WILLIAMS, CONGRESSWOMAN v. POWELL

320 Ga. 221
FINAL COPY

S24A0591. WILLIAMS et al. v. POWELL et al.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

After being arrested and charged with violating OCGA § 16-11-

34.1, which criminalizes conduct that is likely to disrupt meetings

and other official business of the General Assembly and its members

and employees, the appellants in this case brought suit seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent any

enforcement of that Code section.1 The appellants allege that the

Code section is overbroad and violates the free-speech protections of

the Georgia Constitution and is unconstitutionally vague.2 Along

1 The appellants are Nikema Williams, Park Cannon, Devin Barrington-

Ward, Richard Bathrick, Shannon Cofrin Gaggero, Raymond “Ben” Harris,
Mary Hooks, Priscilla Smith, Desmond Tucker, Yomara Velez, and April
Zachary.

2 During the course of the litigation, the appellants limited their
constitutional challenges to subsections (a), (f), and (g) of OCGA § 16.11.34.1.
OCGA § 16-11-34.1 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person recklessly or
knowingly to commit any act which may reasonably be expected to
prevent or disrupt a session or meeting of the Senate or House of
with their facial challenges, the appellants allege that the Code

section is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as applied to

them. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss the

appellants’ facial challenges, their motion to dismiss the as-applied

challenge of one of the appellants, and their motion to deny the

appellants’ motion for a permanent injunction.3 For the reasons

Representatives, a joint session thereof, or any meeting of any
standing or interim committee, commission, or caucus of members
thereof.
...
(f) It shall be unlawful for any person willfully and
knowingly to enter or to remain in any room, chamber, office, or
hallway within the state capitol building or any building housing
committee offices, committee rooms, or offices of members,
officials, or employees of the General Assembly or either house
thereof with intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official
business or to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language or
engage in any disorderly or disruptive conduct in such buildings or
areas.
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person to parade,
demonstrate, or picket within the state capitol building or any
building housing committee offices, committee rooms, or offices of
members, officials, or employees of the General Assembly or either
house thereof with intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official
business or to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language or
engage in any disorderly or disruptive conduct in such buildings or
areas.

3 From the record, it appears that the remaining appellants’ as-applied

challenges remain unresolved. But even without a final judgment, the
appellants were entitled to an immediate appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4),

2
explained below, we conclude that the allegations of the complaint

are insufficient to support a declaration that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is

facially unconstitutionally overbroad or vague under Georgia law.

We also conclude that the allegations of the complaint required the

dismissal of one appellant’s as-applied challenge. Consequently, we

affirm.

According to the complaint, the appellants were each “charged

with a single count of ‘preventing or disrupting General Assembly

sessions or other meetings of members,’ in violation of OCGA § 16-

11-34.1.” Most of the appellants were arrested in November 2018

during a political protest in the rotunda of the State Capitol, during

which some of those who were arrested made speeches or chanted

slogans. The appellants allege that none of the protesters “used any

noise making or amplifying devices” and that “[t]he Georgia House

of Representatives was in session at the time of the arrests, but their

work was not disrupted in any way, either before or during the

because the trial court’s order refused the appellants’ application for a
permanent injunction.

3
arrests.” The appellants allege that the charges against those who

were arrested in November 2018 were later dismissed, not as the

result of any “compromise or plea negotiation.” The complaint

alleges that one of the appellants, State Representative Park

Cannon, was arrested in March 2021 after she knocked on one of the

doors to the governor’s office in an effort “to get information directly

from the [g]overnor’s [o]ffice regarding when [a recently passed bill4]

was going to be signed and become the law of the State of Georgia.”

The appellants allege that “Cannon did not intend to disrupt, and

did not disrupt, any session of the [l]egislature or any other official

business[,]” and that “[n]either the Georgia House, nor the Georgia

Senate, [was] in [s]ession at the time [Cannon] was detained, so they

could not have been disturbed.”

4 The General Assembly designated the bill, SB 202, the “Election
Integrity Act of 2021,” and it comprehensively revised the Elections Code. See
Ga. L. 2021, p. 14, § 1 (Act 9).

4
The complaint names as defendants multiple law enforcement

officers in their personal capacities.5 The appellants allege that the

officers personally arrested one or more of them or made decisions

for the Department of Public Safety regarding the enforcement of

OCGA § 16-11-34.1. The appellants are seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief on the basis that the Code section is

unconstitutionally overbroad and violates the free speech

protections in Georgia’s Constitution.6 In the complaint, the

appellants allege that “OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is facially

unconstitutional for the same reasons that the virtually identical

statute regarding disruption of other government meetings[, OCGA

5 The appellees are defendants-below Darrius Magee, James Womble,

Joseph Goble, Justin Golden, Kevin Hawkins, Kyle McClendon, Chris C.
Wright, William W. Hitchens III, Thornell L. King, G. D. Langford, and Cory
Seymour. The complaint also named Colin Powell, James Wicker, Javen
Roberson, Jeffrey Rogers, Jeremiah Slay, and Matthew Ray as defendants, but
the record does not show service of process on those defendants.

6 In addition to Georgia’s freedom of speech provision, Ga. Const. of 1983,

Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V (“No law shall be passed to curtail or restrain the freedom
of speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish
sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that
liberty.”), the appellants cite to Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. II, VII,
IX, and XIII.

5
§ 16-11-34,7] was declared unconstitutional in State v. Fielden, 280

Ga. 444 (629 SE2d 252) (2006)[,]” under “the overbreadth doctrine.”

The appellants allege that “[t]he only difference between the two

provisions is the type of meetings covered.” The appellants allege

that the Code section is also unconstitutional as applied to them

because they did not intend to disrupt any session of the General

Assembly and did not in fact disrupt any session. The appellants

also allege that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is unconstitutionally vague “as

its terms fail to give fair warning to a citizen as to what conduct is

permitted and insufficient guidance to law enforcement as to what

conduct is criminal.” The appellants filed a corresponding motion for

a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the Code section.

The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in part,

7 OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) provides: “A person who recklessly or knowingly

commits any act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a
lawful meeting, gathering, or procession is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Specifically, the appellants argued that we struck down OCGA § 16-11-34 as
facially overbroad because it criminalized “recklessly or knowingly
commit[ting] any act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt”
specified classes of meetings and that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) is likewise facially
overbroad because it employs the same text.

6
distinguishing Fielden and arguing that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is not

facially unconstitutional, despite any textual similarities to OCGA

§ 16-11-34. The appellees also argued that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is not

unconstitutionally vague and that Cannon failed to state an as-

applied claim for violation of her right to free speech because the

allegations of the complaint do not “plausibly show that [she]

engaged in any protected expression in connection with her arrest”

for knocking on a door to the governor’s office. After a hearing, the

trial court rejected the facial challenges of all of the appellants and

rejected Cannon’s as-applied challenge and granted the motion to

dismiss the complaint in part. The trial court denied as moot the

appellants’ motion for injunctive relief “which sought injunctive

relief based on [the appellants’] facial challenge to [OCGA] § 16-11-

34.1.”

1. The appellants contend that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) is

unconstitutionally overbroad under Georgia law and that the trial

court therefore erred in granting in part the appellees’ motion to

dismiss and in denying the appellants’ request for injunctive relief.

7
Specifically, the appellants argue that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) is

“virtually identical” to OCGA § 16-11-34 and is facially

unconstitutional for the same reasons as that Code section was

declared unconstitutional in Fielden. Assuming without deciding

that an overbreadth challenge is properly brought under the Georgia

Constitution’s free speech provisions,8 like the trial court, we

8 As discussed below, Fielden applied the federal overbreadth doctrine

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U. S. 601 (93 SCt 2908, 37 LE2d 830) (1973). Given that the appellants
challenge OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) only under Georgia’s constitutional free
speech protections, some of us question whether the guarantee of free speech,
first adopted in the Georgia Constitution in 1861, is properly interpreted to
include an equivalent to the federal law overbreadth doctrine outlined in
Broadrick in 1973. As in Fielden, litigants who have invoked the Georgia
Constitution’s free speech protections in challenging a criminal statute as
unconstitutionally overbroad have typically also invoked the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803 (671 SE2d 497) (2009);
McKenzie v. State, 279 Ga. 265 (626 SE2d 77) (2005); State v. Brannan, 267
Ga. 315 (477 SE2d 575) (1996); Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827 (400 SE2d
916) (1991); State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (1) (398 SE2d 547) (1990). In
reviewing trial court judgments in such cases, we have not yet explicated any
differences between the federal overbreadth doctrine and the standard under
the Georgia Constitution — beyond a conclusory statement that Georgia’s
Constitution is even more protective against overbreadth than the First
Amendment. See Fielden, 280 Ga. at 445 (“The 1983 Constitution of Georgia
provides even broader protection” than the federal doctrine of overbreadth
“where a statute infringes upon behavior protected by the First Amendment.”);
Statesboro Publishing Co. v. City of Sylvania, 271 Ga. 92, 95 (2) (516 SE2d 296)
(1999) (“Our state constitution provides even broader protection of speech than
the first amendment.”); Miller, 260 Ga. at 671 (1) (“The 1983 Constitution of
Georgia provides even broader protection” than the First Amendment, which

8
conclude that Fielden does not require facial invalidation of OCGA

§ 16-11-34.1 (a) for overbreadth.9

Duly enacted statutes enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality. A trial court must uphold a statute
unless the party seeking to nullify it shows that it
manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision or
violates the rights of the people. The constitutionality of
a statute presents a question of law. Accordingly, we
review a trial court’s holding regarding the
constitutionality of a statute de novo.

is “a broad umbrella that shelters all political points of view and shields a wide
range of avenues for expression, including symbolic speech”); cf. Chamblee
Visuals v. City of Chamblee, 270 Ga. 33, 34 (2) (506 SE2d 113) (1998) (“When
construing the Georgia free speech clause, this Court applies analogous First
Amendment standards in the absence of controlling state precedent.” (citing
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 255 (1), n.5 (297 SE2d 250)
(1982))). Although we may wonder whether and to what extent the federal
overbreadth doctrine under the First Amendment is the correct analytical
framework for resolving a claim that a statute is facially overbroad under the
Georgia Constitution’s free speech protections, in this case we review the
appellants’ claims as they presented them to the trial court and thus leave that
question for another day.

9 In the alternative, the appellants argue, for the first time on appeal,

that the State failed to show that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) is the least restrictive
means of furthering the government’s interest, a standard that we have held
applies to a limited class of overbreadth challenges under the Georgia
Constitution to content-neutral regulations that may affect protected speech.
See, e.g., Statesboro Publishing, 271 Ga. at 95 (2). We do not address this
theory, because the appellants did not make this argument before the trial
court and did not obtain a ruling for us to review. See Abushmais v. Erby, 282
Ga. 619, 622 (2) (652 SE2d 549) (2007).

9
Rhodes v. State, 283 Ga. 361, 362 (659 SE2d 370) (2008) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

The statute we declared to be unconstitutionally overbroad and

thus void in Fielden, OCGA § 16-11-34 (a), provides: “A person who

recklessly or knowingly commits any act which may reasonably be

expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, gathering, or

procession is guilty of a misdemeanor.” See Scott v. State, 299 Ga.

568, 570 (1) (788 SE2d 468) (2016) (“To assess the extent of a

statute’s effect on protected expression, a court must determine

what the statute actually covers. Accordingly, the first step in any

overbreadth analysis is to construe the statute in question.”). We

concluded that OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) describes the prohibited

conduct with sufficient clarity to warn a person of the scope of the

statute’s application and that the statute is not susceptible to

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Fielden, 280 Ga. at

444-445. Consequently, we held that, contrary to the trial court’s

ruling, OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at

445.

10
We then considered the appellees’ overbreadth challenge. We

explained that

[a] statute that is clear about what it prohibits can
nevertheless be unconstitutionally overbroad if it stifles
expression or conduct that is otherwise protected by the
Constitution. The doctrine of overbreadth is particularly
applicable where a statute infringes upon behavior
protected by the First Amendment.

Fielden, 280 Ga. at 445 (citing Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1)

(449 SE2d 94) (1994); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 611-

612 (93 SCt 2908, 37 LE2d 830) (1973)). We further explained that

conduct that has “some communicative element . . . may be

regulated by the government only if the regulation furthers a

substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the

suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on

First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further

the governmental interest.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

Furthermore, we explained that where expressive conduct is

regulated, a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad only if the

overbreadth is both “real” and “‘substantial[,] . . . judged in relation

11
to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. at 447 (quoting

Broadrick, 413 U. S. at 615). See also Scott, 299 Ga. at 577 (3)

(“Invalidation for overbreadth is strong medicine that is not to be

casually employed.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

In Fielden, we concluded that “the literal language” of OCGA §

16-11-34 (a) criminalizes

[a]ny recklessly or knowingly committed act that could
reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt [any] lawful
meeting, gathering or procession . . . , regardless where it
is committed, how trivial the act, its impact, or the intent
of the actor other than the intent to commit the act itself.

Fielden, 280 Ga. at 447. We reasoned that, with this scope, the Code

section “reaches conduct that is at once innocent and protected by

the guarantees of free speech, thereby affecting and chilling

constitutionally protected activity.” Id. We concluded that OCGA §

16-11-34 (a) “significantly impacts constitutionally permitted

conduct without the requisite narrow specificity” and that the Code

section’s overbreadth is “both real and substantial[,]” judged in

relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Id. Because OCGA

§ 16-11-34 (a) has such a broad scope, and because it is not

12
susceptible to a limiting construction capable of removing the threat

to or deterrence of constitutionally protected expression,10 we held

that it is unconstitutionally overbroad and void. Id. at 447-448.

Turning to the Code section at issue in this case, OCGA § 16-

11-34.1 (a) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person recklessly or
knowingly to commit any act which may reasonably be
expected to prevent or disrupt a session or meeting of the
Senate or House of Representatives, a joint session
thereof, or any meeting of any standing or interim
committee, commission, or caucus of members thereof.

The trial court determined that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) “has a far

narrower scope” than OCGA § 16-11-34 (a), and that “[t]he extent to

which it may be expected to deter any protected speech is thus also

far narrower than” with OCGA § 16-11-34 (a). The trial court

determined that the appellants have not shown that OCGA § 16-11-

10 See Fielden, 280 Ga. at 448 (“This Court may construe statutes to avoid

absurd results and has the authority to narrow a statute to avoid
unconstitutional infirmities. However, under our system of separation of
powers this Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes. . . . Curing
the overbreadth in OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) would be less a matter of reasonable
judicial construction than a matter of substantial legislative revision.”
(citations omitted)).

13
34.1 “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to

its plainly legitimate sweep of prohibiting conduct likely to prevent

or disrupt legislative business.” The trial court concluded that

“Fielden does not, accordingly, require facial invalidation of [OCGA]

§ 16-11-34.1 (a).”

We agree with the trial court that Fielden does not require

facial invalidation of OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a), despite both statutes’

use of the phrase “recklessly or knowingly commit[ ] any act which

may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt . . . .” Contrary to

the appellants’ contention, the textual difference between OCGA §

16-11-34 (a) and OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) — the type of meetings that

they cover — is a meaningful difference. By applying literally to any

lawful gathering, whether governmental or private sector,

professional or social, private or open to the public, OCGA § 16-11-

34 (a) threatens nearly infinite iterations of protected expression.

OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a), by contrast, regulates expression only in the

context of sessions and various types of meetings of the members of

the Georgia General Assembly, a discrete group, comprised of 236

14
elected officials during their terms of service. The trial court

correctly ruled that Fielden does not require facial invalidation of

OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) as unconstitutionally overbroad, because

OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) is far more narrowly tailored than OCGA

§ 16-11-34 (a) and any infringement of protected expression cannot

be deemed “substantial,” relative its legitimate sweep.

2. The appellants contend that subsections (f) and (g) of OCGA

§ 16-11-34.1 “chill[ ] large swaths of constitutionally protected

speech” and are unconstitutionally overbroad, because “there is no

limitation in scope requiring the activities ‘either cause the untimely

termination of the lawful meeting or substantially impair the

conduct of the lawful meeting[,]’” quoting Fielden, 280 Ga. at 448.

The appellants argue even “‘abusive’ speech is often constitutionally

protected,” citing Freeman v. State, 302 Ga. 181 (805 SE2d 845)

(2017), Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (92 SCt 1103, 31 LE2d 408)

(1972), and Merenda v. Tabor, 506 Fed. Appx. 862 (11th Cir. 2013).11

11 In Freeman, we held that OCGA § 16-11-39 (a), defining “disorderly

conduct” as acting “in a violent or tumultuous manner toward another person

15
The appellants contend that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (f) and (g) “are

overbroad in ways similar to laws that have been struck down by”

this Court and the United States Supreme Court, citing McKenzie v.

State, 279 Ga. 265 (626 SE2d 77) (2005); Cunningham v. State, 260

Ga. 827 (400 SE2d 916) (1991); and Gooding, 405 U. S. at 520.12

whereby such person is placed in reasonable fear of the safety of such person’s
life, limb, or health,” is “not unconstitutionally overbroad, because the statute
only can reach conduct which involves no lawful exercise of a First Amendment
right. Specifically, as applied to expressive conduct, the statute only reaches
expressive conduct that amounts to ‘fighting words’ or a ‘true threat.’”
Freeman, 302 Ga. at 185 (1) (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted). In
Gooding, the United States Supreme Court held that, because Georgia
appellate decisions had applied former Code Ann. § 26-6303, defining
disorderly conduct as using “opprobrious words or abusive language tending to
cause a breach of the peace,” to utterances where there was no likelihood that
the person addressed would make an immediate violent response, it was clear
that the Code section had not been limited to “fighting words” and was
unconstitutionally overbroad. Gooding, 405 U. S. at 528. In Merenda, in
considering in an action under 42 USC § 1983 whether an officer had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for calling the officer “a f*cking a**hole,” the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Georgia has “tailored its
disorderly conduct statute[, OCGA § 16-11-39 (a),] to punish only unprotected
fighting words.” Merenda, 506 Fed. Appx. at 865.

12 In McKenzie, we held that OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1), which prohibits

“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent” telephone calls, is an overbroad
infringement on the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech,
because the Code section does not employ the least restrictive means in directly
regulating the content of speech to further a compelling state interest, as with
regulations that apply only to obscene speech, speech directed at minors,
speech intended to harass, or speech not welcomed by the listener, but instead
also applies to speech that is merely indecent, heard by adults, welcomed by

16
OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (f) makes it a crime

for any person willfully and knowingly to enter or to
remain in any room, chamber, office, or hallway within
the state capitol building or any building housing
committee offices, committee rooms, or offices of
members, officials, or employees of the General Assembly
or either house thereof with intent to disrupt the orderly
conduct of official business or to utter loud, threatening,
or abusive language or engage in any disorderly or
disruptive conduct in such buildings or areas.

In very similar terms, OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (g) makes it a crime “to

parade, demonstrate, or picket” in those same places with intent to

disrupt the orderly conduct of official business.

“When interpreting a statute, we must give the text its plain

and ordinary meaning, view it in the context in which it appears,

the listener, and spoken with intent to please or amuse. McKenzie, 279 Ga. at
267. McKenzie is not controlling here, given that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (f) and (g)
are content-neutral in their impact on protected expression. In Cunningham,
we held OCGA § 40-1-4, which prohibits bumper stickers containing profane
or lewd words describing sexual acts, excretory functions, or parts of the
human body, reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech
and is unconstitutionally overbroad, in part because, read literally, it
criminalizes “the display of a bumper sticker bearing any profanity in
combination with words referring to any part of the human body” and in part
because “the face to face confrontation necessary to trigger the exception
allowing regulation of ‘fighting words’ would be unlikely.” Cunningham, 260
Ga. at 831 (1), 832 (2). Cunningham likewise does not apply to the content-
neutral regulations at issue here.

17
and read it in its most natural and reasonable way.” State v. Harris,

319 Ga. 665, 667 (906 SE2d 402) (2024) (citation and punctuation

omitted). “If the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we

attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for

statutory meaning is at an end.” Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 150 (1)

(800 SE2d 348) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). In the

context of OCGA § 16-11-34.1 as a whole, subsections (f) and (g) are

not ambiguous. They prohibit (1) willfully and knowingly entering

or remaining in designated areas that are involved with the

operation of the General Assembly with intent to disrupt the orderly

conduct of official business; (2) parading, demonstrating, or

picketing in those areas with intent to disrupt the orderly conduct

of official business; and (3) making loud or abusive utterances or

engaging in disorderly conduct in those areas. Construed according

to their plain and unambiguous terms, these provisions do not

prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech relative to their

plainly legitimate sweep of prohibiting conduct likely to prevent or

disrupt legislative business, as discussed in Division 1, supra, and

18
Fielden, therefore, does not require facial invalidation of OCGA § 16-

11-34.1 (f) and (g) as unconstitutionally overbroad.

3. The appellants contend that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) is

“unconstitutionally vague[, under the Georgia Constitution,] as its

terms fail to give fair warning to a citizen as to what conduct is

permitted and insufficient guidance to law enforcement as to what

conduct is criminal.” They argue that the phrase “any act which may

reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt” fails to provide

sufficient clarity on what conduct is illegal and will subject a person

to arrest. And they argue that “what is considered ‘reckless’ or

‘knowing’ is determined by the subjectivity of the arresting officer,

leaving citizens all the more vulnerable to arrest.”

For a statute to withstand a challenge that it is

unconstitutionally vague under Article I, Section I, Paragraph I of

the Georgia Constitution of 1983, “it must convey sufficiently

definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by

common understanding, and provide explicit standards to those who

enforce the law in order to prevent arbitrary enforcement.” Banta v.

19
State, 281 Ga. 615, 616 (1) (642 SE2d 51) (2007) (citation and

punctuation omitted).13 See also Poole v. State, 262 Ga. 718, 719 (425

SE2d 655) (1993) (“The due process clauses of our state and federal

constitutions require that an individual be informed as to what

actions a governmental authority prohibits with such clarity that he

is not forced to speculate at the meaning of the law.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)); Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870 (1) (178

SE2d 189) (1970) (When a statute is attacked as being so vague,

uncertain and indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement in a

criminal proceeding, in violation of the due process protection of the

Georgia Constitution, the applicable standard is whether the statute

“fail[s] to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his

contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute.”). “The prohibition

against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which

a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater

precision.” Lindsey v. State, 277 Ga. 772, 773 (1) (596 SE2d 140)

13 See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I (“No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”).

20
(2004) (citation and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, “the fact

that application of the statute’s standards sometimes requires an

assessment of the surrounding circumstances to determine if the

statute is violated does not render it unconstitutional.” Banta, 281

Ga. at 617 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted).

The uncertainty in a statute which will amount to a
denial of due process of law is not the difficulty of
ascertaining whether close cases fall within or without
the prohibition of the statute, but whether the standard
established by the statute is so uncertain that it cannot
be determined with reasonable definiteness that any
particular act is disapproved[.]

Mixon, 226 Ga. at 870 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). See

also Freeman, 302 Ga. at 183 (1) (In interpreting the language of a

criminal statute, “to determine whether the statute is

unconstitutionally vague, we apply the fundamental rules of

statutory construction that require us to construe the statute

according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary

meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language

mere surplusage.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

21
The appellants have not shown that, taking the allegations of

the complaint as true, OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) fails to put a person of

ordinary intelligence on notice of the conduct that is prohibited. The

phrase “any act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or

disrupt” sessions of the General Assembly or meetings of its

members adequately describes the prohibited conduct in terms of its

objectively likely effect. And, although the terms “recklessly” and

“knowingly” are used in the alternative and describe different states

of mind, both terms are used throughout the Criminal Code,

sometimes together,14 and are found in common usage.15 For the

foregoing reasons, OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) is not so vague as to violate

the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution, and the trial

14 See, e.g., OCGA §§ 16-5-45; 16-11-101.1.

15 See Major, 301 Ga. at 151 (1) (“”[A] reckless mindset requires a person

to consciously act in a manner which they know could cause harm. . . .
[R]ecklessness clearly requires an analysis of the accused’s state of mind at the
time of the crime alleged.”); Philpot v. State, 268 Ga. 168, 171 (3) (486 SE2d
158) (1997) (“[K]nowingly” is “not in any sense technical or [a] word[ ] of art,
the meaning of which would not be understood by people of ordinary experience
and understanding. On the contrary, [it is an] ordinary term[ ] found in
common usage and understood by people of common and ordinary experience.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)).

22
court did not err in dismissing the appellants’ facial vagueness

challenge. See In re D. H., 283 Ga. 556, 557 (2) (663 SE2d 139) (2008)

(holding that a statute making it unlawful for any person to disrupt

or interfere with the operation of any public school contains words

of ordinary meaning that give constitutionally sufficient notice as to

the statute’s application); Fielden, 280 Ga. at 444-445.

4. The appellants contend that subsections (f) and (g) of OCGA

§ 16-11-34.1 are unconstitutionally vague. They argue that “[t]he

fundamental problem is that both subsections broadly purport to

make it a crime ‘to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language or

engage in any disorderly or disruptive conduct’” in the state capitol

building or certain designated places connected with the official

business of the General Assembly. Through the repeated use of “or,”

they argue, these provisions provide officers no guidance at all about

what conduct could be disruptive under OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (f) and

(g) and “give an impermissible level of discretionary authority to

make determinations about what conduct could be disruptive under

[OCGA] § 16-11-34.1 (f) and (g) and to enforce the law — through

23
criminal arrests — in an arbitrary and potentially discriminatory

manner.” They also argue that loud volume of speech alone, “without

additional disruptive conduct, is not a sufficient reason to arrest a

person for their speech, especially where, as here, there are no

standards to determine what speech is loud enough to be criminal

and no requirement that anything be disrupted[,]” citing Thelen v.

State, 272 Ga. 81, 82 (526 SE2d 60) (2000).16

As referenced in Division 3, supra, to satisfy due process

requirements, a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give

a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is

forbidden and to provide standards that prevent arbitrary

16 In that case, we held that,

[b]y prohibiting “any unnecessary or unusual sound or noise which
annoys others,” the ordinance [at issue failed] to provide the
requisite clear notice and sufficiently definite warning of the
conduct that is prohibited. . . . Whether the noise of a helicopter
takeoff or landing is unnecessary, unusual, or annoying to a
neighbor more than 50 feet away certainly depends upon the ear
of the listener. A statute is unconstitutionally vague when the
standard of conduct it specifies is dependent upon the
individualized sensitivity of each complainant.
Thelen, 272 Ga. at 82-83 (citation and punctuation omitted).

24
enforcement. See Poole, 262 Ga. at 719; Banta, 281 Ga. at 616-617

(1); Lindsey, 277 Ga. at 773 (1); Mixon, 226 Ga. at 870 (1).

As discussed in Division 2, supra, the most natural reading of

subsections (f) and (g), viewed in the context of OCGA § 16-11-34.1

as a whole, is that these provisions prohibit (1) willfully and

knowingly entering or remaining in designated areas that are

involved with the operation of the General Assembly with intent to

disrupt the orderly conduct of official business; (2) parading,

demonstrating, or picketing in those areas with intent to disrupt the

orderly conduct of official business; and (3) making loud or abusive

utterances or engaging in disorderly conduct in those areas.

Construed in this way, any person of ordinary intelligence can be

expected to understand what language and conduct to avoid while

still freely engaging in protected speech or expressive conduct. See

Freeman, 302 Ga. at 183-184 (1) (holding that OCGA § 16-11-39 (a)

(1), which criminalizes acting “in a violent or tumultuous manner

toward another person whereby such person is placed in reasonable

fear of the safety of such person’s life, limb, or health” provides

25
sufficient notice to persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited

conduct and does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague);

Fielden, 280 Ga. at 444-445 (holding that OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) is not

unconstitutionally vague). The appellants have not shown that

OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (f) and (g) are susceptible of discriminatory

enforcement simply because they provide several alternative ways

of violating their provisions or because they do not require proof of

an actual disruption resulting in the untimely termination or

substantial impairment of the conduct of a lawful meeting. For the

foregoing reasons, OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (f) and (g) are not so vague as

to violate the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution, and the

trial court did not err in dismissing the appellants’ facial vagueness

challenge. See Poole, 262 Ga. at 719; Banta, 281 Ga. at 616-617 (1);

Lindsey, 277 Ga. at 773 (1); Mixon, 226 Ga. at 870 (1).

5. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in

dismissing Cannon’s as-applied claim for a violation of her right to

free speech under the Georgia Constitution, which was based on the

26
trial court’s determination that the allegations of the complaint “do

not plausibly show” that “Cannon was engaged in any protected

expression in connection with her arrest.” The appellants argue that

in the context of this case Cannon’s act of knocking on a door to the

governor’s office was “inherently expressive” and was protected

under the Georgia Constitution.

We do not reach the merits of Cannon’s as-applied claim,

however, because the complaint does not allege that Cannon

engaged in any conduct that is prohibited by OCGA § 16-11-34.1.17

In the complaint, the appellants allege that, before Cannon was

arrested in March 2021, she had knocked on one of the doors to the

governor’s office, seeking information regarding when the governor

was going to sign a particular bill. The appellants further allege

that, because neither the Georgia House nor the Georgia Senate was

in session at the time Cannon was detained, they could not have

been disturbed and, therefore, her knocking could not reasonably

17 The record does not reflect any disposition of the charges against
Cannon.

27
have been expected to prevent or disrupt a legislative session or a

meeting of members of the General Assembly in violation of OCGA

§ 16-11-34.1 (a). The appellants do not allege that Cannon was

occupying, parading, demonstrating, or picketing in any of the

spaces designated in OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (f) or (g), where the official

business of the General Assembly is conducted. The appellants also

do not allege that Cannon knocked on the door with the intent to

disrupt the orderly conduct of official business, as specified for a

violation of those provisions. To the contrary, the appellants

specifically allege that Cannon did not intend to disrupt any official

business of the General Assembly. Regardless if any other statute

might prohibit the conduct for which the complaint alleges that

Cannon was arrested, the Code section at issue in this case, OCGA

§ 16-11-34.1, does not prohibit the conduct alleged in the complaint.

Therefore, Cannon’s as-applied challenge to the Code section fails.18

18 We express no opinion about the merits of the as-applied challenges of

the rest of the appellants, which, as referenced previously, appear to remain
unresolved by the trial court.

28
See Major, 301 Ga. at 152 (3) (“An as-applied challenge addresses

whether a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case

or to a particular party.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Hertz

v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62, 67-68 (2) (c) (751 SE2d 90) (2013)

(determining that the statute at issue regulated the petitioner’s

conduct and reviewing on the merits an as-applied challenge to the

statute).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice, concurring.

I concur fully in the Court’s opinion affirming the trial court’s

rejection of the appellants’ state constitutional challenge to a

Georgia statute regulating conduct at the Georgia State Capitol and

related locations. The appellants are limited on appeal to only those

arguments that they chose to make below, and they cannot succeed

on those arguments. But the State should not confuse this limited

victory with a clean bill of health for the statute. The statute is

seriously flawed. Those charged with its enforcement should take

29
care to avoid those flaws, and the General Assembly should seriously

consider revising it.

1. The statute is seriously flawed.

I concur fully in the Court’s decision today that OCGA § 16-11-

34.1 does not criminalize so much protected speech and expressive

conduct relative to its constitutionally permissible applications that

it must be struck down as overbroad under State v. Fielden, 280 Ga.

444 (629 SE2d 252) (2006). But it is nevertheless pretty clear to me

that the statute does include within its sweep a material amount of

speech and expressive conduct protected by clearly established First

Amendment caselaw, and perhaps also the Georgia Constitution.

Like the statute at issue in Fielden, OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a) on its

face prohibits speech or expressive conduct without any requirement

that the speaker or actor (1) intend to disrupt any official business,

or (2) actually disrupt the conduct of official business. And a person

30
may be prosecuted even where they had not been asked to leave a

meeting and refused.19

The absence of such guardrails is particularly problematic

given the nature of the locations covered by the statute, both in their

significance and their potential breadth. The statute’s principal

focus is on conduct at the Georgia State Capitol, the primary home

of two of the three branches of Georgia state government and a

center of free speech. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5

F3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (describing the rotunda of

the Georgia State Capitol as “a public forum located in a core

government building”). The Capitol is a busy (and noisy) place, home

to debates on many of the most contentious issues of the day. It hosts

a range of visitors who may lack knowledge of the building’s layout,

schedule, and conventions. At the same time, the statute covers a

19 As Fielden noted, the absence of such elements causes our statute to

differ from similar statutes of other states. See 280 Ga. at 446-447 (discussing
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-306, which criminalizes an act that “substantially
obstructs or interferes with [a lawful] meeting, procession, or gathering” with
“the intent to prevent or disrupt”); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.17 (“A
person who willfully interrupts, disturbs, or disrupts an official meeting and
who, upon being directed to leave the meeting by the presiding officer, willfully
refuses to leave the meeting is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.”).
31
wide-ranging scope of meetings far from the Capitol, as legislative

study committees meet throughout the state. And it also reaches

meetings of “caucus[es] of members,” some of which are public and

clearly defined, such as the majority and minority caucuses, while

others may be less obvious to outsiders.20

By not requiring disruptive intent or actual disruption in a

statute aimed at government meetings in general and at a

frequently visited government building in particular, the statute

potentially subjects a host of activity to prosecution. Some of that

activity may not involve core protected speech but still would be

considered innocent in nature by most people, such as a visiting

group of school children causing noise outside of a legislative

meeting, or an audible cell phone ringer or persistent coughing

20 Caucuses mentioned in House or Senate resolutions the last several

years include the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus, Georgia Legislative
Women’s Caucus, Georgia Legislative Sportsman Caucus, Working Families
Caucus, Senate American Korean Friendship Caucus, Taiwan Caucus, and
Landmark (the condominiums on Atlanta’s Piedmont Avenue, not the visible
objects that help one find one’s way) Caucus of the Georgia House of
Representatives. The level of formal existence of caucuses also may vary. Some
caucuses have been created formally by the adoption of a resolution. See, e.g.,
SR 1014 (creating Mountain Caucus of the Georgia State Senate) (adopted
2012).
32
during a meeting. But it also may include core political speech that

might be considered disruptive merely by virtue of its volume, tone,

or content. Similar problems also infect subsections (f) and (g) of

OCGA § 16-11-34.1.

These problems will remain until the General Assembly

corrects subsections (a), (f), and (g).21 And until such amendments

occur, law enforcement charged with the security of the covered

locations and the people within them will be in a very difficult

position with respect to enforcement decisions under these flawed

statutes. These statutes can be enforced in a constitutional manner

on a lot of occasions, which is why the Court’s decision today is

correct. But the statutes also extend beyond those permissible

occasions, and Georgia owes it to law enforcement — and the People

seeking to exercise their constitutional rights — to correct that.

21 To be clear, I do not suggest any specific amendment. First, in my view

that would intrude on the separate constitutional role of the General Assembly.
And second, we have not had briefing or argument on the constitutionality of
any future amendment, and it would not be proper to prejudge such a question.
It is enough to note the absent terms that Fielden found significant, and to stop
at that.
33
2. Overbreadth may not be a cognizable claim under the
Georgia Constitution.

My main point in writing is to ensure that the State doesn’t

misinterpret the Court’s decision. But it’s also important that the

appellants don’t misinterpret this concurrence: it’s not a roadmap

for a future overbreadth lawsuit under the Georgia Constitution. I

am skeptical that Georgia courts have the power to entertain such

claims.

The federal overbreadth doctrine has both a substantive First

Amendment component and a standing component. That standing

component operates as a doctrine permitting plaintiffs to assert the

claims of others in federal court. As such, it’s not a doctrine that the

Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply even for First

Amendment claims. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (123

SCt 2191, 156 LE2d 148) (2003) (“[O]ur standing rules limit only the

federal courts’ jurisdiction over certain claims. . . . Whether

Virginia’s courts should have entertained this overbreadth challenge

is entirely a matter of state law.” (emphasis in original)). And if

34
we’re not required to apply overbreadth standing even to First

Amendment claims, we certainly aren’t required to apply such a

relaxed standing doctrine to claims arising under the Georgia

Constitution unless Georgia’s law of standing permits it.

I readily acknowledge that this Court has applied the

overbreadth doctrine to federal and state constitutional claims. See,

e.g., West v. State, 300 Ga. 39, 40-41 (793 SE2d 57) (2016); Fielden,

280 Ga. at 445; Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor

Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 402 (5) (467 SE2d 875) (1996);

Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827, 831-832 (2) (400 SE2d 916)

(1991); State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673-674 (2) (398 SE2d 547)

(1990). We appear to have imported this doctrine uncritically from

federal caselaw without consideration of the text, history, and

context of the Georgia Constitution. See Breaux v. State, 230 Ga.

506, 507-508 (1) (197 SE2d 695) (1973). As the appellants have

acknowledged here, “[p]rior decisions of this Court have not fully

explained why the federal rule of overbreadth standing has

historically applied equally to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts and

35
to free speech violations of the Georgia Constitution in light of

[Hicks].” But as this Court has explained in detail, “we should not

simply recite holdings of the United States Supreme Court . . . and

uncritically import them into our interpretation of” the Georgia

Constitution. Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 188 (II) (C) (824 SE2d

265) (2019). And the power of Georgia courts to decide cases is

determined independently of federal standing doctrine. See Sons of

Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Commrs., 315 Ga. 39,

45 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 168) (2022) (“SCV”).

Georgia’s law of standing has long had a requirement that a

plaintiff generally is limited to assertions of a violation of his or her

own legal rights. See, e.g., SCV, 315 Ga. at 50 (2) (b) (to have

standing, “a party must have some right at stake that requires

adjudication to protect it”); Mitchell v. Ga. & Ala. R. Co., 111 Ga.

760, 771 (2) (36 SE 971) (1900) (A Georgia plaintiff “can not sue for

. . . the person who has the legal right of action but the action should

be brought in the name of the real plaintiff.”). This general principle

seems inconsistent with a federal standing doctrine that enables

36
plaintiffs to assert a claim based on the violation of someone else’s

legal rights.

And this general principle looks more like a bright-line rule

when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a state statute.

See, e.g., Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 92 (1) (901 SE2d 512)

(2024) (it is “well settled that a court ‘will not listen to an objection

made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it

does not affect, and who has, therefore, no interest in defeating it.’”)

(quoting Reid v. Mayor, etc. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755, 757 (1) (6 SE

602) (1888)); SCV, 315 Ga. at 54 (2) (c) n.13 (citing cases); Tennille

v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 (1) (622 SE2d 346) (2005) (“‘A party has

standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the statute

adversely impacts that party’s rights.’”) (quoting Agan v. State, 272

Ga. 540, 542 (1) (533 SE2d 60) (2000)); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga.

686, 692 (30 SE 759) (1898) (“Before a law can be attacked by any

citizen on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that

its enforcement is an infringement upon his rights of person or

37
property.”).22 Indeed, one case applying this rule articulated it as

applying to all cases except First Amendment overbreadth claims.

See Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 SE2d 144) (1987) (stating

that “except where First Amendment rights are involved, a party

has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only

insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights,” and citing for

this proposition a case citing only federal overbreadth caselaw

(citation and punctuation omitted)).23 This longstanding rule seems

22 For that matter, older caselaw articulates an even stronger rule that

would seem to exclude facial challenges altogether:
The courts will never blot out of existence a great police and moral
enactment on the ground that parts of it are attacked as
unconstitutional, in a general onslaught upon it all. On the
contrary, they will preserve it all, if possible, giving the benefit of
doubts to the co-ordinate branches of government, even when a
legitimate case of individual suffering in person or property is
brought before them; and will never decide laws unconstitutional,
if cases can be otherwise adjudicated. They will always wait until
the law is attempted to be put in operation, and then act against
the officer who executes or attempts to execute it, and not against
the law-making branch of government in the general scope of its
power.
Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 (1886).
23 At least one case applying this rule after the adoption of the 1983

Constitution was a bit confused about what counts as a “right.” See Ambles v.
State, 259 Ga. 406, 406-407 (1) (383 SE2d 555) (1989) (holding that the State
had standing to assert a federal equal protection challenge to state witness
competency statutes, because the State “has both the duty and the right to

38
wholly incompatible with a doctrine permitting parties to assert a

claim based on the violation of someone else’s legal rights. The

appellants argue that the Georgia Constitution’s speech protections

are broader than the First Amendment and so necessarily include

overbreadth. But whether or not the Georgia Constitution protects

more speech than the First Amendment is a question wholly

separate from the scope of the judicial power the Georgia

Constitution grants Georgia courts to decide claims brought under

the Georgia Constitution’s speech provisions.

If, as it seems to me likely, the judicial power conferred by the

Georgia Constitution does not permit a party to assert a claim based

on the violation of someone else’s legal rights, then the Georgia

Constitution likely would not include an overbreadth doctrine.

protect the security of its citizens by prosecuting crime”). This seems wrong;
the State generally has powers, not rights, and in any event is not a “person”
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kelly v. State, 315 Ga. 444, 448-451 (3)
(883 SE2d 363) (2023) (rejecting State’s argument that initial order granting
defendant’s motion for new trial must be vacated because it was “null and void
for failure to comply with due process and fundamental fairness”; “erroneous
premise” that State was a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause “is fatal to the State’s claims”). But this outlier case does not
distract from the clear rule.
39
There may be good policy reasons for certain relaxations on standing

limits. But it is not within the judicial power to disregard limitations

on that power just because we think it would be good policy.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs, and Justice

Warren, Justice Bethel, Justice McMillian, and Justice Colvin join

in this concurrence.

40
Decided October 31, 2024.

OCGA § 16-11-34.1; constitutional question. Fulton Superior

Court. Before Judge Glanville.

Gerald R. Weber, Jr.; Washington Dreyer & Associates, Quinton

G. Washington, David N. Dreyer, Deana H. Ingraham; Ebony J.

Brown, Megan Toomer; Mitchell Shapiro Greenamyre & Funt, Zack

Greenamyre, for appellants.

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy

Attorney General, Deborah N. Gore, Senior Assistant Attorney

General, Zachary A. Mullinax, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen

J. Petrany, Solicitor-General, Ross W. Bergethon, Justin T. Golart,

Deputy Solicitors-General, for appellees.

41