Leo L. Boatman v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2022-1547
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LEO L. BOATMAN,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

October 17, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Leo L. Boatman appeals his conviction and death sentence for

the first-degree premeditated murder of William L. Chapman, a

fellow inmate in Florida State Prison. We have jurisdiction. See

art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm. 1

I. BACKGROUND

The murder took place on July 5, 2019, in the dayroom in the

prison’s I-Wing. Unsurprisingly, the relevant events were largely

1. Boatman does not appeal his separate conviction and
sentence for one count of Possession of a Weapon by a State
Prisoner. See § 944.47(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019).
captured on video—by the dayroom camera, a camera in the

hallway outside the dayroom, and a handheld device outside the

dayroom. The videos show Boatman, along with codefendant

William E. Wells, attacking Chapman for approximately twelve

minutes with a ligature and two shanks (metal rods), while

approximately ten other inmates look on.2 During the attack,

Boatman prevented correctional officers (COs) from entering the

dayroom by blocking the inward-opening door—the only method of

ingress and egress—with his foot. Wells later did the same.

During Boatman’s post-murder interview with law

enforcement, he explained that he and Wells decided to commit

murder after they were denied their respective reviews to be

released from Close Management (CM) level 3 confinement status

and into the general prison population. 3 Boatman also explained

2. Wells, who was similarly convicted and sentenced to death
for the Chapman murder, had his conviction and sentence affirmed
last year. Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005 (Fla.), cert. denied, 144 S.
Ct. 385 (2023).

3. Testimony established that Florida State Prison is a
maximum-security prison. There are two open population dorms,
and a small section of the prison is “max management,” which is
the most restrictive confinement. Most of the prison is CM, which
falls between max management and open population. There are

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they originally selected a different victim (Maurice “Smurf” Bell) but,

days before the murder, decided to kill Chapman after Chapman

“tried” Boatman by passing a “kite” 4 suggesting Chapman and

Smurf were going to attempt to recruit Boatman into performing

sexual favors for them.

At trial, defense counsel largely argued the murder was

“generally heat of passion, provocation, or self-defense.” But the

jury rejected any such defense and convicted Boatman of

premeditated first-degree murder. A few days into the penalty

phase, Boatman waived the jury for the remainder of the penalty

phase. The judge later sentenced Boatman to death.

Guilt Phase

The State presented the testimony of six witnesses—three

individuals who worked at the prison on the night of the murder,

two Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) special agents

(David Meacham and Garrett Carlisle), and the medical examiner

three types of CM, with CM3 being the least restrictive. Boatman,
Wells, and the other inmates in the dayroom at the time of the
murder were all CM3.

4. “Kites” are messages that inmates send between cells.

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(Dr. William Hamilton). The State also introduced, among other

things, photographs, a handful of videos, and audio of Boatman’s

interview with Special Agents Meacham and Carlisle. As outlined

by the trial court, the evidence established as follows:

On July 5, 2019, the Defendant, along with his co-
defendant, William E. Wells, entered the dayroom in I-
Wing in Florida State Prison with the premeditated intent
to kill the victim, William Chapman. Florida State Prison
is a maximum-security prison. And, at the time of the
murder, the Defendant was serving two life sentences for
first-degree murders which he committed in Marion
County, Florida. Additionally, the Defendant was on
Close Management (level 3) at the prison.
Upset that their Close Management level would not
be reduced, the Defendant and Wells decided to kill a
fellow inmate as an act of revenge against the
Department of Corrections. Ultimately, they chose
inmate William Chapman as the intended victim because
he had “tried”/disrespected the Defendant on the prison
wing. In preparation for the murder, the Defendant and
Wells acquired shanks and ligatures to facilitate the
killing. It appears that the Defendant acquired the
shanks (metal rods) while Wells acquired the ligatures.
The Defendant would not disclose from where he
obtained the shanks.
The events which occurred on July 5, 2019, were
captured on video (both inside the dayroom and in the
hallway outside the dayroom). The dayroom video
reflects the Defendant, his co-defendant Wells, the
victim, and approximately 10-12 other inmates in the
dayroom before the attack began. The dayroom’s
singular door is the only entry and exit point into the
room. Approximately ten minutes before the attack
began, the Defendant leaves the dayroom with a
correctional officer to go to the bathroom; and he returns

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two minutes later. After the Defendant returns to the
room, Wells leaves the room and is escorted to the
bathroom.
Once Wells returns to the room, the Defendant
walks over to the victim, speaks to him, and the two walk
out of the dayroom camera’s view into an area that
contains a blind spot. Wells then moves toward where
the Defendant and Chapman are standing and wraps a
white ligature around Chapman’s neck. While Wells is
strangling Chapman, the Defendant begins punching
him. Chapman can be seen struggling as the two co-
defendants are choking and hitting him. The Defendant
then moves in front of the dayroom door, blocking it with
his foot. He then pulls out two large shanks, one in each
hand, tied to his wrists. The Defendant tied the shanks
to his wrists to prevent Chapman from taking them from
him during the attack. During the attack, correctional
officers unsuccessfully attempted to open the dayroom
door, blocked by the Defendant with his body and foot.
Further, the Defendant threatened the officers, telling
them that he and Wells intended to kill Chapman (“This
guy’s going to die today”); and if they entered the
dayroom they would be killed, or harmed, as well. As the
attack continued, the Defendant and Wells stabbed
Chapman in his eyes, neck, torso, back, and face.
Although the correctional officers were ordering the
Defendant to stop, the Defendant persisted in viciously
attacking Chapman.
At this point, correctional officers were able to
slightly open the dayroom door and deploy a chemical
agent into the room. Once the door was ajar, Chapman
places his fingers in the gap, trying to open the door and
escape. However, Chapman was unable to get away from
the Defendant and Wells’ attack. Wells then began
leaning against the dayroom door while the Defendant
continued stabbing Chapman. The Defendant then gives
Wells one of the shanks. Wells begins stabbing
Chapman, ultimately leaving one of the shanks in the
victim’s neck. As he and Wells are stabbing Chapman,

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the Defendant continues to communicate with the
correctional officers who were situated outside of the
dayroom door. Ultimately, Chapman falls to the floor;
and the Defendant and Boatman take a short break. The
Defendant can be seen on the dayroom video, covered in
the victim’s blood, appearing to revel in what he has
done. The Defendant subsequently stomps on the victim
seven times. After which, he stabs the victim with the
second shank, leaving it in the back of his neck. The
Defendant then stomps on the shank with such strength
that it bends the metal. The entire attack lasted
approximately 12 minutes.
Once the Defendant and Wells were certain that
Chapman was dead, they allowed the correctional officers
into the room. Ultimately, Chapman was unable to be
revived. And it was determined that his death was the
result of being beaten, stabbed, and strangled. The
medical examiner testified that Chapman had multiple
traumas to his head, neck, eyes, face, and body,
including: 25 stab wound/cuts on the right-side of his
neck; 13 stab/cut wounds on the back of his neck; a
penetrating injury to his neck by a metal rod (which was
still in the victim’s neck at the time of the autopsy); a
deep ligature furrow in his neck (indicating that he had
been strangled with a ligature); hemorrhaging around the
eyes (the eyes themselves were intact); internal injuries
(brain hemorrhaging caused by blunt force trauma[)]; and
multiple torso injuries (both internal and external)
caused by penetrating injuries due [to] sharp force
trauma. There were multiple modalities of injury and
any of the more serious forms of blunt force trauma or
sharp force trauma could have been the fatal act.
Hours after the murder, the Defendant was
interviewed by FDLE Special Agents David Meacham and
Garrett Carlisle. During the interview, the Defendant
stated that he decided, after being required to stay on
Close Management, that he was no longer going to put up
with “the bullshit”; and that the next person who
“crossed the line” would die. That person ended up being

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William Chapman. The Defendant felt betrayed by
Chapman, whom he considered to be a friend. According
to the Defendant, Chapman was “an undercover fag” who
was acting on behalf of another inmate to trick him and
Wells into performing homosexual acts in exchange for
coffee, and related items. The Defendant further
acknowledged that he had been planning the murder for
up to a week prior, but at least for a few days.

Sentencing Order at 3-6.

For its part, the defense called five witnesses, including

Boatman, in an unsuccessful attempt to establish “heat of passion,

provocation, or self-defense.”

Boatman largely testified to his chaotic upbringing—including

being born in a mental institution; never meeting his father; and

being sexually abused by multiple males and by his mother,

beginning at age seven—and to prison life. As to the latter, he

testified that violent persons get respect, that weapons are needed

for defense, that he is not gay, and that a straight inmate cannot

wait long to act in retaliation after being propositioned by a gay

inmate, otherwise others will begin propositioning you, eventually

opening the door to someone “taking what they want” from you. He

explained why he thought Chapman—with whom he associated and

who initially denied being gay—was a threat, including that

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Chapman had battered a CO and stabbed another inmate. And

Boatman testified he read the “kite” to mean Smurf was using

Chapman to recruit Boatman for sex, and that the murder was

something he thought he “had to do.” On cross examination,

Boatman conceded the first thing he told law enforcement about

why he committed the murder was that he was upset about once

again being denied release from CM confinement. He also explained

that he and Wells originally targeted Smurf for “trying [Boatman] in

a homosexual way,” before they decided to kill Chapman.

Another defense witness, Dr. Tonia Werner, a psychiatrist who

had diagnosed Boatman with an adjustment disorder, opined that

being denied CM review and discovering a plan between inmates to

sexually target you (after you have a history of sexual abuse) is a

“stressor” that can trigger a heightened response.

The other three defense witnesses were the Assistant Warden

(Jeffrey McClellan), who was not aware of any sexual battery on CM,

and two inmates (Reginald Arline and Smurf).

As noted above, the jury rejected the defense’s theory and

convicted Boatman of first-degree premeditated murder.

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Penalty Phase

In the penalty phase, the State presented four witnesses.

Agent Carlisle provided additional testimony regarding the

Chapman murder, and the other three witnesses testified about

Boatman’s prior violent felonies inside and outside the prison

system. Eric Dice, an officer with the Marion County Sheriff’s

Office, testified about the first-degree murders Boatman

committed—using an AK-47—of a young couple in the Ocala

National Forest in 2006. Joseph Lee Hamner, a retired Department

of Corrections (DOC) inspector, testified regarding Boatman’s

conviction for attempted second-degree murder stemming from a

2009 incident at Cross City Correctional Institution, where

Boatman was observed pulling on a sheet tied around the neck of a

fellow inmate (Mark Apicella). And Kevin Michael Ortiz, a senior

inspector with DOC, testified about Boatman’s third-degree murder

conviction stemming from a 2010 incident with a fellow inmate

(Ricky Morris) at Charlotte Correctional Institution, where Boatman

was seen slamming Morris’s head into the concrete floor.

The defense called over a dozen witnesses. Three witnesses

were fellow inmates, one of whom described the difference in

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privileges between general population, CM, and death row.

Other defense witnesses, including several of Boatman’s

relatives, testified about Boatman’s dysfunctional upbringing and

the chaotic and abusive nature of his family. The testimony largely

established the following.

Boatman was born in a mental hospital to a mother, Sheila,

who was a long-term patient (Boatman’s father may have been a

patient). While pregnant with Boatman, Sheila likely took

psychiatric drugs, did not get proper prenatal care, and consumed

alcohol. Sheila’s mother, Lucille, had six children with six different

men and married between eight and ten times. Lucille was

physically and verbally abusive to her children, and later to

Boatman, whom Lucille ended up adopting (along with Boatman’s

sister).

When Boatman was seven years old, he began rebelling after

his best friend was killed in front of him by a distracted driver.

Other tragedies endured by Boatman as a child included Sheila’s

body being found in another state when Boatman was almost nine.

After his mother’s death, Boatman started getting into fights.

Lucille eventually gave up her rights to Boatman, who ended up in

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foster care (where he experienced further abuse) and later in the

custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). When

Boatman was released from DJJ custody at age nineteen, he earned

enough credits to graduate from high school, got a job, and enrolled

in community college. But he soon received two life sentences after

committing the murders in the Ocala National Forest.

Another defense witness, retired judge Irene Sullivan—whose

years on the bench included handling juvenile dependency and

delinquency matters but who never interacted with Boatman while

he was in the juvenile system—testified that she reached out to

Boatman after he committed the Ocala murders, and they became

pen pals. During Retired Judge Sullivan’s testimony, defense

counsel read to the jury some letters Boatman wrote to her about

his life. Among other things, the letters outlined the sexual abuse

Boatman experienced, including that perpetrated by his mother.

Other witnesses included: a woman who lived near Boatman’s

grandmother; a member of the team that represented Boatman in

the Ocala murders; a mitigation specialist; and Dr. Werner, who

reminded the jury about her adjustment-disorder diagnosis of

Boatman.

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Dr. Michael Quinones, a clinical psychologist who met with

Boatman for two evaluation sessions, testified about Boatman’s

“chronically stressful, intensely reactive” development and opined

that Boatman had 8 out of 10 Adverse Childhood Experiences

(ACEs) that mental health professionals use in assessing an

individual’s later psychological, emotional, and health-related

functioning. Dr. Quinones also opined that Boatman has difficulty

controlling his impulses and has contended with lifelong “extreme”

and “severe mental health issues and impairments.”

Dr. Joseph Wu, a professor of psychiatry and human behavior

who specializes in neuropsychiatry and neurocognitive imaging,

reviewed a PET scan of Boatman’s brain and “found many different

kinds of abnormalities” consistent with different clinical

neuropsychiatric diagnoses, including fetal alcohol spectrum

disorder (FASD). Dr. Wu opined that Boatman “is a neurological

perfect storm,” the result of which is “a catastrophic breakdown . . .

in terms of his ability to regulate his aggressive impulses” and

conform his conduct, that “Boatman was under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” and that Boatman’s

capacity to conform his conduct to requirements of the law “was

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substantially neurologically impaired.”

Dr. Geoffrey Colino, a forensic neurologist who evaluated

Boatman, opined that Boatman “no doubt . . . has FASD” and that

he had suffered traumatic head injuries. Dr. Colino opined that

Boatman meets the criteria for a diagnosis of fetal alcohol

syndrome, the most severe form of FASD. According to Dr. Colino,

someone like Boatman cannot stop himself from following through

once a decision to act is impulsively made in response to a setting-

off event—even if the action is deferred and involves planning—and

the syndrome that most characterizes Boatman’s behaviors is

orbitofrontal cortex syndrome. Dr. Colino correlated his findings to

the two statutorily enumerated mental health mitigators, namely

that “[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,”

and “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of

his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the

requirements of law was substantially impaired.” § 921.141(7)(b),

(f), Fla. Stat. (2019) (respectively). But in doing so, Dr. Colino

preferred to “change th[e] language” of those statutory mitigators to

instead “use the idiom of neurology.” Namely, he stated he “would

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change” the language of section 921.141(7)(b) to say “under the

influence of significant to profound neurological

impairment/disturbance,” and of section 921.141(7)(f) to say

“conform his behavior to requirements not just of law but also to

his own knowledge of right and wrong.”

Not all the defense witnesses testified in front of the jury.

After the defense’s first five witnesses testified (including Boatman’s

sister), defense counsel informed the judge that Boatman desired to

waive and dismiss the jury. The next day, after extensive colloquies

with Boatman, the judge granted Boatman’s waiver request.

Spencer 5 Hearing

At the Spencer hearing, the defense presented additional

argument, but neither the defense nor the State had any additional

witnesses to call or evidence to present.

Sentencing

On November 9, 2022, the court held a sentencing hearing,

during which the court sentenced Boatman to death. The court

found all four proposed aggravators were proven beyond a

5. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

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reasonable doubt and assigned them weight as follows: (1) the

capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a

felony and under sentence of imprisonment (very great weight); (2)

the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or

of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (very

great weight); (3) the capital felony was especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (very great weight); and (4) the capital

felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and

premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal

justification (CCP) (great weight).

Regarding mitigation, the court first addressed five statutorily

enumerated mitigating circumstances, finding four were not

established by the evidence, namely: (1) the capital felony was

committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme

mental or emotional disturbance; (2) the victim was a participant in

the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act; (3) the defendant

acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of

another person; and (4) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate

the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of law was substantially impaired. As to the fifth

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statutorily enumerated mitigator—i.e., the age of the defendant at

the time of the crime—the court concluded the mitigator was proven

(Boatman was thirty-two years old) but gave it no weight.

The court then addressed any other factors in Boatman’s

background that would mitigate against imposition of the death

penalty. See § 921.141(7)(h), Fla. Stat. The court found twelve

such factors were established by the evidence and assigned them

weight as follows: (1) courtroom behavior (some weight); (2) waived

jury (some weight); (3) care for the community and family (some

weight); (4) generational trauma (some weight); (5) brain

malformation (little weight); (6) the circumstances of conception (or

Boatman’s perception of the circumstances of his conception) (some

weight); (7) fetal alcohol syndrome (little weight); (8) instability in

the home (some weight); (9) commitment to DJJ from age fourteen

(some weight); (10) sexual abuse (some weight); (11) adverse

childhood experiences (some weight); and (12) mercy (little weight).

As noted above, the trial court imposed a sentence of death for

the murder. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Boatman raises fifteen issues, including the sufficiency of the

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evidence to support the first-degree murder conviction.

Motion to Adjudicate Boatman Incompetent to Proceed

Boatman argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to

adjudicate him incompetent to proceed, given that Dr. Werner

opined that he was incompetent to proceed. We conclude that no

reasonable grounds to question Boatman’s competence were

presented. Indeed, Dr. Werner’s report and testimony make clear

that Boatman was not incompetent to proceed. The trial court thus

did not err in denying Boatman’s motion.

Two years before the guilt-phase trial commenced, Boatman

filed the motion, attaching a report by Dr. Werner, who, at the

request of defense counsel, evaluated Boatman for the stated

purpose “of opining on competency to proceed.” In her report, Dr.

Werner addressed the statutorily enumerated competence factors in

section 916.12(3), Florida Statutes (2019). Although her findings

regarding those factors all suggested Boatman was competent to

proceed, Dr. Werner, who diagnosed Boatman with an adjustment

disorder, opined that he was incompetent to proceed. She

explained that adjustment disorders feature “[t]he presence of

emotional and behavioral symptoms in response to an identifiable

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stressor,” and she identified Boatman’s stressor as “being held in

close management” with “no identifiable end.” She noted Boatman

was “stating his intent to plead guilty in an effort to be moved to

death row,” where he felt “he will have more freedom.” And she

concluded that his “choice of plea” was not “free and rational.”

At a hearing two days after the motion was filed, Dr. Werner

conceded that, aside from the potential plea, she had no issues with

Boatman’s competence to participate in a trial. After some

discussion, the judge recognized that Dr. Werner’s opinion was

wholly detached from her report and testimony. The judge further

stated that Boatman had “always manifested appropriate courtroom

behavior” and that there was no “factual basis” to otherwise

“question” his “competency to go forward.” The judge ultimately

rejected the notion that he “must find [Boatman is] incompetent to

proceed based [solely] upon [Dr. Werner’s report and testimony],”

given that Dr. Werner herself gave “overwhelming evidence” to the

contrary. The judge left open the possibility of appointing a doctor

if later necessary. But nothing in the evidence presented at the

hearing convinced the judge that was necessary. The judge then

set a hearing date for one month later to discuss Boatman’s

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potential plea. No plea was entered at the subsequent hearing.

On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Boatman’s motion and determining there were no

reasonable grounds on which to further pursue the issue of

potential incompetence. Indeed, this record suggests that defense

counsel and Dr. Werner seemingly conflated the “competence”

standard with the “heightened” standard for pleading guilty.

Recently, we explained that “the standard for competence to

stand trial . . . is the same standard of competence required to

plead guilty.” Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933, 945-46 (Fla. 2021).

There is also “a ‘heightened’ standard for pleading guilty,” but that

heightened standard “is not a heightened standard of competence.”

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 (1993). Rather, the

heightened standard means that “[i]n addition to determining that a

defendant who seeks to plead guilty . . . is competent, a trial court

must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is

knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 400 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S.

20, 28-29 (1992); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).

Whether Boatman met that heightened standard is not at issue—he

never pleaded guilty. We deny this claim.

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Motion to Disqualify

Boatman asserts that the judge erred in denying his motion to

disqualify and that he “did not receive a just and fair trial.”

“The standard of review for a trial judge’s decision on a motion

to disqualify is de novo.” Davis v. State, 347 So. 3d 315, 322 (Fla.

2022) (citing Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Fla. 2007)).

Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.330

requires the movant to “allege specifically the facts and reasons

upon which the movant relies as the grounds for disqualification.”

Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(c)(2). The judge against

whom the motion is directed “may determine only the legal

sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts

alleged.” Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h). In determining

legal sufficiency, the judge “must consider ‘whether the facts alleged

would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a

fair and impartial trial.’ ” Davis, 347 So. 3d at 322 (quoting

Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983)).

Boatman’s motion—which included his sworn statement—set

forth a portion of a conversation between the judge and defense

counsel at a pretrial conference on July 28, 2021, “to discuss the

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readiness of Mr. Boatman’s case for an August trial.” After counsel

argued for a continuance, the judge expressed a reluctance to grant

it. The judge, while outlining his recollections of counsel’s

representations at prior conferences and inviting counsel to

respond, questioned whether counsel was “like sort of willfully

putting [himself] in a position to continue to state [they] are not

ready,” and noted it was difficult “to discern between legitimate not

ready and [counsel] engaging in a scheduling strategy.” After co-

counsel stated the defense was not “even close to being ready,” the

judge responded that the defense had for five months been saying

they were “extraordinarily close.” The motion alleged that this

response “mischaracterized the previous representations by

[counsel].” The court denied the motion, citing cases for the

proposition that coaxing counsel to get a case to trial or to resolve

discovery issues does not create a well-grounded fear of bias.

We conclude that Boatman’s motion was legally insufficient.

The motion at most alleged—without adequate explanation—that

the judge “mischaracterized” certain prior statements. In that

regard, Boatman failed to “allege specifically the facts and reasons

upon which [he] relie[d].” Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin.

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2.330(c)(2). In any event, the cases cited by Boatman are

distinguishable in that they involved judges who had preconceived

notions of credibility or had a self-admitted bias. See, e.g., Brown v.

St. George Island, Ltd., 561 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1990)

(disqualifying judge where movant asserted counsel sought to

submit movant’s affidavit and that judge “without having heard

testimony from [movant], tossed the affidavit back and said, ‘If

[movant] were here I wouldn’t believe him anyway’ ”).

Here, Boatman alleged in his motion that the judge expressed

frustration with and invited an explanation from counsel regarding

prior representations on the topic of scheduling and trial readiness.

Although it has been said that “a statement by a trial judge that he

or she feels a party has lied in the case is generally regarded as

indicating a bias against the party,” Campbell Soup Co. v. Roberts,

676 So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), that proposition does not

apply here.

Even if counsel never said the defense was “extraordinarily

close,” the judge’s frustration centered around the defense failing to

calendar depositions the defense represented would be completed.

This additional context supports the denial of the motion. See Wall

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v. State, 238 So. 3d 127, 143 (Fla. 2018) (“[T]he context of the

hearing and history of the case as reflected in the record are

relevant to understanding whether a movant has a well-founded

fear of judicial bias.”).

The judge’s comments “contain clear qualifiers,” Pilkington v.

Pilkington, 182 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), and the judge

did “not make any decisions based upon first impressions,” id.,

instead agreeing to take the defense’s “request under advisement.”

Boatman’s sworn statement that he subjectively “felt that” the judge

accused counsel “of being liars” is insufficient. See Krawczuk v.

State, 92 So. 3d 195, 201 (Fla. 2012) (“The subjective fear of a party

seeking the disqualification of a judge is not sufficient.” (quoting

Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974, 982 (Fla. 2009))). We deny this claim.

Motion to Exclude Photographs and Video

Boatman argues the court erred in denying his motion in

limine that sought to exclude “crime-scene and autopsy

photographs and video” as “gruesome, inflammatory and

unnecessary.” At a hearing, defense counsel offered little argument

regarding video of the murder, and, with respect to the photos—

which counsel had not seen—“ask[ed] that [the State] produce [the

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photographs] in advance.” The judge ultimately outright denied the

motion with respect to “the video that captures the event that Mr.

Boatman is charged with.” And as to the photos, the judge merely

“denied without prejudice” the motion, indicated the State was to

identify the photos, and invited defense counsel “to re-raise” any

issues regarding any specific photos.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 228 n.7 (Fla.

2022). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Although a trial court’s “discretion is limited by the rules of

evidence,” Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1056 (Fla. 2012),

Boatman misstates the rules of evidence. He largely argues the

photos and video “were not necessary.” But “[t]he test for

admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy rather than

necessity.” Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 861 (Fla. 2009) (quoting

Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2004)). Here, the

videos of the crime itself were plainly relevant—including to

establish the disputed element of premeditation—and their

probative value was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of

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unfair prejudice.” § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2019). As to the photos, no

definitive ruling was even made. We deny this claim.

Motion to Preclude Penalty Phase

Boatman argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to

preclude the State from seeking the death penalty should the State

secure a conviction of first-degree murder. His motion asserted

that because the indictment failed to allege aggravating factors, the

indictment could only support a maximum sentence of life in

prison. The gist of his argument was that in the wake of Hurst v.

Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and this Court’s decision on remand in

Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by

State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), aggravators under section

921.141 are “elements” that must be charged in the indictment.

This Court has repeatedly rejected this claim, both before and

after deciding Hurst v. State. See, e.g., Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d

695, 730 (Fla. 2021); Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 496 (Fla. 2011).

“We decline to revisit” this issue. Cruz, 320 So. 3d at 731.

Motion for Individual and Sequestered Voir Dire

Boatman argues the court erred in denying his motion seeking

individual and sequestered voir dire to “inquir[e] into the

- 25 -
prospective jurors’ views on the death penalty as well as to any pre-

trial publicity concerning . . . this case.” The judge denied the

motion but instructed both parties to come up with a summary to

be “read to the courtroom of prospective jurors to try to trigger

whether or not they are aware of anything.” The judge also made

clear that if any prospective “juror indicate[d] . . . a specific unique

familiarity with the case,” it would be discussed “in a sequestered

and individualized format.” The parties later submitted very similar

summaries, except the defense included two sentences the judge

deemed not relevant and thus declined to read.

A trial court’s decision regarding “whether prospective jurors

must be questioned individually about publicity the case has

received” is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bolin v. State, 736 So.

2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 1999) (citing Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347,

1351 (Fla. 1994)). “Individual voir dire to determine juror

impartiality in the face of pretrial publicity is constitutionally

compelled only if the trial court’s failure to ask these questions

renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. (citing Mu’Min v.

Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991)). Here, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion. The decisions cited by Boatman, namely the

- 26 -
Supreme Court’s decision in Mu’Min and this Court’s decision in

Bolin, simply do not support reversal.

Among other things, Mu’Min held “that the voir dire

examination conducted by the trial court . . . was consistent with

[the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].” 500 U.S.

at 431-32. There, in a case involving forty-seven news articles and

“substantial” publicity, id. at 418, 429-30, the trial court denied the

petitioner’s “motion for individual voir dire” and “ruled that voir dire

would begin with collective questioning,” with the venire then

“broken down into panels of four, if necessary, to deal with issues of

publicity,” id. at 419. The trial court also “refused to ask any of

petitioner’s proposed questions relating to the content of news items

that potential jurors might have read or seen.” Id. Of the twelve

seated jurors, eight “had at one time or another read or heard

something about the case,” but “[n]one had indicated that he had

formed an opinion about the case or would be biased in any way.”

Id. at 421. Here, even assuming substantial pretrial publicity—

nothing in Boatman’s motion or briefing reflects actual substantial

pretrial publicity—the judge went beyond the constitutionally

compliant voir dire in Mu’Min by agreeing to a sequestered and

- 27 -
individualized format, if necessary. And nothing suggests any juror

“had formed an opinion about the case or would be biased in any

way.” Id.

Bolin—which limited its holding to “the facts of th[e] case,” 736

So. 2d at 1166—held that the trial court erroneously denied the

defendant’s “motion for individual and sequestered voir dire of

prospective jurors who had been exposed to prejudicial pretrial

publicity and who eventually served on [the] jury.” Id. at 1161. But

the publicity at issue involved newspaper articles containing

“inadmissible and prejudicial information.” Id. at 1162-63. Here,

the court agreed to individual and sequestered voir dire, if

necessary. And there is no indication any juror was exposed to

inadmissible and prejudicial information. We deny this claim.

Motion to Use Photographs and Video During Voir Dire

Boatman claims the court erroneously denied his motion

which asked that of the photographs or videos deemed admissible,

the defense be permitted “to show a representative sample of crime-

scene and autopsy photographs and/or relevant portion of the video

of the crime to prospective jurors during voir dire and to question

prospective jurors about their ability to deliberate fairly and

- 28 -
impartially after viewing those photographs.” At a hearing, the

court noted the risks of granting the request, including that

publishing the information could result in the defense essentially

“trying the case.” The court denied the motion but ruled that both

sides, “[a]t their discretion,” could talk about it with prospective

jurors “to properly evaluate their ability to consider mitigation and

otherwise reach a lawful decision.”

“The scope of voir dire questioning rests in the sound

discretion of the court and will not be interfered with unless that

discretion is clearly abused.” Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 13

(Fla. 2007) (quoting Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.

1994)). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Indeed,

Hoskins supports the trial court’s decision.

In Hoskins, defense counsel “sought to show potential jurors

[a graphic autopsy] photograph and ask whether it would cause

them to vote for the death penalty.” Id. at 12. The trial court

denied the request but “did permit questioning about the effect of

viewing graphic autopsy photographs.” Id. at 13. In holding that

“the trial court did not abuse its discretion,” Hoskins reasoned in

part that “defense counsel, in effect, sought an advance opinion of

- 29 -
the evidence” and that the trial court had not otherwise “restricted

Hoskins’s ability to determine the jurors’ fairness.” Id.

Here, defense counsel similarly “sought an advance opinion of

the evidence,” id., namely “whether it would cause [the prospective

jurors] to vote for the death penalty,” id. at 12. The trial court

properly denied the request while otherwise allowing counsel to

discuss the information with potential jurors. And the record does

not show that the court otherwise “restricted [Boatman’s] ability to

determine the jurors’ fairness.” Id. at 13. We deny this claim.6

Motion to Strike the Jury Panel

Boatman argues the court erred in denying defense counsel’s

ore tenus motion to strike the jury panel during voir dire. At the

mid-afternoon bench conference during jury selection, after it

became obvious that defense counsel needed many more hours for

the initial voir dire, the judge and defense counsel discussed timing

for the day. When the judge asked counsel if they were “going to be

6. As to the jurors ultimately seated, the judge stated for the
record that no juror expressed any visible discomfort either when
the defense “published three different videos” during defense
opening or when the State later introduced the videos and
photographs.

- 30 -
very, very late” and approximated 10:00 p.m., counsel responded:

“Absolutely.” After counsel stated his preference not to give the

prospective jurors an exact time, the judge indicated the prospective

jurors should be given some guidance to make necessary

arrangements. Defense counsel “absolutely agree[d]” with the

judge, who informed the prospective jurors accordingly. After the

prospective jurors left for a recess, counsel made the motion, the

gist of which was that the judge prejudicially informed the panel

they would be staying late and that it was “entirely the defense’s

fault.” Boatman’s argument fails for at least three reasons.

First, any asserted error was “invited” and is therefore

“unreviewable.” Allen v. State, 322 So. 3d 589, 598 n.4 (Fla. 2021).

Indeed, counsel “expressly” agreed to the judge’s proposal. Cf.

Woodbury v. State, 320 So. 3d 631, 653 n.10 (Fla. 2021)

(concluding that “asserted error was invited” where defendant

argued on appeal “that after the Spencer hearing, the trial court

should have ordered a recess and convened a separate proceeding

for imposition of the sentence,” even though defendant “expressly

objected to the court delaying the pronouncement of sentence and

told the court to proceed directly to sentencing”).

- 31 -
Second, any asserted error was cured. As such, “there is no

basis for appellate relief.” Allen, 322 So. 3d at 597. Here, defense

counsel stated it “would be an excellent solution” if the judge gave

the prospective jurors certain clarifying comments, which the judge

did. Moreover, before the 5:00 p.m. break, the judge gave the panel

the choice to stay “for however long that takes” or to “come back”

the next morning. The panel chose to stay.

Third, any error was harmless. As the State notes, “the court

did not inform the [prospective jurors] of anything that they would

be unable to conclude on their own.”

The cases cited by Boatman are easily distinguished. See,

e.g., Richardson v. State, 666 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)

(involving an exchange between prosecutor and venire member

“implying that [defendant] was a convicted felon who previously

served time”). We deny this claim.

Challenges for Cause

Boatman argues the court erred in denying his cause

challenges of four potential jurors. Defense counsel used

peremptory challenges to remove all four individuals. Later, when

the defense was denied another cause challenge and requested an

- 32 -
additional peremptory, the court granted the request.

A ruling on a cause challenge is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 23, 38 (Fla. 2018) (citing

Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. 2001)). “Where the

record demonstrates a reasonable doubt about a juror’s ability to be

impartial, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the cause

challenge.” Hilton v. State, 326 So. 3d 640, 654 (Fla. 2021) (citing

Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 319 (Fla. 2007)). “[I]t is the

adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through

questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality.” Wainwright

v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (citing Reynolds v. United States,

98 U.S. 145, 157 (1879)). Even if a defendant establishes the

erroneous denial of a cause challenge, the defendant must also

“demonstrate . . . that the denial of the challenge resulted in

prejudice.” Hilton, 326 So. 3d at 654 (citing Carratelli, 961 So. 2d

at 319). Here, even assuming this issue is adequately briefed,

Boatman fails to establish error or prejudice.

For each of the four individuals, Boatman simply provides a

transcript citation to where defense counsel, based on his

recollection of the individual’s responses, indicated the basis for the

- 33 -
cause challenge. Boatman does not mention the judge’s differing

recollection or provide citations to the individuals’ actual responses.

His failure to do so waives the issue. See Barwick v. State, 88 So.

3d 85, 101 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting, as “waived,” a claim that was

based in part on counsel’s purported “failure to object to certain

comments made by the State and the trial court,” where defendant

“d[id] not provide argument” and “failed to direct this Court’s

attention to the [comments]”).

In any event, given the conflicting recollections of defense

counsel and the judge—and after reviewing the uncited portions of

the transcript—we cannot say “the record demonstrates a

reasonable doubt about” any of the four potential jurors’ “ability to

be impartial.” Hilton, 326 So. 3d at 654. For example, Boatman

asserts one of the four prospective jurors stated that, among other

things, “he thought it was a first-degree murder, then the death

penalty comes with it.” But according to the judge, that prospective

juror was initially confused and, after explanation, “seemed to

indicate he understood.” That prospective juror did in fact clarify

he “would feel obligated to” consider mitigation, that he was

“confused earlier” about the penalty phase, and that it would be his

- 34 -
“duty to listen to everything.” We remain mindful that the trial

judge “is in a far superior position to properly evaluate the

responses to the questions propounded to the jurors.” Cook v.

State, 542 So. 2d 964, 969 (Fla. 1989).

Even assuming any error occurred, to establish prejudice

Boatman must “show that an objectionable juror has served on the

jury.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004) (citing

Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1991)). Said differently, he

must show he “subsequently exhaust[ed] all of his . . . peremptory

challenges and an additional challenge [was] sought and denied.”

Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 1985) (emphasis added). He

cannot. Indeed, he was granted the only additional peremptory he

requested. 7 We deny this claim.

Evidentiary Issues in Guilt and Penalty Phases

Boatman claims numerous evidentiary errors occurred during

7. The State reads Hill as establishing a rule of per se
reversible error in the context of erroneous denials of cause
challenges and asks this Court to adopt a harmless error standard
instead. Because Hill is plainly inapplicable here, where Boatman
requested and was granted an additional peremptory, we decline
the State’s invitation to revisit Hill.

- 35 -
the guilt and penalty phases that singularly and cumulatively

“infected” the trial and prejudiced him. But he largely just

summarizes the proceedings and provides transcript quotations. To

the extent his arguments are not waived, they are without merit.

And any arguable error—singularly or cumulatively—was harmless

in either phase. There is “no reasonable possibility” that any

asserted errors “contributed to the conviction,” Figueroa-Sanabria v.

State, 366 So. 3d 1035, 1050 (Fla. 2023) (quoting State v. DiGuilio,

491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)), or “contributed to the death

sentence,” Gaskin v. State, 361 So. 3d 300, 309 (Fla. 2023).

Beginning with the guilt phase, Boatman’s meritless claims

include alleged violations of the best evidence rule. That rule

requires the “original writing, recording, or photograph” to be

introduced into evidence “to prove [its] contents.” § 90.952, Fla.

Stat. (2019); Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 383 (Fla. 2007)

(recognizing section 90.952 as codification of the rule). Boatman

conflates “best evidence” and “only evidence,” wrongly suggesting a

witness may never describe actions depicted in a video introduced

into evidence. Cf. Derrick v. State, 335 So. 3d 801, 802 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2022) (“A witness’s in-court description of actions depicted in a

- 36 -
video recording . . . ‘violates the best evidence rule’ when offered to

prove the crime without introduction of the video in evidence.”

(emphasis added) (quoting J.J. v. State, 170 So. 3d 861, 862 (Fla.

3d DCA 2015))). Here, the rule does not preclude Special Agent

Carlisle’s testimony about certain introduced videos—taken prior to

the attack—showing white athletic shoes being carried by Boatman

to his cell and later being passed “to the direction of Mr. Wells’s

cell,” with audio “that the[] shoes were for [Wells],” who was later

wearing white athletic shoes during the attack. Carlisle explained

why tennis shoes were part of the investigation, including that they

“would help give an inmate better grip on the floor, if he was trying

to block a door.” Nor does the rule preclude the testimony of

Sergeant Prock—a CO—regarding the first thing he saw when he

arrived at the dayroom. Indeed, what Prock described took place in

the blind spot of the dayroom camera and is not shown on video.

Boatman refers to the transcript of Special Agent Meacham’s

interview with Boatman but does not advance any argument. The

trial court instructed the jury regarding the use of transcripts of

recordings, allowed the audio to be published, and allowed the

transcript to be followed along by the jury. Boatman does not allege

- 37 -
any transcript inaccuracy, let alone a material one.

Boatman takes issue with “the number of [autopsy] pictures”

(and one x-ray) admitted during the medical examiner’s testimony.

The seven or so photos, which showed separate injuries, were not

unfairly prejudicial. See Smith v. State, 320 So. 3d 20, 30-31 (Fla.

2021) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing twenty-six autopsy photos—most of which “identified

separate injuries on [the victim’s] body”—to be introduced during

medical examiner’s testimony).

Boatman also raises guilt-phase hearsay and Confrontation

Clause arguments, none of which we find convincing. For example,

he takes issue with Sergeant Prock testifying he “overhear[d] Mr.

Boatman handing the weapon to Mr. Wells and telling him to -- he

needed to stab the inmate as well.” But for a statement to be

hearsay, it must be offered “to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019). Boatman’s statement

was introduced to establish premeditation, not to prove Wells

needed to stab the victim. The statement is not hearsay.

As another example, Boatman takes issue with Special Agent

- 38 -
Carlisle explaining why he took photographs of the pipe chase. 8

Carlisle testified he “described to [one of the COs] what type of

weapon would be about nine or ten inches long, made of -- possibly

of brass, kind of like a gold metal, and [the CO] indicated it sounded

like the plungers that were in the pipe chase.” Even if Carlisle’s

testimony about what the CO said is hearsay that implicates the

right to confrontation, any error was harmless. Whether the

shanks Boatman used are pipe chase plungers or were obtained

elsewhere did not possibly contribute to the conviction.

Boatman’s evidentiary arguments pertaining to the penalty

phase mostly involve hearsay and confrontation.9 They center

8. According to Carlisle, the pipe chase in Boatman’s dorm
“runs in between two corridors of cells” and “houses all the
plumbing -- basically the plumbing of the cell itself.”

9. Section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes, recognizes that
hearsay is admissible during the penalty phase “provided the
defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay
statements.” This Court has broadly stated on several occasions
that hearsay in the penalty phase must also satisfy the right to
confrontation. See, e.g., Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 663 (Fla.
2006). Indeed, this Court has described as “uncontroverted” the
“proposition that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
applies to all three phases of the capital trial.” Rodriguez v. State,
753 So. 2d 29, 43 (Fla. 2000). We have no occasion here to
reexamine our precedent, but we note that other courts disagree
with that broad proposition. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Sec’y, Fla.

- 39 -
around the individuals who testified about his prior violent felony

convictions. Some of the testimony of those individuals recounted

statements made by others during the investigations of those prior

crimes. But even assuming there was hearsay that might implicate

the Confrontation Clause, any errors were harmless “given the

number of strong aggravators in this case,” Rodriguez v. State, 753

So. 2d 29, 45 (Fla. 2000), the State’s introduction of certified copies

of the prior convictions thus establishing the relevant aggravators,

and any hearsay being ancillary or cumulative to other evidence

about the prior convictions, including Boatman’s own statements to

investigators about those crimes, see Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d

655, 663-65 (Fla. 2006) (holding that “hearsay testimony presented

in the penalty phase about [defendant’s] prior manslaughter

conviction”—namely “the admission of [eyewitness’s] statements

Dep’t of Corr., 733 F.3d 1065, 1074 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949), and plurality opinion in Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349 (1977), “together stand for the proposition that a
defendant does not have a right to confront hearsay declarants at a
capital sentencing hearing, but that he does have a right to rebut
information relevant to his character and record that is admitted
against him”).

- 40 -
through the [testimony of the] former investigating officer and

assistant state attorney”—violated the Confrontation Clause but

was harmless, where “the State introduced a certified copy of the

prior manslaughter conviction, which established the prior violent

felony conviction aggravator,” and where eyewitness’s statements

were “merely cumulative to, and corroborative of, [defendant’s] own

admissions”).

For example, Boatman takes issue with testimony from

Inspector Ortiz regarding Boatman’s conviction for the third-degree

murder of inmate Ricky Morris at Charlotte Correctional. Ortiz,

who arrived at the scene after the attack, testified about certain

things said and done by the CO who discovered Morris facedown

and bleeding in Boatman’s cell and who witnessed Boatman

continuing to beat Morris. Over objection, Ortiz testified the CO

said that after Morris was discovered facedown and bleeding in

Boatman’s cell, “Boatman began to beat Morris some more,” and

that he (the CO) “tried to get attention from staff and that Boatman

continued to beat Morris.” But Boatman’s own admissions were

introduced, also through Inspector Ortiz, including Boatman telling

investigators that after the CO “discovered them,” Boatman “started

- 41 -
to slam Morris’s head into the concrete floor.” The CO’s statements

were “merely cumulative to, and corroborative of, [Boatman’s] own

admissions.” Rodgers, 948 So. 2d at 665.

Boatman takes issue with six photos admitted during

Detective Dice’s testimony about the first-degree murders Boatman

committed in the Ocala National Forest. The photos are of that

crime scene and those two victims’ bodies. Dice, who was involved

in the investigation, testified that the photos were in the case file

and accurately reflect what was described to him at the time of the

investigation. Boatman’s specific claim on appeal is unclear. He

does not provide any authority to support a claim that hearsay was

erroneously admitted or that the Confrontation Clause was violated;

the photos were not a feature of the penalty phase; and he fails to

explain how the judge erred in rejecting a “gruesomeness”

argument.

As to the testimony about Boatman’s conviction for the

attempted second-degree murder of inmate Apicella at Cross City

Correctional, Boatman takes issue with Inspector Hamner’s

testimony about a sworn interview the since-deceased lead

inspector conducted with Apicella. Of relevance, Apicella stated

- 42 -
that the week before the attack, Boatman told Apicella that he

stabbed a CO while in Marion County Jail. Here, the statement was

introduced by the State—in response to the defense’s opening

statement suggesting that Boatman acted in self-defense against a

threatening Apicella—to show the victim’s state of mind, namely

that Apicella thought Boatman was violent and thus Apicella would

not have been the aggressor. The statement was not offered for its

truth (i.e., that Boatman stabbed a CO). Indeed, the stabbing never

took place, and the State agreed to a stipulation to be read to the

jury that Boatman never stabbed a CO at the Marion County Jail.

In short, we reject Boatman’s assertion that “evidentiary

rulings prevented him from receiving a fair trial.”

Sufficiency of Evidence / Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

In two related issues, Boatman argues the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction, and that the court erred in

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We disagree.

To prove first-degree premeditated murder, the State was

required to establish three elements: (1) the victim is dead; (2) the

death was caused by the criminal act of the defendant; and (3) the

victim’s death was premeditated. Allen, 322 So. 3d at 603 (citing

- 43 -
Glover v. State, 226 So. 3d 795, 804 (Fla. 2017)). In our review of

whether competent, substantial evidence supports Boatman’s

conviction, we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State” and ask whether “a rational trier of fact could have found the

existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).

Here, the testimony of numerous witnesses (including the

medical examiner), the videos, and Boatman’s own words

sufficiently established that Chapman is dead, that his death was

caused by the criminal act of Boatman, and that his death was

premeditated.

We have defined “premeditation” as “a fully formed conscious

purpose to kill.” Sexton v. State, 221 So. 3d 547, 558 (Fla. 2017)

(quoting Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991)). Here, the

murder videos show that, among other things, Boatman procured

two shanks in advance of the murder, blocked the dayroom door,

and, with Wells, viciously attacked Chapman for more than ten

minutes before Boatman stomped on a shank in the back of

Chapman’s neck. Boatman stated during his interview that he and

Wells decided days earlier to kill Chapman at the earliest

- 44 -
opportunity. And two COs testified that, during the attack,

Boatman said something along the lines of “[T]his guy’s going to die

today.” This evidence was certainly sufficient to establish

premeditation.

Because competent, substantial evidence supports the

conviction, the evidence was necessarily sufficient to survive

Boatman’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See, e.g., Sievers v.

State, 355 So. 3d 871, 883 (Fla. 2022) (“We review the denial of a

motion for judgment of acquittal de novo and uphold convictions

supported by competent, substantial evidence.” (citing Pagan v.

State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002))). We deny these claims.

Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 7.7(b)

Boatman argues the court abused its discretion in denying his

request for Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.7(b)

(“Unnecessary Killing to Prevent an Unlawful Act”), which is based

on section 782.11, Florida Statutes, a manslaughter statute.

Instruction 7.7(b) outlines “four elements” of “the crime of

Unnecessary Killing to Prevent an Unlawful Act,” as follows:

1. (Victim) attempted to commit [a felony] [an unlawful
act].

- 45 -
2. (Victim’s) attempt to commit [a felony] [an unlawful
act] was independent of a[n] [[threatened] unlawful act]
directed solely toward (defendant).
3. (Defendant) resisted (victim’s) [failed] attempt to
commit [a felony] [an unlawful act] by intentionally
committing an act or acts that caused the death of
(victim).
4. (Defendant’s) killing of (victim) was unnecessary.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7(b). The exact nature of Boatman’s

argument on appeal is unclear.

To the extent Boatman argues Instruction 7.7(b) applies

because he acted to prevent being sexually battered, he overlooks

that, during the charge conference, after the judge stated there was

“no evidence, under any strain of persuasion, that would support

that Mr. Chapman was committing an unlawful sexual battery,”

defense counsel conceded the instruction does not apply to self-

defense and was “not directed at Mr. Boatman.” Moreover,

Boatman overlooks State v. Carrizales, 356 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1978),

which held that a jury instruction on section 782.11 is not required

“when the accused’s defense is self-defense and where the trial

judge instructs on the applicable degrees of homicide, excusable

homicide, justifiable homicide, and self-defense.” Id. at 274-75.

Those are the circumstances here.

- 46 -
To the extent Boatman instead argues Instruction 7.7(b)

applies because he prevented consensual sexual acts between other

inmates, he fails to explain how a consensual sexual act that

violates DOC policies is “an unlawful act” as contemplated by

Instruction 7.7(b). Even assuming a violation of prison rules—as

opposed to a criminal act—qualifies as “an unlawful act,” Boatman

fails to point to any evidence of “an unlawful act” not directed at

him. We deny this claim.

Waiver of Penalty-Phase Jury

Boatman argues the court erred in accepting—over the

objection of defense counsel—his pro se waiver of the penalty-phase

jury. Boatman asserts he “was not competent to knowingly and

intelligently . . . waive said right.” We disagree.

“A waiver of the right to a [penalty-phase] jury trial must be

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Knight v. State, 211 So. 3d 1,

17 (Fla. 2016). “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing,

intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands

the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in

the circumstances.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)

(emphasis omitted); see Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1054

- 47 -
(citing Ruiz in a case involving defendant’s “waiver of his right to the

assistance of counsel during the penalty phase”).

The knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of a waiver of a

penalty-phase jury is something “the record must affirmatively

show.” Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974). Here, the

record—including Boatman’s lengthy colloquies and his written

waiver—firmly supports the trial court’s decision. See, e.g., Lynch

v. State, 254 So. 3d 312, 319-20 (Fla. 2018) (concluding that, based

on the “extensive colloquy with [defendant] with regard to his

understanding of the rights he sought to waive,” and “both the oral

and written waiver,” which evidenced that defendant “was fully

advised of his right to a penalty phase jury,” defendant “knowingly

and voluntarily waived that right”).

At the end of the second day of the penalty phase, defense

counsel informed the judge that Boatman was “expressing desires

to potentially dismiss the jury.” After some discussion, Boatman

agreed to the judge’s suggestion to think about it for one more night

and to discuss the matter with counsel. The next morning, the

judge conducted a lengthy colloquy with Boatman and came away

with no “reasonable belief” that he was incompetent or that the

- 48 -
desired waiver was “not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

decision.” But the judge delayed ruling and requested that Dr.

Werner, who was scheduled to testify in the afternoon, speak to

Boatman, to which Boatman agreed.

After Dr. Werner testified, the judge conducted another

lengthy colloquy with Boatman, who reaffirmed his desire to waive

the jury. Among other things, Boatman stated that: he considered

the decision for three years; his attorneys had persuaded him to

stay with the jury, but he regretted that decision; he had “[s]everal

reasons” for waiving the jury, including not wanting the jurors to

“have to . . . make a decision that could weigh on their conscience”;

he understood all jurors would have to recommend death before

death could be considered; he was not under the influence of

anything; he considered the advice of counsel; the court would

continue to listen to the evidence and arguments and then apply

the law; he believed the judge would be fair; and his decision was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Boatman also signed a written

waiver. And he stated he was not hoping for or trying to get a death

sentence and was not waiving further mitigation.

Boatman then privately talked with Dr. Werner, who returned

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to testify in the absence of the jury. She continued to believe

Boatman was “motivated to get off of close management.” She

conceded the decision “would be a rationale [sic] decision for some

individuals.” And she was hardly certain when asked if Boatman’s

decision was free, knowing, and voluntary, saying: “I think that’s a

question . . . . I don’t believe so.” She also made clear Boatman did

not tell her he viewed the waiver as “his best chance of getting to

death row.” On cross examination, she conceded Boatman

understood the consequences and was making a rational choice in

his mind. Boatman also explained to her “why he waited to this

point” to waive the jury, including that “he wanted to allow his

sister to have the opportunity to testify in front of the jury because

he felt that that would alleviate some of her guilt or feelings of

guilt.” In response to questions from the judge, Dr. Werner

answered in the negative when asked whether Boatman was

“incompetent to make this decision.” And she was again uncertain

in her opinion that Boatman’s decision was not free, saying: “I’m

not sure.”

After Boatman informed the court that his decision had not

changed, and after final argument, the judge granted the waiver,

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concluding it was “overwhelmingly clear” Boatman’s decision was

valid. We agree. The record conclusively shows Boatman’s waiver

was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The colloquies reflect an

intelligent man who considered the decision for years, provided

reasons for his waiver, and repeatedly affirmed he understood the

nature of the right he was waiving and the consequences of doing

so. To the extent Boatman frames this issue as one of

“competence,” his argument is without merit. Dr. Werner conceded

Boatman was competent, and the judge emphasized Boatman had

not “suddenly . . . lost [his] competence.” We deny this claim.

Florida’s Death Penalty Scheme

Boatman argues Florida’s death penalty scheme “does not

narrow the death-eligible class in a way consistent with the Eighth

Amendment.” Citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988),

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and certain law review

articles, Boatman asserts that the “large class of death eligible

murder offenses” under Florida’s scheme is problematic. Last year,

we explained that this Court has “repeatedly rejected” the argument

regarding “the sheer number of aggravating factors in the statute,”

including “recently—even with the statute in its current form.”

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Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1015 (Fla. 2023) (citing cases).

Boatman “makes no novel or compelling argument that would

warrant reconsideration of the numerous recent decisions of this

Court.” Bevel v. State, 376 So. 3d 587, 597-98 (Fla. 2023). We

deny this claim.

CCP; HAC; Mental Illness; Proportionality

In this final claim, Boatman appears to present four sub-

issues, namely that: (1) the court erred in finding CCP; (2) the court

erred in finding HAC; (3) Boatman’s “serious mental illness”

exempts him from the death penalty in the same way Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002), exempt juveniles and those with intellectual disability,

respectively; and (4) Boatman’s death sentence is disproportionate.

Sub-issues (3) and (4) are plainly foreclosed by our case law.

Indeed, this Court “lacks the authority to extend Atkins to

individuals who . . . are not intellectually disabled as provided in

Atkins,” Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 795 (Fla.), cert. denied,

143 S. Ct. 2452 (2023), and is “forbid[den] . . . from analyzing death

sentences for comparative proportionality in the absence of a

statute establishing that review,” Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544,

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545 (Fla. 2020). As to sub-issues (1) and (2), competent,

substantial evidence supports the findings of CCP and HAC,

respectively.

The CCP aggravator requires proof that

the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection
and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a
fit of rage (cold); that the defendant had a careful plan or
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal
incident (calculated); that the defendant exhibited
heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.

Joseph, 336 So. 3d at 239 (quoting Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79,

98 (Fla. 2007)). Boatman appears to take issue with the “cold” and

“no pretense of moral or legal justification” elements. But he invites

this Court either to reweigh evidence or to “judge this aggravator by

the prison code.”

Our role is not to reweigh the evidence. Rather, “[t]he trial

court’s finding of [CCP] is reviewed for competent, substantial

evidence.” Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 178 (Fla.

2020). Here, the sentencing order lays out how CCP was

established by the evidence. As the trial court explained, “[t]he

manner and circumstances of the crime demonstrate careful

planning to ensure the desired result (the death of the victim) which

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is supported by [Boatman’s] own admissions.” That planning

included selecting the victim days in advance, coordinating with

Wells to obtain shanks and ligatures, and blocking the dayroom

door. The evidence “show[s] such facts as advance procurement of

a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of

a killing carried out as a matter of course.” Ballard v. State, 66 So.

3d 912, 919 (Fla. 2011) (citing Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270

(Fla. 1988)).

We reject Boatman’s assertion that “any planning would have

been secondary to his fight or flight response” from “being passed

over” on CM review fifteen days earlier. The evidence does not

reflect “an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage.”

Joseph, 336 So. 3d at 239 (quoting Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98).

We also reject Boatman’s “prison code” proposal, which lacks

any authority. In any event, the sentencing order explains there

was “no credible evidence of a moral or legal justification for the

murder,” including “no credible evidence” either that Chapman “had

any intent to attack [Boatman]” or that Boatman “was under any

actual threat prior to, or at the time of, the murder.”

As to HAC, this Court has said the aggravator

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applies to murders that are both “conscienceless or
pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.”
Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 134 (Fla. 2001). . . . To
support HAC, “the evidence must show that the victim
was conscious and aware of impending death.” King v.
State, 130 So. 3d 676, 684 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Douglas
v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2004)).

Joseph, 336 So. 3d at 236-37. This Court has also said that “death

by strangulation constitutes prima facie evidence of HAC.” Barnhill

v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2002). And “[t]his Court has

consistently concluded that a finding of HAC was appropriate in

cases where the victim was repeatedly stabbed.” Santiago-Gonzalez,

301 So. 3d at 179 (citing cases).

Here, as noted in the sentencing order and as established by

the medical examiner, “the primary mechanism of death was

multiple stabbings by metal shanks, blunt force trauma, and

strangulation by use of a ligature.” (Emphasis added.) The evidence

shows a torturous attack lasting “over 10 minutes” and “intended

not only to kill the victim but to make him suffer physically and

mentally.” Chapman clearly “was conscious and aware of

impending death.” Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 15 (Fla. 2020). In

short, “[c]ompetent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s

finding of HAC.” Santiago-Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 179. The cases

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cited by Boatman are either distinguishable or support the HAC

finding. See, e.g., Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1262 (Fla.

2004) (upholding HAC and analogizing to cases in which HAC was

“based on evidence that the victims were brutally beaten and

remained conscious for at least part of the attack”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm Boatman’s conviction

and death sentence.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

In Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), this Court

abandoned its decades-long practice of comparative proportionality

review in the direct appeals of sentences of death. Because I

continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence, I can only concur in

the result.

- 56 -
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,
James Matthew Colaw, Judge
Case No. 042019CF000706CFBXMX

David J. Joffe of Joffe Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A.
Buchwalter, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee

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