CourtListener 10680193

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320 Ga. 572
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S24A1327. PARKER v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

Stefan Parker appeals his convictions related to the shooting

death of Shelbra Lee Stallings.1 On appeal, Parker argues that the

evidence was insufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense, the

trial court erred in denying his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw as

counsel, the court erred by admitting a book entitled “The 48 Laws

of Power,” and he received ineffective assistance of counsel for

stipulating to the authenticity of evidence that showed his presence

at the crime scene. We conclude that the evidence authorized the

1 The crimes occurred on February 28, 2021. In November 2021, a
Rockdale County grand jury indicted Parker for malice murder, felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. A jury found Parker guilty on all
counts at a March 2023 trial, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison
for malice murder and a consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense.
The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Parker filed
a motion for new trial in June 2023, which he later amended. The trial court
denied the motion in April 2024 following a hearing. Parker timely filed a
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
jury to reject Parker’s self-defense claim, the trial court did not

commit reversible error in denying counsel’s motion to withdraw or

admitting the book into evidence, and Parker has not shown that

counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the authenticity of evidence

that was consistent with Parker’s self-defense claim. We therefore

affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the trial

evidence showed the following. On the morning of February 28,

2021, Parker and his cousin, Michael Walker, made a trip from

Walker’s workplace to Stallings’s residence in Rockdale County and

then back to Walker’s workplace. They travelled in Walker’s gray

2013 Acura RDX, leaving at 8:23 a.m. and returning at 8:45 a.m.

Upon returning to Walker’s workplace, Walker went inside to begin

his shift, letting Parker use his vehicle.

Parker admitted at trial that he returned to Stallings’s

residence alone. Surveillance cameras from a house across the street

recorded the following. A dark-colored SUV drove down the road,

and then a male in a gray hooded sweatshirt, dark pants, and white

2
shoes walked across Stallings’s front yard from the direction where

the SUV had driven. Shortly thereafter, there was a sound of

approximately 11 gunshots, and the same male ran across the front

yard of the residence toward the SUV. At least two neighbors heard

the gunshots. One neighbor saw a male in a gray hooded sweatshirt

walking quickly toward a gray Acura SUV and saw the vehicle leave.

Another neighbor saw a man in a gray hooded sweatshirt running

across Stallings’s yard and carrying a gun that had the handle

wrapped in a plastic bag.

Police arrived shortly after and found Stallings lying on her

back in her carport and blood pooling around her. Stallings died from

four gunshot wounds. Police searched Stallings’s residence,

recovering nine 9mm casings in the carport and front yard. Police

did not locate any firearms or ammunition inside. Police located a

bullet and a bullet fragment at the scene, and a medical examiner

found two bullets inside Stallings’s body during the autopsy.

Police interviewed Donald Harris, Stallings’s boyfriend, later

that day, and Harris was “crying” and “very emotional” about the

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shooting. Harris testified at trial that he was sleeping at Stallings’s

residence at the time of the shooting, was awakened by the

gunshots, but went back to sleep because people had hunted

previously in the area behind Stallings’s house.

Police also talked to Stallings’s son. After being told about the

Acura, Stallings’s son identified Walker as a suspect, as Walker had

previously sold marijuana to Stallings and him. Police investigated

but learned that Walker had an alibi, as surveillance footage showed

him at work at the time of the shooting.

Police discovered that a GPS tracker had been installed on

Walker’s vehicle and, accessing that system, located the vehicle at

an apartment complex in Decatur. Police eventually found Parker in

an apartment, detained him, and obtained consent to search the

apartment. During the search, police found a backpack in a hall

closet; the backpack contained a Taurus 9mm handgun with an

empty extended magazine and a book entitled “The 48 Laws of

Power.” A GBI firearms examiner determined that the recovered

handgun fired all nine casings found at the crime scene and one of

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the bullets found in Stallings’s body.2

During a custodial interview that was recorded and played for

the jury, Parker denied any involvement in the shooting and claimed

that Walker was the shooter and was wearing Parker’s clothing at

the time. But at trial, he admitted that he had lied to police about

his involvement, admitted that he shot Stallings, and claimed that

he did so in self-defense. Parker stated that during the initial trip to

Stallings’s residence, Walker got out of the vehicle and talked to

someone at the door. Parker said that he went back to the residence

to get money that Walker forgot. Parker also testified that he was

wearing the clothing shown in the surveillance videos and was

carrying the murder weapon.

According to Parker, when he got to Stallings’s residence the

second time, he knocked on the front door and went to the side door

when he heard it open. Parker saw a male, whom he identified as

Harris, stick his head out and say something angrily. Parker said

2 The other bullet found in Stallings’s body was “very damaged,” so the

firearms examiner was unable to determine whether it was also shot by the
Taurus.
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that Harris then exited the residence with a firearm, followed by

Stallings. When Harris began to raise his firearm, Parker began

firing his gun and continued to fire as he ran back to the Acura.

Parker said that Harris definitely fired a shot. Parker also stated,

however, that because “it happened so quick,” he did not really know

if Harris raised a firearm. Parker said that he did not report the

shooting and had lied to police during his interview because he was

scared. Although Parker maintained that he remained scared at the

time of the police interview, he testified that he did not hide the

murder weapon because he did nothing wrong.

In rebuttal testimony, Harris denied ever seeing Parker prior

to trial, pointing a firearm at Parker, or seeing the shooting.

1. Parker argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict

him because the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim

beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

When we consider whether the trial evidence was sufficient as

a matter of federal due process, “we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict and evaluate whether a rational trier

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of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Davenport v. State,

309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). In conducting that

review, “[w]e put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the

credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the

resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.”

Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 766-767 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 150) (2022)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

“When a defendant presents evidence that he was justified in

using deadly force, the State bears the burden of disproving the

defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147,

150 (1) (886 SE2d 818) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

But “[i]t is the role of the jury to evaluate the evidence and, when

doing so, the jury is free to reject any evidence in support of a

justification defense and to accept the evidence that the [act] was

not done in self-defense.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see

also Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 565 (847 SE2d 156) (2020) (“[T]he

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question of justification . . . is for the jury to decide.”).

We conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient to sustain

the verdicts. Parker admitted that he shot Stallings, but claimed

that he did so only in response to a purported threat from Harris.

His claim was based solely on his testimony, which the jury was

authorized to reject. Parker’s testimony was self-contradictory,

claiming at one point that Harris definitely fired a shot and at

another saying that he was not even sure if Harris raised a gun.

Parker’s testimony also conflicted with Harris’s testimony that he

did not point a gun at Parker and had not even seen Parker prior to

trial. And despite Parker’s claim that Harris fired a shot, the only

shell casings recovered from the crime scene were linked to Parker’s

gun. Under these circumstances, the jury was authorized to find

Parker not credible, resolve conflicts in the evidence against him,

and find him guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See

Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 624, 626 (1) (814 SE2d 353) (2018) (“It is the

role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine

the credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts

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adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence

insufficient.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2. Parker argues that the trial court erred in denying trial

counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. We disagree.

Trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on

February 28, 2022. At a hearing on March 1, 2022, the prosecutor

represented that the case had been continued from the court’s

January and February motions calendars, first for the State to

finalize the discovery it had sent to counsel, and then to allow

counsel adequate time to review the “voluminous discovery.” Trial

counsel confirmed that it was “a lot of data” in discovery, but said

Parker consented to his withdrawal, and said he believed Parker

qualified for indigent defense. Trial counsel argued that new counsel

would have plenty of time to prepare for trial. The prosecutor noted

in response that the case was set for a May trial, so new counsel

would have a “voluminous amount of work” to do to “catch up,” and

that even trial counsel conceded that there was a “considerable

amount” of discovery.

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When asked why Parker was interested in appointed counsel

when he had hired counsel, trial counsel said that, although Parker

had originally been appointed counsel, Parker’s mother paid to

retain trial counsel, that Parker had no assets or income of his own,

and that the family was unable to keep “their end of [the] fee

arrangement,” which was why he was seeking a withdrawal. Parker

told the court that he “ran out of money” since he had been

incarcerated for about a year and his mother could not afford to

continue paying the fees. Trial counsel said he was “[a]bsolutely”

more than willing to share the discovery with new counsel. The court

took the matter under advisement, and later denied the motion

without explanation. In reconsidering this issue as a part of Parker’s

motion for new trial, the court concluded that it did not err in

denying the motion to withdraw because granting it would have

unnecessarily delayed the trial.

Parker argues that the trial court made no findings in initially

denying counsel’s motion to withdraw representation and that there

was no basis for the court’s retroactive finding that procuring new

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counsel would unnecessarily delay the trial. Neither of these

arguments prevail.

The decision whether to grant a motion to withdraw

representation falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.

See, e.g., Rouse v. State, 275 Ga. 605, 608-609 (9) (571 SE2d 353)

(2002); White v. State, 365 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (877 SE2d 649)

(2022).

Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the trial court is
afforded substantial deference that allows for a range of
permissible outcomes, as long as that discretionary
decision is based on a correct understanding of the law
and facts. Accordingly, those findings will generally not
be disturbed as long as they are within the bounds of the
law, based on correct, relevant facts, and within the range
in which reasonable jurists could disagree.

Burns v. State, 320 Ga. 320, 327 (2) (907 SE2d 581) (2024) (citations

and punctuation omitted). An attorney’s request to withdraw will be

granted unless the judge determines that doing so “would delay the

trial or otherwise interrupt the orderly operation of the court[.]”

Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3 (1).

To the extent Parker argues that the trial court’s initial

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determination was erroneous because it did not include express

findings of fact or conclusions of law, this argument fails because

Parker points to no authority mandating a detailed order in this

context. Parker’s main argument is that the trial court’s later

finding is not supported by the record, but that too fails. Trial

counsel did not challenge the prosecutor’s representations at the

hearing that the discovery in this case was voluminous; indeed, trial

counsel stated that there was a “considerable amount” of it. Given

that trial counsel’s request to withdraw came two months before the

trial was scheduled to start, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that granting the request would delay the

trial. See Rouse, 275 Ga. at 608-609 (9) (upholding the trial court’s

decision to deny a motion to withdraw, in part, because it “was filed

within two months of the scheduled trial date”).

3. Parker argues that the trial court erred in admitting into

evidence the book entitled “The 48 Laws of Power.” Parker argues

that the evidence was not relevant to the issue of whether Parker

murdered Stallings, and even if relevant, its low probative value was

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substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We

conclude that even if the court abused its discretion in admitting the

book into evidence, any such error was harmless.

A trial court’s non-constitutional evidentiary error requires

reversal of a defendant’s conviction “unless it can be deemed

harmless, meaning that it is highly probable that the error did not

contribute to the verdict.” Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 90 (3) (g) (844

SE2d 791) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In

determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record

de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable

jurors to have done[.]” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (2) (c) (829

SE2d 142) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the admission of the book likely made very little

difference in the jury’s assessment of the evidence. As recounted

above, the evidence of guilt was strong, if not overwhelming. Parker

admitted to shooting Stallings, and his claim of self-defense was

very weak. Parker points to no portion of the book that was

particularly prejudicial. Although the State argued to the court that

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the book was basically an instruction manual on how to deceive and

manipulate people, and that Parker’s actions reflected an intent to

deceive the police and the jury, there is nothing in the record

indicating that the State made this argument to the jury or

otherwise focused on the contents of the book at trial. The only

mention of the book before the jury was the prosecutor identifying it

as having been found in the backpack that also contained the

murder weapon.3 Even if the book was relevant to Parker’s

credibility, the book likely had very little impact compared to

Parker’s inconsistent statements and contradictory testimony. The

jury could assess Parker’s credibility and reject his self-defense

claim independent of Parker’s possession of the book. Because the

evidence of guilt was strong and the book had very little prejudicial

force, any error in admitting the book is not a basis for reversal. See

Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863-865 (2) (896 SE2d 516) (2023) (any

error in admission of demonstrative photographs of model firearms

3 Although the book did go out with the jury during its deliberations, the

State did not mention the book during its closing argument.
14
was harmless given the compelling evidence of guilt and the limited

prejudicial effect from the photographs); Puckett v. State, 303 Ga.

719, 720-721 (2) (814 SE2d 726) (2018) (any error in admitting a

photograph showing several crime books on the defendant’s

bookshelf was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt);

Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 155 (4) (805 SE2d 873) (2017) (any

error in allowing the State to engage in a demonstration regarding

the crime was harmless, as any effect that the demonstration may

have had on the jury “would have been minimal compared to the

effect of the properly-admitted evidence before it”).

4. Parker argues that trial counsel was ineffective for entering

into several stipulations regarding the authenticity of evidence that

showed Parker’s movements on the day of the crime and placed him

in the Acura. Parker argues that counsel’s lack of investigation and

his entering into stipulations resulted in the admission of

overwhelming evidence of Parker’s travels to and from and presence

at the crime scene. Parker argues that the jury would have been

more likely to acquit Parker without these stipulations. This claim

15
has no merit.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must prove both that his counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d

674) (1984). Deficient performance means that “no reasonable

lawyer would have done” what trial counsel did, while prejudice

means there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial

would have been different but for the deficient performance. Wells

v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 164 (2) (a) (758 SE2d 598) (2014). A defendant

claiming that his counsel was underprepared must show that more

preparation “might have produced [something] that would have

made a difference in the outcome of his trial.” Roberts v. State, 305

Ga. 257, 266 (5) (c) (824 SE2d 326) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Parker makes no showing that any of the evidence in question

— surveillance recordings, a GBI fingerprint report, and GPS data

from the Acura — was inadmissible. Trial counsel explained at the

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motion for new trial hearing that he had no reason to question the

authenticity of the evidence, the stipulations were “partly a

housekeeping matter,” and he had no reason to believe the relevant

witnesses would fail to show up at trial to authenticate the evidence

in question. Trial counsel stated that Parker understood the

stipulations and consented to them. Trial counsel also explained

that the stipulated evidence was consistent with Parker’s version of

events and self-defense claim. By challenging these stipulations,

Parker seems to suggest that counsel should have presented an

alternative defense that he was not present for the shooting. But

such a defense would not have been supported by the evidence and

was contrary to his self-defense claim, a defense that Parker had

discussed with counsel prior to trial as part of a review of his

potential trial testimony. See Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 637 (2)

(a) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[I]t is rarely an unreasonable strategy to

not pursue defenses that logically conflict.”). Because Parker has not

shown that any of the evidence would have been inadmissible had

counsel not stipulated to its authenticity, and the evidence in

17
question was consistent with his self-defense claim, Parker cannot

establish that no reasonable attorney would have stipulated to the

evidence’s authenticity. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance claim

fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided December 20, 2024.

Murder. Rockdale Superior Court. Before Judge Bills.

Nation Moore & Associates, Michael B. Nation, for appellant.

Alisha A. Johnson, District Attorney, Alicia C. Gant, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,

Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Nicholas D. Nunn, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 20, 2024

S24A1327. PARKER v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

Stefan Parker appeals his convictions related to the shooting

death of Shelbra Lee Stallings. 1 On appeal, Parker argues that the

evidence was insufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense, the

trial court erred in denying his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw as

counsel, the court erred by admitting a book entitled “The 48 Laws

of Power,” and he received ineffective assistance of counsel for

1The crimes occurred on February 28, 2021. In November 2021, a
Rockdale County grand jury indicted Parker for malice murder, felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. A jury found Parker guilty on all
counts at a March 2023 trial, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison
for malice murder and a consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense.
The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Parker filed
a motion for new trial in June 2023, which he later amended. The trial court
denied the motion in April 2024 following a hearing. Parker timely filed a
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
stipulating to the authenticity of evidence that showed his presence

at the crime scene. We conclude that the evidence authorized the

jury to reject Parker’s self-defense claim, the trial court did not

commit reversible error in denying counsel’s motion to withdraw or

admitting the book into evidence, and Parker has not shown that

counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the authenticity of evidence

that was consistent with Parker’s self-defense claim. We therefore

affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the trial

evidence showed the following. On the morning of February 28,

2021, Parker and his cousin, Michael Walker, made a trip from

Walker’s workplace to Stallings’s residence in Rockdale County and

then back to Walker’s workplace. They travelled in Walker’s gray

2013 Acura RDX, leaving at 8:23 a.m. and returning at 8:45 a.m.

Upon returning to Walker’s workplace, Walker went inside to begin

his shift, letting Parker use his vehicle.

Parker admitted at trial that he returned to Stallings’s

residence alone. Surveillance cameras from a house across the street

2
recorded the following. A dark-colored SUV drove down the road,

and then a male in a gray hooded sweatshirt, dark pants, and white

shoes walked across Stallings’s front yard from the direction where

the SUV had driven. Shortly thereafter, there was a sound of

approximately eleven gunshots, and the same male ran across the

front yard of the residence toward the SUV. At least two neighbors

heard the gunshots. One neighbor saw a male in a gray hooded

sweatshirt walking quickly towards a gray Acura SUV and saw the

vehicle leave. Another neighbor saw a man in a gray hooded

sweatshirt running across Stallings’s yard and carrying a gun that

had the handle wrapped in a plastic bag.

Police arrived shortly after and found Stallings lying on her

back in her carport and blood pooling around her. Stallings died from

four gunshot wounds. Police searched Stallings’s residence,

recovering nine 9mm casings in the carport and front yard. Police

did not locate any firearms or ammunition inside. Police located a

bullet and a bullet fragment at the scene, and a medical examiner

found two bullets inside Stallings’s body during the autopsy.

3
Police interviewed Donald Harris, Stallings’s boyfriend, later

that day, and Harris was “crying” and “very emotional” about the

shooting. Harris testified at trial that he was sleeping at Stallings’s

residence at the time of the shooting, was awakened by the

gunshots, but went back to sleep because people had hunted

previously in the area behind Stallings’s house.

Police also talked to Stallings’s son. After being told about the

Acura, Stallings’s son identified Walker as a suspect, as Walker had

previously sold marijuana to Stallings and him. Police investigated

but learned that Walker had an alibi, as surveillance footage showed

him at work at the time of the shooting.

Police discovered that a GPS tracker had been installed on

Walker’s vehicle and, accessing that system, located the vehicle at

an apartment complex in Decatur. Police eventually found Parker in

an apartment, detained him, and obtained consent to search the

apartment. During the search, police found a backpack in a hall

closet; the backpack contained a Taurus 9mm handgun with an

empty extended magazine and a book entitled “The 48 Laws of

4
Power.” A GBI firearms examiner determined that the recovered

handgun fired all nine casings found at the crime scene and one of

the bullets found in Stallings’s body. 2