The Florida Bar v. Alejandro L. Marriaga

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2024-1241
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THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,

vs.

ALEJANDRO L. MARRIAGA,
Respondent.

September 18, 2025

PER CURIAM.

We have for review a referee’s report recommending that

Respondent, Alejandro L. Marriaga, be found guilty of professional

misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and

suspended from the practice of law for three years. We have

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations

of guilt but disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline. A

three-year rehabilitative suspension is unfit given the intentional
misconduct at issue. It is also inadequate to protect the public and

preserve the profession’s integrity. Instead, we order disbarment.

I

Alejandro L. Marriaga’s actions as a purportedly “neutral

settlement agent” led The Florida Bar to file a four-count complaint

against him. It said he intentionally misdirected funds from real

estate closings, failed to advise buyers of his conflicts of interest,

and failed to comply with trust accounting rules. The Chief Judge

of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit appointed a referee who

conducted guilt and discipline hearings and submitted a report with

findings and recommendations.

Marriaga was a sole practitioner at Marriaga Law Group, P.A.,

doing business as Lawyers Title Network. Steel X Homes, LLC

marketed house designs for construction but lacked its own

construction license. From 2018 until November 2022, Marriaga

served as Steel X’s attorney. Steel X’s corporate filings with the

State of Florida listed Marriaga as its manager from 2021 to 2022

and as its registered agent from 2020 to 2023.

Marriaga testified that he had a verbal agreement with Steel X

to handle its real estate closings, but that he did not represent

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Steel X at those closings.1 Instead, he served as a “neutral

settlement agent” and ran closing transactions between buyers and

Steel X, the seller. Buyers in these transactions understood

Marriaga to be responsible for reviewing and signing documents,

holding their funds in escrow, and disbursing those funds

according to the closing disclosure documents. The buyers paid

Marriaga a fee for his work as settlement agent and escrow holder.

A

In 2021, Marriaga acted as both escrow and settlement agent

in a series of four real estate closings involving Steel X. He told

buyers he was a neutral third party while concealing his roles as

Steel X’s attorney, manager, and registered agent. Three buyers

purchased vacant lots from Steel X; the fourth already owned a

vacant lot. Each hired Steel X to build a home and signed separate

construction agreements with one of two builders since Steel X itself

lacked a construction license.

1. The referee’s report mentions no other evidence of that
agreement.

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In each transaction, the buyer wired closing funds directly to

Marriaga, who deposited them into his Interest on Lawyer Trust

Account2 rather than his real estate closing escrow account. The

closing disclosures in each case allocated specific amounts to the

builder as initial draws for construction, but neither builder

received what was due. Instead, Marriaga deviated from the closing

disclosure documents and diverted the builder draws to Steel X, its

affiliated entities, and, in one instance, to his own law firm.

In one case, Marriaga paid inflated real estate commissions to

the seller’s real estate broker, Ruth Miranda.3 The closing

documents listed Miranda’s entity variously as “Solar X Realty” and

“Steel X Homes.” Her email address linked her to “Solar X Homes”

and the construction contract identified her as the “Steel X Homes

Xpert.” Marriaga admitted that these entities were connected to

2. A lawyer’s Interest on Lawyer Trust Account is an interest-
or dividend-bearing trust account for holding small or short-term
client funds. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1. Instead of earning
interest for the client, the interest goes to Funding Florida Legal
Aid, formerly known as The Florida Bar Foundation, Inc. See id.

3. The referee’s report does not say whether Marriaga and
Miranda operated independently or shared a coordinated role in
diverting closing proceeds.

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Steel X. He testified that the same individuals operated both

Steel X and Solar X Homes, LLC (Solar X Homes), and that Solar X

Homes was the predecessor entity to Steel X. State filings listed

Marriaga as Solar X Homes’s registered agent in 2021, and Solar X

Realty and Solar X Homes shared the same principal address. The

buyer sued Steel X, Marriaga, and Marriaga Law Group. Marriaga

represented all three defendants in the suit, and claimed no conflict

existed because his interests aligned with Steel X’s.

Marriaga also failed to render timely accounting ledgers to

three of the buyers. In one case, the buyer repeatedly emailed

Lawyers Title Network for a full accounting ledger after the builder

notified the buyer that it had not been paid. Marriaga’s nonlawyer

employee sent copies of the closing documents to the buyer, stating

that they were all she was authorized to release. When the buyer

continued to seek a full accounting, the employee told the buyer

that the ledger balance was zero, no funds remained, and he should

contact his builder. Nearly three months after the buyer filed a

grievance with the Bar, and almost a year after closing, Marriaga

finally produced the ledger, which revealed discrepancies between

the closing disclosure documents and actual disbursements.

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Across all these transactions, Marriaga failed to follow the

closing disclosures, diverted escrow funds without consent, and

concealed his significant ties to Steel X and its affiliates. None of

the promised homes were built, and, in each case, buyers lost tens

of thousands of dollars.

According to the referee’s report, Marriaga was entrusted with

$221,365.37 in funds from the four buyers, not including amounts

paid directly to Steel X in one transaction. At least $41,389.56 4 of

that was designated for the builders in the closing disclosure

documents but never reached them. Instead, Marriaga transferred

the funds without the buyers’ authorization to Steel X and its

affiliated entities, with which he maintained direct ties as legal

counsel, registered agent, and manager. He did so with the intent

to conceal those connections from the buyers and to reroute their

escrow funds in violation of the closing disclosures, for his own

4. The referee’s report did not compute the builder payment
owed under the closing disclosure documents in one of the cases.
This figure also does not include additional funds that Marriaga
improperly diverted to Steel X, its affiliates, and Miranda.

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benefit and to the detriment of his clients, without notice or

consent.

B

The referee recommended that Marriaga be found guilty of:

four counts of violating rule 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor

Misconduct); three counts of violating rule 4-1.4(a) (Informing Client

of Status of Representation); three counts of violating rule 4-1.4(b)

(Duty to Explain Matters to Client); four counts of violating rule

4-1.7(a) (Representing Adverse Interests); four counts of violating

rule 4-1.15 (Safekeeping Property); four counts of violating rule

4-8.4(c) (Misconduct); four counts of violating rule 5-1.1(b)

(Application of Trust Funds or Property to Specific Purpose); and

three counts of violating rule 5-1.1(e) (Notice of Receipt of Trust

Funds; Delivery; Accounting).

For discipline, the referee recommended that this Court

suspend Marriaga for three years with proof of rehabilitation

required for reinstatement, a three-year nonreporting probation

period upon reinstatement, and payment of the Bar’s costs. The

referee found as aggravating factors that Marriaga demonstrated a

pattern of misconduct, had a “dishonest motive” (but not “a selfish

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motive”), had substantial experience in the practice of law,

committed multiple offenses against vulnerable victims, and refused

to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct. In mitigation, the

referee found that Marriaga had no prior disciplinary record and

noted that “while [his] misconduct was dishonest, it was not

unlawful.” The referee, in his review of case law, distinguished

Marriaga’s case from our disbarment of the attorney in Florida Bar

v. Dominguez, No. SC20-0621, 2021 WL 5493095 (Fla. Nov. 23,

2021) (unpublished), because Dominguez embezzled money.

The referee also noted Marriaga’s long-standing business

relationship with Steel X, its owners, and its other business

entities. While considering Florida’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions (Standards), the referee analyzed the knowledge and

intent definitions found within and stated that Marriaga “clearly

knew disbursements were being made contrary to the disclosure

statements . . . and that the disbursements were being made to the

benefit of Steel X and/or its owners.” The referee concluded that

Marriaga’s conduct was “deliberate and knowing,” citing Florida Bar

v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999) (“[I]n order to

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satisfy the element of intent it must only be shown that the conduct

was deliberate or knowing.”).

Neither party challenged the referee’s findings or

recommendations. We nevertheless issued an order directing

Marriaga to show cause why the referee’s recommended sanction

should not be disapproved and a more severe sanction, including

disbarment, be imposed. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.7(c)(6)(A)

(“If no review is sought of a referee’s report . . . the findings of fact

are deemed conclusive, and the referee’s recommended disciplinary

measure will be the disciplinary measure imposed by the court,

unless the court directs the parties to submit briefs or conduct oral

argument on the suitability of the referee’s recommended

disciplinary measure.”).

In his response, Marriaga concedes that enhancements could

be added to the referee’s recommended discipline. He suggests that

his sanction include a reporting probation and a trust accounting

workshop.

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II

A

This Court gives deference to the referee’s factual findings

regarding each rule violation and will not reweigh the evidence or

override the referee’s conclusions, so long as those findings are

supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record.

Fla. Bar v. Schwartz, 382 So. 3d 600, 608 (Fla. 2024). As for the

referee’s recommendations as to guilt, “the referee’s factual findings

must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the

recommendations.” Fla. Bar v. Jacobs, 370 So. 3d 876, 883 (Fla.

2023). Neither party contests the referee’s findings of fact or

recommendations of guilt. We therefore approve the referee’s

findings of fact and recommendations of guilt without further

discussion. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Watson, 405 So. 3d 338, 343 (Fla.

2025) (approving the referee’s unchallenged factual findings and

recommendations of guilt).

B

We disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline. Attorney

discipline must shield the public from unethical conduct while

ensuring penalties are fair and proportionate; hold attorneys

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accountable for misdeeds yet encourage their rehabilitation; and

communicate that violations of our self-governing standards result

in predictable punishment. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Dupee, 160 So. 3d

838, 853 (Fla. 2015); Fla. Bar v. Lord, 433 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla.

1983). “In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this

Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s

findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility

to order the appropriate sanction.” Fla. Bar v. Strems, 357 So. 3d

77, 90 (Fla. 2022); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. Generally, we

“will not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long

as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.” Fla. Bar v. Swann, 116

So. 3d 1225, 1237 (Fla. 2013).

Here, Marriaga knew disbursements were wrongly made to

benefit Steel X or its owners. The referee determined that

Marriaga’s conduct was deliberate and knowing, which the referee

identified in his report as sufficient to meet the definition of “intent”

under the Standards. See Fredericks, 731 So. 2d at 1252.

Contrary to the referee’s ultimate recommendation, the

Standards dictate disbarment for Marriaga’s intentional conduct.

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See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.3 (Failure to Avoid Conflicts

of Interest) (proscribing disbarment “when a lawyer causes serious

or potentially serious injury to the client and, without the informed

consent of the affected client(s) . . . engages in representation of a

client knowing that the lawyer’s interests are adverse to the client’s

with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another”); 4.6 (Lack of

Candor) (“[W]here the lawyer engages in fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation directed toward a client . . . [d]isbarment is

appropriate when a lawyer knowingly or intentionally deceives a

client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another regardless of

injury or potential injury to the client.”); 7.1 (Deceptive Conduct or

Statements and Unreasonable or Improper Fees) (“[I]n cases

involving deceptive conduct or statements, improper division of fees,

or unreasonable or improper fees . . . [d]isbarment is appropriate

when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of

a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for

the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious

injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”).

Disbarment, as the presumptively appropriate sanction for the

intentional misappropriation of funds, is also supported by our

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cases. “The Court has repeatedly stated that misuse or

misappropriation of funds held in trust is one of the most serious

offenses a lawyer can commit and that disbarment is the

presumptively appropriate sanction.” Fla. Bar v. Johnson, 132 So.

3d 32, 38 (Fla. 2013). We have allowed rebuttal of this presumption

only “in very limited situations on ‘a showing of substantial

mitigating circumstances.’ ” Fla. Bar v. Bander, 361 So. 3d 808,

818 (Fla. 2023) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 84 (Fla.

2018)); see also Fla. Bar v. McFall, 863 So. 2d 303, 309 (Fla. 2003)

(imposing a three-year suspension followed by three years’

probation for attorney who suffered impaired judgment due to

medications and mental health). We have recognized that this

presumption of disbarment “is especially weighty when the

misconduct is intentional rather than negligent or inadvertent.”

Johnson, 132 So. 3d at 38-39 (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Fla.

Bar v. Wolf, 930 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla. 2006) (imposing a two-year

suspension with one year of probation for inadvertent

misappropriation of trust funds); Fla. Bar v. Mason, 826 So. 2d 985,

990 (Fla. 2002) (same); Fla. Bar v. Whigham, 525 So. 2d 873, 874

(Fla. 1988) (imposing a three-year suspension for gross negligence

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in the absence of willful misappropriation and client financial

injury). But see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Rousso, 117 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2013)

(disbarring two attorneys who were grossly negligent in

mismanaging trust accounts, resulting in employee embezzling over

four million dollars). “Indeed, the overwhelming majority of cases

involving the misuse of trust funds have resulted in

disbarment . . . .” Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d 333, 338

(Fla. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Alters, 260 So. 3d at 84

(collecting cases). We have also disbarred attorneys who create

conflicts of interest in violation of rule 4-1.7. See, e.g., Bander, 361

So. 3d 808; Swann, 116 So. 3d 1225; Rousso, 117 So. 3d 756.

When we consider Marriaga’s mishandling of trust funds

together with his other rule violations, we find that disbarment is

the appropriate sanction. Although Marriaga claimed to not

represent Steel X in the real estate transactions and portrayed

himself as a “neutral settlement agent,” he was far from an

uninterested party. The referee’s report offers no meaningful

distinction between Marriaga and Steel X. Throughout the

transactions, Marriaga acted as Steel X’s attorney, registered agent,

and corporate manager while simultaneously serving as the escrow

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and settlement agent for buyers contracting with Steel X. His dual

roles placed him on both sides of each transaction, undermining

any pretense of neutrality. He did not disclose these overlapping

roles to the buyers or obtain their consent. The referee’s findings

depict a pattern of self-dealing that undermines the foundational

duties of loyalty and integrity required of Florida lawyers.

III

Accordingly, Alejandro L. Marriaga is hereby disbarred from

the practice of law in the State of Florida. The disbarment will be

effective 30 days from the filing of this opinion so that Marriaga can

close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If

Marriaga notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer

practicing and does not need the 30 days to protect existing clients,

this Court will enter an order making the disbarment effective

immediately. Marriaga must fully comply with rule 3-5.1(h) and, if

applicable, rule 3-6.1.

Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

Alejandro L. Marriaga in the amount of $7,979.01, for which sum

let execution issue.

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It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee,
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida, and Laura N. Gryb, Bar Counsel, The Florida
Bar, Orlando, Florida,

for Complainant

Barry Rigby of Law Offices of Barry Rigby, P.A., Orlando, Florida,

for Respondent

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