Antonio Lebaron Melton v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2022-1394
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ANTONIO LEBARON MELTON,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

May 4, 2023

PER CURIAM.

Antonio Lebaron Melton, a prisoner under sentence of death,

appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his sixth

successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We affirm. 1

In 1994, this Court affirmed Melton’s first-degree felony

murder and armed robbery convictions for the robbery and murder

of George Carter. Melton v. State, 638 So. 2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1994).

Melton was 18 years and 25 days old at the time of Carter’s murder.

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
The trial judge sentenced Melton to death in accordance with the

jury’s eight-to-four recommendation for the murder and to life

imprisonment for the robbery. Id. His convictions and sentences

became final in 1994 when the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari review. Melton v. Florida, 513 U.S. 971 (1994).

We have since affirmed the denial of Melton’s initial

postconviction motion and his second, third, fourth, and fifth

successive postconviction motions2 and denied his initial and

successive habeas petitions. See Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 994,

999 (Fla. 2006); Melton v. State, 55 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2011); Melton

v. State, 88 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 2012); Melton v. State, 193 So. 3d 881,

884 (Fla. 2016); Melton v. Jones, No. SC2017-2032, 2018 WL

566451, at *1 (Fla. Jan. 26, 2018); Melton v. State, 236 So. 3d 234,

235 (Fla. 2018).

Months before Melton was apprehended for Carter’s murder,

he murdered Ricky Saylor. Melton, 949 So. 2d at 1000. Melton was

17 years old at the time of the Saylor murder. He was convicted of

2. Melton appealed the denial of his first successive
postconviction motion, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal before
the Court ruled on the merits.

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armed robbery and first-degree felony murder and was sentenced to

life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five

years. Melton v. State, 304 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

The convictions served as the basis for the trial court’s finding of

the prior violent felony aggravator in the Carter murder case.

Melton, 949 So. 2d at 1000.

In 2022, Melton filed the sixth successive postconviction

motion at issue, contending that two pieces of alleged newly

discovered evidence—a declaration from a neurodevelopmental

psychologist and a resolution from the American Psychological

Association (APA)—show that there is a scientific consensus that

the brain does not fully develop until at least 21 years old. Melton

argues that this new evidence requires extending the rationale in

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), for barring the execution of

persons under the age of 18 at the time of the offense to bar the

execution of persons under the age of 21. In the alternative, he

argues that the alleged newly discovered evidence negates the two

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aggravating factors 3 that the trial court found in imposing his death

sentence and therefore would probably yield a less severe sentence

on retrial. See Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021)

(explaining that to obtain relief where alleged newly discovered

evidence relates to the penalty phase, “a defendant must establish:

(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by the trial

court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it could

not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that the

evidence is of such a nature that it would probably . . . yield a less

severe sentence on retrial”).

The circuit court summarily denied relief, finding that Melton’s

claim was untimely and that his request to extend Roper is

meritless. We agree. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B) (“If the

motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the

movant is entitled to no relief, the motion may be denied without an

evidentiary hearing.”).

3. The two aggravating factors are: (1) prior violent felony
(first-degree murder and robbery of Saylor) and (2) pecuniary gain.
Melton, 638 So. 2d at 929.

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Melton’s motion is not timely because it was not filed within

one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable

through due diligence. See Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064

(Fla. 2008) (“To be considered timely filed as newly discovered

evidence, the successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have

been filed within one year of the date upon which the claim became

discoverable through due diligence.”). The declaration and

resolution that Melton argues are newly discovered evidence largely

rely on pre-2021 studies and, in fact, the declaration recognizes

that in 2015 the majority of the neuroscientific community accepted

that the human brain was not fully developed until late

adolescence. “ ‘[N]ew opinions or research studies based on a

compilation or analysis of previously existing data and scientific

information’ are not generally considered newly discovered

evidence.” Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 99 (Fla. 2023)

(alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. State, 125 So. 3d 745, 750

(Fla. 2013)); see also Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40, 72 (Fla. 2013)

(“[N]ew research studies are not recognized as newly discovered

evidence.”). But even if they could be, because Melton’s claim

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depends on a consensus that has been accepted since 2015, the

record conclusively establishes that he failed to diligently raise it.

We also agree with the circuit court that Melton’s request to

extend Roper lacks merit. We have repeatedly held that “unless the

United States Supreme Court determines that the age of ineligibility

for the death penalty should be extended, we will continue to

adhere to Roper.” Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 987 (Fla. 2018);

see also Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1253 (Fla. 2018)

(reaffirming this Court’s adherence to Branch and Roper). Melton,

who relies on evidence that is not newly discovered evidence and

advances the same reasoning for extending Roper that we have

previously rejected, has not persuaded us that our precedent is

“clearly erroneous.” State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020).

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of

Melton’s sixth successive postconviction motion.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County
W. Joel Boles, Judge
Case No. 171991CF000373XXXBXX

Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Alice B.
Copek, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Drew A.
Sena, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondent

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