In the Matter of Kathleen Strang

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 12, 2025

S25Y1147. IN THE MATTER OF KATHLEEN STRANG.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of Special Master LaRae D. Moore, who

recommends that Kathleen Strang (State Bar No. 675018) be

disbarred for her conduct in connection with four client matters.

Strang is currently suspended pursuant to an interim order entered

by this Court after she failed to provide a response to the State Bar’s

Notice of Investigation underlying this matter. See In the Matter of

Strang, Case No. S24Y0064 (Aug. 24, 2023). The Special Master

concluded that, based on Strang’s admissions by virtue of her

default, Strang, who has been a member of the State Bar since 1996,
violated Rules 1.2(a),1 1.3,2 1.4(a)3 and (b)4, 3.2,5 and 9.36 of the

Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or “Rules”) found in

Bar Rule 4-102(d) and recommended that Strang be disbarred. The

maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3 is

disbarment. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4(a)

and (b), 3.2, and 9.3 is a public reprimand. Neither party has filed

exceptions in this Court, and this matter is now ripe for the Court’s

1 Rule 1.2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall abide by a

client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and . .
. shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”

2 Rule 1.3 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall act with

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”

3 Rule 1.4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall “reasonably

consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to
be accomplished,” “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter,” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.”

4 Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent

reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”

5Rule 3.2 provides that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”

6 Rule 9.3 provides that “[d]uring the investigation of a matter pursuant

to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary
authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules.”
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consideration. Having reviewed the record, we agree with the

Special Master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.

The record before us shows that on January 8, 2024, the State

Bar filed a Formal Complaint against Strang in State Disciplinary

Board Docket (“SDBD”) Nos. 7794, 7795, and 7796, charging her

with violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 3.2, and 9.3. On

April 11, 2024, the State Bar filed a second Formal Complaint

against Strang in SDBD No. 7869, charging her with additional

violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), and 3.2. After the State Bar’s

initial attempts to personally serve Strang could not be perfected, it

served her by publication pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1(b)(3)(ii).

Strang failed to timely answer the Formal Complaints, and the

State Bar filed two Motions for Default, which the Special Master

granted. See Bar Rule 4-212(a). The Special Master then scheduled

an aggravation and mitigation hearing — which Strang did not

attend — and submitted her report and recommendation.

The facts, as deemed admitted by Strang’s default, show that

in SDBD No. 7794, Strang was appointed to represent a client

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following his conviction for murder and entered an appearance on

his behalf in January 2019. The client’s motion for new trial hearing

was rescheduled multiple times. On one occasion, Strang

represented to the trial court that she needed additional time, and

on another occasion, she informed the court that she had health

issues and had gotten “backlogged.” The court ultimately held a

hearing on the motion in October 2020. Prior to this hearing, Strang

told the court that her client was concerned because he had written

Strang asking for his trial transcripts, but Strang never responded.

Strang denied receiving the correspondence, although she admitted

that she failed to send the client a copy of the brief she had filed on

his behalf. In July 2022, the court entered an order denying the

motion. Subsequently, the client filed a grievance against Strang

with the State Bar, complaining that Strang only communicated

with him at court appearances and did not adequately prepare to

represent him. Strang never responded to the grievance.

In SDBD No. 7795, Strang was appointed to represent a client

seeking to withdraw his guilty plea to charges of aggravated assault.

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The client filed a grievance against Strang in which he alleged that

Strang had not communicated with him regarding his desire to

withdraw the plea. Strang responded to the grievance in October

2022, stating that she “ha[d] not yet been able to obtain a copy of

[his] plea transcript[,]” which she labeled as “critical” to “any

determination of the validity of [the client’s] plea.” The client

rebutted Strang’s response in November 2022 and claimed that his

transcript was filed in the clerk’s office and dated January 9, 2017.

Strang responded to the client’s rebuttal in February 2023 and

claimed that she had since been able to review the client’s transcript

and believed that his plea was “constitutionally sound.” At Strang’s

disciplinary hearing, which she did not attend, counsel for the State

Bar represented that the client’s transcript “had been filed into the

record in 2017” and that it was “unclear” as to “why [Strang] would

have had problems obtaining the trial transcript when she

responded” to her client “in 2022.” In her recommendation to disbar,

the Special Master found that Strang “admitted that she essentially

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abandoned the case because she unilaterally determined that [the

client’s] appeal was without merit.”

In SDBD No. 7796, Strang was appointed to represent a client

who was convicted of enticing a child. During her representation,

Strang failed to communicate with the client, failed to consult with

him about his case, failed to inform him of at least one court date,

and failed to attend at least two court dates herself. She filed an

amended motion for new trial over ten months after she was

appointed to the case and failed to file certain amended or

supplemental materials that she represented to the court that she

would file thereafter. Further, Strang requested on multiple

occasions that the court grant her additional time to prepare for the

client’s case. And despite the client writing to her to inform her that

he did not want her to request any additional delays and to tell her

what grounds he wanted her to include in the supplemental brief,

Strang did not respond to the client, continued to request additional

time, and never filed the supplemental brief. Subsequently, the

client filed a grievance against her with the State Bar. At the

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evidentiary hearing on this disciplinary matter, which Strang failed

to attend, the Special Master noted that Strang’s response to the

client’s grievance did not address her lack of communication with

the client and, instead, she focused on the merits of his case.

In SDBD No. 7869, Strang was appointed to represent a client

in defending against three felony charges. In January 2020, she

entered an appearance on behalf of the client, and in February

2021 — over a year later — filed a waiver of arraignment and

entered a not guilty plea. It does not appear from the record that

Strang made any further filings in this case, and, in September

2021, the client filed a pro se request for a speedy trial, stating that

he had not been able to communicate with Strang. In September

2023 — over two years later — the superior court entered an order

directing the Georgia Public Defender Council to appoint a new

attorney for the client because Strang had been suspended from the

practice of law due to her failure to respond to the State Bar’s initial

Notice of Investigation. During the year in which there was no

activity in his criminal case, the client filed a grievance with the

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State Bar, alleging that Strang failed to communicate with him and

failed to diligently pursue his case. Strang responded to the

grievance, acknowledging that she had not pushed for trial nor

visited the client in jail due to her own health conditions.

Based on this conduct, the Special Master concluded that

Strang violated Rule 1.2(a) by failing to abide by each client’s

decisions concerning the scope and objectives of

representation — which were to pursue, prepare, and present a

defense — and by failing to consult with the clients regarding the

means by which their objectives would be pursued. Strang violated

Rule 1.3 by failing to act diligently and by willfully abandoning her

clients’ cases to their detriment, as she asked for multiple

continuances, failed to attend scheduled court dates, and failed to

make timely filings. Strang violated Rule 1.4(a) by failing to consult

with her clients and failing to keep them informed about the status

of their cases. Strang violated Rule 1.4(b) by failing to explain to her

clients their cases to the extent reasonably necessary for them to

make informed decisions. Strang violated Rule 3.2 by requesting

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continuances for no reason other than her own case backlog and by

failing to meet deadlines. Strang violated Rule 9.3 by failing to

respond to the Notice of Investigation.

In considering the appropriate level of discipline, the Special

Master considered the American Bar Association Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“ABA Standards”). In the Matter

of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (1996). See also ABA Standard 3.0 (when

imposing a sanction, a court should consider the duty violated, the

lawyer’s mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the

lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating

factors). In addressing the duties violated, the Special Master

determined that Strang violated her duty of diligence, her duty to

abide by her clients’ decisions concerning the scope and objectives of

representation, her duty to keep her clients informed about their

case, and her duty to expedite her clients’ cases consistent with their

best interests. In addressing Strang’s mental state, the Special

Master determined that Strang’s conduct was knowing, as she knew

that the objective of her representation was to defend her clients

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against criminal charges or pursue post-conviction appeals; she

knew that she had deadlines and obligations to her clients and the

courts; and she knew that her indigent clients, whom she

represented by appointment, could not simply hire another lawyer.

Yet, despite being aware of these circumstances and duties, Strang

“knowingly failed to discharge them.” In addressing injury, the

Special Master determined that Strang’s misconduct caused serious

injury or potential serious injury to her clients, as her failure to

communicate with her incarcerated clients left them without any

knowledge of their case status and caused or could have caused

anxiety and worry and as the resolution of her clients’ cases were

delayed by months and even years. Further, the Special Master

determined that Strang’s misconduct caused injury to the

profession, as the Georgia Public Defender Council entrusted the

defense of multiple indigent clients to her and she failed to uphold

the faith the State of Georgia and the justice system placed in her.

The Special Master further determined that, in aggravation,

Strang had a pattern of misconduct, as she repeatedly failed to

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communicate with her clients and perform work in their cases;

committed multiple offenses; refused to acknowledge the wrongful

nature of her conduct, as she never addressed her wrongdoings when

responding to the clients’ grievances; had vulnerable victims, as her

clients were incarcerated and indigent; and had substantial

experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22(c), (d), (g),

(h), and (i). In mitigation, the Special Master determined that the

only applicable factor was the absence of a prior disciplinary record,

but noted that this was not sufficient to balance the many

aggravating factors. See ABA Standard 9.32(a).

The Special Master then concluded that based on the Rules

violated, Strang should be disbarred, noting that such a sanction is

consistent with prior cases in which an attorney has violated similar

Rule provisions. See In the Matter of Jackson, 321 Ga. 256 (2025)

(attorney in default disbarred for violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, and

1.4(a) in connection with one client matter where attorney

abandoned his client’s case and had no prior disciplinary history); In

the Matter of Blain, 315 Ga. 475 (2023) (attorney in default

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disbarred for violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2 in connection

with one client matter where attorney had no prior disciplinary

history); In the Matter of McCrea, 314 Ga. 810 (2022) (attorney in

default disbarred for violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16(d),

and 9.3 in connection with two client matters where attorney had no

prior disciplinary history, abandoned his clients, and failed to

respond to the notice of investigation); In the Matter of Miller, 302

Ga. 366 (2017) (attorney in default disbarred for violations of Rules

1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(c), and 3.2 where attorney failed to communicate

with his client and failed to respond to the notice of investigation).

Having reviewed the record, we agree that disbarment is the

appropriate sanction, and that disbarment is consistent with prior

cases in which an attorney admitted, by virtue of default, to

violating similar provisions of the GRPC that carry disbarment as a

sanction and failed to participate in the disciplinary process.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Kathleen Strang

be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in

the State of Georgia. Strang is reminded of her duties pursuant to

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Bar Rule 4-219(b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not
participating.

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