The Florida Bar v. Ryan F. C. Mitchell

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2023-0869
____________

THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,

vs.

RYAN F. C. MITCHELL,
Respondent.

May 15, 2025

PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar seeks review of a referee’s report

recommending that Respondent, Ryan F. C. Mitchell, be found

guilty of violating the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and publicly

reprimanded based on his plea of no contest to two criminal

misdemeanors for physically assaulting his wife and throwing her

cellphone into a pool.1 The Bar challenges the referee’s

recommended sanction, contending that a public reprimand is too

lenient and that Mitchell’s conduct warrants a 90-day suspension

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
followed by one year of probation and participation in a Florida

Lawyers Assistance, Inc. (FLA, Inc.) contract. We agree that

Mitchell’s conduct requires more than a public reprimand, but

instead of imposing a 90-day non-rehabilitative suspension as

requested by the Bar, we suspend Mitchell from the practice of law

in Florida for two years.

I.

In September 2021, Mitchell and his wife, A.M., were

experiencing marital difficulties. Mitchell eventually decided that

he no longer wanted to remain in the marriage, and he told A.M. on

the night of September 22, 2021, that he planned to file for divorce.

Later that night, a physical altercation occurred between the couple

after A.M. woke Mitchell while he was sleeping. The couple’s three

minor children were in the home during the altercation, from which

A.M. sustained significant injuries, including a fractured nose and a

black eye. Mitchell threw A.M.’s cellphone into the pool after the

altercation and left the house before law enforcement arrived.

Two years later, in January 2023, Mitchell pled no contest to

two criminal misdemeanors arising from the altercation with A.M.

He pled no contest to misdemeanor battery and criminal mischief

-2-
for physically assaulting A.M. and throwing her cellphone into the

pool.2 Adjudication was withheld, and Mitchell was sentenced to 18

months of supervised probation. As part of his probation, Mitchell

was required to: (1) have no contact with A.M.; (2) pay $2,224.23 in

restitution to A.M.; (3) attend and complete the Batterer’s

Intervention Program; (4) submit to a mental health evaluation; and

(5) submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation. As of November 13,

2023, the date of the hearing before the referee, Mitchell was in full

compliance with his misdemeanor probation.

Based on these facts, the referee recommends that Mitchell be

found guilty of violating rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor

Misconduct) and 4-8.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . commit a criminal

act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness,

or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”). As to a disciplinary

sanction, the referee recommends that Mitchell receive a public

reprimand, that he be required to continue his private therapy until

2. Mitchell was initially charged with one count of felony
battery, a third-degree felony, and one count of criminal mischief
with damage of $1,000.00 or more, a third-degree felony.

-3-
the end of his criminal probation, and that the Bar be awarded its

costs.

The Bar challenges the referee’s recommended sanction. After

considering the report of the referee and the parties’ briefs, the

Court ordered Mitchell to show cause why the referee’s

recommended sanction should not be disapproved and a more

severe sanction be imposed.

II.

The referee’s factual findings and recommendation that

Mitchell be found guilty of violating rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(b) are not

in dispute. As there is clear support in the record for both, we

approve the referee’s factual findings and guilt recommendations

without further comment.

That leaves us with only the issue of the appropriate

disciplinary sanction for Mitchell’s conduct. The referee

recommends that we publicly reprimand Mitchell, while the Bar

requests that we impose a 90-day suspension followed by one year

of probation and participation in a FLA, Inc. contract. Our review of

a referee’s recommended discipline is broader than that afforded to

the referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is our

-4-
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction. See Fla. Bar v.

Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56, 64 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538

So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

We begin our analysis by first identifying the presumptive

sanction for Mitchell’s conduct under the Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions. The referee relied on Standard 5.1(c) as support

for her recommendation that Mitchell receive a public reprimand.

Under that standard, a public reprimand is appropriate only “when

a lawyer engages in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation . . . that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness

to practice law.” Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 5.1(c). But, as

Mitchell did not engage in any conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation,” Standard 5.1(c) is not applicable here.

Standard 5.1(b), by contrast, says suspension is appropriate

“when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct . . . that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.” Fla.

Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 5.1(b). Mitchell knowingly engaged in

criminal conduct when he violently assaulted his wife. Such

conduct, along with his no contest plea to two criminal

misdemeanors, raises serious doubts about Mitchell’s willingness to

-5-
abide by the law and reflects adversely on his continued fitness to

practice. Accordingly, we find that suspension is the presumptive

sanction in this case under Standard 5.1(b).

We next consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances found by the referee. “Like other factual findings, a

referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption

of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or

without support in the record.” Fla. Bar v. Scheinberg, 129 So. 3d

315, 319 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613,

621 (Fla. 2007)).

The referee here found two aggravating factors, substantial

experience in the practice of law and vulnerability of the victim.

Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.2(b)(8)-(9). The referee also found

eight mitigating factors: (1) an absence of a prior disciplinary

record; (2) personal or emotional problems; (3) restitution to the

victim; (4) a cooperative attitude towards the proceedings; (5)

physical or mental disability or impairment or substance-related

disorder; (6) interim rehabilitation; (7) imposition of other penalties

or sanctions; and (8) remorse. Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs.

3.3(b)(1), (3)-(5), (8), (10)-(12).

-6-
We find error only in the referee’s finding in mitigation of

payment of restitution. The referee found the factor applicable

based on Mitchell’s payment of $2,224.23 to A.M. to cover her

medical bills. But Mitchell made the payment only after he was

ordered to do so as a condition of his probation. As Mitchell’s

payment of restitution to A.M. was not a voluntary act, it cannot be

considered a mitigating factor. See Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs.

3.4(a) (stating that forced or compelled restitution is neither an

aggravating nor mitigating factor). We, therefore, disapprove the

referee’s finding in mitigation of payment of restitution.

Additionally, when weighed alongside Mitchell’s criminal

conduct, the referee’s findings in mitigation are simply not

compelling enough to support a downward adjustment in the

presumptive sanction of a suspension to a public reprimand.

Mitchell violently assaulted A.M., striking her hard enough to

fracture her nose and cause bruising around her eye. He then

threw her cellphone into the pool and left the house, leaving A.M.

alone, injured, and without her phone to care for herself and the

couple’s three minor children, all of whom were in the house when

the assault occurred.

-7-
To be sure, we recognize that Mitchell made a significant

showing in mitigation. He expressed remorse for the assault, fully

complied with his criminal probation, and has made a number of

positive changes in his day-to-day life, such as engaging in private

therapy. But Mitchell’s choice to commit a violent criminal act—

especially one directed against his spouse—has revealed a

significant breach of ethical conduct that cannot be sufficiently

addressed through a public reprimand or tolerated in the legal

profession. Fla. Bar v. Lord, 433 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1983) (noting

the discipline imposed must be sufficient to punish a breach of

ethics and severe enough to deter others who might be prone or

tempted to become involved in like violations). We, thus, conclude

that Mitchell’s criminal conduct requires suspension from the

practice of law and proof of rehabilitation before reinstatement.

As to the length of Mitchell’s suspension, we look to caselaw

for guidance. Fla. Bar v. Grieco, 389 So. 3d 1257, 1265 (Fla. 2024)

(citing Fla. Bar v. Maurice, 955 So. 2d 535, 541 (Fla. 2007)). This

case aligns closely with our decision in Florida Bar v. Kinsella, 260

So. 3d 1046 (Fla. 2018), where we suspended a lawyer for three

years who pled no contest to a criminal misdemeanor. Kinsella,

-8-
who was initially charged with a felony, pled no contest to a

criminal misdemeanor for stealing money from a cash register. Id.

at 1047. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Kinsella was

placed on probation for one year under certain terms and

conditions. Id. On review, we found Kinsella guilty of violating

multiple Bar rules, and we rejected the referee’s recommended 10-

day suspension, finding that Kinsella’s dishonest motive, pattern of

misconduct, and multiple offenses warranted a more severe

sanction. See id. at 1049. Focusing on the presence of significant

mitigation—namely, Kinsella’s full cooperation with law

enforcement, her voluntary entry into a FLA, Inc. treatment

contract, her efforts to return the money at issue, and the fact that

she had already been subjected to other penalties for the same

misconduct—we determined that Kinsella’s conduct warranted a

three-year suspension, rather than the maximum sanction of

disbarment. See id. at 1049-50.

Based on Kinsella, as well as Mitchell’s showing in mitigation,

we conclude that a two-year rehabilitative suspension, rather than

the maximum term of suspension of three years, is the appropriate

sanction for Mitchell’s misconduct.

-9-
III.

Accordingly, the referee’s findings of fact and

recommendations as to guilt are approved, except for the finding in

mitigation of payment of restitution, which is disapproved. The

referee’s recommended discipline is disapproved, and Ryan F. C.

Mitchell is suspended from the practice of law in Florida for two

years. Mitchell’s suspension is effective 30 days from the date of

this opinion so that he can close out his practice and protect the

interests of existing clients. If Mitchell notifies the Court in writing

that he is no longer practicing and does not need the 30 days to

protect existing clients, the Court will enter an order making the

suspension effective immediately.

Mitchell must not accept any new business from the date of

this opinion until he is reinstated. Once the suspension becomes

effective, Mitchell is prohibited from engaging in any act

constituting the practice of law in Florida until he is reinstated.

Mitchell must fully comply with rules 3-5.1(h) and, if applicable,

3-6.1.

Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

- 10 -
Ryan F. C. Mitchell in the amount of $2,823.36, for which sum let

execution issue.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.

CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the Court’s decision except for the discipline

imposed. Because Mitchell committed criminal acts including a

battery on his then spouse, which resulted in the fracture of her

nose, I would impose a suspension of three years rather than two

years.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff
Counsel, Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida,

for Complainant

Thomas D. Sommerville of Law Offices of Thomas D. Sommerville,
P.A., Orlando, Florida,

for Respondent

- 11 -