Jefferson County Kennel Club, Inc. v. Florida Gaming Control Commission

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-2523
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JEFFERSON COUNTY KENNEL
CLUB, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA GAMING CONTROL
COMMISSION,

Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Angela Cote Dempsey, Judge.

June 3, 2026

OSTERHAUS, C.J.

In a 2021 special session, the Florida Legislature revised the
Pari-mutuel Wagering Act, chapter 550, Florida Statutes, to
implement a new gaming compact between the State and the
Seminole Tribe of Florida. See Ch. 21-271, Laws of Fla. One part
of the revised Act required pari-mutuel wagering permits to be
revoked from permitholders that hadn’t operated in the previous
fiscal year. § 550.054(9)(c), Fla. Stat. Under this provision, the
Jefferson County Kennel Club (“JCKC”) stood to lose its pari-
mutuel wagering permit because it didn’t possess a license to
operate in fiscal year 2020-2021. Hoping to retain its permit (and
to sell it to someone else), JCKC sued the Florida Gaming Control
Commission. Its lawsuit claimed that the § 550.054(9)(c) permit-
revocation provision was unconstitutional. But the trial court
rejected JCKC’s arguments. It granted summary judgment for the
Commission, effectively clearing the way for the Commission to
revoke JCKC’s pari-mutuel wagering permit. JCKC now appeals
the trial court’s decision. We affirm.

I.

Orders granting summary judgment and constitutional
challenges to statutes are subject to de novo review as pure
questions of law. See, e.g., Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond
Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000); Jackson v. State, 191
So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016). “[S]tatutes are presumed
constitutional.” Jackson, 191 So. 3d at 426. And courts must
“construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome
whenever possible.” Id. (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Howard, 916
So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005)). It is the challenging party’s “burden
to establish the statute’s invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

JCKC makes three constitutional arguments that the permit-
revocation provision in § 550.054(9)(c) is unconstitutional. The
statute reads as follows:

The commission shall revoke the permit of any
permitholder, other than a permitholder issued a permit
pursuant to s. 550.3345, who did not hold an operating
license for the conduct of pari-mutuel wagering for fiscal
year 2020-2021. A permit revoked under this paragraph
is void and may not be reissued.

§ 550.054(9)(c), Fla. Stat.

A.

JCKC contends, first, that § 550.054(9)(c) amounts to an
unconstitutional special law, in violation of article III, § 11(a)(12)
of the Florida Constitution, because its permit-revocation regime
applies only to a narrow, known class of nine permit holders
statewide.

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Article III, § 11(a)(12) of the Florida Constitution provides
that “[t]here shall be no special law . . . pertaining to . . . [a] grant
of privilege to a private corporation.” The Florida Supreme Court
has described a “special law” to be “one relating to, or designed to
operate upon, particular persons or things, or one that purports to
operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not
permissible or the classification adopted is illegal.” Fla. Dept. of
Health v. Florigrown, 317 So. 3d 1101, 1116 (Fla. 2021) (quoting
State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (1934) (citation
omitted)). A statute may qualify as an unconstitutional special
law, for instance, if “there [i]s no reasonable possibility that the
classification used in the statute would . . . apply to” the population
as a whole. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. and Pro. Regul. v. Gulfstream Park
Racing Ass’n, Inc., 967 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 2007); see also
Florigrown, 317 So. 3d at 1117 (discussing that “the closed nature
of a class affected by a particular law indicated that the law was
special”).

But not every statute operating on a closed class constitutes a
special law. Florigrown, 317 So. 3d at 1117. Indeed, “whether a law
is special or general must also take account of its place within a
wider regulatory scheme.” Id. at 1118. Laws that are limited in
their direct application are still considered general laws so long as
their limited application reasonably relates to a statewide purpose.
Id. at 1117 (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hall, 67 So. 3d
1084, 1090-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)) (finding a law that applied to
only five tobacco companies to be a general law because it protected
funds used for programs statewide).

In this case, JCKC is challenging a pari-mutuel permitting
provision set forth in one section of a fifty-page, forty-two-section
gaming bill passed in a 2021 special legislative session. See Ch. 21-
271, Laws of Fla. The legislation stemmed from a November 2018
amendment to the Florida Constitution prohibiting greyhound
racing in Florida, see art. X, § 32, Fla. Const., as well as the 2021
Gaming Compact between the State and the Seminole Tribe of
Florida, which revamped how gaming would be conducted in
Florida. See § 285.710, Fla. Stat. Senate Bill 8-A and its companion
special session bills did not focus merely on restricting the limited
number of permitholders in JCKC’s situation. Rather, it revised
Florida’s gaming regime statewide. As part of this effort, Senate

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Bill 8-A set forth requirements for greyhound permitholders, jai
alai permitholders, and harness horse permitholders to conduct
live racing or games, by amending chapter 550, Florida Statutes
(Pari-Mutuel Wagering), chapter 551 (Slot Machines), and chapter
849, F.S. (Gambling). The passage of the § 550.054(9)(c) revocation
language in Senate Bill 8-A, in particular, reduced the number of
pari-mutuel wagering permitholders. It revoked the permits of
entities that were non-operative in 2020-21, while allowing
operational permitholders to continue offering pari-mutuel
wagering. Taking our cue from Florigrown, we do not find the
§ 550.054(9)(c) revocation language from Senate Bill 8-A to be an
unconstitutional special law because it subsisted within the
Legislature’s wider scheme for updating Florida’s regulation of
gaming to align with a constitutional amendment and the Gaming
Compact.

Additionally, because the scheme restricts permits from old
and new entrants alike from the pari-mutuel wagering space, it is
not a special law. The updated regulatory regime didn’t just affect
the nine prior-permitted entities situated like JCKC. Rather, the
new scheme restricted prospective entrants from the pari-mutuel
wagering space too unless they were operational in 2020-2021. See
§§ 550.054(9)(c), (15)(c), Fla. Stat. Because the new scheme
restricts both old and prospective entrants, it is not a special law.
See Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So.
2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 1989) (“A law that operates . . . uniformly upon
subjects as they may exist throughout the state . . . is a general
law.”); Gulfstream, 967 So. 2d at 808 (“[A] statute that appears to
apply to one situation or area at the time of enactment may still be
considered a general law if it could be applied to other situations
or areas in the future.”).

B.

JCKC next argues that § 550.054(9)(c) violates its due process
rights. Under the Due Process Clause, “[n]o person shall be
deprived of . . . property without due process of law.” Art. I, § 9,
Fla. Const. In JCKC’s view the State unconstitutionally infringed
its property interest in the pari-mutuel gaming permit via a law
that wasn’t rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

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JCKC’s substantive due process argument fails for at least
two reasons. In the first place, we aren’t convinced that JCKC has
a protected property right at stake in its pari-mutuel wagering
permit. Indeed “[t]here is no constitutional right to conduct a
gambling business[.]” Carroll v. State, 361 So. 2d 144, 147 (Fla.
1978); Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc.,
434 So. 2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1983) (“[B]ecause of the nature of the
enterprise, authorized gambling, this state may exercise greater
control and use the police power in a more arbitrary manner.”);
Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 399
F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing Florida’s pari-mutuel
industry as being subject to an “extensive and complex regulatory
scheme”). Moreover, chapter 550 states that “[t]he operation of a
dog track and legalized pari-mutuel betting at dog tracks in this
state is a privilege . . . [which] requires strict supervision and
regulation in the best interests of the state.” § 550.1625(1), Fla.
Stat. (2021) (emphasis added); cf. Solimena v. State, 402 So. 2d
1240, 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So. 2d 470
(noting that “Florida courts have consistently emphasized the
special nature of legalized racing, describing it as a privilege
rather than as a vested right”) (citing State ex rel. Mason v. Rose,
165 So. 347 (1936)). With this privilege, the Legislature vested
statutory authority to regulators to revoke or suspend pari-mutuel
wagering permits. § 550.054(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021) (“The division
may revoke or suspend any permit or license issued under this
chapter upon the willful violation by the permitholder or licensee
of any provision of this chapter . . .”). JCKC has identified no
irrevocable promise or guarantee stemming from the State’s
issuance of its permit that establishes a property right in its
permit. And because pari-mutuel betting is a State-granted
privilege, “the government does not forfeit its right to withdraw
those benefits or qualify them as it chooses.” Bojorquez v. State,
411 So. 3d 404, 409 (Fla. 2025) (addressing the State’s freedom to
create and to terminate a taxicab permitting regime without
implicating property rights under the Takings Clause); cf. Leafer
v. State, 104 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. 1958) (noting that “a license is
not property in a constitutional sense . . . since it confers no right
or estate or vested interest, it would seem to follow that it is at all
times revocable at the pleasure of the authority from which it
emanates”) (cleaned up).

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A second reason that § 550.054(9)(c) doesn’t violate JCKC’s
due process rights is because it reasonably relates to the
permissible legislative goal of regulating gaming. “The test to be
used in determining whether an act is violative of the due process
clause is whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a
permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory,
arbitrary or oppressive.” McElrath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836, 839
(Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quoting Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.
2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974). And so, the law violates due process rights
only if it fails to bear any relationship to a permissible legislative
objective. KOS 11838, LLC v. City of Panama City Beach, 326 So.
3d 1173, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021); Haire v. Fla. Dep’t of Agric. &
Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla. 2004). This is a very
deferential standard, to which must be added the customary
strong presumption of legislative validity. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of
Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005)
(noting that statutes enacted by the legislature are presumptively
constitutional on their face).

JCKC has not met its burden of negating every conceivable
rational basis supportive of upholding § 550.054(9)(c). Id. In the
first place, the Commission’s arguments for the permit-revocation
law demonstrate a connection to valid legislative objectives.
Specifically, the Commission asserts that §§ 550.054(9)(c) and
(15)(c) advance the State’s strong interest in regulating gaming
and in limiting pari-mutuel wagering throughout the state. See,
e.g., Hialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 37 So.
2d 692, 694 (Fla. 1948); D’Arcy v. Fla. Gaming Control Comm’n,
361 So. 3d 935, 937–38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023). Florida can lawfully
limit how much gaming activity there is in the state. See, e.g.,
Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d at 881 (noting that
“the State of Florida has a legitimate pecuniary interest in racing
because of the substantial revenue it receives from pari-mutuel
betting. Furthermore, because of the nature of the enterprise,
authorized gambling, this state may exercise greater control and
use the police power[.]”).

The Commission also identifies a second valid legislative goal
at stake here, which is administrative efficiency. By voiding
permits that were inoperative in 2020-21, and by barring new
permits, § 550.054(9)(c) and (15)(c) reduce the need for the State to

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spend resources processing new license applications and policing
entities that hold non-operative permits. Common sense dictates
that there is an administrative burden involved with the
regulation of pari-mutuel wagering in Florida. In fact, the Bill
Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement for SB 8-A prepared for the
Senate’s Appropriations Committee indicates that the Division of
Pari-mutuel Wagering suspended eight licenses and assessed
$19,075 in fines for violations of pari-mutuel statutes and rules in
Fiscal Year 2019-20. Reducing the number of regulated entities
may allow the Commission to focus more resources on monitoring
active pari-mutuel facilities. Because enhancing administrative
efficiency is a permissible legislative goal, § 550.054(9)(c) satisfies
rational basis scrutiny.

JCKC raises an additional procedural due process argument
that we also reject. “Procedural due process requires both fair
notice and a real opportunity to be heard.” See Key Citizens for
Responsible Gov’t, Inc. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 795 So. 2d 940,
948 (Fla. 2001). The Legislature’s passage of § 550.054(9)(c) didn’t
violate procedural due process because the legislative process
itself—involving a special session of the Legislature with its
attendant legislative notice- and hearing-related processes—
provided due process. See, e.g., Meola v. Dep’t of Corr., 732 So. 2d
1029, 1036 n.13 (Fla. 1998) (plurality op.) (“When the government
through the legislature acts against a whole class of people, the
people as a whole have the ability to remedy the situation by
approaching their lawmakers, electing other more desirable
lawmakers, circulating petitions, etc. In other words, other due
process options are available.”); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982) (noting that legislative process had given
plaintiffs “all the process that is due”). Furthermore, the
Commission supplied a point of entry to JCKC here to challenge
the revocation action in an administrative proceeding. The
Commission sent JCKC a notice of intent to revoke its permit,
which JCKC then challenged administratively, before bringing
this case in circuit court and appealing to this court. All to say,
JCKC has not established a procedural due process claim here.

C.

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Finally, we also reject JCKC’s impairment of contract
argument. The Florida Constitution says that “[n]o . . . law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” Art. I, § 10,
Fla. Const. But here JCKC failed to identify a contract impaired
by the passage of § 550.054(9)(c). The record did indicate that
JCKC had discussed selling its permit with a potential buyer
leading to a letter of intent. But no contract was entered via the
letter. See Irby v. Mem’l Healthcare Grp., Inc., 901 So. 2d 305, 306
(Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that a letter that merely presents a
proposal without essential terms is not a contract). The trial court
did not err in rejecting JCKC’s impairment of contract argument.

II.

For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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E. Dylan Rivers of Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Ann Teegen,
Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Acting Solicitor
General, and Jason J. Muehlhoff, Chief Deputy Solicitor General,
Tallahassee; Elina Gonikberg Valentine of the Florida Gaming
Control Commission, Tallahassee; Noah Temple Sjostrom of Coffey
Burlington, Miami; and David Matthew Costello of Boies Schiller
Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale; for Appellee.

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