Emilione, McKendree v. Runion Holdings, LLC

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

USILIA EMILIONE and WILLIAM McKENDREE,

Appellants,

v.

KAREN MILTNER; RUNION HOLDINGS, LLC, a Florida
Limited Liability Company; SKYETEC ENGINEERING
SERVICES, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company;
and ROGER RUNION,

Appellees.

No. 2D2025-2105

June 10, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Susan G. Barthle,
Judge.

George Harder of Harder Law, Lutz, for Appellant.

Gavin D. Magaziner of Magaziner Law, P.A., Dunedin, for Appellee
Miltner.

No appearance for remaining Appellees.

SILBERMAN, Judge.
Usilia Emilione and William McKendree challenge an order
awarding Karen Miltner her attorney's fees and costs related to a motion
to discharge a lis pendens. We conclude that the trial court erred in
granting Ms. Miltner's motion for fees and costs because it was untimely
filed more than thirty days after the entry of the order on the lis pendens.
We therefore reverse.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Emilione and Mr. McKendree sued Roger Runion; Runion
Holdings, LLC; and Skyetec Engineering Services, LLC, following a
dispute related to Runion Holdings' agreement to build a house for Ms.
Emilione and Mr. McKendree. Ms. Miltner is not a party to the lawsuit.
On February 28, 2024, Ms. Emilione and Mr. McKendree filed two
notices of lis pendens relating to two separate properties. One of the
properties is individually owned by Mr. Runion, and the second property
is jointly owned by Mr. Runion and Ms. Miltner. Attorney Gavin
Magaziner filed a notice of special appearance as counsel for Ms. Miltner
for the limited purpose of hearing her and Roger Runion's joint motion to
discharge the notices of lis pendens. On behalf of Mr. Runion and Ms.
Miltner, Mr. Magaziner filed an "Emergency Motion to Discharge Lis
Pendens, or in the Alternative, Motion to Post Bond, and Motion to
Enjoin Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel from Filing Additional Official
Records in this Action." The motion requested an award of attorney's
fees for his work in seeking the dissolution and discharge of the lis
pendens. Mr. Magaziner also filed a motion for intervention on behalf of
Ms. Miltner for the limited purpose of hearing the motion to discharge lis
pendens.
After holding a hearing on the motions, the trial court entered an
order on April 11, 2024, granting Ms. Miltner's motion for intervention
and finding that the motion to discharge the lis pendens was moot
because Ms. Emilione and Mr. McKendree agreed to file a discharge of lis
pendens for both properties. The order also states "[t]hat the Court is
reserving ruling on attorneys' fees and costs associated with and limited

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to the preparation of the Motion to Discharge Lis Pendens and the
Motion for Intervention, and the hearing related to same."
On November 21, 2024, Ms. Miltner filed a motion for attorney's
fees and costs associated with the preparation of the motion to discharge
lis pendens, the motion for intervention, and the hearing on the motions.
She argued that she was entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to
section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2024), because Ms. Emilione and Mr.
McKendree knew or should have known that the lis pendens associated
with the property she jointly owned with Mr. Runion was not supported
by the facts or the applicable law, as the property in question was not
subject to the underlying lawsuit. She also argued that she was entitled
to attorney's fees and costs under section 48.23(3), Florida Statutes
(2024), because the notice of lis pendens was wrongly filed.
On March 13, 2025, the trial court issued an order granting Ms.
Miltner's motion for attorney's fees and costs and directing that the
parties had twenty days to either agree to the amount of attorney's fees
and costs or to schedule an evidentiary hearing. Ms. Emilione and Mr.
McKendree moved for rehearing, arguing that the motion for attorney's
fees was untimely. They argued that the order on the motion to
discharge lis pendens that reserved jurisdiction on attorney's fees was
entered on April 11, 2024, and because the order was a final order, Ms.
Miltner was required to move for attorney's fees within thirty days. As
the motion was not filed until November 21, 2024, it was untimely.
The trial court denied the motion for rehearing, ruling that the April
11 order was an interlocutory order, not a final order, and that the
thirty-day requirement in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 does not
apply to interlocutory orders. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court

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entered an order awarding Ms. Miltner $12,585.90 for her attorney's fees
and costs.
II. DISCUSSION
The first issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court
erred in ruling that the April 11 order on the motion for intervention and
motion to discharge the lis pendens was a nonfinal order. We review the
trial court's ruling on the finality of the order using the de novo standard
of review. See ProntoCash, LLC v. Autoboutique of Mia., Inc., 336 So. 3d
1212, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (citing M.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. &
Fams., 189 So. 3d 134, 137 (Fla. 2016)). An order is final when it ends
judicial labor in the case or as to a party. M.M., 189 So. 3d at 137 (citing
S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974)); see also
Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k) ("If a partial final judgment totally disposes of an
entire case as to any party, it must be appealed within 30 days of
rendition.").
In ProntoCash, the Third District was presented with an issue
similar to the one in our case. ProntoCash sought review of an order
discharging its lis pendens against the property of a nonparty. 336 So.
3d at 1214. The Third District held that the order discharging the lis
pendens was a final order, reasoning as follows:
The order discharging the notice of lis pendens is not a non-
final, interlocutory order because there is no pending case
against [the nonparty]. . . . The order discharging the lis
pendens against her property operates as a final order as to
[the nonparty], as there is no further judicial labor anticipated
as to her or to her property that was the subject of the lis
pendens.
Id. at 1215.
Like the order in ProntoCash, the April 11 order was entered on a
nonparty's motion to discharge the lis pendens. And after the entry of

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the order, there was no further judicial labor anticipated as to Ms.
Miltner or her property. Therefore, the order was a final order, and the
trial court erred in treating it as nonfinal in ruling on the timeliness of
Ms. Miltner's fee motion under rule 1.525.
Rule 1.525 requires a party seeking attorney's fees and costs to
serve their motion "no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment, . . .
which judgment or notice concludes the action as to that party." "[I]t is
not sufficient for a party to plead entitlement to fees or costs only in their
pretrial pleadings, such as in a complaint or an answer. A timely motion
is also required." Med. Specialists of Tampa Bay, LLC v. Kelly, 162 So. 3d
1053, 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (quoting Barco v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas
Cnty., 975 So. 2d 1116, 1124 n.4 (Fla. 2008)); see also Saia Motor Freight
Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 2006) ("When we adopted rule
1.525, effective January 1, 2001, we established a bright-line time
requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees which the Rules of
Civil Procedure had not previously contained."). Under rule 1.525, Ms.
Miltner was required to file her fee motion within thirty days of the April
11 order.
Ms. Miltner contends that this case falls within an exception to rule
1.525 that was announced in AmerUs Life Insurance Co. v. Lait, 2 So. 3d
203, 207 (Fla. 2009). In AmerUs, the supreme court held that "once the
trial court determines entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs, the thirty-
day time requirement for filing motions for attorneys' fees and costs
under rule 1.525 is no longer necessary." Id.
We conclude that the AmerUs exception does not apply here
because the order on the lis pendens did not determine Ms. Miltner's
entitlement to attorney's fees and costs.

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When a court retains jurisdiction to address post-judgment
matters such as authorized motions for attorney's fees and
costs, without a specific finding of entitlement in the order, a
party's motion for attorney's fees and costs that is filed more
than thirty days after the trial court's order is entered is
untimely.
Lyons Heritage of Tampa, LLC v. Phillips, 385 So. 3d 656, 660 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2024) (quoting Fleming v. Blackwell-Gomez, 290 So. 3d 961, 962
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019)).
Ms. Miltner argues that the order did determine her entitlement to
fees, but her argument is belied by the specific language in the order
stating that the trial court "is reserving ruling on attorneys' fees and
costs." In order for the AmerUs exception to apply, the final judgment
must clearly make a determination that a party is entitled to recover
their attorney's fees and costs and that the reservation of jurisdiction is
to determine only the amount owed. Berg v. Scurry, 412 So. 3d 139, 144
(Fla. 2d DCA 2025). In Berg, the appellee filed an affidavit of attorney's
fees and costs several months after the trial court entered final
judgment. Id. at 142. As with the order in this case, the final judgment
in Berg simply stated that the trial court "reserves jurisdiction to
consider an award of appropriate attorney's fees and costs." Id. This
court held that "[t]he judgment's reservation of jurisdiction to 'consider
an award' . . . does not clearly indicate that the only thing left to do is
determine an amount." Id. at 143-44. Here, because the April 11 order
did not clearly make a finding that Ms. Miltner was entitled to attorney's
fees and costs and the only thing left to do was to determine an amount,
the AmerUs exception does not apply and her motion was untimely.
Ms. Miltner's argument is also contradicted by both her November
21, 2024, motion asserting her entitlement to fees and the order dated
March 13, 2025, in which the trial court actually made the finding as to

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entitlement. That order states that "Karen Miltner's motion for
entitlement to her reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with
the preparation and hearing of the Motion to Discharge Lis Pendens and
the Motion for Intervention is hereby GRANTED in favor of Karen Miltner
and against Plaintiffs Usilia Emilione and William McKendree."
Finally, Ms. Miltner's argument that a stay entered by the trial
court extended the thirty-day requirement in rule 1.525 is unpersuasive.
The record reflects that the stay was entered on June 28, 2024, well past
the thirty-day deadline to file her motion for attorney's fees.
Accordingly, we reverse the order awarding Ms. Miltner her
attorney's fees and costs.
Reversed.

VILLANTI and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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