Government Employees Insurance Company v. Glassco Inc.

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2023-1540
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GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

GLASSCO INC., et al.,
Appellees.

September 25, 2024

MUÑIZ, C.J.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has certified

two questions about the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act, sections

559.901-.9221, Florida Statutes (2016). 1 The Repair Act is a

consumer protection law that, among other things, requires auto

repair shops to make certain pre- and post-work disclosures to

their customers. The certified questions are about the rights of a

1. This case involves conduct from 2016 through 2019,
during which time there were no relevant changes to the Repair Act.
We will speak of the statute in the present tense, even when
referring to the 2016-2019 version of the law.
customer’s insurer when a repair shop does not make required

disclosures to the customer but nonetheless performs repair work

and then seeks payment from the insurer. The contending parties

in this case are an insurer, GEICO, and a windshield repair shop,

Glassco.

The Eleventh Circuit asks:

(1) Does Fla. Stat. § 559.921(1) grant an insurance
company a cause of action when a repair shop does not
provide any written repair estimate?

(2) Do the violations here under the Repair Act void
a repair invoice for completed windshield repairs and
preclude a repair shop from being paid any of its invoiced
amounts by an insurance company?

We have jurisdiction to answer these questions, which are

“determinative of the cause and for which there is no controlling

precedent” of this Court. Art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. Our answer

to both questions is no.

I

A

Originally enacted in 1980, the Repair Act broadly governs

dealings between car repair shops and their customers.

Ch. 80-139, § 1, Laws of Fla. The statute includes various

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disclosure-oriented mandates, many tied to the basic requirement

that repair shops offer their customers the option to receive a

detailed written estimate before starting work that will cost the

customer more than $100. § 559.905, Fla. Stat. The Repair Act

also prohibits repair shops from engaging in misrepresentation and

fraud. § 559.920, Fla. Stat.

On its face, the Repair Act focuses almost exclusively on the

interactions between a repair shop and the person who presents the

car for repair. The disclosure provisions of the law are first

triggered when “any customer requests a motor vehicle repair shop

to perform repair work on a motor vehicle, the cost of which repair

work will exceed $100 to the customer.” § 559.905(1), Fla. Stat.

And the obligations at issue in this case—we detail them later—are

all owed to the “customer,” a defined term in the statute. It means:

“the person who signs the written repair estimate or any other

person whom the person who signs the written repair estimate

designates on [that form] as a person who may authorize repair

work.” § 559.903(1), Fla. Stat. 2

2. A 2023 amendment to the Repair Act moved the definition
of “customer” to section 559.903(2).

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From its inception, the Repair Act has contained a “remedies”

section that allows a “customer” who is “injured” by a violation of

the statute to sue for “damages” or injunctive relief. § 559.921(1),

Fla. Stat. The statute was amended in 1993 to include a

requirement that motor vehicle repair shops register with the

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. § 559.904, Fla.

Stat.; ch. 93-219, § 4, Laws of Fla. Since then, the Repair Act has

empowered the Department to enforce the statute through both the

administrative process and civil lawsuits. The statute authorizes

the Department to impose administrative penalties up to $1,000 per

violation. §§ 559.921(5)(a), 570.971(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). When

the Department brings a civil action to enforce the statute, available

remedies include injunctive relief, civil penalties, and “restitution

and damages for injured customers.” § 559.921(5)(a), Fla. Stat.

The statute mentions insurers only once. Section 559.920(10)

says that a repair shop may not substitute used replacement parts

for new ones without notice to the vehicle owner’s “insurer if the

cost of repair is to be paid pursuant to an insurance policy and the

identity of the insurer or its claims adjuster is disclosed to the

motor vehicle repair shop.” In 2023 (after the period at issue in this

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case), the Legislature amended the Repair Act to prohibit repair

shops from offering a customer compensation “in exchange for

making an insurance claim for motor vehicle glass replacement or

repair.” § 559.920(17), Fla. Stat. (2024); ch. 2023-136, § 2, Laws of

Fla.

B

From 2016 to 2019, nearly 1,800 of GEICO’s insureds selected

Glassco for windshield repair or replacement services (we will use

the terms interchangeably). Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Glassco Inc., 85

F.4th 1136, 1138 (11th Cir. 2023). The underlying GEICO policy

promised reimbursement at a prevailing competitive price. Id. And,

because of a mandate in section 627.7288, Florida Statutes (2016),

GEICO’s comprehensive policies included a no-deductible provision

for windshield repairs.

Under its business model, Glassco would present an insured

customer a written work order authorizing the windshield work to

be performed and saying that the repairs would be at no cost to the

insured. Importantly, in the work order, the insured customer

would assign to Glassco all rights to insurance payment for the

repairs. Glassco, 85 F.4th at 1138. (We note that the Legislature

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recently amended the insurance code to prohibit the assignment of

post-loss auto insurance benefits for auto glass repair. That change

applies to policies renewed or issued on or after July 1, 2023, and

has no bearing on this case. § 627.7289, Fla. Stat. (2024); ch.

2023-136, § 3, Laws of Florida.)

Glassco’s own employees typically did not perform the repairs;

the company usually relied on independent contractors. When the

work was finished, Glassco would submit invoices seeking payment

from GEICO. GEICO paid the claims, but only at a “deeply

discounted” rate. Glassco, 85 F.4th at 1138.

Litigation ensued. Glassco filed individual collection actions

against GEICO in state court to recover the unpaid balance of each

invoice. And GEICO responded by suing Glassco in federal court,

in part to get back the money it had paid in partial satisfaction of

Glassco’s bills. Relevant here, one count of GEICO’s complaint

asserted a direct cause of action against Glassco for the alleged

Repair Act violations that we specify later. Another count sought a

declaration that, because of those alleged violations, the invoices

Glassco submitted to GEICO are void and non-compensable. Id. at

1138-40.

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On motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the federal

district court ruled in Glassco’s favor. First, it concluded that

GEICO does not have a private right of action under the Repair Act

because the insurer is not a “customer” for purposes of the statute.

Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Glassco Inc., No. 8:19-cv-1950-T-23JSS,

2020 WL 13358054 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2020). Second, the district

court held that Glassco’s “technical” Repair Act violations, even if

proven, would not render Glassco’s invoices non-compensable vis-à-

vis GEICO. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Glassco Inc., No. 8:19-cv-1950-

KKM-JSS, 2021 WL 4391717 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2021).

GEICO appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit’s certified questions

followed.

II

Some preliminary points bear emphasis.

First, GEICO in this case purports to raise its own Repair Act-

based claims and defenses, rather than those of its insureds. As

the Eleventh Circuit noted: “GEICO does not argue that the law of

subrogation permits it to assert the insured’s private right of action

under the Repair Act. At oral argument, GEICO also acknowledged

that it does not have any assignment of any customer’s potential

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claim under the Repair Act.” Glassco, 85 F.4th at 1143 n.2. Our

decision today does not address any potential subrogation claims or

arguments that might have been raised under these circumstances.

Second, in the underlying litigation so far, the district court

and the Eleventh Circuit have assumed that Glassco violated the

Repair Act in the five ways that GEICO has alleged. Id. at 1142.

For purposes of answering the certified questions, we adopt the

same assumption. We need not and do not address Glassco’s

argument that the Repair Act’s written estimate requirement does

not apply to Glassco’s “no cost to the customer” work orders.

Finally, because the second certified question asks whether

“the violations here under the Repair Act void a repair invoice for

completed windshield repairs,” id. at 1147 (emphasis added), we

note the five specific Repair Act violations at issue: (1)

subcontracting repair work without the customer’s knowledge or

consent, see § 559.920(14), Fla. Stat.; (2) failing to provide notice of

the customer’s option to obtain a written estimate, see § 559.905(2),

Fla. Stat.; (3) failing to provide the written repair estimate before

doing repairs, see § 559.905(1), Fla. Stat.; (4) failing to provide

invoices upon the completion of repairs, see § 559.911, Fla. Stat.;

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and (5) failing to include odometer readings on work orders and

invoices, see §§ 559.911(1), .920(11), Fla. Stat. Glassco, 85 F.4th at

1139, 1141.

In its briefing, GEICO accuses Glassco of intentionally

designing its business model to generate inflated invoices and then

engage in abusive collections litigation. GEICO also maintains that

the repairs at issue were neither authorized nor properly performed.

We do not consider these allegations, which are outside the scope of

the certified questions and inconsistent with the case as it comes to

us. See id. at 1138 (“Glassco completed the repair work, and this

appeal involves no customer complaints.”).

A

The answer to the first certified question is no: section

559.921(1) does not “grant an insurance company a cause of action

when a repair shop does not provide any written repair estimate.”

Id. at 1147. As we have explained, section 559.921(1) creates a

private right of action only for “[a]ny customer injured by a violation

of [the Repair Act].” (Emphasis added.) And “customer” is a defined

term in the statute: “the person who signs the written repair

estimate” or that person’s written designee. § 559.903(1), Fla. Stat.

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GEICO concedes that it is not a “customer” under the statute’s

definition of the term. That concession essentially dictates the

answer to the first certified question. After all, the general rule is

that a “statutory definition, when so declared, takes precedence

over and controls as against all other definitions.” Greenleaf &

Crosby Co. v. Coleman, 158 So. 421, 427 (Fla. 1934); see also

Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation

of Legal Texts 228 (2012) (a statutory definition is “virtually

conclusive”).

We need not decide whether this is the “[r]are, but not

inconceivable” case in which “a defined meaning can be replaced

with another permissible meaning of the word on the basis of other

textual indications.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 228. 3 To support

its asserted entitlement to a private right of action, GEICO does not

offer any arguments based on the text and structure of the statute.

3. The district court suggested that, if the repair shop does
not offer a written estimate, it might be reasonable to interpret the
word “customer” to mean the person who “requests a motor vehicle
repair shop to perform repair work on a motor vehicle.” Glassco,
2020 WL 13358054, at *4 (citing section 559.905(1)). Because
GEICO would not satisfy this definition of “customer,” either, we
need not determine whether the district court identified a
permissible reading of the statute.

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Instead, its arguments sound in policy. GEICO describes a

problem—the insurer’s exposure to harm from unreasonably

expensive claims, exacerbated by the “no deductible” rule for

windshield repairs—and urges this Court to fashion an extra-

textual remedy tailored to the facts of this case. Pointing to the

Repair Act’s overarching purpose of preventing repair shop

misconduct, GEICO says that our Court faces a choice: improvise a

solution by deeming the insurer a “customer” with a private right of

action under the Repair Act, or render civil liability under the

statute “meaningless” and “effectively impotent.”

GEICO exaggerates the stakes. As we have explained, the

Repair Act authorizes government enforcement of the statute

through administrative proceedings and civil lawsuits. Available

remedies include fines, restitution, and damages for “injured

customers.” § 559.921(5)(a), Fla. Stat. The Repair Act need not go

unenforced just because an insurer in these circumstances is not a

statutory “customer” with a private right of action.

More fundamentally, GEICO misconceives a court’s role in

interpreting and applying statutes. A court can look to statutory

purpose to illuminate the meaning of the statutory text, but

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statutory purpose cannot be invoked to justify ignoring the text—

the Legislature’s actual work product. GEICO essentially urges us

to engage in a form of “imaginative reconstruction—the idea that a

court may implement what it is sure the legislature would have

done (had it faced the question explicitly) rather than what the

legislature actually did.” United States v. Logan, 453 F.3d 804, 807

(7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.). That would exceed our authority.

Even assuming GEICO has identified a flaw in the Repair Act,

policy-based fixes are for the Legislature.

B

The answer to the second certified question is also no: the

Repair Act violations at issue here do not “void a repair invoice for

completed windshield repairs and preclude a repair shop from being

paid any of its invoiced amounts by an insurance company.”

Glassco, 85 F.4th at 1147-48. The text of the Repair Act neither

says nor reasonably implies that a repair shop’s violation of the

disclosure requirements at issue renders a subsequent repair

invoice entirely void. And what the statute does say cuts against

the availability of that punitive remedy.

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Most significant to our conclusion is section 559.921(7). The

Legislature added that provision to the Repair Act in 1993, at the

same time it imposed the repair shop registration requirement and

empowered the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

to enforce the statute, including through civil lawsuits seeking

damages for “injured customers.” Ch. 93-219, § 12, Laws of Fla.

Section 559.921(7) says:

If, in any proceeding brought pursuant to this part, it is
determined that the repairs and costs thereof were in fact
authorized, orally or in writing, the repairs were
completed in a proper manner, and the consumer
benefited therefrom, then the enforcing authority may
consider such factors in assessing penalties or damages
and may award the reasonable value of such repairs.

So, notwithstanding a repair shop’s violation of the Repair Act, the

Legislature has expressly allowed government enforcement entities

to adjust the penalties or damages if repairs were authorized and

properly performed. Given section 559.921(7), to read a voiding

penalty into the Repair Act would bring disharmony rather than

coherence to the statutory scheme.

Our conclusion is also informed by the wording of the Repair

Act’s private right of action provision, section 559.921(1). It

authorizes relief in the form of “damages” for a customer who is

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“injured” by a violation of the statute. We need not and do not

decide whether a bare disclosure violation causes “injury” for

purposes of the statute. Assuming a statutory violation has caused

an injury, “the primary basis for an award of damages is

compensation. That is, the objective is to make the injured party

whole to the extent that it is possible to measure his injury in terms

of money.” Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965).

To void a repair shop’s invoice after a bare statutory violation would

go beyond statutorily authorized “damages” and instead serve as a

form of extra-statutory punishment.

GEICO’s argument in favor of a voiding penalty hinges almost

entirely on the authority of Osteen v. Morris, 481 So. 2d 1287 (Fla.

5th DCA 1986), and on subsequent district court of appeal

decisions that followed Osteen’s reasoning. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.

Tremont Body & Towing, Inc., 483 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986);

1616 Sunrise Motors, Inc. v. A-Leet Leasing of Fla., 547 So. 2d 267

(Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Perez-Priego v. Bayside Carburetor & Ignition

Corp., 633 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Safari Tours, Inc. v.

Pasco, 255 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); FGAP Inv. Corp. v. A1

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Body & Glass of Coral Springs, LLC, 325 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA

2021).

The customer in Osteen orally authorized work that the repair

shop satisfactorily performed, but the repair shop did not give the

customer a written estimate or written notice of his statutory right

to receive one. 481 So. 2d at 1288. Based on what it inferred to be

the Legislature’s intent, the Osteen court held that the shop’s

Repair Act violation excused the customer from having to pay for

the repairs. The court reasoned: “[I]f the customer is held legally

liable when the shop has disregarded the provisions of the statute,

the shop could effectively disregard the intention of the legislature

as evidenced by the provisions of this act.” Id. at 1289. Noting that

the outcome was unfair to the repair shop, the court added: “In

such instances the court must carry out the intent of the legislature

and cannot do what the court may feel is justice in the case.” Id. at

1290.

GEICO now argues that Osteen supports a voiding penalty in

the circumstances here. The logic of the insurer’s position is

straightforward: Repair Act violations that would render an invoice

void as to the customer should make that same invoice void as to

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the customer’s insurer. If Osteen is sound, GEICO’s argument has

substantial force.

We need not decide whether Osteen was correct at the time it

was decided, because subsequent amendments to the Repair Act

have rendered that case’s reasoning obsolete. In 1986, when the

Fifth District Court of Appeal decided Osteen, the Repair Act did not

include a mechanism for government enforcement through the

imposition of administrative and civil fines. Nor did the statute

include section 559.921(7) and that provision’s express permission

for government enforcement authorities to credit repair shops for

work authorized and properly performed. The two basic premises

underlying the Osteen decision—that the Legislature intended a

voiding penalty, and that the Repair Act would be ineffective

without such a remedy—are no longer valid. And because Osteen is

not a reliable guide to the Repair Act in its current form, the logic of

that case cannot sustain GEICO’s position here.

III

Having answered the certified questions, we return this case to

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

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CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 23-11056

John P. Marino, Lindsey R. Trowell, Max Gershenoff, and Yonatan
Bernstein of Rivkin Radler LLP, Jacksonville, Florida,

for Appellants Government Employees Insurance Co., GEICO
Indemnity Co., and GEICO General Insurance Co.

Howard J. Levine of Law Office of Howard Levine, Miami Beach,
Florida; and Michael V. Laurato, Ocala, Florida,

for Appellees Glassco Inc., John Bailey, Jason Wilemon, and
Andrew Victor

David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte, Gilbert, McNamara & Caldevilla,
P.A., Tampa, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae Automotive Education and Policy Institute

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