Robert Craft v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2023-1501
____________

ROBERT CRAFT,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

December 19, 2024

SASSO, J.

Robert Craft, a prisoner under a sentence of death, appeals

the circuit court’s denial of his initial motion for postconviction

relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons we

explain below, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.
I

A

The facts of this case, set forth in this Court’s opinion on

direct appeal, are as follows:

On May 16, 2018, Craft strangled and beat to death
Darren W. Shira in the cell they shared at Columbia
Correctional Institution. Following Shira’s murder, Craft
confessed multiple times, including in two recorded
statements to Special Agent Terrance Tyler of the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement and in letters to the
state attorney’s office and the trial court.
The trial court accurately summarized Craft’s
statements and the circumstances of the killing in the
sentencing order, in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he Defendant [admitted] that he
“tortured” the victim “on purpose.” He
explained the various methods and manner in
which he attacked the victim over
approximately 30 minutes [and] . . . [h]e
admitted that he only stopped this relentless
attack when the victim’s feet turned purple,
there was blood coming out of the victim’s
nose, and the victim’s eyes were bulging. . . .
....
. . . The Defendant admitted that the
victim did not pose a threat to him nor did the
victim initiate the altercation. Rather, the
Defendant admitted that the victim was lying
on his bed when the Defendant initiated the
attack by slapping the victim’s feet. As soon
as the victim sat up, the Defendant smacked
or punched the victim’s face and then
launched into a physical attack that lasted,
according to the Defendant, about a half hour.

-2-
The Defendant explained that he first
attempted to crush the victim’s neck but that
this proved more difficult than in the movies,
so he had to strangle the victim. The victim
offered minimal resistance. Nonetheless, the
Defendant “beat on” the victim with his fists,
continued to choke the victim, and pulled the
victim off of his bed and onto the floor where
the Defendant used his feet against the wall as
leverage to push down on the victim’s throat.
The Defendant also tore off the white stripe
that runs down the side of the prison pants
and tied this around the victim’s neck. . . .
....
[Further,] . . . the Defendant admitted
that he had planned the murder. Specifically,
he explained that, after learning that the
victim was in prison for allegedly molesting
children, the Defendant determined that he
was going to kill the victim and immediately
began planning the murder, which he
committed a few days later. According to his
own admission, the Defendant waited because
he first wanted to inform his sister, via letter,
that he was going to “catch a body.” He also
informed other inmates, prior to the killing,
that he was going to kill the victim and was
even offered a knife for the killing, which he
refused. Another inmate, according to the
Defendant, attempted to convince the
Defendant not to do it. The Defendant also
realized that the killing would likely be bloody,
so he removed the victim’s pants and donned
them during the attack to prevent his pants
from getting covered in blood. He further
admitted that he had intended to sodomize the
victim but that he could not do that.
Moreover, while explaining to Special Agent
Tyler that he had planned the murder for a few

-3-
days, he stated that he wanted the murder to
be “CCP” and even asked if it would be
considered a hate crime because the victim
was Jewish, gay, a child molester, and ex-
Navy. The Defendant also told Special Agent
Tyler that he had told the victim, while they
were eating dinner [just before the killing], that
this was the victim’s last meal and that it was
a pretty “f[***]ed up” last meal.[n.6]
[N.6] Even the discovery of the
body was orchestrated by the
Defendant: he told the inmate
trustee that he had some trash, and
when directed to slide it under the
door of his cell, he stated that a
dead body would not fit.
Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d 45, 47-48 (Fla. 2020) (alterations and

omissions in original).

On October 1, 2018, Craft was indicted for premeditated first-

degree murder. Id. at 48. Shortly thereafter, Craft “began

expressing his desires to quickly end his case, plead guilty, waive a

penalty-phase jury, waive mitigation, and receive the death

penalty.” Id. On January 23, 2019, the trial court held a hearing

during which Craft “maintained that he wanted to waive counsel

and represent himself, that he wanted to proceed with a speedy

bench trial, and that he did ‘not want mitigation.’ ” Id.

-4-
Before ruling on Craft’s request to waive counsel and proceed

pro se, the trial court ordered two mental health experts, Dr.

Salvatore M. Blandino and Dr. Chris P. Robison, to evaluate Craft

for competency. Id. at 49. Dr. Blandino and Dr. Robison evaluated

Craft in tandem on March 25, 2019, and reported that Craft was

competent to represent himself. Id. On March 27, 2019, the trial

court orally found Craft competent based on the experts’

evaluations, conducted a Faretta 1 inquiry, ruled that Craft could

waive counsel and represent himself, and appointed standby

counsel. Id.

Craft then “immediately announced his desire to plead guilty.”

Id. After a recess, the trial court conducted a plea colloquy with

Craft. Id. During the colloquy, Craft stated that he did not have all

the State’s discovery but explained that he wanted to plead guilty

anyway. The specific exchange between Craft and the trial judge

was as follows:

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I spoke to the State about it. I
had two motions. One of them I don’t need now because
I’m putting in a plea of guilty, but I have one that I was
going submit [sic], a demand for discovery. Because I

1. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

-5-
was sent a discovery, but from the index, going over the
index part, the whole discovery is not there.

THE COURT: Do you want to wait on taking your plea
until after you have received that other discovery or you
just want it for your own records later?

THE DEFENDANT: I want it for my own records later,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: That’s really important because if there’s
anything in that discovery that might affect whether you
want to plead guilty, then it needs to be in your hands
and you need to review it before you plead guilty. If
you’re telling me, regardless of what it says, I want to
plead guilty. I want those papers, but it’s not going to
affect my plea. Do you want to plead today even without
those papers?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

Following the colloquy, Craft pled guilty and stated he wanted

to waive his right to a penalty-phase hearing. Id. at 49-50. The

trial court accepted Craft’s guilty plea, finding it was “freely,

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given.” Id. at 50.

On May 13, 2019, the trial court held Craft’s penalty-phase

proceeding. Id. Craft maintained his desire to continue to waive

counsel and a penalty-phase jury and indicated that he did not

intend to present mitigation. Id. However, Craft ultimately allowed

the testimony of four family members. Id. Additionally, he made

-6-
his own statement explaining why he pled guilty, admitting that he

killed the victim, explaining why he wanted a death sentence,

expressing love for his family, and saying he was sorry that his

actions had made them suffer. Id. at 50-51.

Thereafter, the trial court held a combined Spencer2 and

sentencing hearing. Id. at 51. During the hearing, Craft

maintained his desire to represent himself, confirmed that he did

not want to be heard on any of the information contained in the

pre-sentence investigation, and stated that he did not want to offer

anything else that had not been offered previously. Id. The trial

court sentenced Craft to death. Id. In the direct appeal, this Court

affirmed Craft’s conviction for first-degree murder and death

sentence. Id. at 58. Among other things, we determined “that

Craft’s guilty plea to first-degree murder was knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary.” Id.

B

Craft filed a “Motion to Vacate Judgments of Conviction and

Sentence with Special Request for Leave to Amend” pursuant to

2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

-7-
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 on November 15, 2022.

Craft’s rule 3.851 motion sought to vacate his conviction and

sentence on six grounds. 3 On July 6, 2023, the circuit court

conducted a Huff4 hearing to determine whether an evidentiary

hearing was necessary to address any of the claims raised in Craft’s

motion. After the Huff hearing, Craft filed a report of a

neuropsychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Barry M. Crown on

June 6, 2023, in support of his motion.

Ultimately, the circuit court summarily denied each of Craft’s

claims. Craft now appeals the circuit court’s decision. Specifically,

3. The grounds were: (1) trial counsel was prejudicially
ineffective in failing to seek a delay in the Faretta and change of
plea proceedings (this ground also included claims that the trial
court did not place Craft under oath before the plea colloquy and
that if Craft had received all the State’s discovery he would not have
pled guilty); (2) prosecutorial misconduct in failing to investigate
claims that the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) guards
wanted the victim to be harmed; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in
failing to advise the court of the FDOC guards’ role in the killing of
the victim as a possible mitigating factor; (4) the State committed a
Giglio/Napue violation by advising the court that Craft could have
no pretense of moral justification because there was no evidence the
victim was a child molester; (5) Craft’s intellectual disability
precluded imposition of the death penalty; and (6) cumulative error.
Craft withdrew claim five during the Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982
(Fla. 1993), hearing.

4. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

-8-
Craft argues that the circuit court erred in (1) denying his claim for

ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to delay the Faretta and

change of plea hearings; (2) denying his claim based on

prosecutorial misconduct for failing to investigate allegations that

the guards wanted the victim to be harmed; (3) denying his claim

based on prosecutorial misconduct for failing to advise the trial

court of the guards housing him with the victim as a possible

mitigating factor; and (4) denying his claim based on a misleading

closing argument in violation of Giglio v. United States 5 and Napue

v. Illinois. 6 Craft also alleges cumulative error.

II

A circuit court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary

hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is essentially a pure question of law

subject to de novo review. Hojan v. State, 212 So. 3d 982, 989 (Fla.

2017); Reynolds v. State, 99 So. 3d 459, 471 (Fla. 2012). As we

explained in Hojan:

When reviewing the circuit court’s summary denial of an
initial rule 3.851 motion, [the Court] will accept the
movant’s factual allegations as true and will affirm the

5. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

6. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).

-9-
ruling only if the filings show that the movant has failed
to state a facially sufficient claim, there is no issue of
material fact to be determined, the claim should have
been brought on direct appeal, or the claim is positively
refuted by the record.
212 So. 3d at 989 (quoting Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 911

(Fla. 2013)).

“An evidentiary hearing must be held on an initial 3.851

motion whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that

requires factual determination.” Id. at 988 (quoting Barnes, 124 So.

3d at 911). “[T]he defendant bears the burden of establishing a

prima facie case based on a legally valid claim.” Id. at 989 (internal

quotations omitted) (quoting Barnes, 124 So. 3d at 911). “[T]o the

extent there is any question as to whether a rule 3.851 movant has

made a facially sufficient claim requiring a factual determination,

the Court will presume that an evidentiary hearing is required.” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Barnes, 124 So. 3d at 911).

III

A

Although Craft raises five issues on appeal, Craft appropriately

recognizes that the success of each claim rests on this Court’s

determination of his first claim. We therefore begin by evaluating

- 10 -
whether the circuit court erred when it denied Craft’s claim of

ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to delay the Faretta and

change of plea hearings.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Craft must

demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2)

the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Smith v. State, 330 So. 3d

867, 875 (Fla. 2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984)). “To establish deficiency, the defendant must show a

specific act or omission by counsel that falls below an objective

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”

Hampton v. State, 219 So. 3d 760, 770 (Fla. 2017) (citing Francois v.

State, 423 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1982)). “[T]he defendant must

establish ‘that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.’ ” Smith, 330 So. 3d at 875 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687). “[T]here is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s

performance was not ineffective . . . .” Hampton, 219 So. 3d at 770.

As to prejudice, when a defendant challenges his guilty plea based

on ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

- 11 -
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Brant v. State, 197 So. 3d 1051, 1063-64 (Fla. 2016) (quoting

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

In examining Craft’s first claim, we note that although Craft

has presented it as a singular issue, the claim presents two

subclaims, one of which is cognizable and one of which is not.

Regardless, both fail.

Craft’s first subclaim is that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to obtain a delay of the Faretta hearing. On this point, Craft

argues that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel was on

notice that Craft had frontal lobe brain damage that could be

impairing his judgment, including his decision-making ability. For

that reason, Craft argues, trial counsel should have sought

neuropsychological testing and delayed the Faretta hearing.

While this subclaim is properly presented, we reject Craft’s

argument. Prior to the Faretta hearing, two court-appointed experts

evaluated Craft and found him competent to proceed. Both experts’

reports noted Craft had potential brain damage from a past car

accident and from his mother’s use of drugs and alcohol while she

was pregnant with him. Nonetheless, both experts concluded that

- 12 -
Craft was competent to waive counsel and enter a guilty plea. Trial

counsel had the benefit of both expert reports and was permitted to

rely on the experts’ assessments. Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366,

377 (Fla. 2007) (finding no deficiency where trial counsel relied on

the evaluation conducted by a qualified mental health expert and

did not obtain neuropsychological testing, even if, in retrospect, the

evaluation may not have been as complete as others desire); see

also Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2011) (holding that trial counsel’s performance was not

deficient for trusting his expert’s opinion and for not seeking a more

thorough mental health evaluation). Therefore, trial counsel’s

actions were not deficient.

Because counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to

delay the Faretta hearing, Craft’s second subclaim necessarily fails.

In this subclaim, Craft argues counsel was ineffective for failing to

delay the change of plea hearing. But by this time, Craft was

proceeding pro se with standby counsel, and a pro se defendant—

“even if he has standby counsel”—“cannot later complain that the

quality of his defense was substandard or amounted to ineffective

assistance of counsel.” McKenzie v. State, 153 So. 3d 867, 878-79

- 13 -
(Fla. 2014) (citing Behr v. Bell, 665 So. 2d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla.

1996)). For that reason, Craft’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim related to the change of plea hearing is not cognizable.

In sum, each of Craft’s arguments as to deficient performance

of counsel fail, and as a result, his first claim does not provide a

basis for relief. 7 See also Davis v. State, 383 So. 3d 743, 757 (Fla.

2024) (“Because Strickland requires a defendant to establish both

prongs, if one prong is not met, the Court need not reach the other.”

(quoting Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803, 816 (Fla. 2022))).

B

We now turn to the second, third, and fourth claims Craft has

raised on appeal. Each of these claims is predicated on discovery

that Craft alleges, had he been aware of, he would not have entered

7. To the extent Craft argues the postconviction court erred in
denying an evidentiary hearing based on the State’s alleged
concession, we reject the argument both because, in context, we do
not consider the State’s statement regarding the potential necessity
of an evidentiary hearing to be a concession and because if the
State conceded, it was a legal issue to which the postconviction
court was not bound. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 395 So. 3d 127, 130
(Fla. 2024) (“[E]ven characterizing the State’s comments at the first
hearing as a concession as to whether Okafor permitted the trial
court to deviate from this Court’s mandate, the concession was not
binding.”).

- 14 -
a guilty plea. As Craft recognizes though, his second, third, and

fourth claims fall with his first.

Although presenting distinct legal arguments, each of Craft’s

claims addressed in this section references a recorded interview

that another inmate, Michael Bullett, gave to a Florida Department

of Law Enforcement agent. Craft says that in the interview, Bullett

told the agent that he was housed with Shira before being

transferred out and replaced with Craft. Bullett further stated that

when he was placed with Shira, the guards told him Shira was a

sex offender and asked Bullett to harm him. When Bullett refused,

Craft was transferred in. Craft asserts that this interview would

have corroborated his belief that he was “set up” by the FDOC

guards to murder the victim.

With this background established, Craft argues that the

postconviction court erred in denying his claim for relief based on

prosecutorial misconduct because the State failed to investigate

Bullett’s allegations that the prison guards intentionally placed

Craft into the same cell as the victim. However, Craft’s claim is

procedurally barred.

- 15 -
Craft entered his plea knowing that he did not have complete

discovery. It follows then that Craft could have discovered Bullett’s

statements through due diligence and raised this issue at the

appropriate time. As a result, the postconviction court properly

determined his claim could have been raised on direct appeal. See,

e.g., Morris v. State, 317 So. 3d 1054, 1063 (Fla. 2021) (testimony

contradicting witness in murder prosecution was not admissible in

hearing for postconviction relief, since testimony was not

unavailable at trial and could have been discovered with due

diligence); cf. Harich v. State, 542 So. 2d 980, 981 (Fla. 1989)

(finding conflict of interest claim was not procedurally barred

because it could not have been discovered previously through due

diligence).

For the same reasons, Craft’s third argument on appeal also

fails. The postconviction court did not err in denying his claim of

prosecutorial misconduct for failing to advise the court about the

guards placing Craft with Shira, which Craft characterizes as a

possible mitigating factor. Again, this claim is procedurally barred

notwithstanding Craft’s belated discovery of Bullett’s interview. See

Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 514 (Fla. 1999) (“Because we find

- 16 -
Downs was aware at the time of trial of the evidence he now claims

is newly discovered, his claim for ineffective assistance of guilt-

phase counsel based on newly discovered evidence is procedurally

barred.”).

Finally, the postconviction court also did not err in denying

Craft’s claim that the State committed a Giglio/Napue violation

when counsel for the State argued that Craft had no pretense of

moral justification when he committed the murder. “Claims of

improper argument should be raised on direct appeal and are

therefore procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings.”

Martin v. State, 311 So. 3d 778, 811 (Fla. 2020) (citing Jennings v.

State, 123 So. 3d 1101, 1121-22 (Fla. 2013)); see also Ferrell v.

State, 29 So. 3d 959, 977 (Fla. 2010) (“[A]s the trial court

concluded, this claim actually presents a substantive claim of

improper closing argument, which should have been raised on

direct appeal, and is thus procedurally barred.”).

More fundamentally though, Craft objects to the prosecutor’s

statement not because of what was in the record, but because of

what Craft believes should have been in the record. However, as

postconviction counsel conceded during the Huff hearing, this

- 17 -
potential evidence was not in the record because Craft waived

discovery.

In sum, each of Craft’s claims is predicated on discovery that

Craft waived. The claims are therefore procedurally barred and do

not provide a basis for relief.

C

Finally, Craft alleges cumulative error. However, because each

of Craft’s preceding claims fails, so does his claim of cumulative

error. Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1187 (Fla. 2022) (“[W]here

the individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred

or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also necessarily

fails.” (alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d

370, 380 (Fla. 2005))).

IV

Because the postconviction court did not err in summarily

denying Craft’s rule 3.851 motion, we affirm in all respects.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

- 18 -
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Columbia County,
Melissa G. Olin, Judge
Case No. 122018CF000667CFAXMX

Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Alice B.
Copek, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North Region,
Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

- 19 -