Richard Barry Randolph v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2024-0273
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RICHARD BARRY RANDOLPH,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

December 5, 2024

COURIEL, J.

Richard Barry Randolph, a prisoner under sentence of death,

appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his third

successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Thirty-five years after his conviction,

Randolph claims to have learned of newly discovered evidence: the

identity of his birth parents. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,

§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. As explained below, we affirm.

I

A jury found Randolph guilty of first-degree murder, armed
robbery, sexual battery with force likely to cause serious personal

injury or with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle.

We have previously recounted the facts of his brutal crime. See

Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331, 332-33 (Fla. 1990). What is of

primary relevance to his current appeal is that, at the penalty phase

of his trial, Randolph presented testimony from a single witness:

psychologist Dr. Harry Krop. Dr. Krop testified that Randolph was

adopted at five months of age by an emotionally unstable mother

and physically abusive father, which contributed, along with his

later substance use, to his atypical personality disorder. Dr. Krop

testified that Randolph’s birth parents were young college students,

but no other information about them was known. The jury

recommended the death penalty. The trial court accepted that

recommendation and sentenced Randolph to death. We affirmed.

Id. at 332.

Randolph’s postconviction relief efforts have been

unsuccessful. See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 676 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1996)

(consolidating and remanding all “Howard Pearl” cases); Randolph v.

State, 853 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2003) (affirming the postconviction

court’s finding that none of the additional mitigation witnesses at

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the evidentiary hearing offered any evidence other than what had

already been presented by Dr. Krop at the penalty phase); Randolph

v. Crosby, 861 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2003) (denying petition for habeas

relief); Randolph v. State, 320 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2021) (affirming

denial of second successive postconviction motion).

A recent change in New York law allowed Randolph to retrieve

his original birth certificate, reunite with his birth mother, and

learn additional facts about his birth parents. His birth mother was

in fact a 17-year-old high school student when he was born, not a

college student. Both his birth parents did indeed graduate from

college, however, and both went on to have successful relationships

and careers after placing him for adoption. Neither of them appears

to have been affected by mental health challenges or substance use

disorders. Each of his birth parents would, if called, testify to that

effect.

Randolph claims that this information, coupled with testimony

from an adoption expert, would probably yield a life sentence. This

newly discovered evidence would help his case, he contends,

because it would tend to show that he lacked a genetic

predisposition to criminal violence, and that a significant

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contributing factor to his decision-making was the cruelty he

suffered as a child from his adoptive parents.

The circuit court summarily denied the motion, ruling that the

proffered evidence, even if newly discovered, fails under the second

prong of Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998). The court

reasoned, in part, that the evidence is neither relevant to his

character nor the circumstances of the offense. This appeal follows.

II

The circuit court did not err in denying Randolph’s

postconviction motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

“[This Court] review[s] a circuit court’s summary rejection of a

postconviction claim de novo, ‘accepting the movant’s factual

allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record,

and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the

movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Harvey v. State, 318 So. 3d 1238,

1239 n.2 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1215

(Fla. 2019)). “A circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing on

a rule 3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant makes a facially

sufficient claim that requires a factual determination.’ ” Rogers v.

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State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108

So. 3d 558, 560 (Fla. 2012)).

To be facially sufficient, newly discovered evidence must meet

the two-prong Jones test. We have described that test as follows:

First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it
must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could
not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the
newly discovered evidence must be of such [a] nature
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.

Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50, 53 (Fla. 2022) (alteration in

original) (quoting Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016)).

Since Randolph sought to vacate his death sentence rather than his

conviction, “the second prong requires [a showing] that the newly

discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.”

Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 249 (Fla. 2018). Summary denial

of a newly-discovered-evidence claim is authorized “if the motion,

files, and record refute the allegations pertaining to either (or both)

prongs of the Jones test.” Rogers, 327 So. 3d at 787 (citing Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)).

While the scope of permissible mitigation evidence is broad,

see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), Randolph has not

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shown that evidence regarding the identity of his birth parents

would probably yield a less severe sentence.

We accept his factual allegations as true, as our precedent

requires. Yet mitigation evidence must be “relevant to the

defendant’s character, his prior record, and the circumstances of

the offense in issue.” Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935, 944 (Fla. 2009)

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Hess v. State, 794 So. 2d 1249, 1269

(Fla. 2001)), as revised on denial of reh’g (Oct. 8, 2009); see also

Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (“Nothing in this opinion limits the

traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence

not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the

circumstances of his offense.”).

The identity of Randolph’s birth parents, their degree of

educational attainment at the time of his birth, and their generally

successful lives do not tend to prove or disprove any matter at

issue. He therefore cannot show that the evidence he seeks to

introduce would yield a less severe sentence. And even if

Randolph’s genetic traits were a matter on which the sentencing

court had to pass, the fact that his birth parents are from all

outward appearances well-adjusted people would not necessarily

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establish anything about their, or his, inherited traits. See

§ 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2023).

Had Randolph not been adopted, or adopted by different

people, it well may be that the environmental factors that

contributed to his development would have been different. But Dr.

Krop already testified that the abuse Randolph suffered from his

adoptive parents contributed to or reinforced his personality

disorder. Dr. Krop also testified about the increased likelihood of

strong psychological well-being for individuals raised by stable and

loving parents compared to those raised by abusive ones.

The newly discovered information is also not relevant to the

four aggravating factors at issue: that the crime was committed

during commission or flight after commission of a sexual battery; to

avoid or prevent lawful arrest; for pecuniary gain; and under

circumstances that rendered it especially heinous, atrocious, or

cruel. Summary denial was appropriate in light of these

conclusively established aggravators.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order summarily

denying Randolph’s third successive postconviction motion.

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It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Putnam County,
Howard O. McGillin, Judge
Case No. 541988CF001357CFAXMX

Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Marie-Louise
Samuels Parmer, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, and Jeanine Cohen, Staff Attorney, Office of Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris
Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach,
Florida,

for Appellee

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