CourtListener 10680271

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319 Ga. 665
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S24A0623. THE STATE v. HARRIS.

LAGRUA, Justice.

On April 30, 2023, 15-year-old Bjorn Harris was arrested on

murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Jaylan

Major and transported to the Regional Metro Youth Detention

Facility. Harris made his first appearance in the Superior Court of

Fulton County1 on May 5, 2023, and following a hearing, the

superior court found probable cause for the charges against Harris,

appointed counsel to represent him, and denied bond. On July 28,

2023, Harris — who remained incarcerated following his arrest —

was indicted by a Fulton County grand jury for voluntary

manslaughter,2 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and

1 Given the nature of the charges against Harris, the superior court had

exclusive jurisdiction over his case pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-560 (b) (1), (3)
(“The superior court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the trial of
any child 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed any of the
following offenses: . . . Murder; . . . Voluntary manslaughter[.]”).

2 The superior court retained jurisdiction when Harris was indicted for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On

November 16, 2023, Harris was reindicted for murder, felony

murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a pistol

or revolver by a person under 18. On November 21, 2023, at the

request of the State, the superior court issued an order of nolle

prosequi on the initial July 2023 indictment.

On December 1, 2023, Harris filed a motion to transfer his case

to the juvenile court pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-50.1, arguing that,

because he had been consistently detained since the date of his

arrest, the State was required to indict him within 180 days, and

because the November 2023 reindictment was returned outside that

180-day time period, the superior court no longer had jurisdiction

over his case. On December 7, 2023, the superior court held an

evidentiary hearing on Harris’s motion to transfer, and on December

11, 2023, the superior court granted the motion, relying largely on

the statutory analysis undertaken by the Court of Appeals in State

voluntary manslaughter.
2
v. Armendariz, 316 Ga. App. 394 (729 SE2d 538) (2012). The State

appealed the superior court’s decision to this Court. See OCGA § 5-

7-1 (a) (7) (authorizing the State, in a criminal case, to appeal from

“an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transferring a

case to the juvenile court”).

On appeal, the State argues that the superior court erred in

transferring this case to juvenile court because the grand jury

returned a true bill of indictment against Harris within 180 days of

his arrest and detention in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a),

and a transfer is only required where that deadline passes without

a true bill being returned. See OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b) (“If the grand

jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within the

time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the

detained child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court[.]”).

The State further argues that the subsequent reindictment of Harris

is immaterial to OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b), which does not purport to

alter the rules of reindictment. For these reasons, the State contends

that the superior court was not authorized by OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b) to

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transfer this case to the juvenile court, and its order doing so must

be reversed. We agree.

In statutory interpretation cases such as this, it is
well settled that a statute draws its meaning from its text.
When interpreting a statute, we must give the text its
plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the context in
which it appears, and read it in its most natural and
reasonable way. For context, we may look to other
provisions of the same statute, the structure and history
of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional,
statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal
background of the statutory provision in question. When
we construe such statutory authority on appeal, our
review is de novo.

State v. Coleman, 306 Ga. 529, 530 (832 SE2d 389) (2019) (citations

and punctuation omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn to

the statutory text in question, OCGA § 17-7-50.1. See id.

In pertinent part, OCGA § 17-7-50.1 provides:

(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided
in Code Section 15-11-560 or 15-11-561, who is detained
shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled
to have the charge against him or her presented to the
grand jury. The superior court shall, upon motion for an
extension of time and after a hearing and good cause
shown, grant one extension to the original 180 day period,
not to exceed 90 additional days.
(b) If the grand jury does not return a true bill

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against the detained child within the time limitations set
forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained
child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court and
shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title
15.

OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), (b).

In granting Harris’s motion to transfer, the superior court

focused on the term “the charge” found in OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a)

(“Any child . . . who is detained shall within 180 days of the date of

detention be entitled to have the charge against him or her presented

to the grand jury. . . .”) (emphasis supplied), interpreting this

language to mean that, where a child defendant is detained, the

State is required to present the specific charges upon which the

defendant will ultimately be tried to the grand jury within 180 days.

In furtherance thereof, the superior court noted the following: (1)

“[t]he State’s initial timely indictment did not charge [Harris] with

murder, felony murder, or possession of a pistol or revolver by a

person under 18”; (2) “the language of the statute specifically

requires that ‘the charge’ be presented to the grand jury prior to the

180 day mark”; and (3) “while [Harris was] indicted twice for the

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same incident, [he] was not indicted with the same charges prior to

the 180 day mark.” See OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a). Relying on the Court

of Appeals’ decision in Armendariz, the superior court further noted

that, “when the State fails to return an indictment within the 180

days, the case must be transferred back to [j]uvenile [c]ourt[,] even

if the preceding indictment was timely,” because “the 180 day clock

does not stop running even if the initial indictment was valid.” See

Armendariz, 316 Ga. App. at 396 (1). Applying “the same statutory

analysis undertaken in Armendariz,” the superior court concluded

that, because the initial timely indictment against Harris was nolle

prossed; because the subsequent indictment included new charges

for murder and felony murder that were not alleged in the initial

indictment; and because the subsequent indictment was not

returned within 180 days of Harris’s date of detention, “OCGA § 17-

7-50.1 unambiguously require[d] . . . a transfer to [j]uvenile

[c]ourt[.]” For the reasons that follow, including the superior court’s

reliance on Armendariz, which was wrongly decided, we conclude

that the superior court erred in reaching its conclusion.

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The Court of Appeals indeed held in Armendariz that an out-

of-time reindictment represents “the state’s failure to obtain the

timely return of a true bill,” which “requires that the case then be

transferred back to juvenile court.” Armendariz, 316 Ga. App. at 396

(1) (citing OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b)). But that holding is incorrect, is

inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, and therefore is

overruled. See OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), (b).

As we explained in Coleman, the text of this statute is clear:

[OCGA § 17-7-50.1] entitles a child “who is detained”
on criminal charges within the jurisdiction of the superior
court to have those criminal charges presented to a grand
jury within 180 days “of the date of detention.” Id. at (a).
If the grand jury does not return a true bill “against the
detained child” within 180 days, then the superior court
must transfer “the detained child’s case” to juvenile
court.

Coleman, 306 Ga. at 531 (citing OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), (b)).

Reading this language “in its most natural and reasonable

way,” Coleman, 306 Ga. at 530, subsection (a) requires that, where

a child defendant is detained on a criminal charge or charges within

the superior court’s jurisdiction, the State must present that

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“charge” or charges to the grand jury “within 180 days of the date of

detention.” OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a). And subsection (b) requires a

grand jury to return “a true bill” of indictment against a “detained

child” within 180 days. OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b) (emphasis supplied).

See also OCGA § 15-12-74 (b) (addressing the procedure to be

followed when “a true bill is returned by the grand jury on any count

of an indictment”). The text of this statute only requires that a true

bill be returned on at least one charge that is within the jurisdiction

of the superior court for the court to retain jurisdiction. OCGA § 17-

7-50.1 (a), (b). Thus, the superior court’s focus on the “charge”

language in the statute to conclude that the indictment could not be

amended to add additional charges was misplaced. Affording the

text its “plain and ordinary meaning,” Coleman, 306 Ga. at 530, this

statute provides that, if a grand jury returns a true bill of indictment

against a “detained child” within 180 days of the date of the child’s

detention, that true bill is timely, and the case may proceed in the

superior court. OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), (b). If, however, “the grand

jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within [180

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days of the date of detention]” and the superior court did not

otherwise grant an extension as authorized by OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a),

the true bill is not timely, and “the detained child’s case shall be

transferred to the juvenile court[.]” OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b).

Moreover, the statute does not address reindictments at all, let

alone prohibit the return of a true bill on a subsequent indictment

outside the 180-day timeframe specified in OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a).

Under Georgia law, the State is generally authorized to reindict a

defendant at any time prior to trial, which could include modifying

the charges in the initial indictment or adding additional charges to

the indictment, unless that right has been explicitly limited by

statute — a claim which is not at issue here. See, e.g., State v. Heath,

308 Ga. 836, 840 (843 SE2d 801) (2020) (holding that “the State can

usually re-indict before trial unless[, for example,] the statute of

limitations for the crimes with which the defendant was charged

bars the prosecution”); Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 396, 396-397 (1) (614

SE2d 79) (2005) (explaining that a superseding charging instrument

can be returned by a grand jury against a defendant as long as

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jeopardy did not attach to the first indictment). Thus, while OCGA

§ 17-7-50.1 explicitly requires a grand jury to return a true bill of

indictment against a detained child within 180 days of his or her

detention, the statute does not by its clear terms prohibit a

reindictment of that same defendant outside the 180 days or provide

that doing so deprives the superior court of jurisdiction and requires

the case to be transferred to juvenile court. See id.

In this case, Harris was arrested and detained on April 30,

2023, and the grand jury returned a true bill against him on July

28, 2023 — within 180 days of his detention. See OCGA § 17-7-50.1

(a). And the subsequent indictment of Harris, which was returned

by the grand jury on November 16, 2023, included charges over

which the superior court retained its exclusive jurisdiction under

OCGA § 15-11-560 (b) (1). Accordingly, given that the true bill of the

July 2023 indictment against Harris was timely returned under

OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), we conclude that OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (b) did not

authorize the superior court to transfer this case to juvenile court,

and that order must be reversed.

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Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

Decided September 4, 2024.

Voluntary manslaughter, etc. Fulton Superior Court. Before

Judge Dempsey, Senior Judge.

Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Kevin C.

Armstrong, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan

H. Hill, Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for

appellant.

Lauren B. Shubow, Cody J. Jung, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 4, 2024

S24A0623. THE STATE v. HARRIS.

LAGRUA, Justice.

On April 30, 2023, 15-year-old Bjorn Harris was arrested on

murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Jaylan

Major and transported to the Regional Metro Youth Detention

Facility. Harris made his first appearance in the Superior Court of

Fulton County 1 on May 5, 2023, and following a hearing, the

superior court found probable cause for the charges against Harris,

appointed counsel to represent him, and denied bond. On July 28,

2023, Harris—who remained incarcerated following his arrest—was

indicted by a Fulton County grand jury for voluntary

1 Given the nature of the charges against Harris, the superior court had

exclusive jurisdiction over his case pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-560 (b) (1) (“The
superior court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the trial of any
child 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed any of the following
offenses: . . . Murder; . . . Voluntary manslaughter; . . . .”).
manslaughter,2 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On

November 16, 2023, Harris was reindicted for murder, felony

murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of pistol