Jourdan Daniel Parks v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2023-1355
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JOURDAN DANIEL PARKS,
Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.

June 12, 2025

CANADY, J.

In this case we consider whether certain minimum costs

required by statute to be imposed on persons convicted of crimes

may be imposed only when requested by the State. The costs in

question are “[c]osts for the state attorney,” which section

938.27(8), Florida Statutes (2019), provides “must be set in all

cases at no less than $50 per case when a misdemeanor or criminal

traffic offense is charged” and “$100 per case when a felony offense

is charged.”
In the decision now on review, Parks v. State, 371 So. 3d 392

(Fla. 1st DCA 2023), the First District Court of Appeal held that the

minimum costs for the state attorney—as costs mandated by

section 938.27(8)—could be imposed without a request by the State.

Id. at 393. We accepted jurisdiction based on express and direct

conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in

D.L.J. v. State, 331 So. 3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), which—without

considering section 938.27(8)—held that a request by the State for

costs for the state attorney was required by another provision of the

same statute—section 938.27(1), Florida Statutes (2019)—related to

certain costs of prosecution. Id. at 228. Because we conclude that

the unequivocal, specific direction of section 938.27(8) is

controlling, we approve Parks and disapprove D.L.J. 1

I.

The pertinent statutory provisions are subsections (1) and (8)

of section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2019). In relevant part,

subsection (1) provides that

convicted persons are liable for payment of the costs of
prosecution, including investigative costs incurred by law

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

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enforcement agencies, by fire departments for arson
investigations, and by investigations of the Department of
Financial Services or the Office of Financial Regulation of
the Financial Services Commission, if requested by such
agencies.

Subsection (1) thus generally imposes upon convicted persons “the

costs of prosecution, including investigative costs,” under certain

circumstances. By its plain terms, subsection (1) does not require

imposition of any minimum costs or use the specific phrase “[c]osts

for the state attorney.”

Subsection (8), on the other hand, does both of those things.

Namely, subsection (8) states in part:

Costs for the state attorney must be set in all cases at no
less than $50 per case when a misdemeanor or criminal
traffic offense is charged and no less than $100 per case
when a felony offense is charged, including a proceeding
in which the underlying offense is a violation of probation
or community control. The court may set a higher
amount upon a showing of sufficient proof of higher costs
incurred.

Subsection (8) thus requires the court to impose $50 or $100 in

minimum “[c]osts for the state attorney . . . in all cases,” depending

on the offense charged. And subsection (8) authorizes the court to

impose more than the minimum amount “upon a showing of

sufficient proof of higher costs incurred.” In other words, a showing

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of proof is required only if the amount of costs imposed exceeds the

minimum amount.

The language in subsection (8) requiring imposition of the

minimum “[c]osts for the state attorney” was not always part of the

statute. Rather, the Legislature enacted that language in 2008.

See ch. 2008-111, § 44, Laws of Fla. Immediately prior to the 2008

amendments, subsection (8) merely addressed where “[c]osts that

are collected by the state attorney” are to be deposited and how they

are “to be used.” § 938.27(8), Fla. Stat. (2007). In short, the 2008

amendments changed the operation of the statute in a manner that

directly relates to the issue in this case.

II.

Petitioner Jourdan Parks “was adjudicated guilty of five

charges” and “duly sentenced as a habitual felony offender to 25

years in prison.” Parks, 371 So. 3d at 393. The trial court also

“assessed [certain] costs and fines, including the minimum $100

state attorney cost of prosecution assessed per § 938.27(8).” Id.

The trial court imposed this cost even though “[t]he State did not

expressly request” it. Id.

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Petitioner then moved to correct alleged sentencing errors,

including the $100 cost for the state attorney. That cost, Petitioner

argued, was prohibited by subsection (1) of section 938.27 with its

provision regarding the assessment of certain costs “if requested.”

Petitioner relied largely on Brown v. State, 348 So. 3d 31 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2022), and Richards v. State, 288 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 2020).

In Brown, the First District issued an order striking an

Anders 2 brief and allowing defense counsel to file a motion seeking

relief from certain “sentencing errors,” including an “unaccounted-

for sum of $82 in court costs.” 348 So. 3d at 32-33. At one point,

Brown opined that the $82 in unidentified costs could not have

been imposed under section 938.27. Id. at 33. But Brown

undertook no analysis of the text of the statute. Brown simply

reasoned that “[u]nder section 938.27, . . . the State is required to

request [the minimum] costs . . . and the State is further required to

demonstrate a factual basis for assessing costs above the $50

minimum,” neither of which the State did. Id. In so reasoning,

Brown cited this Court’s decision in Richards for the proposition

2. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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“that the State is required to ask a trial court to assess prosecution

costs.” Id. (citing Richards, 288 So. 3d at 576).

In Richards, the trial court ordered the defendant “to pay $150

in investigative costs to the Daytona Beach Shores Police

Department” even though the State never requested those costs.

288 So. 3d at 575 (emphasis added). The issue this Court

addressed was “whether the State, on remand, [could] request

[those] investigative costs pursuant to section 938.27(1).” Id. In

answering in the negative, Richards at one point unremarkably

stated that “[s]ection 938.27(1) requires that the State request

investigative costs before a trial court can impose them.” Id. at 576

(emphasis added). Because Richards involved investigative costs of

a local police department rather than costs for the state attorney,

Richards unsurprisingly never mentioned subsection (8) of the

statute.

In any event, the trial court here rejected Petitioner’s reliance

on Brown and Richards, ruling that the $100 minimum cost for the

state attorney was properly imposed. The trial court recognized

subsection (1) of section 938.27 but looked to the “[n]otabl[e]” 2008

amendment to “subsection (8) that mandates costs of

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prosecution . . . of $100.00 in felony cases.” The trial court

concluded that its decision was “controll[ed]” not by the First

District’s order in Brown but by the First District’s decision in Hills

v. State, 90 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), which held that “[t]he

2008 amendments to section 938.27(8) created mandatory

minimum costs for the state attorney and removed the trial court’s

discretion to impose these costs.” Id. at 928. The trial court

“recognize[d]” that the Second District in D.L.J. had “recently

determined that the cost of prosecution may not be imposed unless

requested by the Office of the State Attorney.” But the trial court

concluded “that the mandatory nature of the cost of prosecution

[was] clearly explained by statute and by the holding of Hills.”

On appeal to the First District, Petitioner again cited Brown

and Richards, but this time also attempted to advance an argument

based on the statutory text. Namely, Petitioner argued that when

subsections (1) and (8) are “read together,” they “require that the

State attorney request[] the cost of prosecution, and set[] the

amount at no less than $50 for a misdemeanor and $100 for a

felony.” The State countered that “the lower court was required by

section 9[38].27(8) to assess the minimum cost of prosecution” even

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in the absence of a request. The State explained why Hills

controlled over Brown, given Brown’s “interlocutory, non-dispositive

nature.” And the State distinguished Richards on the ground that it

“addressed the assessment of investigative costs”—not costs for the

state attorney.

The First District affirmed, holding that “the cost for the state

attorney is a minimum cost that is mandated by subsection (8) and

not an ‘investigative’ cost incurred by an agency, as described in

§ 938.27(1), which can only be imposed ‘if requested’ by the

agency.” Parks, 371 So. 3d at 392-93 (quoting § 938.27(1), Fla.

Stat.). Viewing subsections (1) and (8) together, the First District

explained that “[i]n setting forth the minimum mandatory state

attorney cost, subsection (8) does not include a request requirement

like the one applicable to agency-investigative costs in subsection

(1).” Id. at 393. The First District thus held “that the . . . minimum

cost for the state attorney is mandatory under § 938.27(8) and need

not be requested by the State.” Id. Lastly, the First District

recognized the Second District’s divergent decision in D.L.J. but did

not certify conflict.

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In D.L.J., the Second District held in part that “the imposition

of a $100 cost of prosecution,” which “the State did not specifically

request,” “was imposed in error and must be stricken.” 331 So. 3d

at 228. Citing solely subsection (1) of section 938.27, the Second

District adhered to its precedents that “held that the [express

request] requirement applies to the [State Attorney’s Office] as well.”

Id. (citing Vandawalker v. State, 310 So. 3d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020);

Davis v. State, 286 So. 3d 898, 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Mercado v.

State, 304 So. 3d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)). Those cited precedents,

like D.L.J. itself, do not mention subsection (8) of the statute.

III.

The conflict issue is whether the minimum “[c]osts for the

state attorney” set forth in section 938.27(8) may be imposed

without a request by the State. This issue presents a discrete

question of statutory interpretation. Our review is thus de novo.

See Tomlinson v. State, 369 So. 3d 1142, 1146 (Fla. 2023).

As outlined above, this case turns on the interplay between

subsections (1) and (8) of section 938.27. Taken together, the

statutory texts—set forth earlier in this opinion—lead to the

conclusion that the minimum costs for the state attorney must be

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imposed by the trial court even in the absence of a request by the

State. We thus approve Parks, which reached that conclusion after

properly considering the entire statutory text. And we disapprove

D.L.J., which reached the opposite conclusion.

D.L.J. violates the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that

a portion of a legislative enactment may not be interpreted in

isolation from the other provisions of the same enactment. See

Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022) (“Under

the whole-text canon, proper interpretation [of statutory text]

requires consideration of ‘the entire text, in view of its structure and

of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.’ ” (quoting

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation

of Legal Texts 167 (2012))). D.L.J. likewise fails to adhere to the

corollary canon requiring various portions of an enactment to be

read—to the extent that it is reasonably possible—in a manner that

produces a harmonious whole. See Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020,

1025 (Fla. 2023) (“[I]n cases that task us with interpreting multiple

[statutory] provisions, where possible, we ‘must give full effect to all

statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in

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harmony with one another.’ ” (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key

Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992))).

In short, whether subsection (1) standing alone could properly

be understood to apply to “[c]osts for the state attorney” and to

require that such costs be requested by the State is ultimately

beside the point. Subsection (1) cannot be considered standing

alone. It must be understood in the context of the whole statute,

most particularly subsection (8), which unequivocally singles out

“[c]osts for the state attorney”—a phrase used nowhere else in the

statute—with a mandatory requirement that does not apply to other

costs. That specific mandate of subsection (8)—which contains no

requirement for a request by the State—controls over any general

language that might be understood to point in a different direction.

See Bank of New York Mellon v. Glenville, 252 So. 3d 1120, 1129

(Fla. 2018) (“[A] specific statute covering a particular subject area

always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects

in more general terms.” (quoting McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45,

46 (Fla. 1994))).

D.L.J. adopts an interpretation—which Petitioner argues is

correct—that does not give due attention to the provisions of

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subsection (8). That interpretation is consistent with versions of

the statute that existed before the enactment in 2008 of the

amendments adopting subsection (8)’s requirement that “[c]osts for

the state attorney [must] be set in all cases at . . . no less than $100

per case when a felony offense is charged.” See ch. 2008-111, § 44,

Laws of Fla. Under the prior law, “imposition of ‘costs of

prosecution’ was discretionary and therefore required a request by

the state, on the record.” Hills, 90 So. 3d at 928 (citing James v.

State, 662 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). The statutory provision

then governing the award of such costs of prosecution required no

minimum amount to be imposed for any element of such costs, and

proof—that would necessarily follow a request by the State—was

therefore required to establish costs in any amount. See § 939.01,

Fla. Stat. (1993). That version of the statute granted the court

discretion—to be exercised in accord with specified factors—in

determining “whether to order costs and the amount of such costs.”

§ 939.01(5), Fla. Stat. (1993). In the context of those statutory

provisions, a request by the State was obviously necessary to

provide the predicate for the award of all costs of prosecution.

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But the current version of the law changes the statutory

scheme in a fundamental way by requiring the award of a minimum

amount of “[c]osts for the state attorney”—costs that “must be set in

all cases” in a minimum amount based on whether the offense is a

misdemeanor ($50) or a felony ($100). These mandatory minimum

costs by their very nature are not discretionary. And there is no

need for proof to support the award of the mandatory minimum

amount of costs. (An award that exceeds the mandatory minimum

amount, of course, requires “sufficient proof of higher costs

incurred.” § 938.27(8), Fla. Stat.)

Because the State carries no burden of proof regarding the

minimum costs, requiring that the State request those costs is

unnecessary. Indeed, requiring a request for a set amount would

undermine the legislative choice to treat minimum costs for the

state attorney—the subject of subsection (8)—differently than the

investigative costs that are the subject of subsection (1). Such a

request by the State may serve as a helpful reminder to the

sentencing judge of the duty imposed on the judge by law, but no

prejudice comes to the defendant from the absence of a request by

the State.

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It is axiomatic that costs not mandated in a minimum amount

set by statute will have to be requested—and established—by the

State. Because they must be proven, they must be requested. (The

phrase in subsection (1) “if requested by such agencies” thus simply

signals a recognition that costs that must be proven must be

requested.) In contrast—absent legislative direction to the

contrary—costs in a set amount mandated by law need not be

requested by the State. Because they need not be proven, they

need not be requested.

The Second District’s precedents to which D.L.J. adhered

(Vandawalker, Davis, and Mercado) all relate back to and

erroneously rely on a First District decision, one that—like this

Court’s decision in Richards—had nothing to do with costs for the

state attorney and instead involved “investigative costs” incurred by

a law enforcement agency. See Mercado, 304 So. 3d at 786 (relying

on Thomas v. State, 236 So. 3d 1159, 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018));

Davis, 286 So. 3d at 899 (relying on Mercado); Vandawalker, 310

So. 3d at 483 (relying on Davis). D.L.J. carried forward that

erroneous reliance on Thomas.

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IV.

We conclude that the minimum “[c]osts for the state attorney”

mandated by section 938.27(8) must be imposed by the trial court

even in the absence of a request by the State. We thus approve the

decision of the First District in Parks and disapprove the decision of

the Second District in D.L.J.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Direct Conflict of Decisions

First District - Case No. 1D2022-1566

(Bay County)

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, Kathryn Lane, Assistant Public
Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Second
Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau
Chief, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondent

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