David Kelsey Sparre v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2024-1512
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DAVID KELSEY SPARRE,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

December 4, 2025

GROSSHANS, J.

David Kelsey Sparre, a prisoner under sentence of death,

appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his second

successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851 of

the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

I

In 2010, law enforcement found Tiara Pool dead in her

apartment in Jacksonville, Florida. She had been stabbed roughly

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
ninety times. Based on evidence found in the apartment, law

enforcement investigated and interviewed Sparre. After initially

denying involvement, Sparre admitted to stabbing Pool to death

with a knife he found in her apartment. He also confessed to taking

various items from her apartment, including a gaming system.

Ultimately, the State charged Sparre with first-degree murder

in connection with Pool’s killing. And after hearing overwhelming

incriminating evidence, a Duval County jury found Sparre guilty as

charged.

At the penalty-phase hearing, the State introduced evidence in

support of two aggravating circumstances—that the murder was

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC aggravator) and was

committed in the course of a burglary (burglary aggravator).

Sparre, for his part, elected not to present mitigating evidence.

Despite this choice, defense counsel still argued that the mitigating

evidence already in the record weighed in favor of a life sentence.

Following deliberations, the jury recommended a sentence of death,

doing so by a unanimous verdict.

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After holding a Spencer2 hearing, the trial court sentenced

Sparre to death, finding that the State had proven the HAC and

burglary aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt. These two

aggravators, the court determined, outweighed the fourteen

mitigators discernable from the record.3

We affirmed Sparre’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.

Sparre v. State (Sparre I), 164 So. 3d 1183, 1202 (Fla. 2015).

Sparre then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to issue a writ of

certiorari and review our decision. It declined to do so. Sparre v.

Florida, 577 U.S. 961 (2015).

In the ten years since, Sparre has mounted several challenges

to his conviction and death sentence. See Sparre v. State (Sparre II),

289 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 2019) (initial postconviction motion and

petition for habeas corpus), cert. denied, Sparre v. Florida, 141 S.

Ct. 672 (2020); Sparre v. State (Sparre III), 391 So. 3d 404 (Fla.

2024) (first successive postconviction motion); Sparre v. Sec’y, Dep’t

2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

3. Under our precedent, even in cases of a mitigation waiver,
the circuit court maintains the “responsibility to consider mitigating
evidence in the record.” Bell v. State, 336 So. 3d 211, 217 (Fla.
2022) (citing Sparre v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183, 1196 (Fla. 2015)).

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of Corr., No. 3:20-cv-216-TJC-JBT (M.D. Fla.), petition for habeas

corpus filed (Mar. 4, 2020).

While his first successive postconviction motion was pending,

Sparre filed a second one—the denial of which is at issue in this

appeal. In it, Sparre raised three constitutional claims under the

Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I

of the Florida Constitution. To support these claims—which all

focus on the representativeness of his jury—Sparre relies on an

unpublished report (the “Gau Study”), 4 which he argues is newly

discovered evidence of the jury-related constitutional violations.

Specifically, according to Sparre, the Gau Study shows that his jury

was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, thereby

violating the constitutional provisions alluded to above.

The circuit court summarily denied Sparre’s claims, finding

them to be untimely and meritless. Sparre now appeals.

4. Jacinta M. Gau, Racialized Impacts of Death
Disqualification in Duval County, Florida (2021) (considering data
from 12 capital cases in Duval County from 2010 to 2018, including
Sparre’s case).

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II

Sparre argues that the circuit court erred in summarily

denying his second successive postconviction motion. 5 We

disagree.

As our cases make clear, we affirm summary denials of

successive motions if the claims raised are “legally insufficient,”

“procedurally barred,” or “conclusively refuted by the record.”

Sparre III, 391 So. 3d at 405. Similarly, we also affirm when the

defendant fails to raise a claim within rule 3.851’s one-year time

limit and does not establish one of the rule’s timeliness exceptions.

Hutchinson v. State, 408 So. 3d 752, 754 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S.

Ct. 1980 (2025). We now apply these principles to Sparre’s claims.6

5. We review summary denials of successive postconviction
claims de novo. See Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1022-23 (Fla.
2023).

6. At the outset, we briefly address two issues. First, Sparre
argues that the circuit court failed to hold a preliminary hearing as
required by rule 3.851, which provides: “Within 30 days after the
state files its answer to a successive motion for postconviction relief,
the trial court must hold a case management conference. At the
case management conference, the trial court also must determine
whether an evidentiary hearing should be held and hear argument
on any purely legal claims not based on disputed facts.” Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B) (emphasis added). This text’s meaning is
clear. Thus, it was error for the circuit court (at the urging of the

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A

We begin with the timeliness of Sparre’s claims. Sparre filed

his second successive motion well beyond rule 3.851’s one-year

time limit. Thus, Sparre needs to demonstrate an applicable

exception or his claims are barred. Recognizing this issue, Sparre

argues that the Gau Study is newly discovered evidence under rule

3.851(d)(2)(A), which excuses untimeliness if the claim is predicated

on facts which “were unknown to the movant or the movant’s

attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence.” Our cases, though, are inconsistent with Sparre’s

argument.

We have repeatedly held that new reports or studies, based on

previously available information, do not meet the timeliness

State’s attorney) to sidestep this requirement. However, based on
our thorough review of the record, we find that any error was
harmless. See Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 157-58 (Fla. 2018).
Second, Sparre argues that the circuit court failed to make
sufficient findings and conclusions for two of his claims. To the
extent that there was error, we conclude that it was not sufficiently
preserved, see Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 822 (Fla. 2005), or
properly briefed, see Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482 (Fla.
2008). Moreover, even if this issue had been preserved and
properly briefed, we would find any error harmless in light of our
analysis below.

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exception for newly discovered evidence. See Hutchinson, 408 So.

3d at 754; Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 99 (Fla. 2023); Sliney v.

State, 362 So. 3d 186, 189 (Fla. 2023); Melton v. State, 367 So. 3d

1175, 1177 (Fla. 2023).

The Gau Study purports to be drawn from data collected from

Duval County capital trials spanning from 2010-2018—with the

majority of them occurring before 2015. At the very least, the

underlying factual basis for the study was available several years

before Sparre filed the current motion. See Sparre III, 391 So. 3d at

406 & n.4 (discussing due-diligence requirement). Accordingly, we

conclude that the Gau Study does not excuse the late filing of

Sparre’s motion and the three claims it raises. 7 For this reason,

Sparre’s claims are untimely and, thus, cannot support the

postconviction relief that he seeks. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)

(barring consideration of untimely successive claims).

7. Sparre also alleges Professor Michael Radelet’s report
confirms the work and conclusions of the Gau Study. To the extent
Sparre independently relies on Professor Radelet’s opinion to argue
a timeliness exception, that reliance is misplaced for the reasons
given above.

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B

Sparre’s claims are also procedurally barred. We have long

held that a death-sentenced defendant is barred from asserting

claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in earlier

postconviction proceedings. See Doty v. State, 403 So. 3d 209, 214

(Fla. 2025); Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701, 714 (Fla.), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct 2833 (2025). Jury-related claims like those

brought by Sparre are no exception. See Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d

994, 1014 (Fla. 2006) (“Claims alleging that a defendant’s jury was

not a fair cross-section of the community should be raised on direct

appeal.”); Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1104 (Fla. 2009)

(discriminatory-jury-selection claim barred in postconviction

proceeding); Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1186 (Fla. 2022)

(fair cross-section claim barred in postconviction proceeding).

Consistent with what we have said above, we see no reason

why Sparre could not have raised his jury-composition claims on

direct appeal or in his prior postconviction motions. Consequently,

his claims are now barred.

III

We have concluded that Sparre’s claims are both untimely and

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procedurally barred. However, even if those bars were inapplicable,

we would still affirm the summary denial for the reasons we give

below.

A

We first consider Sparre’s Sixth Amendment claim. Sparre

alleges that Duval County’s death-qualification process and the

State’s use of peremptory strikes infringed on his Sixth Amendment

right to have a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the

community. A major premise of Sparre’s argument is that his

actual jury—the twelve-member body that found him guilty and

recommended his death—was required to represent a fair cross-

section of the community. He is wrong.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees “the right to a speedy and

public trial, by an impartial jury.” Amend. VI, U.S. Const. The U.S.

Supreme Court has long recognized that this right includes an

entitlement to be tried by a jury chosen from a fair cross-section of

the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975)

(discussing early case law on the subject). However, as the

Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, this right does not

guarantee that the jury actually selected—the petit jury—will

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always mirror the relevant community. See id. at 538; Duren v.

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 n.20 (1979); Lockhart v. McCree, 476

U.S. 162, 173 (1986); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 482-83

(1990). The federal circuit courts have stressed this same point.

See United States v. O’Lear, 90 F.4th 519, 525 (6th Cir. 2024) (“To

be clear, the Sixth Amendment does not require that the assembled

jury itself (often referred to as the ‘petit’ jury) represent a fair cross

section of the community. . . . So, unlike the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Sixth Amendment does

not limit a prosecutor’s use of [peremptory] challenges to excuse

specific jurors.” (citing Holland, 493 U.S. at 478-84)); see also

United States v. Fernetus, 838 F. App’x 426, 434 (11th Cir. 2020);

United States v. Erickson, 999 F.3d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 2021); United

States v. Colon, 64 F.4th 589, 591 (4th Cir. 2023).

Put simply, this uniform body of case law is incompatible with

Sparre’s Sixth Amendment claim, which focuses on the composition

and representativeness of the actual jury that tried him—not the

pool from which that jury was chosen. Indeed, nowhere in Sparre’s

motion does he allege that his jury pool was not representative of

the relevant community. That being the case, Sparre’s Sixth

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Amendment claim is without merit as a matter of law.

B

Sparre’s Eighth Amendment claim fares no better. For this

claim, Sparre largely repeats the same factual premises underlying

his Sixth Amendment claim. He then argues some general Eighth

Amendment principles. For example, he reminds us that the

Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to forbid arbitrary

sentences and to require that the sentencer consider a defendant’s

mitigating evidence. However, Sparre cites no cases where the

Eighth Amendment has been applied in the jury-representativeness

context. And we are aware of none. In light of this absence, and

based on our own understanding of the constitutional provisions at

issue, we think the Fifth Circuit was correct in saying that

“empaneling an impartial jury is grounded in the Sixth Amendment

and not the Eighth Amendment.” United States v. Sanders, 133

F.4th 341, 376 (5th Cir. 2025) (relying on Wainwright v. Witt, 469

U.S. 412, 423 (1985)); cf. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330,

1354 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Brown provides no rationale for why the

identical argument would be any more persuasive if considered

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under the rubric of the Eighth Amendment, and he offers no case

law in support of his position.”). 8

C

For his final claim, Sparre alleges that four provisions of

Article I of the Florida Constitution prohibit Duval County’s

“discriminatory” death-qualification process and the prosecutor’s

peremptory strikes. Sparre mainly asserts that sections 16 and 22

of Article I jointly provide an “inviolate” right to an impartial jury,

which encompasses the right to a petit jury that mirrors the

relevant community. But as with the two prior claims, Sparre fails

to identify any supporting precedent. Moreover, we are unaware of

any cases relying on the four cited state-law provisions as authority

for any petit-jury-representativeness requirement. In sum, Sparre

has not persuaded us that these state-constitutional provisions

support the right he seeks.

8. To the extent Sparre’s arguments could be seen as an
implicit invitation for us to recognize a new Eighth Amendment
right, we must decline. See Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 978-79
(Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025).

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s

summary denial of Sparre’s second successive motion for

postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,
Jonathan David Sacks, Judge
Case No. 162010CF008424AXXXMA

Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Chelsea
Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Nida
Imtiaz, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

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