discovered evidence under

Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998). The circuit court

summarily denied both of Stein’s claims.

denial of second successive postconviction motion), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 191 (2018). Stein also filed a federal habeas petition in
2009, which is still pending in the Middle District of Florida.
See Stein v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 3:09-cv-1162 (M.D. Fla.).

3. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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This appeal follows. 4

II

Stein argues that the circuit court erred in denying his

successive postconviction motion without first holding an

evidentiary hearing. We disagree.

A circuit court “should hold an evidentiary hearing on a rule

3.851 motion where ‘the movant makes a facially sufficient claim

that requires a factual determination.’ ” Booker v. State, 336 So. 3d

1177, 1180 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784,

787 (Fla. 2021)); see also Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 560 (Fla.

2012). However, a “court may summarily deny a postconviction

claim when the claim is legally insufficient, procedurally barred, or

refuted by the record.” Morris v. State, 317 So. 3d 1054, 1071 (Fla.

2021) (quoting Matthews v. State, 288 So. 3d 1050, 1060 (Fla.

2019)). And relevant here, when a defendant brings any claim in a

successive motion more than one year after the judgment and

sentence became final, he must meet an exception to the time-limit

rule—otherwise, the claim is barred. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2),

4. The standard of review is de novo. See Dillbeck v. State,
357 So. 3d 94, 98 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 856 (2023).

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(e)(2). With this framework in mind, we now turn to Stein’s two

claims.

A

We first consider Stein’s Brady claim. As an initial matter, the

claim is untimely. The relevant procedural rule provides an

exception to the time limit if the facts supporting the claim “were

unknown to the [defendant] and could not have been ascertained by

the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). It is

undisputed that Stein knew Sidas before trial—not only was she

engaged to his roommate, but they also lived together. Stein also

knew White and specifically cross-examined him at trial on the

theory that White was trying to avoid prosecution by testifying

against Stein. Stein had access to both witnesses and could have

questioned Sidas on that theory or questioned White further. Stein

has offered no reason why, with due diligence, he could not have

timely discovered White’s alleged expectation of an agreement with

the State. Yet, Stein failed to raise this claim until well after his

case became final. Thus, the claim is procedurally barred.

Even if Stein’s claim were not barred, it would fail on the

merits. To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must prove that

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(1) favorable evidence which is exculpatory or impeaching (2) was

suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material,

he was prejudiced. See Sweet v. State, 293 So. 3d 448, 451 (Fla.

2020). His claim fails on the second and third prongs.

In his motion, Stein failed to allege specific facts showing that

the State knew about or suppressed information relating to White’s

expectations. Nor would the record support such an assertion. At

trial, Stein cross-examined White and asked him whether he was

concerned that he might be prosecuted for the murders. The State

at no point tried to limit this line of inquiry. Cf. Morris, 317 So. 3d

at 1071 (“[T]here is no Brady violation where the information is

equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution . . . .” (quoting

Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 497 (Fla. 2007))).

Nor do we find White’s alleged expectation to be material.

Impeaching White with this information would not put Stein’s case

in a “different light.” See Sweet, 293 So. 3d at 452. The State’s

case was strong and included Stein’s own confession to the robbery.

See Stein v. State, 995 So. 2d 329, 338 (Fla. 2008). And given that

Stein already cross-examined White about possible bias, it is

unlikely that further impeachment on this related subject would

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alter the result in this case. See Sweet, 293 So. 3d at 452. Thus,

Stein’s Brady claim does not warrant relief.

B

We next consider Stein’s newly discovered evidence claim. It

fares no better. To be facially sufficient, a newly discovered

evidence claim must pass the Jones test. The test proceeds in two

parts:

First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it
must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could
not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the
newly discovered evidence must be of such [a] nature
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.

Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Tompkins v.

State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1086 (Fla. 2008)). As relevant here, if “the

defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong

requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a

less severe sentence.” Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 249 (Fla.

2018) (citing Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991)).

We agree with the circuit court that Stein cannot prevail on

his newly discovered evidence claim. First, Stein relies on the same

rule 3.851 time-limit exception here as above. And as discussed

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above, Stein has failed to establish that he exercised due diligence.

His claim is thus barred as untimely.

Moreover, even if Stein’s newly discovered evidence claim were

not barred, it would still fail. Based on the record, we conclude that

neither White’s expectation of a deal, nor Sidas’s statement about a

deal, would “probably produce an acquittal on retrial.” See Long,

183 So. 3d at 345. Stein cannot meet the Brady materiality

standard, nor can he meet the more demanding Jones probability

standard. Cf. Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1185 (Fla. 2022)

(failure under lower prejudice standard is consistent with failure

under more demanding standard). As we stressed above, the

State’s case was strong and unrebutted. See Stein, 995 So. 2d at

338. And given that Stein already unsuccessfully sought to

impeach White on his fear of prosecution, more impeachment on

that related topic would not greatly undermine White’s credibility.

See, e.g., Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50, 54 (Fla. 2022) (Jones

probability standard not satisfied where additional evidence would

only amplify evidence defense already presented at trial and would

not weaken State’s overwhelming evidence of guilt (citing Bogle v.

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State, 288 So. 3d 1065, 1069 (Fla. 2019))). Thus, Stein’s Jones

claim fails.

III

For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s summary

denial of Stein’s third successive motion for postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Kevin Anthony Blazs, Judge
Case No. 161991CF001505AXXXMA

Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Dawn B.
Macready, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Drew
A. Sena, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

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