Edward J. Zakrzewski, II v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2025-1009
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EDWARD J. ZAKRZEWSKI, II,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

July 22, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Edward J. Zakrzewski, II, has been sentenced to death for the

murders of his wife, Sylvia, and two minor children, Edward and

Anna. On July 1, 2025, Governor Ron DeSantis signed a death

warrant scheduling Zakrzewski’s execution for July 31, 2025.

Zakrzewski unsuccessfully sought relief in the circuit court and

now appeals. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

We affirm. We also deny Zakrzewski’s motion for stay of execution

and request for oral argument.
I

After experiencing marital problems and twice telling a

neighbor that he would kill his family rather than go through a

divorce, Zakrzewski carried out his plan on June 9, 1994. He killed

Sylvia, seven-year-old Edward, and five-year-old Anna with a

machete. We recounted the facts surrounding the murders in our

opinion on direct appeal. Zakrzewski v. State (Zakrzewski I), 717

So. 2d 488, 490-91 (Fla. 1998). After the murders, Zakrzewski fled

to Hawaii, changed his name, and lived there for four months before

turning himself in. Id. at 491. Zakrzewski pled guilty to all three

murders. Id. at 490.

At the end of a penalty-phase trial, the jury recommended

sentences of death for the murders of Sylvia and Edward, each by a

vote of seven to five, and a sentence of life imprisonment for the

murder of Anna. Id. at 491. On April 19, 1996, the trial court

imposed death sentences for all three murders, overriding the jury’s

recommendation of life imprisonment for the murder of Anna. Id. 1

1. Florida’s capital sentencing regime in 1996 was, as it is
today, a “hybrid system” in which “[a] jury render[ed] an advisory
verdict but the judge [made] the ultimate sentencing

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For each murder, the trial court found three aggravating

factors: (1) Zakrzewski was previously convicted of other capital

offenses (the contemporaneous murders); (2) the murders were

committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without

pretense of legal or moral justification (CCP); and (3) the murders

were committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel

manner (HAC). Zakrzewski I, 717 So. 2d at 491. The trial court

gave significant weight to both of Zakrzewski’s statutory

mitigators—no significant prior criminal history and the fact that

the murders were committed while the defendant was under the

influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance—and varying

degrees of weight to twenty-four nonstatutory mitigators. Id. at 491

nn.1-2.

determinations.” Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002).
However, at the time, section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1996),
provided in relevant part that a simple majority vote was sufficient
for the jury to recommend a sentence of death. A jury’s advisory
sentence of life imprisonment could be overridden by the trial court
“after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” so
long as the court set forth in writing its findings upon which the
sentence of death was based as to certain enumerated facts.
§ 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (1996).

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On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Zakrzewski’s convictions

and sentences.2 Id. at 495. The sentences became final when the

United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Zakrzewski

v. Florida, 525 U.S. 1126 (1999). In the next three decades,

Zakrzewski unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief many times

in state and federal court.

In federal court, Zakrzewski petitioned for habeas relief in the

Northern District of Florida. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed the district court’s denial of relief after reviewing two

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Zakrzewski v.

McDonough (Zakrzewski III), 455 F.3d 1254, 1256, 1258-61 (11th

2. Zakrzewski’s issues on direct appeal were: (1) the trial
court erred by finding HAC; (2) the trial court erred by finding CCP;
(3) the death sentence is not proportionately warranted; (4) the trial
court erred in overriding the jury’s recommendation of life for
Anna’s murder; (5) the trial court allowed prejudicial photographs of
the victims to be admitted into evidence; (6) the trial court
permitted the State’s mental health expert to testify about certain
topics; (7) the trial court permitted the State’s mental health expert
to testify, when the testimony did not rebut the testimony of
Zakrzewski’s mental health expert; (8) the trial court failed to
instruct the jury that Zakrzewski’s ability to understand his
conduct was substantially impaired; and (9) the trial court failed to
instruct the jury on each of Zakrzewski’s nonstatutory mitigating
factors.

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Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1349 (2007).3 Zakrzewski then

filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to reopen his

federal habeas proceedings, alleging that state counsel and federal

habeas counsel perpetrated a fraud on him and the federal court.

See Zakrzewski v. McDonough (Zakrzewski IV), 490 F.3d 1264, 1265

(11th Cir. 2007). The district court first dismissed the motion as a

successive habeas petition, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed and

remanded for reconsideration on the merits. Id. at 1267-68. On

remand, the district court denied relief, finding that counsel made

no material misrepresentation, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

See Zakrzewski v. McDonough, No. 3:04CV66/RV, 2007 WL

2827735 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2007); Zakrzewski v. McNeil

(Zakrzewski V), 573 F.3d 1210, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009).

In state court, Zakrzewski filed five motions for postconviction

relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and a petition

for state habeas relief. Each was denied. See Zakrzewski v. State

3. The two ineffective assistance of counsel claims reviewed by
the Eleventh Circuit were whether trial counsel was ineffective (1)
for failure to object to statements made by the prosecutor in closing
argument and (2) for failure to file a motion to suppress evidence
contained in the house which constituted the murder scene.
Zakrzewski III, 455 F.3d at 1256.

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(Zakrzewski II), 866 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2003) (affirming circuit court’s

denial of Zakrzewski’s initial rule 3.851 motion); Zakrzewski v. State

(Zakrzewski VI), 13 So. 3d 1057 (Fla. 2009) (unpublished table

decision) (affirming the denial of Zakrzewski’s first successive rule

3.851 motion); Zakrzewski v. State (Zakrzewski VII), 115 So. 3d

1004 (Fla. 2012) (unpublished table decision) (affirming the denial

of Zakrzewski’s second successive rule 3.851 motion); Zakrzewski v.

State (Zakrzewski VIII), 147 So. 3d 531 (Fla. 2014) (unpublished

table decision) (affirming the denial of Zakrzewski’s third successive

rule 3.851 motion); Zakrzewski v. Jones (Zakrzewski IX), 221 So. 3d

1159 (Fla. 2017) (holding that Hurst 4 did not apply retroactively to

Zakrzewski’s sentences of death and denying Zakrzewski’s habeas

petition (citing Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016))); Zakrzewski

v. Jones (Zakrzewski X), 254 So. 3d 324 (Fla. 2018) (affirming the

denial of Zakrzewski’s fourth successive rule 3.851 motion (citing

Zakrzewski IX, 221 So. 3d at 1159)).

4. Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in
part by State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020); see Hurst v.
Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016).

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Governor Ron DeSantis signed Zakrzewski’s death warrant on

July 1, 2025, setting an execution date of July 31, 2025. On July

9, 2025, Zakrzewski filed his fifth successive motion for

postconviction relief in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial

Circuit, in and for Okaloosa County. He raised three claims: (1)

executing an individual like him, whose jury vote would have made

him ineligible for the death penalty today, is arbitrary and violates

the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Florida

Constitution; (2) the Governor’s signing of his death warrant

immediately prior to the Fourth of July holiday weekend, while

another death row defendant’s death warrant was still pending,

violated his right to access the courts and counsel under the Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and his right to due process;

and (3) the Governor’s signing of his death warrant without

conducting a recent updated clemency review is arbitrary and

violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause, the Fifth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and corresponding provisions

of the Florida Constitution. After holding a second case

management conference to hear argument on the necessity of an

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evidentiary hearing, 5 the circuit court summarily denied relief on all

claims. The circuit court also denied Zakrzewski’s motion for a stay

of execution.

Zakrzewski now appeals the denial of his postconviction

motion, raising four arguments.

II

We have consistently said:

Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is
appropriate if the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.
We review the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny
a successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the
movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are
not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the
record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to
no relief.

Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 390 (Fla.) (citing Owen v. State, 364

So. 3d 1017, 1022-23 (Fla. 2023)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914

(2025). Applying this standard, we affirm the circuit court’s

5. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the
circuit court to conduct a hearing to determine whether an
evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve a death penalty
defendant’s initial postconviction claims). This requirement also
applies to successive postconviction motions under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B). See Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d
151, 157 (Fla. 2018).

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summary denial of Zakrzewski’s fifth successive postconviction

motion.

A

In his first claim on appeal, Zakrzewski contends that his

execution would be unconstitutional and arbitrary because the

advisory jury votes at his penalty-phase trial (7-5, 7-5, and 6-6 on

counts 1 through 3, respectively) would make him ineligible for the

death penalty today, and the circuit court’s summary denial of this

claim violates his Eighth Amendment rights. We agree with the

circuit court that Zakrzewski’s claim is untimely, procedurally

barred, and meritless.

Zakrzewski’s claim is untimely. Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.851 prohibits, with certain exceptions, claims made

more than one year after the judgment and sentences at issue

become final. Zakrzewski’s judgment and sentences became final

on January 25, 1999, when the United States Supreme Court

denied certiorari review of our decision affirming his sentences.

Zakrzewski, 525 U.S. 1126.

Zakrzewski argues that his claim challenging the bare majority

vote and judicial override was not ripe until the signing of his death

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warrant because there was no indication until then that he would

not continue to live out his natural life in prison on death row: he

had no injury to complain of and nothing to litigate. Leaving aside

that this proposed exception would swallow the rule as to

timeliness, it is foreclosed by the record. As he concedes in his

initial brief, Zakrzewski raised arguments about the jury’s simple

majority vote in favor of the death penalty, and the sentencing

court’s decision to sentence him to death for Anna’s murder, “even

prior to his 1996 trial,” “[a]fter being sentenced,” and at “every step

of the way.” It stands to reason, then, these claims were not

contingent on the signing of Zakrzewski’s death warrant. On the

contrary, they have been available to him and extensively litigated

in the last three decades. They were ripe for adjudication and in

fact adjudicated. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300

(1998) (defining a claim not ripe for adjudication as a claim resting

upon contingent future events); Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 978

n.5 (Fla.) (denying the defendant’s claim under Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551 (2005), as untimely because his mental age remained

stable for the past twenty-five years and therefore was ripe for

adjudication), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025).

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Zakrzewski’s claim is also procedurally barred. This Court

has many times held that a postconviction claim is procedurally

barred where it was or could have been litigated on direct appeal.

See, e.g., Doty v. State, 403 So. 3d 209, 214 (Fla. 2025) (holding

that a claim is precluded from our consideration on collateral review

if it could have been raised on direct appeal); Hendrix v. State, 136

So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior

postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being

relitigated in a successive motion.”); Turner v. Dugger, 614 So. 2d

1075, 1078 (Fla. 1992) (barring postconviction claims, or variations

thereof, that have been raised on direct appeal).

Here, Zakrzewski raised the same claim on direct appeal,

contending that the trial court erred in overriding the jury’s

recommendation of life imprisonment for the murder of Anna. We

affirmed, finding that “the facts suggesting the sentence of death for

all three of these murders are clear and convincing, and as to Anna,

even more compelling,” and we concluded, “ ‘no reasonable person

could differ’ as to the appropriateness of the death penalty for the

murder of Anna.” Zakrzewski I, 717 So. 2d at 494 (“In order to

sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life,

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the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and

convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”

(quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975))).

Zakrzewski cannot now use the postconviction proceeding as a

means of obtaining a second appeal of the issue. See Barwick v.

State, 361 So. 3d 785, 793 (Fla. 2023) (“[U]sing ‘a different

argument to relitigate the same issue’ . . . is inappropriate.”

(quoting Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 1990))).

Next, relying on Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, and invoking

evolving standards of decency, Zakrzewski argues he could not be

sentenced to death today on the basis of a simple majority advisory

vote from a penalty-phase jury. He also contends that this Court is

not bound by the law of the case doctrine to follow erroneous

precedents.

To the extent this is a repackaged Hurst claim, we have, twice,

denied it in Zakrzewski’s postconviction proceedings. See

Zakrzewski IX, 221 So. 3d at 1159 (denying habeas relief and

reiterating our holding from Asay, 210 So. 3d 1, that Hurst v.

Florida and Hurst v. State do not apply retroactively to death

sentences finalized before Ring); Zakrzewski X, 254 So. 3d at 324

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(denying Zakrzewski’s fourth successive postconviction motion

raising Hurst). Here, we again deny Zakrzewski’s invitation to

reconsider our precedent on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and

Hurst v. State.

Even without the time and procedural bars, Zakrzewski’s

claim is meritless. As acknowledged in his brief, at the time of

Zakrzewski’s trial, the trial court could override a jury’s

recommendation where “the facts suggesting a sentence of death

[were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person

could differ.” Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910 (citing § 921.141(3), Fla.

Stat. (1973)); see also Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391, 401 (Fla.

1998) (stating that the standard set out in Tedder was the standard

for a trial court to override a jury recommendation of life

imprisonment at the time). In its sentencing order, the trial court

explicitly stated that all of the physical evidence in the case and

related expert testimony established beyond a reasonable doubt

that Anna was still living, saw her brother’s mutilated body, and

knew her own father was about to kill her before she was murdered

with a machete. “This [c]ourt could not imagine a more heinous

and atrocious way to die.” State v. Zakrzewski, No. 94-1283-CFA,

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1996 WL 34578426 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. Apr. 19, 1996). As we have

affirmed on direct appeal, “no reasonable person could differ as to

the appropriateness of the death penalty for the murder of Anna.”

Zakrzewski I, 717 So. 2d at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of Zakrzewski’s

first claim.

B

Zakrzewski next claims that the thirty-day period between the

signing of his death warrant and expected execution, overlapping

with the Fourth of July holiday and the pendency of another death

row inmate’s execution, deprived him of meaningful access to

counsel and the courts.

We have repeatedly held that the Governor’s broad discretion

in selecting which death warrants to sign and when does not violate

the United States Constitution or the Florida Constitution. See,

e.g., Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0517, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S71a,

S73, 2025 WL 1198037, at *5 (Fla. Apr. 25) (“[W]e are aware of no

constitutional principle that demands a fixed formula, thereby

limiting the decisionmaker in determining the order of execution.”),

cert. denied, No. 24-7079, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (May 1, 2025); Gore v.

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State, 91 So. 3d 769, 780 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting claims that the

Governor’s absolute discretion to sign death warrants violates the

United States Constitution); Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782, 787-88

(Fla. 2019) (“We have consistently rejected the assertion that the

warrant selection process is arbitrary because there are no

standards that constrain the Governor’s discretion in determining

which warrant to sign.” (collecting cases)).

Here, Zakrzewski had meaningful access to counsel and the

courts after his death warrant was signed. Zakrzewski

acknowledges having discussed his death warrant and legal claims

for a postconviction motion with counsel. The circuit court timely

held case management hearings, scheduled filing deadlines,

assessed the necessity of an evidentiary hearing, considered

Zakrzewski’s multiple demands for additional public records, and

ruled upon his postconviction motion.

Zakrzewski also contends that an expedited process of warrant

litigation deprived him of his due process rights. We reject this

claim, as this Court recently did in other cases challenging the

death warrant time period. See Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 393; Bell v.

State, No. SC2025-0891, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S155a, S163, 2025 WL

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1874574, at *17 (Fla. July 8), cert. denied, No. 25-5083, 2025 WL

1942498 (U.S. July 15, 2025).

C

Zakrzewski next claims that the Governor’s signing of his

death warrant without a recent updated clemency review violates

his rights to due process and equal protection and his rights under

the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida

Constitution.

This Court has previously rejected similar challenges to

Florida’s clemency process. We reiterated that, due to important

considerations about the separation of powers, we do not second-

guess the executive branch in matters of clemency in capital cases.

“The clemency process in Florida derives solely from the Florida

Constitution and we have recognized that the people of the State of

Florida have vested ‘sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion

exclusively in the executive in exercising this act of grace.’ ” Carroll

v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 888 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Sullivan v. Askew,

348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977)); see also Bundy v. State, 497 So.

2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 1986) (“[T]his Court has always viewed the

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pardon powers expressed in the Constitution as being peculiarly

within the domain of the executive branch of government.” (quoting

In re Advisory Op. of the Governor, 334 So. 2d 561, 562-63 (Fla.

1976))).

No specific procedures are mandated in clemency proceedings.

See Bundy, 497 So. 2d at 1211 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that

he must be allowed time to prepare and present an application for

executive clemency before his death sentence may be carried out);

Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 998 (Fla. 2009) (“In Ohio Adult Parole

Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), five justices of the

United States Supreme Court concluded that some minimal

procedural due process requirements should apply to clemency

proceedings. But none of the opinions in that case required any

specific procedures or criteria to guide the executive’s signing of

warrants for death-sentenced inmates.”).

Zakrzewski has provided no reason for the Court to depart

from its decisions on these matters.

And in any event, Zakrzewski has indeed had the benefit of a

clemency proceeding. As his postconviction motion acknowledged,

he initiated clemency proceedings in 2007 and made presentations

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to the Florida Commission on Offender Review. The death warrant

signed by Governor DeSantis expressly states that “executive

clemency for EDWARD J. ZAKRZEWSKI, II, as authorized by Article

IV, Section 8(a), of the Florida Constitution, was considered

pursuant to the Rules of Executive Clemency, and it has been

determined that executive clemency is not appropriate.” Under our

cases, these proceedings were sufficient. See Valle v State, 70 So.

3d 530, 551 (Fla. 2011) (denying the defendant’s claim that his

clemency proceeding did not serve the fail-safe purposes because it

was done before his postconviction proceedings); Rutherford v.

State, 940 So. 2d 1112, 1122-23 (Fla. 2006); Johnson v. State, 27

So. 3d 11, 24 (Fla. 2010); Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1129 (Fla.

2009).

D

In his final claim on appeal, Zakrzewski contends that the

circuit court abused its discretion in denying his requests for public

records from various state agencies under Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.852(i), which violates his rights to due process and

equal protection under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to

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the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of

the Florida Constitution.

We review a circuit court’s denial of requests for public records

for abuse of discretion. See Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 391. Rule

3.852(i)(2) limits the production of additional public records to only

those demonstrating:

(A) collateral counsel has made a timely and diligent
search of the records repository;

(B) collateral counsel’s affidavit identifies with specificity
those additional public records that are not at the
records repository;

(C) the additional public records sought are either
relevant to the subject matter of a proceeding under
rule 3.851 or appear reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence; and

(D) the additional records request is not overly broad or
unduly burdensome.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(i)(2). We have held that rule 3.852 is “not

intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for

records” and that records requests made under rule 3.852(i) “must

show how the requested records relate to a colorable claim for

postconviction relief and good cause as to why the public records

request was not made until after the death warrant was signed.”

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Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 792 (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

Here, Zakrzewski requested additional public records from

nine state agencies under rule 3.852(i) after his death warrant was

signed. The circuit court denied each request with specified

reasons. For Zakrzewski’s records demands relating to Florida’s

lethal injection protocol from the Department of Law Enforcement,

the Department of Corrections, and the Office of the Medical

Examiner, the circuit court found them overly broad, not related to

a colorable claim for relief, and without good cause for failing to

request them prior to the signing of the warrant. For his requests

for clemency records from the Office of the Attorney General, the

Executive Office of the Governor, the Commission on Offender

Review, and the Office of the Okaloosa County Clerk of Court, the

circuit court denied them because clemency records are

confidential. For his requests to the Okaloosa County Sheriff’s

Office and the Office of the State Attorney for records relating to his

investigation and prosecution, responsive records did not exist, and

the demands were moot.

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We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decisions.

Zakrzewski’s “any and all” requests were overly broad and

burdensome. See Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002)

(upholding the trial court’s discretion to deny public records

requests that are “overly broad, of questionable relevance, and

unlikely to lead to discoverable evidence”). His all-encompassing

requests for records relating to Florida’s lethal injection protocol

bear no relation to a colorable postconviction claim for relief. See

Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 203 (Fla. 2013) (“[R]equests

related to actions of lethal injection personnel in past executions do

not relate to a colorable claim concerning future executions because

there is a presumption that members of the executive branch will

perform their duties properly.”); Valle, 70 So. 3d at 549 (denying

requests for lethal injection protocol because the records sought

were not related to a colorable Eighth Amendment claim). And

clearly, records relating to the clemency process are confidential

and exempt from public records requests under section 14.28,

Florida Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Executive Clemency. See

Gudinas v. State, No. SC2025-0794, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S124, S127,

2025 WL 1692284, at *9 (Fla. June 17) (“The requested records

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relating to the clemency process are exempt from disclosure.”), cert.

denied, No. 24-7457, 2025 WL 1739159 (U.S. June 24, 2025).

The circuit court’s denial of Zakrzewski’s requests for public

records was far from arbitrary or unreasonable but instead

supported by adequate reasons. See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d

120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (“Discretion is abused only when the judicial

action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way

of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable person

would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (quoting White v.

State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806 (Fla. 2002))).

III

We affirm the summary denial of Zakrzewski’s motion for

postconviction relief, along with the circuit court’s denial of his

demands for public records. Accordingly, we also deny his motion

for stay of execution and request for oral argument. No motion for

rehearing will be entertained. The mandate shall issue

immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County,
Lacey Powell Clark, Judge
Case No. 461994CF001283XXXAXX

Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa M.
Fusaro, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Alicia
Hampton, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Janine D. Robinson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

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