CourtListener 10680292

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 13, 2024

S24A0642. BOWMAN v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Appellant Roe Dale Bowman was convicted of malice murder

and other crimes in connection with the death of Tammy Wolfe. 1 On

appeal, he argues that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective

on numerous grounds and that the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting evidence of Bowman’s prior acts of violence involving

1 The crimes occurred on April 4, 2017. On March 19, 2018, Bowman was

indicted for malice murder; felony murder; two counts of aggravated assault;
and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, in connection with
Wolfe’s death. At a trial in March 2020, the jury found Bowman guilty of all
counts. On March 31, 2020, the trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison
without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), and five years in
prison consecutive to Count 1 for the possession offense (Count 5). The felony
murder count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated
assault counts (Counts 3 and 4) merged into the malice murder count for
sentencing purposes. On April 30, 2020, Bowman filed a motion for new trial
through new counsel. He amended that motion on March 31, 2021. The trial
court held a hearing on the amended motion from August 11 to August 12,
2022, and denied the motion in an order dated September 28, 2023. On October
30, 2023, Bowman timely filed a notice of appeal. This case was docketed to the
term of Court beginning in April 2024 and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
his ex-wife. For the reasons that follow, his claims fail, so we affirm.

1. The evidence at trial showed the following. For a few years

before her death, Wolfe and Bowman had been in a romantic

relationship, throughout which they would ride motorcycles and

take trips together. At one point, the two got engaged, but their

relationship was tumultuous. Multiple witnesses testified about

instances where Bowman treated Wolfe in jealous, violent, or

controlling ways. One of Wolfe’s brothers testified to an instance

where Bowman argued with Wolfe for not holding his hand on a

street in Florida. Another one of Wolfe’s brothers recounted that

once after a friend hugged Wolfe from behind, Bowman grabbed

Wolfe’s arm “really, really hard” and said “I can’t believe you turned

your back on me like that.” An acquaintance of Wolfe’s mom

observed Bowman “take [Wolfe] by the arm and pull her towards the

door” when she wanted to stay at a flea market against Bowman’s

wishes and “slap” Wolfe “if she looked at somebody else for

anything.” The same acquaintance testified that Bowman “wouldn’t

think twice about balling his fist up and hitting [Wolfe] right in the
eye,” and that Wolfe had “[b]lack eyes, busted lips” and bruises on

her arms and wrist, which gave the acquaintance further concern

about Bowman and Wolfe’s relationship. One of Wolfe’s work

colleagues testified that Wolfe had confided in her that Bowman

would follow Wolfe; that once in Florida, Bowman had pushed Wolfe

down on a bed and choked her; and that Wolfe was afraid to end her

relationship with Bowman because he had told her that “he could do

something to her and get rid of her and . . . nobody would ever prove

anything[.]”

Eventually, Wolfe broke off the engagement and started dating

another man. Wolfe and Bowman continued to communicate,

however, texting and calling each other in the days leading up to

Wolfe’s death. According to Wolfe’s son, Jesse Wolfe (“Jesse”),

Bowman would stalk Wolfe after the engagement ended, including

at a Walmart, at a convenience store, near Jesse’s grandparents’

house, and near where Wolfe checked the mail. Jesse recounted

Wolfe telling him that even after she “changed her routine,”

Bowman would still be “waiting on her.” At one point, Jesse testified,
he “confront[ed] Roe [Bowman] about stalking [his] mother,” and

told Bowman that “he needed to leave her alone and just be done

with it.”

On the morning of April 4, 2017, at 5:28 a.m., Wolfe’s cell phone

texted Bowman’s cell phone, “Good morning.” Bowman’s phone did

not reply. 2 Eleven seconds later, Wolfe texted “Good morning” to

another cell phone ending in the digits 7925 (“-7925 phone”), which

texted Wolfe’s phone “Good morning” at 5:30 a.m. The -7925 phone

then called Wolfe’s phone at 5:30 a.m., and Wolfe’s phone called the

-7925 phone at 5:33 and 5:58 a.m. Cell tower data showed that at

5:33 and 5:58 a.m., Wolfe’s phone and the -7925 phone used the same

cell phone towers and sectors 3 angling towards a cemetery where

Wolfe was later found dead. As cell tower data suggested, Wolfe’s

2 It appeared that Bowman’s cell phone never responded to Wolfe’s “Good

morning” text. Also, although Wolfe sent “Good morning” to Bowman’s cell
phone at 5:28 a.m., his phone did not receive the text until 6:39 a.m. A law
enforcement officer testified that this meant that between 5:28 a.m. and 6:39
a.m., Bowman’s cell phone might have been turned off, on “airplane mode,” out
of battery, or in an area “not covered by cell phone service.”
3 Detective Scott Demeester testified that a cell phone tower covers a

360-degree radius, of which a “sector” covers a 120-degree radius showing the
direction a cell phone is relative to the tower.
phone arrived at the cemetery at about 6:05 a.m. Between 6:07 and

6:08 a.m., Wolfe’s phone began moving away from the cemetery,

traveling east and then south, the same direction as Bowman’s

residence. At 6:13 a.m., the last time at which law enforcement

documented data activity from Wolfe’s phone, her phone

disconnected from the cell tower network. Cell tower data indicated

that right before disconnecting, Wolfe’s phone was close to a body of

water and a wooded area. Neither Wolfe’s phone nor the -7925 phone

were ever recovered by law enforcement. “The last location we had

of both cell phones pinging . . . [was] beside the pond,” one law

enforcement officer testified, and the last communication

documented for both phones was the 5:58 a.m. call.

According to Detective Scott Demeester, an expert in cell phone

forensics, the -7925 phone was a prepaid phone that lacked

subscriber information and started service on March 9, 2017, about

a month before the murder; was “not used very often” and “primarily

communicated with the decedent”; and made or received only 11

calls from March 28 to April 7, 2017, communicating with Wolfe’s
phone for eight of those calls. And, Detective Demeester testified, in

the weeks leading up to Wolfe’s murder, the cell tower most

frequently used by both the -7925 phone and by Bowman’s phone

was the same.

Later on the morning of April 4, family and friends started to

wonder where Wolfe was. Her son Jesse called Bowman at 9:49 a.m.

to ask him if he had seen Wolfe, to which Bowman replied he had

not. In the following hours, Bowman’s cell phone began contacting

Wolfe’s phone several times, starting from 10:01 a.m.

At about 1:00 p.m., the cemetery’s general manager discovered

Wolfe’s dead body covered in blood in the driver’s seat of her car with

the driver’s side window down. An autopsy later revealed that she

had gunshot wounds to her head and neck and stab wounds in her

neck and chest. On the windshield were the letters “R” and “O”—the

first two letters of Bowman’s first name, “Roe”—written in blood.

Law enforcement did not find a murder weapon but found Wolfe’s

purse inside the car, as well as shell casings and .22-caliber bullets

on the ground next to the driver’s side window. Male non-blood DNA
(“contact DNA”) found on Wolfe’s purse did not match the DNA of

Bowman or an officer at the scene, and DNA tests conducted on

blood droplets found on and near the car were inconclusive.

After visiting the crime scene, law enforcement also began

interviewing members of Wolfe’s family. Through that investigation,

law enforcement discovered Wolfe’s cell phone number and obtained

records from the provider, which led to the discovery of Wolfe’s

contacts with the -7925 phone on the day of her murder. Wolfe’s son

Jesse was able to log into Wolfe’s Google account and sync her

contact list to his phone. Entering digits from the -7925 phone

number into Jesse’s phone, an investigator found that the -7925

number had been saved in Wolfe’s contacts as Bowman’s first name

(“Roe”) and “FS Phone”—“Roe FS Phone.” 4

Officers interviewed Bowman, once on April 6 and once on

4 Seeking to discredit this evidence, Bowman points to Jesse’s testimony

on cross-examination that when he logged into his mother’s Google account a
few months after April 4, 2017, “the contacts had disappeared. I mean . . . I
don’t know where they went.” But this point is of no avail; law enforcement
saved a screenshot of the -7925 phone number matching with “Roe FS Phone,”
and the screenshot was admitted as evidence.
April 7, 2017. In Bowman’s first interview, officers talked to

Bowman about his relationship with Wolfe and asked him about his

phone; he stated that he broke off the engagement and that he had

one phone, which he then handed to the officers. In his second

interview, officers asked Bowman to speak further about his

relationship with Wolfe and asked him if he had a second phone. He

stated that he and Wolfe ended their relationship because “she

didn’t want to be friends with benefits anymore.” And, he stated that

he had a “food stamp” phone, which made, as an officer testified at

trial, “the letters FS [become] pretty significant[.]” Bowman later

gave law enforcement a phone that he claimed was the “food stamp”

phone. Officers did not find information on that phone linking

Bowman to the murder, and the number for that phone was not the

same as the one saved in Wolfe’s contacts as “Roe FS Phone.” At one

point, Bowman also told police that he did not “carry any weapons”

due to a medical condition, but that he did have a knife, which police

found in his truck. After the grand jury indictment, when law

enforcement officials arrested Bowman and executed a search
warrant on his residence, they found Bowman carrying a firearm on

his side and a sheath knife on a lanyard around his neck, and found

another sheath knife in his house.

2. Bowman claims his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance on five grounds. To prevail on an ineffective

assistance claim, Bowman must show that counsel’s performance

was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove deficiency, Bowman must

show that counsel “performed his duties in an objectively

unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light

of prevailing professional norms[.]” Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 221

(2) (892 SE2d 744) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). To

prove prejudice, Bowman “must establish a reasonable probability

that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, the result of

the trial would have been different.” Moulder v. State, 317 Ga. 43,

47 (3) (891 SE2d 903) (2023). If Bowman “fails to make a sufficient

showing on one part of the Strickland test, we need not address the
other part.” Copeland v. State, 316 Ga. 452, 457 (3) (888 SE2d 517)

(2023). And, “[i]n reviewing a trial court’s ruling on an ineffective-

assistance claim, we accept the trial court’s factual findings and

credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

independently apply the relevant legal principles to the facts.” Id.

With this framework in mind, we assess each of Bowman’s

ineffective-assistance arguments.

(a) Bowman first claims that counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a timely alibi notice, and in so doing, prevented counsel from

calling Bowman’s brother Ralph as an alibi witness, which counsel

unsuccessfully attempted to do on the morning of trial. At the

motion-for-new-trial hearing, Ralph testified that he heard Bowman

“get[ ] up and walk[ ] through the living room” at around 7:00 a.m.

the morning of the murder. On appeal, Bowman argues that had

Ralph been called as an alibi witness, he could have testified that

Bowman was at the house around 7:00 a.m. and that had he left the

house earlier that morning, Ralph would have heard Bowman’s feet

“drop” against the floor due to a condition that caused Bowman to
lose strength in his legs. According to Bowman, counsel failed to call

Ralph to testify at trial, not because of trial strategy, but because

counsel failed to interview Ralph earlier and to timely file an alibi

notice.

“A decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of

counsel’s trial strategy and tactics and will not support a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so unreasonable that no

competent attorney would have made the decision under the

circumstances.” Smith v. State, 308 Ga. 81, 92 (4) (839 SE2d 630)

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, counsel testified at

the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he “knew . . . there was no

alibi” because he knew from speaking with Bowman that Bowman

had left the house the morning of the murder and while Ralph was

still asleep. And, counsel testified that he did not call Ralph to the

stand because counsel feared that doing so would result in perjury:

I didn’t want to talk to Ralph after I talked to Roe
[Bowman] and you know the reason. I didn’t want to
support perjury and I didn’t want to talk to somebody if
I’ve got to put them on the stand and make him testify
without me asking did you do this or what time it was,
and . . . I think then and I think today it was best that I
didn’t put him on the stand.

And as for why counsel still ultimately sought to introduce Ralph as

an alibi witness the morning of trial, counsel testified that he did so

at Bowman’s request.

Counsel’s testimony amply shows that his initial choice to not

call Ralph as an alibi witness was strategic since it was based on his

investigation of the case and his assessment that Ralph lacked an

alibi and might commit perjury, and thus was not “so unreasonable

that no competent attorney would have made the decision under the

circumstances.” Smith, 308 Ga. at 92 (4) (citation and punctuation

omitted). See Andrews v. State, 293 Ga. 701, 703 (2) (749 SE2d 734)

(2013) (concluding that counsel made a “strategic decision” to not

call alibi witness who might have lied about her activity with

defendant on night of the murder); Sims v. State, 278 Ga. 587, 591

(3) (c) (604 SE2d 799) (2004) (concluding that counsel was not

ineffective for failing to call witness to present testimony that

counsel believed was perjured).
Moreover, Ralph’s potential testimony, as indicated at the

motion-for-new-trial hearing, was that Bowman was at the house at

around 7:00 a.m. This would not conflict with the theory of Bowman

killing Wolfe earlier between 6:05 and 6:07 a.m. Thus, counsel was

not deficient for failing to call, as an alibi witness, a potentially

perjurious witness who could not provide testimony supporting that

it was impossible for Bowman to have committed the murder. See

OCGA § 16-3-40 (“The defense of alibi involves the impossibility of

the accused’s presence at the scene of the offense at the time of its

commission”); McKelvey v. State, 311 Ga. 34, 44 (5) (855 SE2d 598)

(2021) (identifying no deficiency in counsel’s failure to call two alibi

witnesses whose testimony “would not have been helpful” and “may

even have been harmful”); Sims, 278 Ga. at 591 (3) (c).

That counsel later sought to call Ralph as an alibi witness does

not render counsel’s failure to earlier provide an alibi notice

deficient. As explained above, counsel had a strategic basis for his

initial choice to not call Ralph as an alibi witness and thus not give

timely alibi notice. That counsel later changed his mind upon his
client’s request, after it was too late to do so, does not make his

initial strategy any less reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that

counsel was not deficient in failing to timely file an alibi notice.

(b) Bowman also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate and present evidence that Bowman suffered from a

degenerative disease, Charcot-Marie-Tooth (CMT) disease, that

would have hindered him from committing the murder. At the

motion-for-new-trial hearing, the defense offered testimony from

one of Bowman’s doctors that she had prescribed him pain

medication and orthotics equipment for his CMT and that the

disease could cause numbness, pain, and weakness; testimony from

Bowman’s sister that Bowman had modifications on his motorcycle

accommodating his disabilities; and testimony from Ralph that

Bowman wore leg braces and had trouble running. On cross-

examination at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, the same doctor

testified that her records showed that Bowman did not need help

with transportation, shopping, preparing meals, housework, or

laundry; Ralph’s sister testified that Bowman regularly carried a
gun with him and indicated that he could operate a motorcycle for

long trips; and Ralph testified that on the day of Wolfe’s murder, he

and Bowman went to a rock quarry, picked up a load of rocks, and

later unloaded the rocks with shovels and rakes.

When explaining why he chose not to focus more on Bowman’s

CMT disease, counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing

that he had investigated the disease by researching it and discussing

it with Bowman and various witnesses, but concluded that a defense

based on Bowman’s CMT disease “would not be extremely helpful”

and seeking further medical records “would not be in the best

interest.” Counsel explained: he “wanted [the jury] to know that

[Bowman] was weak in the hands and . . . that was about the extent

of it because [counsel] was concerned about [Bowman] . . . driving

and riding motorcycles with his hands and using the brakes and the

clutches.”

Bowman has failed to show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. As counsel’s motion-for-new-trial testimony shows—and

as the trial court found in its order denying the motion for new trial
the reason why counsel did not subpoena or introduce evidence of

Bowman’s CMT disease was strategic. Counsel assessed that the

jury would not believe the theory that Bowman’s CMT disease

precluded him from stabbing and shooting Wolfe. The record

supports counsel’s assessment. Not only did the jury hear evidence

that Bowman was physically able to ride his motorcycle for long

distances, the jury also heard that at the time of Bowman’s arrest,

he was carrying a firearm on his side and a sheath knife on a lanyard

around his neck, which supported the inference that Bowman was

capable of using both weapons. Moreover, evidence was presented

that Bowman had been physically violent towards Wolfe. And lastly,

the witnesses who testified to Bowman’s CMT disease at the motion-

for-new-trial hearing indicated that Bowman could perform a host

of activities requiring physical strength, including shopping, meal

preparation, laundry, and transporting rocks using shovels and

rakes. Thus, even if the defense presented the theory that Bowman’s

CMT disease prevented him from murdering Wolfe and called the

witnesses above to testify in support, that theory would not have
been credible, let alone persuasive, to the jury. Accordingly,

counsel’s failure to present such a defense was not deficient

performance. See Lanier v. State, 310 Ga. 520, 525 (3) (a) (852 SE2d

509) (2020) (identifying no deficiency in counsel’s failure to present

defense theories that counsel did not find viable given the evidence);

Brooks v. State, 309 Ga. 630, 637 (2) (847 SE2d 555) (2020) (“An

attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a question of

trial strategy, and trial strategy, if reasonable, does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)).

to find and use at trial six photos that police took of Bowman

showing him without injuries or scratches only a few days after the

murder. We conclude that Bowman has failed to show deficiency. As

this Court has stated before, “decisions as to what witnesses and

other evidence to present are matters of trial strategy and are

ineffective only if unreasonable ones that no competent attorney

would make.” Horton v. State, 310 Ga. 310, 328 (5) (a) (849 SE2d
382) (2020). Here, the State never argued that Bowman and Wolfe

engaged in a physical struggle before Wolfe’s death such that

Bowman was likely to have been injured as a result, but instead,

presented evidence that Bowman shot and stabbed Wolfe and drove

away in a matter of minutes (from around 6:05 a.m. to 6:07 a.m.).

Photos showing that Bowman lacked injuries shortly after the

murder would have been unhelpful in rebutting the theory that

Bowman ambushed Wolfe and thus would have carried little

exculpatory weight, if any. Since the photos would have been of little

or no avail to the defense, Bowman has failed to show that counsel

was deficient for failing to find the photos and use them at trial. See

Morrison v. State, 303 Ga. 120, 125-26 (5) (b) (810 SE2d 508) (2018)

(no deficiency in counsel’s failure to introduce medical-records

evidence where counsel testified that the records “would not have

had ‘any significant bearing one way or the other on the trial’”);

McKelvey, 311 Ga. at 44 (5) (no deficiency in counsel’s failure to call

two alibi witnesses, in part because their testimony “would not have

been helpful”).
(d) Bowman also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing

to present testimony showing that two knives found after Bowman’s

arrest, and later admitted as evidence, were purchased after Wolfe

was killed. Following Bowman’s indictment in March 2018, police

arrested Bowman and searched his residence, finding a sheath knife

on a lanyard around Bowman’s neck, and another sheath knife at

his home. At trial, both knives were admitted as exhibits and

became the subject of direct- and cross-examination. Sergeant Josh

Smith testified for the State that the knives were “important”

because Bowman had previously told police that “he did not carry

any type of weapons with him, because of his medical disability.”

Another prosecution witness, a medical examiner who had

examined Wolfe, testified that the two knives were “consistent with

the way [Wolfe’s stab] wounds look[ed].” In response, defense

counsel pointed out on cross-examination that numerous other

knives could have created Wolfe’s stab wounds and that the medical

examiner had neither tested the two knives for DNA nor seen them

before trial. At closing argument, defense counsel pointed out the
lack of DNA evidence linking the two knives to Wolfe and argued

that the knives had “nothing to do” with the case. The State, in turn,

argued that at least one of the knives was “consistent with the knife

that stabbed [Wolfe],” that Bowman “had plenty of time to clean [the

knives]” after Wolfe’s death, and that the knives showed that

Bowman lied about not having weapons.

On appeal, Bowman argues that counsel should have presented

testimony from Ralph or Bowman’s girlfriend that the two knives

were purchased after Wolfe’s death. According to Bowman, by failing

to present such testimony, counsel did not dispel the suggestion that

Bowman killed Wolfe with those knives.

Assuming without deciding that counsel performed deficiently

by failing to present such testimony, we conclude that Bowman has

failed to show prejudice. Even if counsel had presented testimony

showing that the two knives admitted at trial were purchased after

the murder, that would not have undermined the State’s point that

the finding of one of those knives on Bowman’s person indicated that

he had lied to police when he told them that he did not carry any
weapons due to his disability. Moreover, even if counsel used the

timing of Bowman’s purchase of the knives to show that Bowman

could not have murdered Wolfe using the particular knives admitted

at trial, thus rebutting the State’s point that those knives were

“consistent” with Wolfe’s stab wounds, that would still have done

little to rebut the evidence that Bowman was the one who murdered

Wolfe. This evidence included: the -7925 phone number, which

exchanged calls with Wolfe’s phone and tracked with its movements

shortly before she was murdered, being labeled as “Roe FS Phone,”

a label consistent with Bowman’s first name and his admission that

he possessed a “food stamp” phone; testimony that in the weeks

leading up to Wolfe’s murder, the cell tower most frequently used by

both the -7925 phone and by Bowman’s phone was the same;

testimony from multiple witnesses of Bowman’s jealous and

controlling behavior towards Wolfe; and the “R” and “O,” the first

two letters of Bowman’s first name “Roe,” written in blood on Wolfe’s

car windshield. For these reasons, Bowman has failed to show a

“reasonable probability” that the trial outcome would have been
altered by testimony showing that the two knives were purchased

after Wolfe’s death. See Moulder, 317 Ga. at 47 (3); Richardson-

Bethea v. State, 301 Ga. 859, 865 (2) & n.8 (804 SE2d 372) (2017)

(identifying no prejudice from counsel’s failure to present testimony

because, among other reasons, the testimony could not rebut various

aspects of the State’s case).

(e) Next, Bowman argues that counsel was ineffective for

failing to introduce evidence and elicit testimony about cell phone

records that Bowman claims would show that he and Wolfe had a

good relationship leading up to Wolfe’s death, despite evidence that

the two had a volatile relationship previously. First, Bowman argues

that counsel should have called a “cell phone expert” and presented

call records to show that he and Wolfe called and texted frequently

in the week before the murder. A cell-phone-forensics expert that

Bowman called at the motion-for-new-trial hearing testified that in

the week leading up to Wolfe’s death, Wolfe’s phone called Bowman’s

phone several times a day for a total of 36 calls; Bowman’s phone

called Wolfe’s phone almost every day for a total of 27 calls; and the
two phones texted several times a day with a total of 179 texts.

Second, Bowman argues that counsel should have introduced cell

phone records showing the contents of texts exchanged between him

and Wolfe. According to Bowman, these records showed that he and

Wolfe made plans together and exchanged friendly, caring, and

comforting messages in the week leading up to Wolfe’s death. And,

Bowman contends, these records showed that Wolfe routinely texted

“Good morning” to people other than Bowman, thus reducing the

probative value of Wolfe texting this message to Bowman shortly

before she was murdered.

We conclude that Bowman has failed to show that counsel was

deficient in failing to call a “cell phone expert” to give testimony as

Bowman describes above or to produce the cell phone records. At the

motion-for-new-trial hearing, counsel testified that the State’s

expert in cell phone forensics had “admitted everything [that

counsel] asked him to admit” on cross-examination and had provided

at trial “all of the information” that counsel would have sought had

he hired his own expert. And, Detective Demeester, the State’s cell-
phone-forensics expert, testified at trial that Bowman and Wolfe’s

phones called over 60 times and texted close to 170 messages,

rendering cumulative the expert testimony and evidence that

Bowman argues counsel should have presented on the frequency of

Bowman’s calls and texts with Wolfe. Moreover, the cell phone

records showing Bowman and Wolfe’s texts are largely cumulative

of other evidence that Bowman and Wolfe appeared to have a good

relationship leading up to the murder, including: Detective

Demeester’s testimony on the number of calls and texts between the

two in the week before the murder; evidence that on the morning of

the murder, Wolfe sent Bowman a positive greeting (“Good

morning”); and evidence that shortly after Jesse noticed Wolfe was

missing, he called Bowman to ask if he had seen her. Lastly, that

the cell phone records showed Wolfe texting “Good morning” to

people other than Bowman, does little to offset the probative value

of Wolfe texting “Good morning” to Bowman’s phone eleven seconds

before it texted the same message to the -7925 phone that tracked

with Wolfe’s phone shortly before she was murdered. It was not
objectively unreasonable for counsel to not present expert testimony

or cell phone records that would have been unhelpful or cumulative

of Detective Demeester’s testimony and the evidence above. See

Patterson v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 176 (2) (f) (875 SE2d 771) (2022) (no

deficiency in counsel’s failure to call witness whose testimony would

have been cumulative); Birdow v. State, 305 Ga. 48, 52 (2) (823 SE2d

736) (2019) (no deficient performance when “trial counsel made a

clear strategic choice not to call Dr. Burton to testify, reasoning that

the same conclusions he would testify to could effectively be drawn

out in the cross-examination of Dr. Reddy”).5

3. Next, Bowman claims that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”)

evidence of Bowman’s prior acts of violence against his ex-wife,

5 Lastly, to the extent Bowman asserts a generalized claim that counsel

was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation,
Bowman has failed to show that counsel performed deficiently. Bowman does
not offer any argument supporting such a generalized claim, and, to the
contrary, counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that, among
other things, he “thoroughly inspected the discovery,” read summaries of
witness statements and examined cell phone records in detail, and spoke with
Bowman multiple times and collected information from witnesses to prepare
for trial.
Bonnie Brewer.6 See Rule 404 (b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in

order to show action in conformity therewith,” but may “be

admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

or absence of mistake or accident.”).

Before trial, the State filed its notice of intent to offer the prior-

acts evidence for purposes of showing intent, motive, or plan. Over

defense counsel’s objections, which he renewed at trial, the trial

court permitted the State to present the prior-acts evidence under

Rule 404 (b) and instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for

the purposes of showing intent, motive, or plan. Brewer then

testified that she had married Bowman in 1986, gave birth to a

daughter about a year later, and divorced him shortly after; that

Bowman would hit her; that he had told her once to not get out of

6 Bowman claims in his appellate briefing that the trial court “erred” in

admitting the Rule 404 (b) evidence. But as we state below, “[o]n appeal, a trial
court’s decision to admit evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) is reviewed
for a clear abuse of discretion.” Brannon v. State, 298 Ga. 601, 606 (4) (783
SE2d 642) (2016).
bed because he had a gun under it; that after the two divorced,

Bowman “wanted [Brewer] to come back,” apologized to her and

promised to not hit her again, but then “hit [her] in [her] face” and

would tell her “nobody else would have [her]”; that once after the

divorce, he choked a man that she was “seeing” and “took [her] kids

and . . . left with them”; and that in another incident after the

divorce, around 1999, Bowman arrived in violation of a restraining

order at Brewer’s house where her boyfriend was also staying, told

her he “just want[ed] to talk to [her],” used a gun to prevent Brewer

from calling 911 and to command her and her boyfriend to enter a

room, and told her boyfriend that he had “better not never catch him

back there again.” The State also introduced a copy of Bowman’s

indictment and sentencing for aggravated assault stemming from

this last incident.7

“On appeal, a trial court’s decision to admit evidence pursuant

to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion.”

7 The defense then tendered a copy of a subsequent pardon issued for the

aggravated assault offense, which the trial court admitted.
Brannon v. State, 298 Ga. 601, 606 (4) (783 SE2d 642) (2016).

“[E]videntiary errors require reversal only if they harm a

defendant’s substantial rights,” and the “test for determining

nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable

that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Pritchett v. State,

314 Ga. 767, 778 (2) (c) (879 SE2d 436) (2022) (citations and

punctuation omitted). “In determining whether the error was

harmless, we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as

we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so.” Jackson v. State,

306 Ga. 69, 80 (2) (c) (829 SE2d 142) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting the prior-acts evidence, we conclude that any

error was harmless. See Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 293-94 (7) (a)

(824 SE2d 346) (2019) (pretermitting whether testimony was

admitted in violation of Rule 404 (b) and stating “we need not decide

whether the evidence was properly admitted, because its admission

was harmless”). To start, the marginal harm of the jury learning of
Bowman’s violence and jealousy against his ex-wife from nearly two

decades ago, was unlikely to have significantly altered the jury’s

perception of Bowman, given that the jury heard substantial other

evidence, unchallenged on appeal, of Bowman’s violence and

jealousy against Wolfe. This evidence included testimony that:

Bowman argued with Wolfe for not holding his hand; he forcefully

grabbed her arm or slapped her when she did not give him the

attention he wanted; Bowman hit Wolfe “right in the eye,” and she

had “[b]lack eyes, busted lips” and bruises on her arms and wrist

while dating Bowman; Wolfe confided in a friend that Bowman had

pushed her down on a bed and choked her, but she was afraid to end

her relationship with him because he had told her “he could do

something to her and get rid of her and . . . nobody would ever prove

anything”; and, after the two terminated their engagement, Wolfe

dated another man and Bowman would stalk Wolfe at stores and

residential areas to the point where her son decided to confront him

to stop. In light of all this testimony of Bowman’s violent, controlling

behavior toward Wolfe, any unfair prejudice from the erroneous
admission of evidence that Bowman behaved similarly toward

another woman decades earlier was very low. Thus, because the

prior-acts evidence was not probative of Bowman’s guilt and was low

in unfair prejudice, it was unlikely to have carried significant

additional weight with the jury. 8 See State v. Williams, 316 Ga. 249,

254-55 (887 SE2d 285) (2023) (evidence that defendant’s

relationship with a woman was extramarital carried “exceedingly

8 Some members of this Court would conclude that the probative value,

if any, of the prior-acts evidence was substantially outweighed by its unfair
prejudice, thus rendering the admission of such evidence a violation of OCGA
§ 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]”). See
Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 479-80 (4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018) (proper admission
of prior-acts evidence under Rule 404 (b) requires that such admission not
violate Rule 403). But even if prior-acts evidence is admitted in violation of
Rule 403, thus rendering its admission error, that does not mean that the error
is per se harmful such that reversal is required. The “test for determining
nonconstitutional harmless error”—an inquiry separate from Rule-403
analysis—“is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to
the verdict.” Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 778 (2) (c) (citation and punctuation omitted).
And here, one reason why it was highly probable that evidence of Bowman’s
prior acts against Brewer did not contribute to the jury’s verdict even if
erroneously admitted, is that the prior-acts evidence was not probative of
Bowman’s guilt and was low in unfair prejudice. Given all the evidence of
Bowman’s prior violence against Wolfe—as well as substantial evidence of
Bowman’s guilt, as we later explain—evidence that he had also been violent
against Brewer did not add much to sway the jury to find him guilty on a basis
other than the unchallenged-on-appeal evidence of his guilt. See Williams, 316
Ga. at 253 (“unfair prejudice” speaks to the capacity of evidence to “lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof specific
to the offense charged” (emphasis added) (citation and punctuation omitted)).
low prejudicial impact” in light of evidence of the “extramarital

nature” of defendant’s relationship with another woman); Young v.

State, 309 Ga. 529, 536-38 (3) (847 SE2d 347) (2020) (concluding that

assumed error in admission of photo showing defendant with a gun

was harmless, in part because “any harmful effect that the [ ] photo

may have had was diminished” given the other evidence “pertaining

to other pictures of [the defendant] with guns”); Rodrigues v. State,

306 Ga. 867, 867 n.1, 870-72 (2) (834 SE2d 59) (2019) (concluding

that assumed error in admitting evidence of separate stabbing

incident occurring about five years before the crimes was harmless,

in part because the “marginal harm” of jury learning that the

defendant had been “previously convicted of involuntary

manslaughter related to a stabbing [was] unlikely to have

substantially impacted the jury’s perception of [him], given that they

were already aware that [he] was incarcerated at the time” he killed

the victim in the present case”).

Moreover, the evidence against Bowman, though

circumstantial, was substantial. As discussed above, the jury heard
ample testimony, unchallenged on appeal, from multiple witnesses

showing that Bowman used forced against Wolfe when he was

jealous, as well as testimony that Wolfe started dating another man

after she terminated her engagement to Bowman and that Bowman

stalked her after the termination. The -7925 phone that exchanged

three calls with Wolfe and pinged the same cell towers and sectors

shortly before she was murdered, and whose last communication

and pinged location were the same as those of Wolfe’s cell phone,

was saved in Wolfe’s contacts as “Roe FS Phone” with “Roe” being

Bowman’s first name and “FS Phone” aligning with the fact that

Bowman stated to officers that he had a “food stamp” phone. Also,

in the weeks leading up to Wolfe’s murder, the cell tower most

frequently used by both the “Roe FS Phone” and by Bowman’s phone

was the same. The morning of the murder, Wolfe’s cell phone texted

the “Roe FS Phone” number “Good morning” only eleven seconds

after texting “Good morning” to Bowman’s phone and not receiving

a reply. Law enforcement found “R” and “O,” the first two letters of

Bowman’s first name, written in blood on Wolfe’s car windshield.
And, as indicated by Bowman’s carrying of a sheath knife and a gun

at the time of his arrest, Bowman had lied to police about not

carrying any weapons, which the jury could have determined

revealed a consciousness of guilt. See Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81,

89 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022) (the fact of “concealment” or

“assumption of a false name . . . is admissible as evidence of

consciousness of guilt for the charged offense, and thus of guilt itself”

(citation and punctuation omitted)); Michael v. State, 335 Ga. App.

579, 585 (1) (782 SE2d 479) (2016) (“The jury . . . could reasonably

infer from [defendant’s] . . . initial lying to the police that [she] was

conscious of her own guilt”).

For all these reasons, it is “highly probable” that any assumed

error in the trial court’s admission of the prior-acts evidence “did not

contribute to the verdict.” Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 778 (2) (c). See

Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 7 (2) (885 SE2d 790) (2023) (any Rule

404 (b) error in admitting evidence of prior crime committed “a long

time ago” was harmless given strong evidence of defendant’s guilt);

Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 487 (4) (c) (819 SE2d 468) (2018) (error
in admitting prior-acts evidence was harmless where jury “was

already aware that [Appellant] had committed other violent crimes”

and where “any prejudice from the evidence that [Appellant] had

committed” additional violent acts was “easily offset by the other

compelling evidence against Appellant”); Douglas v. State, 303 Ga.

178, 182-83 (3) (811 SE2d 337) (2018) (any error in admission of Rule

404 (b) testimony was harmless where evidence of defendant’s guilt

was strong and where other evidence established the same facts

supported by the challenged testimony).

4. Finally, to the extent Bowman claims that he is entitled to a

new trial based on the cumulative prejudice resulting from the trial

court’s error and from his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance, that

claim fails. “At least as to evidentiary issues, this Court must

‘consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court

errors, along with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance

of counsel.’” Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 417 (4) (851 SE2d 541)

(2020) (citation omitted). See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 14 (1) (838

SE2d 808) (2020). Here, even considering the presumed trial court
error in admitting the prior-acts evidence along with the presumed

deficiency in counsel’s failure to present testimony regarding the

two knives, we conclude that given the strength of the evidence

against Bowman, Bowman “has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability that, but for these” two assumed errors, “the outcome of

the proceeding would have been different.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga.

322, 334 (4) (877 SE2d 202) (2022). Thus, we conclude that the

cumulative effect of the assumed errors does not entitle Bowman to

a new trial. See Jennings v. State, 318 Ga. 579, 592-93 (4) (899 SE2d

210) (2024) (combined prejudicial effect of assumed trial court error

and deficiencies by counsel did not warrant new trial where evidence

against defendant was strong); Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 366-67

(7) (846 SE2d 57) (2020) (combined prejudicial effect of assumed trial

court errors and deficiency by counsel did not deprive defendant of

his right to a fair trial where properly admitted evidence of

defendant’s guilt was strong).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

319 Ga. 573
FINAL COPY

S24A0642. BOWMAN v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Appellant Roe Dale Bowman was convicted of malice murder

and other crimes in connection with the death of Tammy Wolfe.1 On

appeal, he argues that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective

on numerous grounds and that the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting evidence of Bowman’s prior acts of violence involving

his ex-wife. For the reasons that follow, his claims fail, so we affirm.

1 The crimes occurred on April 4, 2017. On March 19, 2018, Bowman was

indicted for malice murder; felony murder; two counts of aggravated assault;
and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, in connection with
Wolfe’s death. At a trial in March 2020, the jury found Bowman guilty of all
counts. On March 31, 2020, the trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison
without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), and five years in
prison consecutive to Count 1 for the possession offense (Count 5). The felony
murder count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated
assault counts (Counts 3 and 4) merged into the malice murder count for
sentencing purposes. On April 30, 2020, Bowman filed a motion for new trial
through new counsel. He amended that motion on March 31, 2021. The trial
court held a hearing on the amended motion from August 11 to August 12,
2022, and denied the motion in an order dated September 28, 2023. On October
30, 2023, Bowman timely filed a notice of appeal. This case was docketed to the
term of Court beginning in April 2024 and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
1. The evidence at trial showed the following. For a few years