The Florida Bar v. Michael Christopher Grieco

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2020-1118
____________

THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,

vs.

MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER GRIECO,
Respondent.

June 27, 2024

PER CURIAM.

We have for review a referee’s report recommending that

Respondent, Michael Christopher Grieco, be found guilty of

professional misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The

Florida Bar (Bar Rules), and recommending that he be suspended

from the practice of law for 90 days. 1 For the reasons discussed

below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and

recommendations as to guilt, but we disapprove the referee’s

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
recommendation as to discipline. We instead suspend Grieco from

the practice of law for one year.

BACKGROUND

In July 2020, the Bar filed a complaint against Grieco, alleging

that during a period of time spanning 2016 and 2017, while serving

as a city commissioner for Miami Beach and running as a candidate

for its mayor, Grieco engaged in conduct that violated Bar Rules

3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct) and 4-8.4(b)

(Misconduct; A lawyer shall not “commit a criminal act that reflects

adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a

lawyer in other respects.”). The Bar further alleged that Grieco later

made statements that were violative of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c)

(Misconduct; A lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”).

The allegations concerned Grieco’s behavior in connection with

an entity known as People for Better Leaders (PBL), a political

organization that facilitated contributions to Grieco’s mayoral

campaign. The alleged violations of Bar Rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(b)

arose from Grieco pleading no contest to accepting a campaign

contribution donated by an individual in the name of another
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individual—a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of section

106.08(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2017). Adjudication was withheld

and Grieco was placed on misdemeanor probation. He agreed not

to seek elected office during the probationary period, and he

resigned from his position as city commissioner. His criminal

history was later expunged.

The asserted violations of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) arose from

statements Grieco gave to the Miami Herald and to the operator of

an internet blog known as Political Cortadito. Grieco made

statements denying any involvement in the operation and control of

PBL. The Bar alleged that Grieco made multiple false or misleading

statements to the press, and by extension the public, in violation of

Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).

The disciplinary hearing commenced in August 2022. The Bar

called a single witness, Karl A. Ross, who testified about his

participation in a joint investigation conducted by the State

Attorney’s Office and the Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics &

Public Trust (MDCOE). Ross testified that administrative ethics

charges had been brought against Grieco based on allegations that

he gave inaccurate statements to the Miami Herald and Political
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Cortadito. Ross testified about a formal MDCOE complaint brought

against Grieco that alleged violations of the Truth in Government

provision of the Citizens’ Bill of Rights in the Miami-Dade County

Charter. The Bar introduced several documents through Ross,

including court records, news articles, MDCOE reports, sworn

statements, hearing transcripts, filings from the Florida Division of

Elections, and letters from Grieco’s counsel.

Grieco called three witnesses to testify on the charged

misconduct: an expert on Florida campaign law; an expert in

Florida election law and Miami-Dade County political committees;

and a member of the Florida House of Representatives. Collectively,

these witnesses opined in part that the only persons responsible for

a political committee are that committee’s officers and bank

account signatories, and that because Grieco’s name did not appear

on PBL’s organizational or bank account documents, he had no

legal role in PBL and could not direct its operations.

Grieco also testified on his own behalf. He swore that his

position as city commissioner did not involve the practice of law,

and he insisted that he had never been an officer, director, owner,

or signatory of PBL. He testified that he did not believe that the
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Truth in Government provision of the Miami-Dade County Charter

implicated his duties as a lawyer but that, either way, he did not

think any of his statements to the Miami Herald or Political

Cortadito violated the Truth in Government provision. Grieco also

testified that Political Cortadito has a poor reputation for

truthfulness and that it denigrates politicians who are unwilling to

pay for favorable treatment, and he claimed that the Miami Herald

attributed to him quotes he did not actually say. Notably, however,

the referee found that Grieco made no effort to correct any

misquoted or inaccurate statements published in either source.

Grieco called 17 witnesses to testify in mitigation. These

witnesses testified generally that Grieco engaged in good works and

community service, that he had a reputation for truth and honesty,

and that he was excellent as both a lawyer and an elected official.

Following the disciplinary hearing, the referee submitted a

Report of Referee. The referee found that the Bar clearly and

convincingly proved violations of Bar Rules 3-4.3, 4-8.4(b), and

4-8.4(c). The referee found that the evidence presented referenced

Grieco’s actions in political and campaign processes, including

public statements he made to the media about political
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organizations, and that no misconduct caused harm to clients or

involved the practice of law. The referee recommends that we find

Grieco guilty of violating all three Bar Rules. As to the sanction, the

referee recommends that Grieco be suspended from the practice of

law for 90 days. Both Grieco and the Bar now seek review of the

referee’s report.

ANALYSIS

A. The Referee’s Findings of Fact and Recommendations as
to Guilt.

Our review of a referee’s findings of fact is limited; if the

referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial

evidence in the record, we will not reweigh the evidence or

substitute our own judgment for that of the referee. Fla. Bar v.

Schwartz, 284 So. 3d 393, 396 (Fla. 2019); Fla. Bar v. Frederick,

756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000).

When we review a referee’s recommendations as to guilt, the

referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable

rules to support the recommendations. Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913

So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005). Ultimately, the party challenging a

referee’s findings of fact or conclusions as to guilt has the burden to

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demonstrate “that there is no evidence in the record to support

those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the

conclusions.” Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007).

Here, the referee found that the Bar proved by clear and

convincing evidence that Grieco violated Bar Rules 3-4.3, 4-8.4(b),

and 4-8.4(c). The referee recommends that Grieco be found guilty

of violating all three Bar Rules. Grieco challenges the referee’s

findings and recommendations as to guilt.

Bar Rule 3-4.3

Bar Rule 3-4.3 states that a lawyer shall not commit “any act

that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice.”

The referee found that the Miami-Dade County State

Attorney’s Office charged Grieco with accepting a campaign

donation from an individual in the name of another individual.

Grieco pled no contest to the first-degree misdemeanor charge.

Adjudication was withheld, and Grieco was placed on misdemeanor

probation for 12 months. The referee found that these facts

constituted a determination of guilt under Bar Rule 3-7.2(a)(2)

(Procedures on Criminal or Professional Misconduct; Discipline on

Determination or Judgment of Guilt of Criminal Misconduct;
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Discipline on Removal from Judicial Office). The referee further

found that Grieco admitted to the above facts during the Bar’s

investigation and that the testimony from Ross (who was present

when Grieco entered his no-contest plea) about the plea agreement

and MDCOE investigation provided further evidence of misconduct.

We agree that the withholding of adjudication following

Grieco’s no-contest plea constitutes a determination of guilt under

Bar Rule 3-7.2(a)(2). We also observe that while Grieco made

admissions to his no-contest plea and to the misdemeanor offense

in his responses to the Bar’s investigation, he later denied the same

facts in his answer to the Bar complaint.

Grieco insists that section 943.059, Florida Statutes (2017),

prohibits expunged records from being used as evidence in Bar

disciplinary proceedings. He claims that under the 2017 version of

section 943.059(4)(a), expunged records may only be introduced in

certain enumerated types of proceedings, and that while Bar

admission proceedings are enumerated, Bar disciplinary

proceedings are not. Grieco misreads the statute. Section

943.059(4)(a) does not say that expunged criminal records are

inadmissible in Bar disciplinary proceedings; it merely states that
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aside from certain enumerated circumstances (such as Bar

admission proceedings), a person to whom the statute applies “may

lawfully deny or fail to acknowledge the arrests covered by the

sealed record.” § 943.059(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). But Grieco is not

being accused of perjury, and whether he could lawfully deny an

arrest has never been an issue in this case.

Given that the evidence of Grieco’s criminal history was

admissible at the disciplinary proceeding, we find that the criminal

information charging Grieco with violating section 106.08(7)(a) by

willfully accepting a contribution from one individual in the name of

another; the letter to the Bar from Grieco’s counsel reporting his

no-contest plea admitting to the criminal charge; and the testimony

of Ross, who participated in the joint investigation with the MDCOE

and State Attorney’s Office and was present for Grieco’s plea, all

constitute competent, substantial record evidence supporting the

referee’s finding that Grieco engaged in an unlawful act. For these

reasons, we approve the referee’s recommendation as to guilt and

find Grieco guilty of violating Bar Rule 3-4.3.

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Bar Rule 4-8.4(b)

Bar Rule 4-8.4(b) provides that a lawyer shall not “commit a

criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,

trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” The

referee’s factual findings as to Bar Rule 3-4.3 served as the primary

basis for his findings on Bar Rule 4-8.4(b).

Grieco argues that even if the evidence introduced at the

disciplinary hearing establishes that he committed a crime, the Bar

failed to prove that the crime was one that “reflects adversely on

[his] honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other

respects,” as required to prove a violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(b). He

argues that because the charged offense did not involve the practice

of law, the crime of conviction was not one that reflects adversely on

his fitness as a lawyer. He also argues that because fraud, deceit,

and misrepresentation are not essential elements of section

106.08(7)(a), the crime of conviction is not a crime of dishonesty for

purposes of Bar Rule 4-8.4(b).

We find Grieco’s arguments unpersuasive. Knowingly

accepting campaign donations from one individual, through or in

the name of another (the offense to which Grieco pled no contest) is
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a dishonest act. We agree with the referee that the nature of

Grieco’s criminal act establishes conduct that reflects adversely on

his honesty and on his trustworthiness—two components of fitness

as a lawyer as expressly identified in Bar Rule 4-8.4(b). Because

the record evidence does not clearly contradict the referee’s

conclusion that Grieco’s criminal act reflects adversely on his

honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,

we approve the referee’s recommendation and find Grieco guilty of

violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(b).

Bar Rule 4-8.4(c)

Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) prohibits lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” While

Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) requires a showing of intent, establishing intent

only requires proof that the lawyer “deliberately or knowingly

engaged in the activity in question.” Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d

41, 46 (Fla. 2004). And as relevant here, to establish a violation of

Bar Rule 4-8.4(c), reliable hearsay is admissible. Fla. Bar v.

Bischoff, 212 So. 3d 312, 318 (Fla. 2017). Though we may assess

the reliability of the hearsay evidence, we do not second-guess a

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referee’s findings as to evidentiary weight or witness credibility.

See Fla. Bar v. Vannier, 498 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 1986).

In the proceedings below, Grieco argued to the referee that the

Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any quotes

printed in the Miami Herald or Political Cortadito were in fact uttered

by him or that his statements were given proper context. He

further argued that the Bar did not prove that his statements were

deliberately or knowingly false or misleading, and he urged the

referee not to adopt the MDCOE’s findings that he made false or

misleading statements as proof of violations of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).

The referee rejected Grieco’s arguments, finding that the

MDCOE report—which included findings that Grieco violated the

Truth in Government provision of the Citizen’s Bill of Rights on two

occasions—was sufficient to support violations of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).

Of note, the referee emphasized that the Bar also submitted the

evidence and documents relied upon by MDCOE to establish that

Grieco was heavily involved with every aspect of the creation,

operation, and funding of PBL. Such evidence undermined Grieco’s

public statements disavowing any involvement with or knowledge of

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PBL.2 And that evidence also showed that Grieco never made any

attempt to publicly correct what he now claims were inaccurate

representations of his earlier comments.

Furthermore, Grieco made admissions during the disciplinary

process that directly contradicted his earlier public statements on

his relationship with PBL. For example, during the Bar

proceedings, when trustworthiness as a lawyer had become an

issue, Grieco changed his story and asserted that he had actually

never been retained as a lawyer for PBL and had never performed

any legal services for the organization. He attempted to explain

these contradictions by stating in his briefs that he was only

retained as PBL’s lawyer after PBL’s officers became subjects of

2. The referee also observed that one of the Miami Herald
articles reported that forensic handwriting examiners had identified
handwriting on a PBL document as Grieco’s handwriting. After the
handwriting report was made public, Grieco stated for the first time
that he had in fact been involved with PBL, but as its lawyer, and
that the confidential attorney-client relationship required him to
initially deny any involvement. The referee found the handwriting
report to be significant—not for its truth, but because Grieco and
his team “shifted the official party line” after the report’s release. In
addition, the referee found that PBL’s two officers were both close
friends of Grieco and that both admitted they performed very few
services for PBL.

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investigation. He insists that his assertions about never being

PBL’s lawyer and never performing legal services were meant to

refer only to the period of his alleged misconduct. But this creates

yet another contradiction: if Grieco only began performing legal

services after investigations began, then there would have been no

attorney-client relationship to justify his initial denials of

involvement with PBL.

Grieco asserts that the media articles are unreliable as proof of

his statements, because the articles could easily have misquoted

him or taken his words out of context. We acknowledge the

potential for error in newspapers and other media. However, the

referee’s findings are not based simply on Grieco’s initial statements

as reported in the articles. Instead, in determining that Grieco

made false or misleading public statements, the referee considered

the articles, Grieco’s shifting storyline, the MDCOE investigation

into Grieco’s involvement with PBL, and the admissions Grieco

made during the Bar grievance process. As aptly noted by the

referee, “it is clear that [Grieco’s] narrative and testimony on this

topic change depending on the audience to whom it is presented,

and the goal [he] wishes the statements to accomplish.”
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Moreover, we emphasize that we are not scrutinizing political

speech made by Grieco while campaigning or otherwise engaging in

the political arena. We are aware that the standard governing the

propriety of a lawyer’s statements often depends on the factual

context and setting of such statements. Here, the focus is not on

statements of a political nature, but on the referee’s findings that,

on more than one occasion, Grieco intentionally deceived or mislead

the public about his involvement with PBL.

Consistent with the discussion above, we find that competent,

substantial evidence in the record supports the referee’s finding

that Grieco deliberately engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct

by making repeated false or misleading statements. We further

conclude that Grieco has failed to show that the referee’s

recommendations as to guilt are clearly contradicted by the record.

Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and

recommendations as to guilt and, thus, find Grieco guilty of

violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(c).

B. The Referee’s Recommendation as to Discipline.

We now turn to the referee’s recommendation to impose a 90-

day suspension as a sanction for Grieco’s misconduct. A referee’s
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recommended discipline must have a reasonable basis in existing

case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

(Standards). See Fla. Bar v. Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 765 (Fla. 2016);

Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). Our review of

a referee’s recommendation as to discipline is broader than our

review of a referee’s findings of fact, for it is ultimately this Court’s

responsibility to determine the appropriate discipline. Fla. Bar v.

Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 83 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla. Bar v. Anderson,

538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989)); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

That said, we have recognized that a referee “is in a unique position

to assess the credibility of witnesses, and his judgment regarding

credibility should not be overturned absent clear and convincing

evidence that his judgment is incorrect.” Fla. Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So.

2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d

1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991)).

In this case, the referee considered the following Standards:

5.1(b) (Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity; Suspension); 6.1(d)

(False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation; Admonishment);

7.1(d) (Deceptive Conduct or Statements; Admonishment); and

8.1(b) (Violation of Court Order or Engaging in Subsequent Same or
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Similar Misconduct; Suspension). We agree with the referee that

suspension is the appropriate sanction. We question the referee’s

reliance on the admonishment subdivisions of Standards 6.1 and

7.1. Subdivision (d) of each of these Standards addresses negligent

dishonest conduct, which is incongruous with the referee’s finding

that Grieco “chose to make misleading statements” and with the

referee’s findings on Grieco’s failure to truthfully clarify statements,

his shifting narrative following the handwriting report, and his

misrepresentations about his role as PBL’s lawyer. According to the

referee, the Bar established clearly and convincingly that Grieco

“intended to mislead” the public. Nevertheless, we agree with the

referee that the suspension subdivisions of Standards 5.1 and 8.1

apply, and both of those Standards indicate that suspension is the

appropriate sanction.

Next, we consider the referee’s findings on the applicable

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. “Like other factual

findings, a referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation carry a

presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record.” Fla. Bar v. Scheinberg,

129 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Germain, 957 So. 2d at
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621). A finding that an aggravating or mitigating factor applies—or

a failure to find that an aggravating or mitigating factor applies—is

afforded the same deference. Id. “The fact that there is some

evidence in the record to support a finding that a mitigating [or

aggravating] factor might apply does not mean that the referee

should have necessarily found it applicable.” Fla. Bar v. Herman, 8

So. 3d 1100, 1106 (Fla. 2009). Ultimately, the party challenging a

referee’s findings of fact on aggravation or mitigation “must

establish there is a lack of evidence in the record to support such

findings or that the record clearly contradicts the referee’s

conclusions.” Fla. Bar v. Horton, 332 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla. 2019)

(quoting Fla. Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2008)).

Here, the referee found the existence of seven aggravators:

3.2(b)(1) (prior disciplinary offenses); 3.2(b)(2) (dishonest or selfish

motive); 3.2(b)(3) (a pattern of misconduct); 3.2(b)(4) (multiple

offenses); 3.2(b)(6) (submission of false evidence, false statements,

or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process);

3.2(b)(7) (refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the

conduct); and 3.2(b)(9) (substantial experience in the practice of

law). The referee also found several mitigating factors.
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The referee’s findings as to the applicable aggravators and

mitigators have record support and are not clearly erroneous.

However, in light of Grieco’s continued dishonest conduct over time,

including the crime of dishonesty underlying this case, the multiple

misleading public statements regarding his involvement with PBL,

the submission of false or misleading statements during the

disciplinary process, and past misconduct for which Grieco was

previously disciplined (conduct that involved misrepresentations to

law enforcement about his role in an investigation), we conclude

that the referee should have afforded greater weight to the pattern

of misconduct aggravator.

To be clear, we recognize that mitigation testimony was

provided by no less than seventeen witnesses, including judges and

elected officials, who spoke of Grieco’s good works and

rehabilitation efforts. We also acknowledge the referee’s finding

that Grieco has taken steps to correct deficiencies in his campaign

and electioneering conduct. However, we find that Grieco’s

continuous shifting of the narrative (including presentation of yet

another new narrative in his briefing and oral argument before this

Court), and his reliance on the technically accurate nature of
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statements that were clearly intended to mislead the public,

indicate a troubling character flaw that requires a period of

rehabilitation before he can be readmitted to the Bar.

As for the appropriate length of time for the rehabilitative

suspension, we must examine existing case law. See Fla. Bar v.

Maurice, 955 So. 2d 535, 541 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that because

the Standards “do not suggest the appropriate length of a

suspension, the Court examines caselaw to determine whether the

referee’s recommendation . . . has a reasonable basis”).

Looking at relatively recent analogous cases, we first take note

of Germain, 957 So. 2d at 623-24, where we imposed a one-year

suspension on a lawyer who lied under oath in connection with

ongoing legal proceedings. We are also mindful of Florida Bar v.

MacNamara, 132 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 2013), a case relied on by the

referee and cited by Grieco in the briefing of this case. In

MacNamara, a lawyer misrepresented to the probate court that he

had filed a tax return, despite knowing he had not sent the IRS a

signed return. Id. at 172. The lawyer also sent a deliberately

misleading cover letter to the IRS and failed to honestly inform his

client about the status of the return. Id. Finally, the lawyer made
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misrepresentations to the Bar, claiming he filed the tax return

earlier than he had. Id. In MacNamara, we determined that the

appropriate sanction was a 90-day suspension, making note of the

absence of any prior disciplinary history and of the lawyer’s

acknowledgment that he had engaged in misconduct. Id. at 173.

Grieco argues that he should get a lighter sanction than the

90-day suspension issued in MacNamara. However, Grieco not only

engaged in multiple instances of dishonest behavior (including

misrepresentations to the Bar), but he also submitted false

statements during the disciplinary proceeding to distance his prior

misconduct from his professional duties as a lawyer, and he

committed a crime of dishonesty when he solicited, facilitated, and

accepted an unauthorized campaign contribution in an illegal

manner. And unlike the attorney in MacNamara, Grieco has not

owned up to his misconduct, and he has received discipline in the

past for prior dishonest conduct. We believe Grieco’s actions

warrant a harsher sanction than the conduct in MacNamara,

particularly in light of the aggravating circumstances discussed

above.

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Finally, we note our decision in Florida Bar v. Kinsella, 260 So.

3d 1046 (Fla. 2018). In Kinsella, a lawyer pled no contest to a

criminal misdemeanor, and like in this case, adjudication was

withheld. Id. at 1047. Also like in this case, the lawyer’s criminal

conduct in Kinsella did not involve the practice of law. Id. We

found that substantial mitigation existed in Kinsella, including the

lawyer’s full cooperation with law enforcement, her voluntary entry

into a treatment contract, her efforts to return the money at issue,

and the fact that she had already been subjected to other penalties

for the same misconduct. Notably, the referee in this case found

many of the same mitigating factors. But unlike Grieco, the lawyer

in Kinsella also had no prior Bar disciplinary history, was

inexperienced in the practice of law, had personal or emotional

problems, and made serious expressions of remorse. Id. at 1049.

We suspended the lawyer in Kinsella for a period of three years, and

while that lawyer’s conduct was egregious (including stealing money

that had been entrusted to her), we focused on the significant

aggravating circumstances—which included a dishonest and selfish

motive and a pattern of misconduct. Id. at 1050. Both of those

serious aggravators are also present in this case.
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Based on the existing caselaw, and in consideration of the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we conclude that a one-

year rehabilitative suspension is the appropriate sanction for

Grieco’s misconduct.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and

recommendations as to guilt. However, we disapprove the referee’s

recommendation for a 90-day suspension and instead suspend

Grieco from the practice of law for one year. The suspension will be

effective 30 days from the filing of this opinion so that Grieco can

close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If

Grieco notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing

and does not need the 30 days to protect existing clients, this Court

will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.

Grieco shall fully comply with Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-

5.1(h). Grieco shall also fully comply with Rule Regulating The

Florida Bar 3-6.1, if applicable. In addition, Grieco shall accept no

new business from the date this order is filed until he is reinstated.

Grieco is further directed to comply with all other terms and

conditions of the report.
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Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

Michael Christopher Grieco in the amount of $12,572.00, for which

sum let execution issue.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.
COURIEL, J., recused.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Mark Lugo Mason, Bar
Counsel, and Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida
Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; and Jennifer R. Falcone, Bar Counsel,
The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida,

for Complainant

Benedict P. Kuehne of Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., Miami, Florida,

for Respondent

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