Johns v. State

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 12, 2025

S25A0875. JOHNS v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

In December 2023, George Sharrod Johns was convicted of

malice murder and other crimes in connection with the November

2022 stabbing death of Jason Cason, Jr.1 Johns appeals those

convictions, contending that the evidence was insufficient as a

matter of constitutional due process; that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting photographs taken before and during

1 The stabbing occurred on November 10, 2022. On February 7, 2023, a
Fulton County grand jury indicted Johns for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). Johns was tried from
December 12 to 13, 2023. After the jury found Johns guilty of all counts, the
trial court entered a final judgment sentencing Johns to life in prison for malice
murder. The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law.
On December 15, 2023, Johns timely filed a motion for new trial, which he later
amended on September 2, 2024. On September 24, 2024, the trial court
entered an order denying the motion. Johns then filed a timely notice of
appeal, which he subsequently amended, and the case was docketed to the
April 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
Cason’s autopsy; and that the trial court violated his rights under

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution by allowing a medical examiner to provide

testimony about Cason’s autopsy when she was not the person who

performed the autopsy. For the reasons explained below, each of

these claims fail and we affirm Johns’s convictions and sentence.

1. As relevant to his claims on appeal, the evidence presented

at Johns’s trial showed the following. Cason shared an apartment

with Gary Mack, who testified about the events on the evening of

November 10, 2022. Both Mack and Cason knew Johns and had

lived in the same apartment complex with him for several years.

Cason and Johns were “friends,” and Johns came over to Cason and

Mack’s apartment to see Cason “every day.” Mack described Cason

as “a little man” compared to Johns, who was “more muscular.”

On the afternoon of November 10, Mack came home to his

apartment. After Mack greeted Cason, who was sitting in the living

room, Mack went into his bedroom, turned on the television, and lay

down on his bed. While he was watching television, Mack saw Cason

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walk down the hallway to his own bedroom. After a short time,

Johns came into the apartment and went into Cason’s room. Mack

testified that no one else was in Cason’s room besides Cason and

Johns. At first, Mack heard the men “laughing and talking,” but

then Mack heard Cason say in a low voice, “[D]on’t hit me no more.”

Sitting up on his bed, Mack sensed “something [was] wrong.” Then,

Mack saw Johns leave Cason’s room, walk down the hall, and close

the front door to the apartment. Mack got off of his bed, walked out

of his bedroom, and called Cason’s name. After several moments of

silence, Mack looked into Cason’s room and saw Cason “laying on

the floor up against the wall” “in a pile of blood.”

Mack called Cason’s name again, but Cason was unresponsive.

Because Mack “[didn’t] know [what was] going on,” he went to front

door of the apartment and locked the door. Then, Mack noticed that

“the door handle” “was moving” and that Johns was “trying to come

back in” the apartment. Unsuccessful, Johns walked off toward a

nearby road and eventually disappeared from view. When he could

no longer see Johns, Mack called 911.

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Around 6:00 p.m., Atlanta police arrived at the apartment

complex. One of the police officers who responded testified that he

found Cason in a bedroom in the back of his apartment. Cason

“appeared to be deceased” and was “covered in blood.” After securing

the crime scene, the officer received information that Johns lived in

a different apartment unit 200-300 yards away from Mack and

Cason’s unit and “had previously been inside [Cason’s] apartment.”

At 6:59 p.m., the officer and a police captain walked to Johns’s

apartment and knocked on the door. Johns answered and allowed

the officers to enter his apartment, where they conducted a sweep of

the premises. When Mack later identified Johns as the person he

saw leaving Cason’s bedroom around the time of the killing, officers

detained Johns and procured a search warrant. By the end of the

night, Johns was arrested and taken into custody.

At trial, a crime-scene investigator who searched and

processed Johns’s apartment testified that she took samples from

“reddish stains on the bathroom door” and “collected a towel with

reddish stains” inside the apartment. A forensic serologist with the

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Georgia Bureau of Investigation testified that her analysis of both

samples “indicated that there was blood present.” And a forensic

biologist concluded that Cason’s DNA matched the primary profile

found on the swabs taken from Johns’s bathroom door and the towel.

Dr. Karen Sullivan conducted a peer review of Cason’s autopsy

photographs and the draft report prepared by Dr. Sally Aiken, the

primary forensic pathologist. Dr. Sullivan was qualified as an

expert in forensic pathology at trial and testified that she concluded

that Cason sustained 27 “sharp force injuries” on “the left side of

[his] torso” that she deemed “sharp force wounds or stab wounds[.]”

Cason’s autopsy photographs showed “a number of . . . sharp force

injuries . . . in the heart,” the aorta, and the pulmonary trunk, any

one of which could have been “independently fatal.” The

photographs also showed that Cason sustained “a sharp force injury

on the left side of the neck,” along with “defensive wounds” on his

hands that suggested Cason had “tr[ied] to ward off the knife or

object that [he was] being assaulted with.” Dr. Sullivan opined that

the cause of Cason’s death was “stab wounds of the chest” which

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caused “rapid death . . . within minutes.” In her opinion, Cason’s

injuries were consistent with homicide.

2. Johns contends that the evidence was not sufficient as a

matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 318–19 (1979). When assessing

this claim, “we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdicts and consider whether any rational

juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Moulder v. State,

317 Ga. 43, 46–47 (2023). In making this determination, “[w]e leave

to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the

evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be

derived from the facts.” Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2022)

(citation and punctuation omitted). “As long as there is some

competent evidence, even [if] contradicted, to support each fact

necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be

upheld.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2018) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

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The evidence presented at Johns’s trial, viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdicts, authorized the jury to find Johns

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. A person

commits malice murder if “he unlawfully and with malice

aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another

human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1(a). Among other things, the evidence

showed that Johns was the only other person in Cason’s bedroom at

the time of the murder. Mack, Cason’s roommate, testified that,

while Johns was in Cason’s bedroom, he overheard Cason tell Johns,

“[D]on’t hit me no more.” Mack further testified that he saw Johns

leave Cason’s bedroom and then the apartment alone; and, after he

observed Cason “laying on the floor up against the wall” “in a pile of

blood,” he locked the apartment door and Johns attempted to reenter

the apartment. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from the

State’s forensic biology expert, who testified that blood stains found

on a white towel in Johns’s apartment and on Johns’s bathroom door

contained traces of Cason’s DNA. Finally, the State’s forensic

pathology expert testified that, based on her review of Cason’s

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autopsy examination, Cason sustained 27 “sharp force injuries” and

“defensive wounds” on his hands that indicated Cason had “tr[ied]

to ward off the knife or object that [he was] being assaulted with.”

Presented with this evidence, a reasonable jury could find

Johns guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. See

Pounds v. State, 320 Ga. 288, 292–93 (2024) (evidence presented was

constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for

malice murder when, among other things, the defendant was the

only other person present at the time of the death); Russell v. State,

319 Ga. 556, 559–60 (2024) (evidence presented was constitutionally

sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for malice murder when

the victim suffered approximately 28 sharp and blunt force injuries,

including defensive wounds to the hands and arms); Smith v. State,

306 Ga. 556, 556–57 (2019) (evidence presented was constitutionally

sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for malice murder when

witnesses testified that they had last seen the victim with the

defendant and “[i]nvestigators later found [the victim’s] DNA on [the

defendant’s] shorts”); Collins v. State, 290 Ga. 505, 505 (2012)

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(evidence presented was constitutionally sufficient to support

defendant’s conviction for malice murder when a blood stain found

on the defendant’s clothing contained traces of the victim’s DNA).

See also Martin v. State, 306 Ga. 747, 747–48 (2019) (evidence

presented was constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s

conviction for felony murder when paramedics found the victim

“lying on a bedroom floor with a stab wound to the chest” and the

defendant and the victim “had been fighting” before the stabbing). 2

3. Johns contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting into evidence five photographs taken before and during

Cason’s autopsy. Two of the five photographs Johns objected to were

taken before Cason’s autopsy and depicted Cason’s appearance at

the time the body bag was opened by forensic examiners. The other

2 To the extent Johns also argues that the trial court failed to exercise its

discretion as the thirteenth juror under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 as a
separate enumeration of error, this claim also fails. The trial court expressly
declined “to grant a new trial under the authority provided by OCGA §§ 5-5-20
and 5-5-21” after having concluded that “this is not an exceptional case in
which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Because the
record does not support Johns’s argument that the trial court failed to exercise
its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, Johns’s general grounds
claim—to the extent he makes one—fails. See Drennon v. State, 314 Ga. 854,
861 (2022).
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three photographs were taken during Cason’s autopsy and depicted,

from different angles, the location, severity, and extent of Cason’s

injuries, including the injuries to his chest and defensive wounds to

his hands. Johns moved to exclude these photographs under OCGA

§ 24-4-403, arguing that they were cumulative because the State had

introduced similar photographs in connection with the testimony of

the crime-scene investigator; that the photographs did not “add

anything of value, as far as to the evidence”; and that the purpose of

introducing the photographs was to inflame the passions of the jury.

Over Johns’s objection, the trial court ruled that the State could

introduce only one of the two pre-autopsy photographs and admitted

the other three photographs taken during Cason’s autopsy.

On appeal, Johns contends that the trial court abused its

discretion “when it allowed the State to introduce photos of the

victim’s body.” In enumerating this error, he does not specify which

of the four photographs he contends the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting. But even assuming he complains of all four

photographs, his claim fails.

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In general, the admissibility of autopsy photographs is

governed by OCGA §§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403. See White

v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 375 (2024). Under OCGA § 24-4-401, an

autopsy photograph is relevant evidence if it has “any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” Relevant autopsy photographs are

generally admissible as evidence, see OCGA § 24-4-402, but such

photographs “may be excluded if [their] probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations

of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403. We review a trial court’s evidentiary

rulings for an abuse of discretion. Baker v. State, 318 Ga. 431, 446

(2024).

Johns does not dispute that the photographs taken before and

during Cason’s autopsy were relevant evidence under OCGA § 24-4-

401. Instead, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion

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in concluding that the probative value of the photographs was not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under

OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). In particular, Johns complains that

the probative value of the photographs was low because they were

“cumulative” of other photographs that had been previously

introduced by the State, and that the photographs unfairly

“inflam[ed] the passions of the jurors against him.”

We disagree. To begin, neither the pre-autopsy photograph nor

the autopsy photographs were “needlessly cumulative,” see Salvesen

v. State, 317 Ga. 314, 317 (2023), of other photographs the State had

already admitted. The previously admitted photographs—those

introduced through the crime-scene investigator—depicted Cason’s

apartment building, his apartment unit and bedroom, the condition

of his body after he was found dead, Johns’s apartment unit, and

Johns once he was in custody. Although some of those photographs

also depicted Cason’s injuries, they were not probative of the nature

and extent of those injuries, including his defensive wounds—key

evidentiary points in the State’s case. The photographs taken before

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and during Cason’s autopsy, by contrast, assisted the State’s

forensic-pathology expert in “describing the nature and severity” of

Cason’s injuries and were “highly relevant to the issues of both how

and when the injuries were sustained.” Johnson v. State, 316 Ga.

672, 683 (2023). As to the prejudicial effect of these photographs,

they were not “especially gory or gruesome in the context of autopsy

photographs” and therefore were unlikely inflame the jury’s

passions in a murder case involving fatal stab wounds. Pike v. State,

302 Ga. 795, 799 (2018). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial

court abused its discretion when it concluded that the probative

value of the photographs taken before and during Cason’s autopsy

was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

under Rule 403.

4. Finally, Johns asserts that his rights under the

Confrontation Clause were violated when the trial court allowed Dr.

Sullivan to provide testimony about Cason’s autopsy when she was

not the person who performed the autopsy. We review this claim of

error de novo. See State v. Gilmore, 312 Ga. 289, 292 (2021).

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The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. “The

Clause bars the admission at trial of ‘testimonial statements’ of an

absent witness unless she is ‘unavailable to testify, and the

defendant has had a prior opportunity’ to cross-examine her.” Smith

v. Arizona, 602 US 779, 783 (2024) (quoting Crawford v.

Washington, 541 US 36, 53–54 (2004)) (alterations adopted).

Therefore, the State in a criminal prosecution “may not introduce

the testimonial out-of-court statements of a forensic analyst at trial,

unless she is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior chance

to cross-examine her.” See id. at 802-803 (citations omitted). As a

result, the State cannot “introduce a forensic laboratory report

containing a testimonial certification—made for the purpose of

proving a particular fact—through the in-court testimony of a

scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the

test reported in the certification.” Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564

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U.S. 647, 652 (2011).

But these Sixth Amendment principles were not violated in

Johns’s trial. We have explained that a defendant’s rights under the

Confrontation Clause are not violated when “the State [does] not

seek to admit [an] autopsy report itself, but rather ask[s] [a second

expert] his independent, expert opinion regarding the facts

contained in that report and associated documents.” Naji v. State,

300 Ga. 659, 663 (2017). Dr. Sullivan was that second expert in

Johns’s case. At trial, Dr. Sullivan, a pathologist, testified that as a

general practice, autopsies performed at the Fulton County Medical

Examiner’s Office are peer-reviewed, meaning that a second

pathologist independently reviews the autopsy photographs and the

primary pathologist’s draft report and that the peer-reviewing

pathologist forms his or her own expert opinion as to the victim’s

cause and manner of death. According to Dr. Sullivan, that is what

happened here: Cason’s autopsy was conducted by Dr. Aiken, the

primary pathologist, and then Dr. Sullivan conducted a peer

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review.3 Dr. Sullivan testified that she reviewed “the case

information that the investigator had prepared initially, and then

[she] viewed the photographs that had been taken during [Cason’s]

autopsy, and Dr. Aiken’s draft report,” and that her independent,

expert opinion regarding Cason’s cause and manner of death were

based on these materials.

But the State never sought to admit the materials prepared by

Dr. Aiken, the medical examiner who performed Cason’s autopsy.

Instead, Dr. Sullivan used the facts contained in Dr. Aiken’s

preliminary report, along with the autopsy photographs, to inform

3 The State filed a pre-trial notice of its intent “to present the testimony

of a substitute medical examiner” because Dr. Aiken, the primary forensic
pathologist that performed Cason’s autopsy, “resides and practices in the State
of Washington” and the State “anticipates Dr. Aiken’s unavailability at trial.”
The State represented that Dr. Sullivan, the forensic pathologist that “signed
Dr. Aiken’s autopsy report as a peer reviewer,” would testify in lieu of Dr.
Aiken “pursuant to” OCGA § 24-7-702, which says that “[t]he opinion of a
witness qualified as an expert under this Code section may be given on the
facts as proved by other witnesses,” and OCGA § 24-7-703, which says that
“[t]he facts or data in the particular proceeding upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing.” In his brief, Johns argues only that Dr. Sullivan’s
testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; he does not
challenge the State’s reliance on OCGA §§ 24-7-702 and 24-7-703 to introduce
Dr. Sullivan’s testimony.

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her expert opinion regarding the cause of Cason’s injuries and the

cause of death. In other words, “[t]he expert opinion admitted at

trial was not the restatement of the diagnostic opinion of another

expert,” Naji, 300 Ga. at 663, the Confrontation Clause was not

violated, and Johns’s claim therefore fails. See Taylor v. State, 303

Ga. 225, 230 (2018) (holding that the Confrontation Clause was not

violated when the medical examiner testified as to his independent,

expert opinion regarding the facts contained in an autopsy report he

did not prepare, and the State did not seek to admit the report itself).

See also Moody v. State, 316 Ga. 490, 544–46 (2023) (holding that

the Confrontation Clause was not violated when a medical examiner

testified as to his expert opinion regarding the results of testing and

evaluations that were conducted by resident trainees, and the

trainees’ evaluation and testing results were not admitted into

evidence).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua, J.,
disqualified, and Land, J., not participating.

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