Robbins v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 15, 2024

S24A0512. ROBBINS v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Joandre Robbins was convicted of malice murder in connection

with the August 2014 shooting death of Wayne Edwards.1 On

appeal, Robbins contends that the trial court abused its discretion

in excluding from evidence two photographs of Edwards holding

1 Edwards was killed on August 16, 2014. On March 18, 2015, a Chatham

County grand jury indicted Robbins and Michael Thompson for malice murder
and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault. On October 13, 2015,
Thompson entered a guilty plea and was convicted of a reduced charge of
aggravated assault and sentenced to 20 years of probation. On November 6,
2015, a jury found Robbins guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced
Robbins to life in prison for malice murder. Although the trial court purported
to merge the felony murder count with the malice murder count for sentencing,
the felony murder count actually was vacated by operation of law. See Williams
v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 153 (3) (886 SE2d 818) (2023). Robbins timely moved for
a new trial on November 12, 2015. Robbins amended his motion for new trial
on October 25, 2019, and again on November 13, 2019. After a hearing on
November 13, 2019, the trial court denied Robbins’s motion for new trial, as
amended, on November 1, 2023. Robbins filed a timely notice of appeal in this
Court on November 27, 2023. This case was docketed in this Court to the April
2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
guns. Robbins also contends that his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance on three grounds. For the

reasons explained below, we affirm.

1. As pertinent to Robbins’s claims on appeal, the evidence

presented at trial showed the following. Approximately one week

before the shooting, Taylor Smith drove Robbins to a family

member’s apartment to retrieve some medicine. Michael Thompson,

who was a friend of Robbins, accompanied them. After Thompson,

Robbins, and Smith arrived at the family member’s apartment,

Thompson and Robbins went inside, leaving Smith outside. When

Thompson and Robbins returned, Smith was gone, and Edwards—

who was Smith’s brother—jumped over the car toward Robbins and

said, “Y’all f**ked, ni**as, give it up.” Edwards was holding a gun.

Robbins responded, “I don’t play like that[.]” Edwards then stated,

“you’ll be the next ni**a on [a rest-in-peace] shirt.”

On August 16, 2014—approximately one week after the

altercation between Robbins and Edwards—Thompson asked Smith

for a ride to a party that evening. Smith agreed, and Thompson told

2
Smith to pick him up at Robbins’s house. Smith assured Thompson

that “nobody [would be] in the car with him.” Before picking up

Thompson, Smith picked up Edwards and two minor girls. Edwards

drove the car, with Smith in the passenger seat and the two girls in

the back seat. During a brief stop en route to Robbins’s house,

Edwards removed a handgun from the car’s console and placed it in

one of the girls’ purse, which remained with her in the backseat of

the car.

When the four arrived at Robbins’s house, Thompson and

Robbins came into the front yard and approached the waiting car.

Thompson testified that Edwards, while still in the driver’s seat,

mimed holding a gun, although he had no gun in his hand. According

to Thompson, Robbins then took out an actual gun and held it at his

side—to which Edwards responded, “[t]hat little behind gun.”

Robbins replied, “[y]eah, ni**a, what that s**t you said?” As

Edwards turned toward the car’s backseat, Smith heard Thompson

tell Robbins to “shoot that ni**a.” Robbins then fired his gun at least

five times, killing Edwards with a bullet wound to the back.

3
At trial, Robbins’s trial counsel argued that Robbins shot

Edwards in self-defense, contending that he shot Edwards because

he believed Edwards was turning to reach for a gun in the backseat

of the car immediately prior to the shooting. 2 Relatedly, Thompson

and Smith both testified that they were aware that Edwards carried

a gun.

Additionally, Thompson testified about his guilty plea. He

admitted on cross-examination that he “cut a deal [with the State]

to get from one to twenty years” if he testified at trial for the State.

Thompson also admitted “that if [he] was convicted of felony murder,

[he would] have to do thirty years [in prison] before [he would] be

considered for parole.”

2. Robbins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

excluding from evidence two photographs of Edwards holding guns.

At trial, Robbins attempted to offer into evidence one

photograph of Edwards holding a handgun and one photograph of

Edwards holding a rifle. The trial court excluded the photographs

2 Robbins did not testify at trial.

4
based on the State’s objection that they constituted impermissible

character evidence. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (a). On appeal, Robbins

argues that he did not offer the photographs to show Edwards’s bad

character, but as “additional evidence to strengthen the point of

Edwards’ having threatened Robbins with a gun a week before

Edwards died and Robbins’ expectation that Edwards very likely

had a gun at the time of the shooting.”

However, we need not decide whether the trial court

erroneously excluded the photographs, because even assuming that

it did, the error was harmless. “‘Erroneous evidentiary rulings are

subject to a harmless-error test.’” Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 683

(4) (889 SE2d 914) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). “A

nonconstitutional error is harmless if it is ‘highly probable that the

error did not contribute to the verdict.’” Id. at 683-684 (4) (citation

omitted). “The burden to make this showing is the State’s to bear,

and in determining whether the showing has been made, we review

the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect

reasonable jurors to have weighed it.” Id. at 684 (4).

5
Here, it is highly probable that the trial court’s error, if any, in

excluding the photographs did not contribute to the verdicts. To the

extent that Robbins offered the photographs “as additional evidence

to strengthen the point” that Edwards threatened Robbins with a

gun a week before Edwards was shot, the photographs were of low

probative value given Thompson’s testimony that Edwards had

made such a threat and Thompson’s and Smith’s testimony that

they were aware Edwards carried a gun—from which the jury could

have inferred that Robbins also knew Edwards carried a gun. And

to the extent that Robbins offered the photographs as “additional

evidence to strengthen the point of . . . Robbins’ expectation that

Edwards very likely had a gun at the time of the shooting[,]” there

was no evidence presented at trial that Robbins actually saw the

photographs before the shooting, which would have allowed the jury

to infer that the photographs influenced Robbins’s expectation that

Edwards was armed that day. For these reasons, it is highly

probable that the trial court’s error, if any, in excluding the

photographs did not contribute to the verdict. See, e.g., Beck v. State,

6
310 Ga. 491, 498-499 (3) (852 SE2d 535) (2020) (concluding that any

error in excluding evidence of a murder victim’s “conviction for

carrying a firearm without a license” and “other evidence about [the

victim’s] violent character . . . was cumulative of the evidence about

[the victim] that was introduced” and was therefore harmless).

3. Robbins also contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance in three ways.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

“defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient” and

“that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984)). “To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must

demonstrate that his attorney ‘performed at trial in an objectively

unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light

of prevailing professional norms.’” Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 901

(5) (873 SE2d 185) (2022) (citation omitted). “This is no easy

showing, as the law recognizes a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel

performed reasonably, and [a defendant] bears the burden of

7
overcoming this presumption.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 183 (2)

(787 SE2d 221) (2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (III) (A)).

To carry this burden, a defendant “‘must show that no reasonable

lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed

to do what his lawyer did not.’” Gardner v. State, 310 Ga. 515, 518

(2) (852 SE2d 574) (2020) (citation omitted).

“To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a

reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient

performance, the result of the trial would have been different.”

Perkins, 313 Ga. at 901 (5). “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694 (III) (B). “This burden is a heavy one[.]” Young v. State,

305 Ga. 92, 97 (5) (823 SE2d 774) (2019). Moreover, “[t]he reviewing

court need not ‘address both components of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.’” Davis, 299 Ga. at

183 (2) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (IV)).

(a) Robbins contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move for a

8
mistrial on the ground that the State violated OCGA § 17-8-76 in its

closing argument. In the relevant part, OCGA § 17-8-76 provides:

(a) No attorney at law in a criminal case shall argue to or
in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted,
may not be required to suffer the full penalty imposed by
the court or jury because pardon, parole, or clemency of
any nature may be granted by the Governor, the State
Board of Pardons and Paroles, or other proper authority
vested with the right to grant clemency.

(b) If counsel for either side in a criminal case argues to
or in the presence of the jury as provided in subsection (a)
of this Code section, opposing counsel shall have the right
immediately to request the court to declare a mistrial, in
which case it shall be mandatory upon the court to declare
a mistrial. Failure to declare a mistrial shall constitute
reversible error.

During trial, trial counsel cross-examined Thompson about the

sentence for felony murder and the circumstances of Thompson’s

guilty plea:

Q: [Y]ou were charged with felony murder, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the penalty for felony murder is life in prison,
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And I guess your lawyer -- he’s a good lawyer, he got
you a good deal -- told you that if you were convicted of
felony murder, you’d have to do thirty years before you’d
be considered for parole; is that correct?

9
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you cut a deal to get from one to twenty years; is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So the reason you’re here is to get out from under a life
sentence. That’s the reason you’re here, isn’t it?
A: Yes, sir.

During its closing argument, the State referenced the above

exchange and related it to the sentence that Robbins faced if

convicted:

Ordinarily, in a criminal case, juries don’t get to find out
what potential sentences are upon conviction. . . . But you
legitimately found out this time [about the sentence that
Robbins faced if convicted], and it’s legitimate because
[Robbins’s trial counsel] is perfectly entitled to challenge
the witness I put on the stand, Michael Thompson, about
what his motives might have been for testifying. And I
can’t complain about that. I put him on the stand. I knew
that was coming. . . . [trial counsel’s] challenge to Mr.
Thompson, you know that if you convict Joandre Robbins,
it’s a long, hard road for him based on current parole
guidelines.

Robbins’s trial counsel did not object.

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified that

he cross-examined Thompson about his plea “to show what a good

deal [Thompson] was getting[ ]” in exchange for testifying at

10
Robbins’s trial. When asked why he did not object to the State’s

comment in its closing argument about Robbins’s parole, trial

counsel testified:

I knew the jury already knew [the sentence Robbins faced
if convicted] because I had gone through it with Mr.
Thompson. But also I thought we had a really good case
of self[-]defense in this case. And it was my feeling at the
time of trial, if it was driven home again to the jury that
if you convict this young man based on this evidence,
which I thought was a good self[-]defense case, he’s going
to have to do 30 years in prison before he would even be
paroled.

On appeal, Robbins contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move for a

mistrial on the ground that the State violated OCGA § 17-8-76 by

arguing in its closing that “it’s a long, hard road for [Robbins] based

on current parole guidelines.” However, because we cannot say that

trial counsel’s performance was “objectively unreasonable . . . in the

light of prevailing professional norms[,]” trial counsel was not

constitutionally deficient in this respect. Anthony v. State, 311 Ga.

293, 296 (1) (857 SE2d 682) (2021). Trial counsel’s assessment that

he did not object to the State’s comment because he thought that

11
Robbins “had a really good case of self[-]defense” was not objectively

unreasonable given the evidence presented that Edwards had

previously threatened Robbins while showing a gun; Edwards

mimed shooting at Robbins immediately before the shooting; and

Robbins shot Edwards in his back, which supported Robbin’s self-

defense argument that he shot Edwards because he believed

Edwards was turning to retrieve a gun. Given the evidence that

Robbins acted in self-defense and trial counsel’s assessment that the

State’s parole comment struck him as helpful to Robbins’s defense

considering that evidence, we cannot say that trial counsel’s decision

to continue working for a possible acquittal—instead of obtaining a

mistrial and retrying the case—was “objectively unreasonable . . . in

the light of prevailing professional norms.” Anthony, 311 Ga. at 296

(1) (concluding, where a portion of the indictment read to the jury

falsely alleged that the defendant was a convicted felon, that the

defendant “failed to show that his trial counsel’s decision not to

request a mistrial was objectively unreasonable[ ]” because “the

convicted-felon counts of the indictment were read only once, [ ] trial

12
counsel wanted to try [the defendant’s] case in front of the jury that

he had already selected, [the defendant] agreed to trial counsel’s

recommendation to seek a curative instruction and not a mistrial,

and [ ] the trial court informed the jury that the State had made a

‘mistake’ in the charges because [the defendant] was not actually a

convicted felon”). See also State v. Goff, 308 Ga. 330, 335 (2) (840

SE2d 359) (2020) (concluding, where “[t]rial counsel testified that he

declined to press for a mistrial because he thought ‘we had a pretty

good jury and a pretty good trial going[,]’” that “trial counsel’s

assessment” was not “objectively unreasonable” “[g]iven the fleeting,

nonspecific nature of [the witness’s] reference to [the defendant’s]

probation status[ ]” (citations omitted)).

(b) Robbins also claims that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object

to a self-defense jury instruction on the use of excessive force. The

trial court instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense as follows:

A person is justified in threatening or using force against
another person when, and to the extent that, he
reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary

13
to defend himself or a third person against the other’s
imminent use of unlawful force. A person is justified in
using force that is intended or likely to cause death or
great bodily harm only if that person . . . reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or
great bodily injury to himself.

...

A person is not justified in using force if that person:
initially provokes the use of force against himself with the
intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm
upon the assailant; or is attempting to commit or is
committing a felony, the offense of aggravated assault is
a felony . . . and has been previously defined for you; or
was the aggressor, unless the person withdraws from the
encounter and effectively communicates his intent to
withdraw to the other person and the other person still
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful
force.

...

[O]ne who is not the aggressor is not required to retreat
. . . before being justified in using force that is necessary
for personal defense or using force that is likely to cause
death or great bodily harm if one reasonably believes such
force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury
to oneself or to a third person.

...

[T]he use of excessive or unlawful force while acting in
self-defense is not justifiable, and the Defendant’s
conduct in this case would not be justified[,] if you find

14
that the force used exceeded that which the Defendant
reasonably believed was necessary to defend against the
victim’s use of unlawful force, if any. . . . [W]hen the force
used exceeds that necessary for self-defense, the law
considers the purported defender to be the aggressor.

(emphasis supplied). Trial counsel did not object to this portion of

the jury charge.

On appeal, Robbins contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the

italicized language, claiming that the italicized language

impermissibly “emphasized that charge by repetition of law

favorable to the State.” However, we have concluded that a trial

court did not err in giving a jury instruction with substantially the

same language as that at issue here because it “adequately captured

th[e] principle of law” that “‘[a] homicide is not justified if the force

used by the defendant exceeds that which a reasonable person would

believe was necessary to defend against the victim’s unlawful act[.]’”

Wynn v. State, 313 Ga. 827, 839 (5) (874 SE2d 42) (2022) (citation

omitted) (noting that the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

“When the force used exceeds that necessary for self-defense, the law

15
considers the defender to be the aggressor[]”). See also Hill v. State,

290 Ga. 493, 497-498 (5) (722 SE2d 708) (2012) (rejecting a challenge

to a portion of a self-defense jury charge providing that, “[w]here the

force used exceeds that necessary for defense of the person, the law

will consider the defender the aggressor,” because “‘the charge as a

whole encompasse[d] the elements of self-defense under OCGA § 16-

3-21.’” (punctuation omitted)). Moreover, in the context of analyzing

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we have explained that

“mere repetition of a correct and applicable principle of law is not

such error as requires reversal unless it takes color of an

argumentative or opinionative utterance so as to tend to prejudice

the minds of the jury.” Wilkins v. State, 308 Ga. 131, 140 (5) (839

SE2d 525) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The language at issue here—supported by at least some

evidence presented at trial—“adequately captured” the legal

principle that “[a] homicide is not justified if the force used by the

defendant exceeds that which a reasonable person would believe was

necessary to defend against the victim’s unlawful act[.]’” Wynn, 313

16
Ga. at 839 (5). And even assuming that the language at issue was

repetitive of other portions of the charge, Robbins has not shown

that it was inapplicable or “argumentative or opinionative so as to

tend to prejudice the minds of the jury.” Wilkins, 308 Ga. at 140 (5).

Consequently, Robbins has not shown that trial counsel was

constitutionally deficient for failing to object to the language at issue

on the ground that it “emphasized th[e] charge by repetition of law

favorable to the State.” See, e.g., Walker v. State, 306 Ga. 637, 645

(2) (832 SE2d 783) (2019) (explaining that “the failure to make a

meritless objection is not deficient performance”).

(c) Robbins claims that trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court’s response

to the jury’s request for a definition of “implied malice.” In its closing

charge on the issue of malice, the trial court instructed the jury that

[a] person commits murder when that person unlawfully
and with malice aforethought, either express or implied,
causes the death of another human being. Express malice
is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the
life of another human being, which is shown by external
circumstances capable of proof. Malice may, but need not,
be implied when no considerable provocation appears and

17
when all of the circumstances of the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart.

While it was deliberating, the jury sent the trial court the following

question: “Can you clarify ‘malice may but need not be implied when

no considerable provocation appears and when all of the

circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant

heart?’” The jury underlined the phrase “no considerable

provocation.”

After considering the question, the trial court stated to the

parties, but outside of the jury’s presence, that:

[M]y staff attorney . . . found some case law from Browder
v. State, [294 Ga. 188, 190 (1) (751 SE2d 354) (2013)] . . .
that reads as follows. “Implied malice may be found when
the defendant’s conduct exhibits a reckless disregard for
human life. Implied malice is defined as extremely
negligent conduct which creates what a reasonable man
would realize to be . . . not only an unjustifiable but also
a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury
to another or to others – though unaccompanied by any
intent to kill or do serious bodily injury – and which
actually causes the death of another. Reckless disregard
for human life may be the equivalent of a specific intent
to kill.” . . . I point that out as one possibility [to instruct
the jury].

Trial counsel did not object to the trial court’s instructing the jury

18
using the text from Browder. The trial court then read the foregoing

quote from Browder to the jury.

On appeal, Robbins contends that trial counsel should have

objected to the Browder excerpt because, among other things, there

was no evidence of “extremely negligent conduct.” However,

pretermitting whether trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in

failing to object to the trial court’s response, Robbins has not shown

that trial counsel’s failure to object prejudiced him because the trial

court’s response to the jury’s question was inapplicable to the

evidence presented at trial. Robbins contended at trial that he

purposefully shot Edwards in self-defense because he believed that

Edwards was turning in his seat to retrieve a gun. And there was

evidence to support that contention: Edwards had threatened

Robbins while holding a gun one week before the shooting; Edwards

mimed holding a gun at Robbins immediately before the shooting;

and Robbins shot Edwards in his back, which supported Robbin’s

argument that Robbins shot Edwards because he believed Edwards

was turning in his seat to retrieve a gun. Moreover, neither party

19
introduced evidence or argument that Robbins’s conduct in shooting

Edwards was “extremely negligent.” Under these circumstances,

Robbins has not shown a reasonable probability that the result of

the trial would have been different had trial counsel objected

because we “generally deem harmless a jury instruction that

indicates that a defendant could be found guilty under a theory for

which there was no evidence or even argument[.]” Wilkins, 308 Ga.

at 139-140 (4) (concluding trial counsel’s failure to object to a jury

instruction that “‘(t)he testimony of one accomplice may be

supported by the testimony of another accomplice’” was inapplicable

and therefore harmless where the defendant “may have had two

accomplices . . . [b]ut only one of them . . . testified as a witness at

trial” because “there was no testimony about the [crime] from a

second accomplice”); Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 650-651 (7) (784

SE2d 365) (2016) (explaining that any error by the trial court in

giving the jury a charge on parties to a crime was harmless because

there was “no evidence [the appellant] procured someone else to

20
commit the crimes[,]” and the State did not argue to the contrary).3

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

3 We have assumed one trial-counsel deficiency in failing to object to the

trial court’s response to a question from the jury and one trial-court error in
excluding photographs that Robbins introduced. Robbins has not contended
that we should conduct a cumulative-error review. Even assuming that the
assumed trial-counsel deficiency and assumed evidentiary error are errors that
could be examined cumulatively, we conclude that any such cumulative error
does not demand a new trial. See Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712, 722 (2) n.14
(884 SE2d 310) (2023) (conducting a cumulative-error review even though the
appellant did not request that the Court do so and concluding that “even
assuming that these presumed errors should be considered cumulatively, . . .
[the appellant] has failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of
these errors requires a new trial”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
21

320 Ga. 19
FINAL COPY

S24A0512. ROBBINS v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Joandre Robbins was convicted of malice murder in connection

with the August 2014 shooting death of Wayne Edwards.1 On

appeal, Robbins contends that the trial court abused its discretion

in excluding from evidence two photographs of Edwards holding

guns. Robbins also contends that his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance on three grounds. For the

1 Edwards was killed on August 16, 2014. On March 18, 2015, a Chatham

County grand jury indicted Robbins and Michael Thompson for malice murder
and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault. On October 13, 2015,
Thompson entered a guilty plea and was convicted of a reduced charge of
aggravated assault and sentenced to 20 years of probation. On November 6,
2015, a jury found Robbins guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced
Robbins to life in prison for malice murder. Although the trial court purported
to merge the felony murder count with the malice murder count for sentencing,
the felony murder count actually was vacated by operation of law. See Williams
v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 153 (3) (886 SE2d 818) (2023). Robbins timely moved for
a new trial on November 12, 2015. Robbins amended his motion for new trial
on October 25, 2019, and again on November 13, 2019. After a hearing on
November 13, 2019, the trial court denied Robbins’s motion for new trial, as
amended, on November 1, 2023. Robbins filed a timely notice of appeal to this
Court on November 27, 2023. This case was docketed in this Court to the April
2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
reasons explained below, we affirm.

1. As pertinent to Robbins’s claims on appeal, the evidence

presented at trial showed the following. Approximately one week

before the shooting, Taylor Smith drove Robbins to a family

member’s apartment to retrieve some medicine. Michael Thompson,

who was a friend of Robbins, accompanied them. After Thompson,

Robbins, and Smith arrived at the family member’s apartment,

Thompson and Robbins went inside, leaving Smith outside. When

Thompson and Robbins returned, Smith was gone, and Edwards —

who was Smith’s brother — jumped over the car toward Robbins and

said, “Y’all f**ked, ni**as, give it up.” Edwards was holding a gun.

Robbins responded, “I don’t play like that[.]” Edwards then stated,

“you’ll be the next ni**a on [a rest-in-peace] shirt.”

On August 16, 2014 — approximately one week after the

altercation between Robbins and Edwards — Thompson asked

Smith for a ride to a party that evening. Smith agreed, and

Thompson told Smith to pick him up at Robbins’s house. Smith

assured Thompson that “nobody [would be] in the car with him.”

2
Before picking up Thompson, Smith picked up Edwards and two

minor girls. Edwards drove the car, with Smith in the passenger seat

and the two girls in the back seat. During a brief stop en route to

Robbins’s house, Edwards removed a handgun from the car’s console

and placed it in one of the girls’ purse, which remained with her in

the back seat of the car.

When the four arrived at Robbins’s house, Thompson and

Robbins came into the front yard and approached the waiting car.

Thompson testified that Edwards, while still in the driver’s seat,

mimed holding a gun, although he had no gun in his hand. According

to Thompson, Robbins then took out an actual gun and held it at his

side — to which Edwards responded, “[t]hat little behind gun.”

Robbins replied, “[y]eah, ni**a, what that s**t you said?” As

Edwards turned toward the car’s back seat, Smith heard Thompson

tell Robbins to “shoot that ni**a.” Robbins then fired his gun at least

five times, killing Edwards with a bullet wound to the back.

At trial, Robbins’s trial counsel argued that Robbins shot

Edwards in self-defense, contending that he shot Edwards because

3
he believed Edwards was turning to reach for a gun in the back seat

of the car immediately prior to the shooting.2 Relatedly, Thompson

and Smith both testified that they were aware that Edwards carried

a gun.

Additionally, Thompson testified about his guilty plea. He

admitted on cross-examination that he “cut a deal [with the State]

to get from one to twenty years” if he testified at trial for the State.

Thompson also admitted “that if [he was] convicted of felony murder,

[he would] have to do thirty years [in prison] before [he would] be

considered for parole.”

2. Robbins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

excluding from evidence two photographs of Edwards holding guns.

At trial, Robbins attempted to offer into evidence one

photograph of Edwards holding a handgun and one photograph of

Edwards holding a rifle. The trial court excluded the photographs

based on the State’s objection that they constituted impermissible

character evidence. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (a). On appeal, Robbins

2 Robbins did not testify at trial.

4
argues that he did not offer the photographs to show Edwards’s bad

character, but as “additional evidence to strengthen the point of

Edwards’ having threatened Robbins with a gun a week before

Edwards died and Robbins’ expectation that Edwards very likely

had a gun at the time of the shooting.”

However, we need not decide whether the trial court

erroneously excluded the photographs, because even assuming that

it did, the error was harmless. “‘Erroneous evidentiary rulings are

subject to a harmless-error test.’” Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 683

(4) (c) (889 SE2d 914) (2023) (citation omitted). “A nonconstitutional

error is harmless if it is ‘highly probable that the error did not

contribute to the verdict.’” Id. at 683-684 (4) (c) (citation omitted).

“The burden to make this showing is the State’s to bear, and in

determining whether the showing has been made, we review the

record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect

reasonable jurors to have weighed it.” Id. at 684 (4) (c).

Here, it is highly probable that the trial court’s error, if any, in

excluding the photographs did not contribute to the verdicts. To the

5
extent that Robbins offered the photographs as “additional evidence

to strengthen the point” that Edwards threatened Robbins with a

gun a week before Edwards was shot, the photographs were of low

probative value given Thompson’s testimony that Edwards had

made such a threat and Thompson’s and Smith’s testimony that

they were aware Edwards carried a gun — from which the jury could

have inferred that Robbins also knew Edwards carried a gun. And

to the extent that Robbins offered the photographs as “additional

evidence to strengthen the point of . . . Robbins’ expectation that

Edwards very likely had a gun at the time of the shooting[,]” there

was no evidence presented at trial that Robbins actually saw the

photographs before the shooting, which would have allowed the jury

to infer that the photographs influenced Robbins’s expectation that

Edwards was armed that day. For these reasons, it is highly

probable that the trial court’s error, if any, in excluding the

photographs did not contribute to the verdict. See, e.g., Beck v. State,

310 Ga. 491, 498-499 (3) (852 SE2d 535) (2020) (concluding that any

error in excluding evidence of a murder victim’s “conviction for

6
carrying a firearm without a license” and “other evidence about [the

victim’s] violent character . . . was cumulative of the evidence about

[the victim] that was introduced” and was therefore harmless).

3. Robbins also contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance in three ways.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

“defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient” and

“that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984). “To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must

demonstrate that his attorney ‘performed at trial in an objectively

unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light

of prevailing professional norms.’” Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 901

(5) (873 SE2d 185) (2022) (citation omitted). “This is no easy

showing, as the law recognizes a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel

performed reasonably, and [a defendant] bears the burden of

overcoming this presumption.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 183 (2)

(787 SE2d 221) (2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 689 (III) (A)).

7
To carry this burden, a defendant “‘must show that no reasonable

lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed

to do what his lawyer did not.’” Gardner v. State, 310 Ga. 515, 518

(2) (852 SE2d 574) (2020) (citation omitted).

“To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a

reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient

performance, the result of the trial would have been different.”

Perkins, 313 Ga. at 901 (5). “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466

U. S. at 694 (III) (B). “This burden is a heavy one[.]” Young v. State,

305 Ga. 92, 97 (5) (823 SE2d 774) (2019). Moreover, “[t]he reviewing

court need not ‘address both components of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.’” Davis, 299 Ga. at

183 (2) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV)).

(a) Robbins contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move for a

mistrial on the ground that the State violated OCGA § 17-8-76 in its

closing argument. In the relevant part, OCGA § 17-8-76 provides:

8
(a) No attorney at law in a criminal case shall argue
to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if
convicted, may not be required to suffer the full penalty
imposed by the court or jury because pardon, parole, or
clemency of any nature may be granted by the Governor,
the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, or other proper
authority vested with the right to grant clemency.
(b) If counsel for either side in a criminal case argues
to or in the presence of the jury as provided in subsection
(a) of this Code section, opposing counsel shall have the
right immediately to request the court to declare a
mistrial, in which case it shall be mandatory upon the
court to declare a mistrial. Failure to declare a mistrial
shall constitute reversible error.

During trial, trial counsel cross-examined Thompson about the

sentence for felony murder and the circumstances of Thompson’s

guilty plea:

Q: [Y]ou were charged with felony murder, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the penalty for felony murder is life in prison,
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And I guess your lawyer — he’s a good lawyer, he got
you a good deal — told you that if you were convicted of
felony murder, you’d have to do thirty years before you’d
be considered for parole; is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you cut a deal to get from one to twenty years; is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So the reason you’re here is to get out from under a life

9
sentence. That’s the reason you’re here, isn’t it?
A: Yes, sir.

During its closing argument, the State referenced the above

exchange and related it to the sentence that Robbins faced if

convicted:

Ordinarily, in a criminal case, juries don’t get to find
out what potential sentences are upon conviction. . . . But
you legitimately found out this time [about the sentence
that Robbins faced if convicted], and it’s legitimate
because [Robbins’s trial counsel] is perfectly entitled to
challenge the witness I put on the stand, Michael
Thompson, about what his motives might have been for
testifying. And I can’t complain about that. I put him on
the stand. I knew that was coming. . . . [Trial counsel’s]
challenge to Mr. Thompson, you know that if you convict
Joandre Robbins, it’s a long, hard road for him based on
current parole guidelines.

Robbins’s trial counsel did not object.

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified that

he cross-examined Thompson about his plea “to show what a good

deal [Thompson] was getting[ ]” in exchange for testifying at

Robbins’s trial. When asked why he did not object to the State’s

comment in its closing argument about Robbins’s parole, trial

counsel testified:

10
I knew the jury already knew [the sentence Robbins
faced if convicted] because I had gone through it with Mr.
Thompson. But also I thought we had a really good case
of self[-]defense in this case. And it was my feeling at the
time of trial, if it was driven home again to the jury that
if you convict this young man based on this evidence,
which I thought was a good self[-]defense case, he’s going
to have to do 30 years in prison before he would even be
paroled.

On appeal, Robbins contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move for a

mistrial on the ground that the State violated OCGA § 17-8-76 by

arguing in its closing that “it’s a long, hard road for [Robbins] based

on current parole guidelines.” However, because we cannot say that

trial counsel’s performance was “objectively unreasonable . . . in the

light of prevailing professional norms[,]” trial counsel was not

constitutionally deficient in this respect. Anthony v. State, 311 Ga.

293, 294-295 (1) (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Trial counsel’s assessment that he did not object to the

State’s comment because he thought that Robbins “had a really good

case of self[-]defense” was not objectively unreasonable given the

evidence presented that Edwards had previously threatened

11
Robbins while showing a gun; Edwards mimed shooting at Robbins

immediately before the shooting; and Robbins shot Edwards in his

back, which supported Robbins’s self-defense argument that he shot

Edwards because he believed Edwards was turning to retrieve a

gun. Given the evidence that Robbins acted in self-defense and trial

counsel’s assessment that the State’s parole comment struck him as

helpful to Robbins’s defense considering that evidence, we cannot

say that trial counsel’s decision to continue working for a possible

acquittal — instead of obtaining a mistrial and retrying the case —

was “objectively unreasonable . . . in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Anthony, 311 Ga. at 294-295 (1), 296 (2)

(citation and punctuation omitted) (concluding, where a portion of

the indictment read to the jury falsely alleged that the defendant

was a convicted felon, that the defendant “failed to show that his

trial counsel’s decision not to request a mistrial was objectively

unreasonable” because “the convicted-felon counts of the indictment

were read only once, [ ] trial counsel wanted to try [the defendant’s]

case in front of the jury that he had already selected, [the defendant]

12
agreed to trial counsel’s recommendation to seek a curative

instruction and not a mistrial, and [ ] the trial court informed the

jury that the State had made a ‘mistake’ in the charges because [the

defendant] was not actually a convicted felon”). See also State v.

Goff, 308 Ga. 330, 335 (2) (840 SE2d 359) (2020) (concluding, where

“[t]rial counsel testified that he declined to press for a mistrial

because he thought ‘we had a pretty good jury and a pretty good trial

going[,]’” that “trial counsel’s assessment” was not “objectively

unreasonable” “[g]iven the fleeting, nonspecific nature of [the

witness’s] reference to [the defendant’s] probation status”).

(b) Robbins also claims that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object

to a self-defense jury instruction on the use of excessive force. The

trial court instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense as follows:

A person is justified in threatening or using force
against another person when, and to the extent that, he
reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary
to defend himself or a third person against the other’s
imminent use of unlawful force. A person is justified in
using force that is intended or likely to cause death or
great bodily harm only if that person . . . reasonably

13
believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or
great bodily injury to himself.
...
A person is not justified in using force if that person:
initially provokes the use of force against himself with the
intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm
upon the assailant; or is attempting to commit or is
committing a felony, the offense of aggravated assault is
a felony . . . and has been previously defined for you; or
was the aggressor, unless the person withdraws from the
encounter and effectively communicates his intent to
withdraw to the other person and the other person still
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful
force.
...
[O]ne who is not the aggressor is not required to
retreat . . . before being justified in using force that is
necessary for personal defense or using force that is likely
to cause death or great bodily harm if one reasonably
believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great
bodily injury to oneself or to a third person.
...
[T]he use of excessive or unlawful force while acting
in self-defense is not justifiable, and the Defendant’s
conduct in this case would not be justified[,] if you find
that the force used exceeded that which the Defendant
reasonably believed was necessary to defend against the
victim’s use of unlawful force, if any. . . . [W]hen the force
used exceeds that necessary for self-defense, the law
considers the purported defender to be the aggressor.

(Emphasis supplied.) Trial counsel did not object to this portion of

the jury charge.

14
On appeal, Robbins contends that trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the

italicized language, claiming that the italicized language

impermissibly “emphasized that charge by repetition of law

favorable to the State.” However, we have concluded that a trial

court did not err in giving a jury instruction with substantially the

same language as that at issue here because it “adequately captured

th[e] principle of law” that “‘a homicide is not justified if the force

used by the defendant exceeds that which a reasonable person would

believe was necessary to defend against the victim’s unlawful act[.]’”

Wynn v. State, 313 Ga. 827, 839 (5) (874 SE2d 42) (2022) (citation

omitted) (noting that the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

“When the force used exceeds that necessary for self-defense, the law

considers the defender to be the aggressor[ ]”). See also Hill v. State,

290 Ga. 493, 497-498 (5) (722 SE2d 708) (2012) (rejecting a challenge

to a portion of a self-defense jury charge providing that, “[w]here the

force used exceeds that necessary for defense of the person, the law

will consider the defender the aggressor,” because “‘the charge as a

15
whole encompasse[d] the elements of self-defense under OCGA § 16-

3-21.’” (citation omitted)). Moreover, in the context of analyzing an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we have explained that “mere

repetition of a correct and applicable principle of law is not such

error as requires reversal unless it takes color of an argumentative

or opinionative utterance so as to tend to prejudice the minds of the

jury.” Wilkins v. State, 308 Ga. 131, 140 (5) (839 SE2d 525) (2020)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

The language at issue here — supported by at least some

evidence presented at trial — “adequately captured” the legal

principle that “‘a homicide is not justified if the force used by the

defendant exceeds that which a reasonable person would believe was

necessary to defend against the victim’s unlawful act[.]’” Wynn, 313

Ga. at 839 (5) (citation omitted). And even assuming that the

language at issue was repetitive of other portions of the charge,

Robbins has not shown that it was inapplicable or “argumentative

or opinionative so as to tend to prejudice the minds of the jury.”

Wilkins, 308 Ga. at 140 (5) (citation and punctuation omitted).

16
Consequently, Robbins has not shown that trial counsel was

constitutionally deficient for failing to object to the language at issue

on the ground that it “emphasized th[e] charge by repetition of law

favorable to the State.” See, e.g., Walker v. State, 306 Ga. 637, 645

(2) (b) (832 SE2d 783) (2019) (explaining that “the failure to make a

meritless objection is not deficient performance”).

(c) Robbins claims that trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court’s response

to the jury’s request for a definition of “implied malice.” In its closing

charge on the issue of malice, the trial court instructed the jury that

[a] person commits murder when that person unlawfully
and with malice aforethought, either express or implied,
causes the death of another human being. Express malice
is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the
life of another human being, which is shown by external
circumstances capable of proof. Malice may, but need not,
be implied when no considerable provocation appears and
when all of the circumstances of the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart.

While it was deliberating, the jury sent the trial court the following

question: “Can you clarify ‘malice may but need not be implied when

no considerable provocation appears and when all of the

17
circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant

heart?’” The jury underlined the phrase “no considerable

provocation.”

After considering the question, the trial court stated to the

parties, but outside of the jury’s presence, that

my staff attorney . . . found some case law from Browder
v. State, [294 Ga. 188, 190 (1) (751 SE2d 354) (2013)] . . .
that reads as follows. “Implied malice may be found when
the defendant’s conduct exhibits a reckless disregard for
human life. Implied malice is defined as extremely
negligent conduct which creates what a reasonable man
would realize to be . . . not only an unjustifiable but also
a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury
to another or to others — though unaccompanied by any
intent to kill or do serious bodily injury — and which
actually causes the death of another. Reckless disregard
for human life may be the equivalent of a specific intent
to kill.” . . . I point that out as one possibility [to instruct
the jury].

Trial counsel did not object to the trial court’s instructing the jury

using the text from Browder. The trial court then read the foregoing

quote from Browder to the jury.

On appeal, Robbins contends that trial counsel should have

objected to the Browder excerpt because, among other things, there

18
was no evidence of “extremely negligent conduct.” However,

pretermitting whether trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in

failing to object to the trial court’s response, Robbins has not shown

that trial counsel’s failure to object prejudiced him because the trial

court’s response to the jury’s question was inapplicable to the

evidence presented at trial. Robbins contended at trial that he

purposefully shot Edwards in self-defense because he believed that

Edwards was turning in his seat to retrieve a gun. And there was

evidence to support that contention: Edwards had threatened

Robbins while holding a gun one week before the shooting; Edwards

mimed holding a gun at Robbins immediately before the shooting;

and Robbins shot Edwards in his back, which supported Robbins’s

argument that Robbins shot Edwards because he believed Edwards

was turning in his seat to retrieve a gun. Moreover, neither party

introduced evidence or argument that Robbins’s conduct in shooting

Edwards was “extremely negligent.” Under these circumstances,

Robbins has not shown a reasonable probability that the result of

the trial would have been different had trial counsel objected

19
because we “generally deem harmless a jury instruction that

indicates that a defendant could be found guilty under a theory for

which there was no evidence or even argument[.]” Wilkins, 308 Ga.

at 138-140 (4) (concluding trial counsel’s failure to object to a jury

instruction that “‘the testimony of one accomplice may be supported

by the testimony of another accomplice’” was inapplicable and

therefore harmless where the defendant “may have had two

accomplices . . . [b]ut only one of them . . . testified as a witness at

trial” because “there was no testimony about the [crime] from a

second accomplice”); Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 650-651 (7) (784

SE2d 365) (2016) (explaining that any error by the trial court in

giving the jury a charge on parties to a crime was harmless because

there was “no evidence [the appellant] procured someone else to

commit the crimes[,]” and the State did not argue to the contrary).3

3 We have assumed one trial-counsel deficiency in failing to object to the

trial court’s response to a question from the jury and one trial-court error in
excluding photographs that Robbins introduced. Robbins has not contended
that we should conduct a cumulative-error review. Even assuming that the
assumed trial-counsel deficiency and assumed evidentiary error are errors that
could be examined cumulatively, we conclude that any such cumulative error

20
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided October 15, 2024.

Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Freesemann.

Steven L. Sparger, for appellant.

Melanie N. Fenley, Aletha C. Farley, Emily C. Puhala, Gabriel

A. Justus, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C.

Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Grace

G. Griffith, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

does not demand a new trial. See Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712, 722 (2) n.14
(884 SE2d 310) (2023) (conducting a cumulative-error review even though the
appellant did not request that the Court do so and concluding that “even
assuming that these presumed errors should be considered cumulatively, . . .
[the appellant] has failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of
these errors requires a new trial” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
21