Jeffrey G. Hutchinson v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2025-0590
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JEFFREY G. HUTCHINSON,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

April 30, 2025

PER CURIAM.

For the murders he committed in 1998, Jeffrey Glenn

Hutchinson is scheduled to be executed on May 1, 2025, at 6:00

p.m. Since Hutchinson’s warrant issued on March 31, 2025, he

has litigated numerous issues, including his competency to be

executed. Hutchinson now appeals the circuit court’s order finding

him competent to be executed under state and federal law.

Carrying out our mandatory-review function, 1 we affirm, and also

deny Hutchinson’s motion for stay.

1. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
I

We have previously discussed at length the horrific crimes that

Hutchinson committed and for which he has been sentenced to die.

We will mention just a few facts to give background and context to

our discussion below.

After drinking at a local bar, Hutchinson drove to a home in

Crestview, Florida, where he lived with his then-girlfriend Renee

and her three young children. Armed with a pump-action shotgun,

he broke down the front door and proceeded to the bedroom where

he shot and killed Renee and two of her children—seven-year-old

Amanda and four-year-old Logan. He then fatally shot Geoffrey,

Renee’s nine-year-old son—once in the chest and once in the head.

Hutchinson called 911 and told the dispatcher that he had

just shot his family. Later in the call, he added something about

“some guys” being present at the home, implying that they were

responsible for the shootings.

Law enforcement arrested Hutchinson and took him to a

nearby police station. During the ensuing interview with officers,

Hutchinson expounded on his theory of innocence. In part,

Hutchinson said that the intruders wore black masks and were

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likely from Quantico. And he implored the interviewing officers to

find the perpetrators.

Ultimately, the State charged Hutchinson with four counts of

first-degree murder and sought the death penalty. At trial, the

State introduced overwhelming evidence of Hutchinson’s guilt.

Multiple witnesses said that Hutchinson’s voice was that of the 911

caller; witnesses indicated that blood from the victims, as well as

body tissue from Geoffrey, was on Hutchinson at the time of arrest;

and witnesses testified that the shotgun belonged to Hutchinson

and that Hutchinson had gun residue on his hands. Following

presentation of this evidence and more, the jury found Hutchinson

guilty as charged on all four murder counts.

With his guilt established, Hutchinson waived a jury for the

penalty phase. After hearing aggravating and mitigating evidence,

the trial court sentenced Hutchinson to death for the murders of

the three children, and to life for Renee’s murder.

Hutchinson appealed, but we affirmed. He soon began

collateral attacks on his convictions and death sentences. As part

of certain claims attacking his guilt, he argued complete innocence

of the crimes. Of note, he (with the assistance of counsel) has

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asserted numerous theories of innocence. One version was that

government-connected individuals from Quantico were the alleged

killers. Other times, Hutchinson said that the killers were two

(former) friends: Billy Taylor and Joel Adams. And at other times

still, he alleged that the killer was Renee’s ex-husband. But like the

rest of his postconviction claims, these innocence-related claims

were rejected by all courts to have considered them.

Turning to recent events, Hutchinson filed two more

successive postconviction motions in 2025. The circuit court

denied each of those motions, prompting two appeals. While these

appeals were pending, Hutchinson sent a letter to the Governor

asking that he be declared “insane” under section 922.07, Florida

Statutes (2024). As required by that statute, see § 922.07(1), the

Governor stayed the execution and appointed a three-person

commission to evaluate Hutchinson’s sanity—that is, whether he

“understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it

is to be imposed upon him.” Id. The commission consisted of three

psychiatrists: Dr. Tonia Werner, Dr. Wade Myers, and Dr. Emily

Lazarou. Based on interviews with prison staff, a review of

voluminous records, and a 90-minute in-person evaluation of

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Hutchinson, the commission found that Hutchinson satisfied the

statute’s definition of sanity. Agreeing with the commission’s

report, the Governor entered an executive order finding Hutchinson

sane to be executed. Consistent with that finding, the Governor

also lifted the stay.

Hutchinson then filed a motion in circuit court, asking to be

declared “insane” under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.811

and 3.812—a term meaning that the death-sentenced prisoner

lacks understanding of the fact of the forthcoming execution and

the State’s reasons for the punishment. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811(b);

3.812(b). Hutchinson also relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent,

which holds that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

bars the execution of those who are insane or incompetent at the

time such punishment is to be inflicted. 2

The circuit court held a hearing at which both sides presented

evidence on the issue of Hutchinson’s competency and sanity. For

his part, Hutchinson called nine witnesses, including past and

2. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from
inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”).

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present members of his legal team and two experts to support his

theory that delusions (namely, that the government was conspiring

against him to keep him quiet and that he viewed the execution as

the State’s ultimate way of enforcing that conspiracy) prevented him

from rationally understanding the State’s true reasons for the

punishment. As for the first category of witnesses, they indicated

that Hutchinson has long maintained a sincere belief that the

murders were the product of the government’s efforts to silence

him. Relying in part on these observations, Hutchinson’s experts

opined that his mental disorders—including Delusional Disorder—

rendered him unable to rationally understand the State’s reasons

for executing him.

The State countered this evidence with two experts of its own,

Dr. Werner and Dr. Myers. Both found that Hutchinson did not

suffer from Delusional Disorder or any other mental illness for that

matter. And in the final analysis, both concluded that Hutchinson

was, in fact, competent to be executed. Among other things, the

experts noted that Hutchinson’s detailed story of innocence had

evolved throughout the years and was not a subject of Hutchinson’s

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regular conversation with the prison staff. Indeed, three members

of that staff echoed this point.

Ultimately, the trial court credited the State’s witnesses and

found Hutchinson competent for purposes of execution. 3

Hutchinson now challenges the order making this finding. He also

seeks reversal of other orders denying his request for a continuance

or stay and declining to compel additional discovery.

II

The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of “cruel and

unusual punishment.” As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court,

this amendment prohibits the execution of those who have “lost

[their] sanity” or (using more modern terms) have become

“incompetent to be executed.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (framed in

terms of “sanity”); Dunn v. Madison, 583 U.S. 10, 13 (2017) (framed

in terms of “mental competence”).

This prohibition, the Supreme Court tells us, means that it is

unconstitutional for a state to execute someone “whose mental

3. In denying the requested relief, the circuit court found that
Hutchinson could not prevail under the clear-and-convincing
standard or the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

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illness makes him unable to ‘reach a rational understanding of the

reason for [his] execution.’ ” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265,

274 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman,

551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007)). Put differently, a state may not execute

a prisoner whose “concept of reality is so impaired that he cannot

grasp the execution’s meaning and purpose or the link between his

crime and its punishment.” Id. at 269 (cleaned up). In applying

this standard, the focus is on the prisoner’s “understanding of why

the State seeks capital punishment for a crime”—looking “beyond

any given diagnosis to [the] downstream consequence[s]” of the

mental illness. Id. at 276, 279.

In line with this precedent, our procedural rules also set forth

a competency standard and prohibit the execution of a death-

sentenced prisoner who cannot understand “the fact” of the pending

execution “and the reason for it.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811(b);

3.812(b). When a prisoner meets this standard, the court must

order stay relief. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.812(e).

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III

A

Hutchinson argues that the circuit court erred in finding him

competent to be executed. We disagree. Our review of any legal

issues is de novo. See Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1247

n.8 (Fla. 2021). If no legal error is shown, we will affirm where

there is “competent, substantial evidence supporting the circuit

court’s determination.” Owen v. State, 363 So. 3d 1035, 1038 (Fla.

2023) (citing Gore v. State, 120 So. 3d 554, 557 (Fla. 2013)).

To begin, Hutchinson has failed to demonstrate any legal error

in the challenged order. The court stated and applied the correct

legal standards in determining that Hutchinson was sane or

competent to be executed. In doing so, the court cited our recent

decision in Owens and indirectly quoted principles discussed above

from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Panetti and Madison.

Additionally, the court did not employ the restrictive procedures

found inadequate in Ford. 4 Nor did the court deem Hutchinson’s

4. Rather, the court allowed Hutchinson to present his
evidence on the subject of competency and to cross-examine the
State’s witnesses. The statute disapproved of in Ford did not give a
death-sentenced prisoner such procedural rights, and it entrusted

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claimed delusions to be irrelevant to its competency

determination—something that Panetti disapproved of. See Panetti,

551 U.S. at 960 (rejecting “a strict test for competency that treats

delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State

has identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be

inflicted”).

We now turn to the record to determine if the court’s findings

are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Here, the court

found that (1) Hutchinson understands that he is to be executed for

the children’s murders and that he will die if the execution is

successfully carried out; (2) Hutchinson does not have any current

mental health issues, including Delusional Disorder; (3) Hutchinson

provided no evidence that even if he did have Delusional Disorder,

he could not understand the link between the murders and the

impending execution; (4) Hutchinson has anti-social and

narcissistic traits; and (5) Hutchinson has raised his government-

conspiracy theory in an effort to avoid responsibility for the

murders and the death penalty.

the executive branch alone with the sanity determination. Ford,
477 U.S. at 413-16.

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The record supports these findings. At the hearing, the State’s

experts opined that Hutchinson rationally understands that Renee

and her three children were murdered and that he will die as a

result of the execution, should it go forward. Indeed, Hutchinson’s

own experts conceded as much. Additionally, an expert for the

State noted that although Hutchinson does not accept the State’s

reasons for executing him, he does have the capacity to appreciate

why the State would punish (by death) the person or persons who

murdered the three children.

The State’s experts also testified that while Hutchinson had

certain anti-social and narcissistic traits, they saw no indications of

current mental illness or signs of Delusional Disorder. This was

consistent with the Department of Corrections’ records (which noted

no such diagnosis or anything comparable to it), 5 Hutchinson’s

detailed—and evolving—descriptions of innocence, and

Hutchinson’s interactions with various prison staff. Nevertheless,

even assuming that Hutchinson had delusions, both experts opined

5. Indeed, Dr. Barry Crown, one of Hutchinson’s witnesses,
had not diagnosed Hutchinson with Delusional Disorder prior to
this proceeding, even having examined him multiple times in the
past.

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that such a disorder did not interfere with Hutchinson’s ability to

rationally understand the reasons for his execution.

Moreover, according to the experts, Hutchinson’s steadfast

commitment to the government-conspiracy theory was nothing

more than an “alibi” that he “stuck with” despite overwhelming

evidence to the contrary. In disagreeing with Hutchinson’s experts,

an expert for the State underscored that the length of time that an

individual adheres to a particular alibi is not indicative of mental

illness.

Though Hutchinson acknowledges the existence of this

evidence, he asks us to instead focus on the favorable evidence he

presented at the hearing—essentially urging us to credit that

evidence (though the trial court did not). But our job is not to

reassess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.

Lambrix v. State, 39 So. 3d 260, 268 (Fla. 2010) (“Appellate courts

do not ‘reweigh the evidence or second-guess the circuit court’s

findings as to the credibility of witnesses.’ ” (quoting Nixon v. State,

2 So. 3d 137, 141 (Fla. 2009))). Rather, we limit our review in this

respect to whether the circuit court’s determinations are supported

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by legally sufficient evidence. Calhoun v. State, 376 So. 3d 583, 586

(Fla. 2023) (a legal sufficiency standard). We find that they are.

In so holding, we again underscore what the circuit court also

noted: What matters is whether a person has the ‘rational

understanding’ of why the State seeks to execute him, not whether

he has any particular memory or any particular mental illness.

(Cleaned up.) As clearly articulated by the circuit court, “[t]here is

no credible evidence that in his current mental state Mr.

Hutchinson believes himself unable to die or that he is being

executed for any reason other than the murders he was convicted of

by a jury of his peers.”

Hutchinson’s steadfast refusal to take responsibility for his

actions aside, it is clear from the record that Hutchinson

understands and fully comprehends the following: Renee and her

three children were brutally murdered; the evidence against him

was great; a jury of his peers found him guilty; he was sentenced to

death in a court of law; the sentence of death will be executed upon

him for those crimes; and he will die as a result of the execution.

See Madison, 586 U.S. at 275; Ferguson v. State, 112 So. 3d 1154,

1156 (Fla. 2012) (“[F]or insanity to bar execution, the defendant

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must lack the capacity to understand the nature of the death

penalty and why it was imposed.”).

B

Hutchinson also argues that the circuit court erred in denying

his motions to continue the evidentiary hearing, for a stay, and for

additional discovery. Such rulings are committed to the sound

discretion of the court. Owen, 363 So. 3d at 1039 (continuances);

Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *3

(Fla. Apr. 25, 2025) (post-warrant discovery); Barwick v. Governor of

Florida, 66 F.4th 896, 902 (11th Cir. 2023) (stays). Having carefully

reviewed the record (including the motions, rulings, and transcripts)

as well as the briefing here, we believe that reasonable judges might

well agree with the court’s decisions not to postpone the hearing,

stay the execution, or compel the requested discovery. 6 Although

6. We note the following supportive facts: (1) due to the
professionalism and diligence of the presiding judge, court staff,
and the parties—the evidentiary hearing was completed in one
calendar day despite collateral counsel’s initial concerns that it
would take more time; (2) all of the projected defense witnesses
testified fully at the hearing, in spite of its expedited nature; and
(3) on the day of the evidentiary hearing, collateral counsel did not
renew any objection to the timing of the hearing or indicate that any
witness was unavailable or ill-prepared.

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Hutchinson points to certain things that he deems less than ideal,

he does not claim that further evidentiary development would have

altered the trial court’s competency ruling. Nor, for that matter,

would additional evidence alter our conclusion on whether legally

sufficient evidence was introduced. We find no abuse of discretion

in the circuit court’s denial of these motions.

IV

Based on our analysis above, we affirm the challenged orders.

In light of our affirmance, we decline to stay Hutchinson’s

execution. No motion for rehearing will be considered, and the

mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.

LABARGA, J., dissenting.

As I explained in my recent dissent, “I fully acknowledge the

horrific facts of this death warrant case.” Hutchinson v. State,

SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *7 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025)

(Labarga, J., dissenting). Moreover, I join the majority in

recognizing “the professionalism and diligence of the presiding

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judge, court staff, and the parties” that aided in conducting the

evidentiary hearing in the circuit court. Majority op. at 14 note 6.

And yet, this death warrant case has had a procedural path

unlike any in recent history. It is because of this that I continue to

believe that a stay would be beneficial to the consideration of the

issues raised. As such, I dissent.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,
James Matthew Colaw, Judge
Case No. 042025CA000163CAAXMX

Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Chelsea
Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa M.
Fusaro, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Alicia
Hampton, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Janine D. Robinson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

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