Hall v. State

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 26, 2025

S25A0731. HALL v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Michelle Garner Hall was convicted of felony murder for the

shooting death of her husband John Britt Hall (“Britt”). 1 On appeal,

1 The shooting occurred on July 30, 2008. On January 5, 2009, a Coweta

County grand jury indicted Hall, charging her with malice murder (Count 1),
felony murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault – family violence (Count 3).
At a trial from September 21 through 25, 2009, a jury found Hall guilty on all
counts. After a direct appeal, this Court affirmed her convictions. See Hall v.
State, 287 Ga. 755 (2010).
This case appeared again before this Court from a trial court’s grant of
habeas relief, which this Court reversed. See Seabolt v. Hall, 292 Ga. 311
(2013). Hall then pursued a habeas petition in federal court, which was denied
by the district court in June 2014. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed based on the ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel and remanded the case to the district court with direction to grant Hall
a “new direct appeal.” Hall v. Warden, 686 FApp’x 671 (11th Cir. 2017). The
district court entered an order adopting that mandate on July 17, 2017.
Hall then appealed her 2009 convictions to this Court a second time on
August 15, 2017, but the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that
notwithstanding the direction from the Eleventh Circuit for a “new direct
appeal,” this Court was without jurisdiction to consider a second direct appeal
from the same final judgment. See Hall v. State, 304 Ga. 281 (2018). On August
31, 2018, Hall filed a motion in the trial court to set aside the judgment
Hall argues that the trial court erred in admitting (i) other-acts

evidence about her conduct towards her ex-husbands, and (ii) two

recorded statements made by her eight-year-old daughter

immediately after the shooting and several days after the shooting.

Hall also argues that the cumulative harm from these errors

warrants a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The evidence presented at trial showed that on July 30, 2008,

Hall called 9-1-1 just after 8:00 p.m. and reported that she and Britt

had been “fighting” and that Britt “shot at” her, “said he was going

“pursuant to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and
the Georgia Supreme Court,” and sought a retrial. Following a hearing on
October 29, 2018, the motion was denied on November 2, 2018.
While concurrently seeking habeas relief in federal court, Hall again
appealed to this Court on November 30, 2018. See Hall v. State (S19A1108).
On April 11, 2019, during the pendency of that appeal, the district court
ordered the State to grant Hall a new trial due to the ineffective assistance of
her appellate counsel. On June 10, 2019, the trial court, complying with this
direction, ordered that Hall’s conviction be set aside and for a new trial be
scheduled. Hall then withdrew her appeal to this Court. See Hall v. State
(S19A1108) (motion to withdraw granted May 3, 2019).
At a retrial from October 7 through 15, 2019, a jury found Hall guilty of
Counts 2 and 3. The trial court sentenced Hall to serve life in prison for Count
2. Count 3 was merged with Count 2 for sentencing purposes.
On November 14, 2019, Hall filed a timely motion for new trial, which
was amended on July 26 and December 22, 2023. The parties waived a hearing,
and the trial court denied the motion, as amended, on August 12, 2024. On the
same day, Hall filed a notice of appeal. The case was docketed to the April 2025
term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
to kill himself,” and then “shot himself.” Hall and Britt had been

married since September 2006, and were experiencing stress as a

result of serious financial difficulties and contentious relationships

with their former spouses.

When first responders arrived, they found Britt “lying on his

back on the floor” in the bathroom, and he was pronounced dead.

Paramedics and officers quickly noted that Britt had multiple

gunshot wounds – to his chest, leg, and arm – and that the

circumstances did not appear consistent with a suicide.

A revolver with six spent rounds in the cylinder, a loose shell

casing, and an unloaded, live round were lying next to Britt’s body.2

There was also a trail of blood leading into the bathroom. Several

rounds had been fired into the house in various locations, and

unspent rounds were found in both the garage and the office areas.

An officer testified that Hall showed him “a mark under her

chin ... [where she said Britt] put the gun up under her head and her

2 The State’s firearms expert testified that the safety features on the

revolver were “all operational and functional” and that significant force was
required to pull its trigger.
3
throat and told her that if she didn’t leave he was going to kill her.”

She told the officer that they “were fighting all over the house ... over

the gun and it went off.” She said that, after Britt shot himself, she

fired the gun into the floor to unload it.

Hall demonstrated to two other officers how, while they were

fighting, Britt put the gun “[c]ompletely up against his chest” and

“killed himself.” However, the officers did not see evidence

indicating that the gunshot to Britt’s chest was a “pressed contact

wound” as expected based on Hall’s description. The medical

examiner also testified that the fatal shot to Britt’s chest was not a

“pressed contact injury” but was likely inflicted from a “close range

of fire,” “maybe up to six inches away.”

In a subsequent interview with an investigator, Hall did not

mention self-defense or that Britt had shot at her. Instead, she

described their struggle for the gun and how the gun went off several

times. She said she hoped that if she kept “shooting it at things, it’s

gonna run out of bullets.” She was unsure which shot hit Britt’s leg

but saw that he was on the ground and that his leg was bleeding. At

4
that point, she said she went out to the garage to “get all the bullets

out” but did not know how to “work that gun.” She came back inside

– while still holding the gun – and sat down on the floor to talk with

Britt. She demonstrated how Britt reached out like he wanted to hug

her but was “holding [her] down” when the shot hit his chest. She

then told the investigator that she “didn’t shoot him on purpose.” In

a second interview, Hall said that “she always had the gun ... Britt

never had the gun.”

Alissa Davis – Hall’s daughter from a previous marriage who

was eight years old at the time of the shooting but nineteen years

old at the time of the retrial – testified that Hall and Britt had been

arguing that evening. At one point, a “vacuum was thrown,” and

Alissa was told to go up to her room. From her room, she heard

“screaming and hollering” downstairs – mostly from Hall – and then

someone said “Alissa[,] stay in your room.”

Alissa testified that she heard more yelling and then Britt said,

“[P]ut the gun down” multiple times – each time “a little louder, a

little more forceful to make sure [Hall] did it” – and then “[Hall],

5
don’t do this.” She then heard a few gunshots, followed by a period

of “calm,” a few more gunshots, and Hall “screaming more.”3 In total,

Alissa believed approximately six shots were fired.

1. Hall argues that the trial court erred by admitting other-acts

evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”).

(a) Background

Before trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to introduce

other-acts evidence – specifically, four prior acts of violence by Hall

against her first two husbands: Rusty Hart and Steve Davis –

pursuant to Rule 404(b). In addition to Hart and Davis, the State

proffered that it also intended to call Andy Binion, who was a

witness to one of the incidents involving Davis. During a pre-trial

hearing on the issue, the State contended that the acts were

admissible to demonstrate Hall’s motive, intent, and absence of

mistake or accident. In response, Hall’s counsel argued that the acts

3 As discussed in more detail in Division 2 (a) below, Alissa testified at

the 2019 trial that she could not remember the “exact sequence” of these events
or certain details that she had previously recounted. The State attempted to
refresh her recollection with the testimony she provided at the 2009 trial, but
it was mostly unsuccessful.
6
constituted propensity evidence and did not show a motive or intent

to control, that the evidence “offered by the State shows ubiquitous

facts that are common amongst domestic disputes and not a specific

motive to establish control,” that the specific intent of the charged

crimes was different than that of the offenses that occurred in the

other-acts evidence, and that “any relevance or any probative value

is substantially outweighed by the risk.”

The court found that (1) the evidence was “relevant to show

motive[,] ... intent, and absence of mistake[;]” (2) the probative value

was “not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice[;]” and (3) there was “sufficient proof for a jury to find by

a preponderance of the evidence that [Hall] committed those acts.”

Hall subsequently asked for a continuing objection to the admission

of Hart’s, Davis’s, and Binion’s testimony under Rule 404(b), which

the trial court permitted. 4

4 Even though Hall was granted a continuing objection under Rule 404(b)

to the admission of the evidence, the State argues that any error was not
preserved because Hall failed to thereafter object to “any and all testimony by
the ex-husbands that went beyond what the trial court previously admitted

7
In line with its proffer, the State called Hart, Davis, and

Binion. Hall’s first ex-husband, Hart, testified that, during a party,

Hart talked with Hall’s sister and told her that his relationship

“wasn’t going very good at all,” that he “was falling out of love with

[Hall],” and that he “loved [Hall’s sister] more than [Hall].” Hall

later learned about the conversation and “punched [Hart] in the

nose.” Hart then described a conflict just after his and Hall’s divorce

wherein he went to the marital home to gather his belongings and

addressed Hall about having someone “of the opposite sex spend the

night in the house.” When Hart turned to leave, Hall “picked up a

cordless phone off the wall and hit [him] in the back of the head with

it.”

Next, the State called Davis, Hall’s second ex-husband. Davis

testified about a time when he forgot to bring home ice from the

store, and Hall became “very upset” and went on “a tirade,” during

pretrial as 404(b) evidence.” However, as we have explained, “[c]ontinuing
objections eliminate the need to repeat an objection where the trial court’s
ruling on the first objection clearly covers subsequent proceedings and the
court has granted a party the right to have a continuing objection.” State v.
Larocque, 268 Ga. 352, 353 (1997).
8
which she “began to push and shove toward [him], [and tried] to kick

[him]” in the shin. Davis also recounted an incident while he was

preparing to leave for a business trip. Hall became “very agitated”

and “very aggressive,” and – as Davis was leaving the house – Hall

“began to strike [him] on the back and chase [him] to [his] truck.”

Davis described that Hall “stood between the door of the truck and

the frame of the truck” and “wouldn’t let [him] shut the door.” Hall

finally relented, but when Davis attempted to back out of the

driveway, Hall was “standing behind the truck” and told him to “run

her over.”5

(b) Analysis

Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to

show action in conformity therewith.” OCGA § 24-4-404(b). This

evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes, such as

5 Binion, one of Davis’s employees, witnessed this event. Binion testified

that he went to Davis’s residence to pick up his paycheck and saw Hall chasing
and hitting Davis – either with her fists or with a bag – and screaming at him
to “run over her” with his vehicle.
9
“proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” if the evidence is

relevant for proving that other purpose. Id. “Relevant evidence is

defined under OCGA § 24-4-401 as evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 775

(2022) (cleaned up).

Along with having to be relevant to an issue other than

character, evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) must pass the test

of OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) – in that its probative value is not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice – and

must be sufficient to permit the jury to conclude by a preponderance

of the evidence that the accused actually committed the other act.

See Harrison v. State, 310 Ga. 862, 867 (2021). “A trial court’s

decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) will be disturbed only

if it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.

(i) Motive

10
The State argues that the other-acts evidence was admissible

to show Hall’s motive to harm and control Britt because Hall had

previously acted violently towards her ex-husbands. See Harris v.

State, 314 Ga. 238, 270 (2022) (“We have described motive as the

reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the

criminal intent.” (cleaned up)). We recently considered a similar

scenario in Harris v. State, 321 Ga. 87 (2025), in which the trial court

admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior aggravated battery

against his ex-girlfriend for the purpose of showing motive, among

other things, and we held that the admission was improper. In that

case, the other-acts evidence was admitted to prove that the

defendant’s “motive in killing [the victim] was to control her with

violence, and this was the same motive shown in the [prior] incident

with [his ex-girlfriend].” 321 Ga. at 91 (cleaned up). We held that the

trial court erred in admitting the other-acts evidence to show the

defendant’s “motive to control intimate partners with violence”

because it was a generic motive that served as a “classic improper

propensity argument,” and no sufficient “logical link” existed

11
between the alleged motive and the alleged crimes. Id. at 98.

The trial court here similarly erred in admitting the other-acts

evidence to prove that Hall had the motive to control intimate

partners with violence. This motive is generic, and neither Hall’s

prior acts against Hart and Davis nor her shooting of Britt had a

strong logical connection to a motive to use violence to control

intimate partners. Instead of motive, the prior acts primarily

demonstrated that when Hall became angry in the past at her ex-

husbands, she used violence against them, such that she was more

likely to have behaved that way against Britt. Thus, it was a clear

abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit this evidence for the

purpose of proving Hall’s motive in shooting Britt.

(ii) Intent and Absence of Mistake or Accident

We reach a different conclusion with respect to the admission

of the other-acts evidence to show intent and absence of mistake or

accident. Although Hall claimed in the 9-1-1 call that Britt “shot at”

her and in a subsequent interview said that she shot Britt in self-

defense, Hall also specifically stated in her interview that Britt

12
either shot himself or that she accidentally shot him. And Hall did

not testify to take the issue of intent off the table at trial (i.e., by

claiming only justification). Furthermore, the facts here, while more

severe, are similar to the prior acts, in that each prior act involved

violence against a romantic partner which was motivated by anger.

Thus, Hall’s “prior acts of intentional violence or threats” against

her ex-husbands made it more probable that the shooting of Britt

was “done intentionally rather than by accident,” and thus were

relevant to proving intent and absence of mistake or accident.

Harrison, 310 Ga. at 867 (where defendant entered a plea of not

guilty, claimed the shooting was accidental, and did not take

“affirmative steps ... to remove intent as an issue,” he made intent a

material and “particularly salient” issue, and the State could prove

it with qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence). See United States v. Miers,

686 FApp’x 838, 841–42 (11th Cir. 2017) (prior incidents in which

defendant had beaten his ex-girlfriends and ex-wife were admissible

to show defendant’s common intent “to harm, restrain, and/or

dominate” women and his absence of mistake in kidnapping and

13
interstate domestic violence charges); United States v. Reid, 2025

WL 1235126, *3 (11th Cir. 2025) (evidence of defendant’s prior

distributions of child pornography was “probative of permissible

purposes under Rule 404(b), including intent,” where State was

required to prove that defendant “knowingly” distributed and

transported child pornography, and the “extrinsic conduct was

essentially the same as the charged conduct, and so was unlikely to

inject emotions into the jury’s decision-making not already present

in the case” (cleaned up)); United States v. Edouard, 485 F3d 1324,

1344–46 (11th Cir. 2007) (defendant’s prior drug smuggling

activities were relevant to whether he possessed the requisite intent

for a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy where both offenses involved the

same mental state).6 Cf. Harris, 321 Ga. at 99 (concluding that the

other-acts evidence was not properly admitted to prove absence of

mistake or accident because the defendant testified at trial that he

6 Because Rule 404(b) “is modeled on its counterpart in the Federal Rules

of Evidence, we may look to federal appellate precedents interpreting [Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b)] for guidance in applying the state provision.”
Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 775 n.6 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
14
acted in self-defense, not by mistake or accident, which affirmatively

took the issue off the table).

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the other-acts evidence was relevant to proving

Hall’s intent and absence of mistake or accident.

(iii) Remaining Prongs of the Rule 404(b) Test

We have concluded that the other-acts evidence satisfies the

first prong of the Rule 404(b) test because it was relevant to an issue

other than Hall’s character (namely, her intent and absence of

mistake or accident). In evaluating the second prong, we examine

both the probative value and the prejudicial impact of the other-acts

evidence. See Harrison, 310 Ga. at 867.

“In assessing the probative value of other acts evidence in

proving intent, we consider the acts’ overall similarity to the charged

crimes, their temporal remoteness, and the prosecutorial need for

it.” Harrison, 310 Ga. at 867–68. As discussed above, this other-acts

evidence has probative value: because Hall behaved in an

intentionally violent way towards her ex-husbands, it is less likely

15
that she shot Britt by mistake or accident. The prior acts were

similar to the charged crimes – both involved violence against a

romantic partner, motivated by anger. See Harrison, 310 Ga. at 868

(“[T]he prior acts were similar to the charged crimes, as both sets of

acts involved threats and violence against a romantic partner …

apparently motivated by jealousy and anger.”).

And while the prior acts were somewhat remote in time from

the charged crimes, the prosecutorial need for the evidence was high

to disprove Hall’s defenses. Hall claimed that the shooting was an

accident or self-defense, and there was little direct evidence, aside

from Hall’s own account, of how the shooting transpired. See

Harrison, 310 Ga. at 868 (evidence of defendant’s prior threats and

violence against a romantic partner were properly admitted where

defendant “claimed the shooting was an accident, and there was no

direct evidence, aside from [his] own account, of how the shooting

transpired”); Miers, 686 FApp’x at 842 (“[T]he prior acts were the

only evidence the government had to refute [defendant’s] theory of

consent aside from [victim’s] own testimony and the video of her

16
alleged abuse.”).

Moreover, the past acts were not of a particularly

inflammatory nature, the injuries to Hart and Davis were not

significant, and the evidence was not heavily relied on to prove the

State’s case – the State made no mention of this evidence in closing.7

Cf. Harris, 321 Ga. at 103–04 (“[T]he State not only relied on this

[other-acts] evidence but leaned into the classic propensity

argument throughout its closing, telling the jury that [defendant’s]

battery of his ex-girlfriend showed that [his] ‘motive is to control

romantic partners with violence. That’s what he does. That’s what

he did in this case.’”). Thus, any unfair prejudicial effect did not

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence, and was

mitigated by the trial court’s limiting instruction, given before the

introduction of the other-acts evidence and again during the final

charges. See Harrison, 310 Ga. at 868 (the unfair prejudice inherent

7 Although Hall argues that the State did mention this evidence in
closing by stating that Hall “has got all of these problems with exes,” the State
was not referring to any of the challenged evidence here but rather issues with
“fighting over custody.”
17
in the other-acts evidence did not substantially outweigh its high

probative value, particularly given that the trial court “instructed

the jury, both prior to [ex-girlfriend’s] testimony and at the close of

the evidence, that this evidence was to be considered only for the

limited purposes for which it was admitted”).

With regard to the third prong of the Rule 404(b) test, there is

little doubt – and Hall does not dispute – that the testimony

provided by Hart, Davis, and Binion sufficed to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that Hall did in fact commit the acts

about which they testified. Accordingly, we conclude that there was

no clear abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the

other-acts evidence for the purpose of proving Hall’s intent and

absence of mistake or accident in shooting Britt.8 See Harrison, 310

Ga. at 869.

2. Hall contends that the trial court erred in admitting State’s

8 Because we conclude that this evidence was properly admitted for
proving intent and lack of mistake or accident, and Hall argues only that the
evidence was erroneously admitted, we need not address any argument that
also admitting the evidence for proving motive was harmful. See Naples v.
State, 308 Ga. 43, 52 n.9 (2020).
18
Exhibits 25 and 26 – two recorded statements made by her eight-

year-old daughter immediately after the shooting and several days

after the shooting – over trial counsel’s hearsay objections. Again,

we disagree.

(a) Background

The State called Alissa as a witness at trial. After Alissa

testified about what she remembered from the night of the shooting,

the State asked Alissa to identify State’s Exhibit 25: an audio-

recorded interview she had with an investigator immediately after

the shooting on July 30, 2008, in her grandmother’s car that was

parked at her house, during which she was “[s]till scared” and

“stressed from what had just occurred.” Hall’s counsel made a

hearsay objection to the admission of the exhibit, to which the State

responded that it was admissible as an excited utterance. The court

overruled the objection, and the State published the recording to the

jury.

In that interview, Alissa said, among other things, that she

heard “gun noises” after Britt said, “[P]ut the gun down.” After the

19
audio was played and during cross-examination, Hall’s counsel

called into question Alissa’s memory of the events by utilizing a

variety of sources – a transcript of Alissa’s audio recording presented

as a demonstrative aid, a handwritten account of what Alissa said

to one of her teachers in April of 2009, and Alissa’s testimony at the

prior trial in this case.

Specifically, Hall’s counsel asked Alissa whether she

remembered the portions of the audio recording in which she told

the investigator that: Hall said “I can’t breathe”; “[Hall] was

breathing so hard”; and there was a pause between gun noises. She

was unable to recall at the second trial these details that she

provided 11 years earlier. Alissa also acknowledged speaking to her

teacher in 2009 but testified that she did not remember conveying

that “both [Hall] and [Britt] were punching each other” or that

“[Hall] had blood coming from her nose.” Hall’s counsel briefly

brought up the fact the Alissa had regularly spoken with her father,

Davis – Hall’s ex-husband – about what had happened that night.

Hall’s counsel then used the 2009 trial transcript to question Alissa,

20
who testified that she did not remember seeing “[Hall] and Britt

fighting” or Britt “shooting the handgun the day before,” despite her

testimony at the first trial.

On re-direct, the State asked Alissa to identify State’s Exhibit

26, which was a video-recorded interview that she had with the

investigator on August 5, 2008 – less than a week after the shooting.

Hall’s counsel objected to the exhibit as hearsay, to which the State

responded that Alissa’s statements in the video were admissible as

prior consistent statements pursuant to OCGA § 24-6-613. The court

ruled, “I’ll allow it,” and the video was published to the jury.

In that interview, Alissa repeated some of the events from July

30, such as hearing two separate volleys of gunshots. Alissa also

described how Britt said, “[P]ut the gun down” ten times.

(b) Analysis

Hall correctly points out that the interviews that Alissa gave

in State’s Exhibits 25 and 26 contained hearsay statements about

the events on the night of the shooting. See OCGA § 24-8-801(c)

(defining hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the

21
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence

to prove the truth of the matter asserted”). However, we conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

Alissa’s statements in State’s Exhibit 25 fell within the excited

utterance exception to the hearsay rule. And even presuming that

the statements in State’s Exhibit 26 were improperly admitted, the

admission was harmless.

(i) Exhibit 25

The audio-recorded interview between Alissa and the

investigator immediately after the shooting was admissible as an

excited utterance. The excited utterance exception, found in OCGA

§ 24-8-803(2), says that “[a] statement relating to a startling event

or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of

excitement caused by the event or condition” shall not be excluded

by the hearsay rule. See Blackmon v. State, 306 Ga. 90, 94 (2019)

(trial court reasonably concluded that defendant’s threat to shoot at

a car the victim was in was a startling event and that the victim’s

statements just moments later were made while she was still under

22
the stress of the roadway threat).

The declarant need not express any particular emotion when

making the statement as long as she remains under the stress

caused by the startling event. See Blackmon, 306 Ga. at 96. And the

trial court has wide discretion to admit or exclude evidence and

should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining

whether the statement was made while still “under stress.” See

Coston v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (2025 Ga. LEXIS 123) (trial court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting witness’s statement made

20 minutes after the murder, while the witness was still on scene

and “upset,” as an excited utterance); Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716,

725 (2022) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting as

excited utterances witnesses’ statements, made as they were

screaming and crying, approximately ten minutes after the shooting

and while victim was still on the scene bleeding to death); Robbins

v. State, 300 Ga. 387, 389–90 (2016) (quoting U.S. v. Belfast (11th

Cir.), held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting statements made by victim – who had been beaten by her

23
husband throughout the night – to a relative the morning after the

beating as excited utterances).

Though she was not an eyewitness to the shooting, Alissa

testified that she sat in her room, feeling “scared,” as she overheard

yelling between her parents and then subsequent gunshots.

Moreover, she recalled that she was “still scared” and “stressed”

during the initial interview with the investigator, which took place

“right after” the incident in her grandmother’s car on the property.

The record supports the trial court’s conclusions that the shooting

was a startling event and that Alissa was under the continuing

stress of excitement when she made the statements in State’s

Exhibit 25. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting this evidence over the hearsay objection.

(ii) Exhibit 26

Even assuming that the trial court erred in admitting State’s

Exhibit 26 as a prior consistent statement, the error is harmless. See

Allen v. State, 315 Ga. 524, 534–36 (2023) (“[B]ecause we conclude

that any error in admitting [the witness’s] statement was harmless,

24
we need not address whether it was admissible as a prior consistent

statement under OCGA § 24-6-613(c).”). 9 It is highly probable that

any error in admitting the statements did not contribute to the

verdict. Alissa’s statements in this exhibit were “largely cumulative”

of her statements in Exhibit 25. Additionally, other evidence

presented was strong, such as the medical examiner’s conclusion

that the evidence was incompatible with suicide, and Hall’s

changing stories of what happened that night. See Puckett v. State,

303 Ga. 719, 722 (2018) (any error in admitting the prior consistent

statements was harmless where “the testimony was largely

cumulative of the unobjected-to testimony of [other witnesses]”);

Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 105–06 (2016) (wrongly admitted evidence

9 “Where improper bolstering has occurred, [the harmless error analysis]

must be made without reliance on the testimony that was improperly
bolstered.” McGarity v. State, 311 Ga. 158, 167 (2021). However, it should be
noted that we have recently questioned whether that approach makes sense,
noting that we “may have conflated the improper admission of hearsay
statements that repeated the live witness’s testimony with ‘bolstering’ – a term
that more precisely describes the scenario of one witness vouching for the
credibility of the other.” Harmon v. State, 219 Ga. 259, 266 n.7 (2024). But
regardless, even applying this approach by not considering Alissa’s trial
testimony in the harmless error analysis, the assumed error here is still
harmless.
25
of drug deals was harmless given “strong” evidence of defendant’s

guilt and other properly admitted evidence that he had distributed

drugs to people other than the murder victim).

3. Hall argues that the cumulative harm from these errors

warrants a new trial. We “consider collectively the prejudicial effect,

if any, of trial court errors,” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (2020), and

determine “whether the cumulative prejudicial impact of these

admissions requires a new trial.” Greene v. State, 316 Ga. 584, 607

(2023). To establish cumulative error, Hall must show that (1) at

least two errors were committed during the trial and (2) considered

together with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the

jury’s deliberation that they denied her a fundamentally fair trial.

See Greene, 316 Ga. at 607–08.

Even if Hall’s prior acts against her ex-husbands should not

have been admitted for the purpose of demonstrating motive and we

presume that the State’s Exhibit 26 was improperly admitted

hearsay, these errors did not deny Hall a fair trial. The other-acts

evidence was properly admitted for the purpose of showing Hall’s

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intent and absence of mistake or accident, so the jury would have

heard the testimony from her ex-husbands despite any error in

admitting the evidence to show motive. And it is unlikely that

Exhibit 26 contributed to the verdict in any meaningful way, as it

was not heavily relied on by the State and was largely cumulative of

other evidence that was properly admitted. See Greene, 316 Ga. at

608 (defendant was not entitled to a new trial “[i]n light of the

harmlessness of the evidentiary errors in question and in light of the

other substantial evidence heard by the jury” in the case, and where

defendant did not show that, because of the errors, he was denied a

fundamentally fair trial). In short, Hall has not “explain[ed] to the

reviewing court just how [s]he was prejudiced by the cumulative

effect of multiple errors.” Lane, 308 Ga. at 18.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Land, J.,
who concurs in judgment only. Warren, P.J., disqualified, and
Pinson, J., not participating.

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