CourtListener 10680314

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319 Ga. 259
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S24A0158. HARMON v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Shanadore Harmon and Jermaz Lawson got into an argument

that ended with Harmon shooting into the car that Lawson was driv-

ing. The bullet struck and killed Brittany Trantham, who was sit-

ting in the passenger seat. Harmon was convicted of the malice mur-

der of Trantham, the aggravated assault of Lawson, and three fire-

arms offenses.1

1 Trantham was shot on October 24, 2015, and died two days later. On

January 20, 2016, a Richmond County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Harmon with malice murder of Trantham (Count 1), felony murder
of Trantham predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), two counts of posses-
sion of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 3, 5), aggravated
assault of Lawson (Count 4), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
(Count 6). At a jury trial from May 7 to 9, 2018, the jury returned guilty ver-
dicts on all counts. On May 10, 2018, the trial court entered a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), consecutive sen-
tences of five years for each of the firearm convictions (Counts 3, 5, 6), and a
consecutive sentence of 20 years for aggravated assault (Count 4). The felony
murder count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law. New counsel for Har-
mon entered an appearance and timely filed a motion for new trial; Harmon
changed counsel and filed amendments to that motion several times. After a
hearing on June 27, 2022, the trial court denied Harmon’s motion for new trial,
as amended, on June 30, 2022. Harmon timely filed a notice of appeal on July
On appeal, Harmon contends that the evidence was not consti-

tutionally sufficient to convict him of Trantham’s murder or the re-

lated firearms offenses, the trial court erred by denying his motion

for directed verdict on the aggravated assault and firearm offense

related to Lawson, and he received constitutionally ineffective assis-

tance of counsel because his trial counsel did not raise a hearsay

objection to the admission of Lawson’s recorded statement to police.

Each claim fails. The evidence, recounted below, was sufficient to

support each of Harmon’s convictions related to the murder of Tran-

tham and the denial of his motion for directed verdict on the counts

related to the assault of Lawson. Harmon also failed to establish

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the admission

of Lawson’s statement to police, because even putting this statement

aside, the convictions were supported by strong evidence, including

testimony from two witnesses who saw Harmon stand behind Tran-

tham’s car (which Lawson was driving) and then heard gunshots, as

14, 2022. His appeal was docketed to the term of court beginning in December
2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2
well as evidence that Harmon was found soon after the shooting

with the gun that fired both the fatal bullet and all the bullets col-

lected from the crime scene. So we affirm Harmon’s convictions and

sentence.

1. The evidence at trial showed the following.2

On the night of October 24, 2015, Harmon, Lawson, Trantham,

and others went to the Limelite Café in Richmond County, where

Harmon and Lawson got into an argument. Their argument got so

“heated” that security told their group to leave. Lawson left with

Trantham and drove her car, Harmon left in another car, and their

group eventually met near Lawson’s grandmother’s home on Cun-

ningham Drive.

Trantham remained in the passenger seat of the parked car the

whole time she and Lawson were at Cunningham Drive that night.

Lawson, however, got out of the car, and he and Harmon resumed

2 Because this case involves a question of prejudice under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), we recount the
trial evidence in some detail, weighing the evidence as we would expect rea-
sonable jurors to have done rather than only in the light most favorable to the
verdict. See Wood v. State, 316 Ga. 811, 812 (1) n.2 (890 SE2d 716) (2023).
3
their argument. Harmon pulled out a gun and was “waving it

around” during the argument, and the argument eventually esca-

lated into a fistfight.

Tammy Lawson, who was related to both Harmon and Lawson,

testified at trial that she was asleep at the Cunningham Drive home

and woke up when she heard arguing. She looked outside and saw

that Lawson and Harmon were arguing, and that Harmon had a

gun. She saw “a couple people” other than Harmon with guns but

did not think Lawson had one. Tammy went outside and told Law-

son to leave. He left, but came back less than five minutes later and

resumed arguing with Harmon.

Tammy testified at trial that she did not see Harmon fire the

gun, but she said that “[h]e was waving it around then he fired [it].”

In interviews recorded with police on the night of the shooting,

Tammy first told police that she woke up to loud music, heard two

gunshots, and went to the door and saw two cars driving by at a fast

speed. But once she and the officer resumed the interview outside

4
the presence of other family members, she told police the same ver-

sion of events she testified to at trial: that, while Harmon and Law-

son were arguing, she saw Harmon walk to the back of Trantham’s

car (which Lawson was driving) and “heard” him “fire” two shots. In

another interview recorded at the police station later that night,

Tammy told police that Harmon shot at the car twice and appeared

to be aiming for the trunk.

Lawson testified that he was standing by the driver’s side door

of the car when he heard gunshots from behind him, and he then got

into the car and drove away.

As Lawson drove toward home, he tried to get Trantham’s at-

tention, nudged her, and discovered that she was bleeding and un-

responsive. He immediately drove her to the hospital, where doctors

determined that Trantham’s wounds were fatal and placed her on

life support until her organs could be donated. She died two days

later.

Lawson spoke to police about the shooting twice: first after

bringing Trantham to the hospital, and again later that morning at

5
the police station. In the police station interview, Lawson said that

the night before, he and Harmon had been “talking trash” at Lime-

lite. Later, he and Trantham left Limelite and went back to his

grandmother’s home on Cunningham Drive. Harmon was already

there and stood outside Lawson’s front passenger door with a pistol

when Lawson got out of the car. Harmon’s pistol fell, and Harmon

picked it up and put it in his waistband. Harmon then “swung” at

Lawson, and Lawson fought back. During the fight, Harmon pulled

his pistol out more than once. Eventually, someone told Lawson he

needed to leave, and he did. Harmon “started shooting” and Lawson

heard two gunshots while he was still outside of the car and a third

shot as he was driving away. He drove toward home and, when he

tried to get Trantham’s attention, her head fell to the side, and he

saw blood, so he drove her to the hospital.

Meanwhile, back at Cunningham Drive, Tammy saw Harmon

“walk[ ] up the street” as Lawson drove away. A sheriff’s deputy,

responding to a report of shots fired on Cunningham Drive, saw a

man duck behind a tree, so he stopped, and he found Harmon on his

6
hands and knees under the tree with a pistol. The officer took a

Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter pistol from Harmon and detained

him.

After investigators connected the report of shots fired on Cun-

ningham Drive with Trantham’s shooting, Harmon’s hands were

swabbed for gunshot residue and his clothes were collected and

tested for gunshot residue. No gunshot residue was detected on the

swabs from his hands, and one particle characteristic of gunshot res-

idue was found on his shirt.

The autopsy and other forensic evidence showed that a bullet

passed through the back window of the car Trantham had been sit-

ting in, into the headrest of her seat, and through her neck, where

the bullet severed her spinal cord and lodged in her tongue. The

medical examiner testified that this gunshot wound was the sole

cause of Trantham’s death, and the fatal bullet was removed from

her tongue and submitted to the GBI for testing. That bullet, as well

as shell casings found at Cunningham Drive, were matched to the

firearm police found Harmon with when he was detained soon after

7
the shooting. The firearms expert also concluded that a bullet found

in the spare tire of Trantham’s car was consistent with being fired

from the same type of firearm, but she could not determine if the

bullet was fired from Harmon’s specific gun because the bullet was

damaged.

2. Harmon contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sup-

port his convictions for malice murder, possession of a firearm dur-

ing that crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon be-

cause the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that

Harmon, and not Lawson or someone else, fired the fatal shot. Har-

mon also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for directed verdict as to the aggravated assault against Lawson and

possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime because

there was no evidence that Lawson was ever in fear of being shot.

(a) We evaluate a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict. See Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 415 (2) (a) (897 SE2d 856)

(2024) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt

8
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). Viewing the evidence in that light, we

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found be-

yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crimes

of which he was convicted. See Lee, 318 Ga. at 415 (2) (a). In doing

so, “we leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies

in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences

to be derived from the facts.” Id. at 415-416 (2) (a) (citation and punc-

tuation omitted).

Applying that standard here, the evidence summarized above

and viewed in the proper light was sufficient for a rational trier of

fact to find Harmon guilty of each of the offenses he was convicted

of. As to malice murder, both Lawson and Tammy saw Harmon with

a gun when he was arguing with Lawson and heard gunshots while

Harmon stood behind Trantham’s car. Tammy also saw Harmon

shoot at the back of the car where Trantham sat.3 And, soon after

3 Harmon contends that he was not the shooter and does not specifically

9
the shooting, police found Harmon hiding behind a tree nearby with

the gun that fired the fatal bullet, and forensic testing showed that

all the shell casings and bullets collected during the investigation

were or may have been fired from that same gun. See Morris v. State,

317 Ga. 87, 92-93 (2) (891 SE2d 859) (2023) (affirming malice mur-

der conviction where the evidence authorized the jury to conclude

that the defendant fired the fatal bullet, as the evidence showed he

possessed at least two guns on the night of the shooting, including

one from which the fatal bullet could have been fired, and his act of

shooting at the victim’s van was the proximate cause of the victim’s

death).

This evidence was also sufficient to support Harmon’s convic-

tion for possession of a firearm during the commission of malice

night, their physical altercation at Cunningham Drive, and evidence that Har-
mon shot at the car as Lawson entered it. Under the doctrine of transferred
intent, a person who intends to, for example, shoot one person and uninten-
tionally strikes another cannot avoid wrongdoing by claiming that he did not
intend to shoot that victim; his intent is transferred from the person he in-
tended to shoot to the person whom he actually shot. See Smith v. State, 315
Ga. 357, 364-365 (4) (882 SE2d 289) (2022). So the element of malice is sup-
ported by the evidence that Harmon intended to shoot and kill Lawson, and
that intent was transferred to Trantham, whom Harmon actually shot. Id.
10
murder. See Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 221 (3) (576 SE2d 886) (2003)

(“Evidence that the defendant . . . carried or was within arm’s length

of a weapon during the commission of a crime authorizes a finding

of guilt” for possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime).

Combined with the evidence of Harmon’s three earlier felony convic-

tions,4 this evidence also supported the conviction for possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon. See Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 165

(10) (c) (635 SE2d 740) (2006) (certified copies of prior felony convic-

tion combined with evidence supporting convictions for malice mur-

der and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime were

sufficient to support conviction for possession of a firearm by a con-

victed felon).

(b) The standard for review of the constitutional sufficiency of

the evidence also governs our review of the denial of a motion for

directed verdict. See Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199, 206 (2) (897 SE2d

760) (2024).

4 The State introduced certified copies of Harmon’s three prior felony

convictions, which were admitted into evidence during the bifurcated portion
of the trial.
11
To convict someone of aggravated assault (or deny them a di-

rected verdict on that count), as relevant here, the State must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a deadly weapon

“to commit an act which places another person in reasonable appre-

hension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” Jackson v. State,

315 Ga. 543, 549 (1) (a) (883 SE2d 815) (2023) (citation and punctu-

ation omitted). See OCGA §§ 16-5-20; 16-5-21. Whether the victim

was placed “in reasonable apprehension of injury” is a question of

fact, and “[t]he presence of a deadly weapon would normally place a

victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently.” Jack-

son, 315 Ga. at 549 (1) (a) (quoting Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622,

626 (2) (a) (791 SE2d 61) (2016)).

The evidence at trial authorized the jury to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that Lawson was placed in reasonable apprehen-

sion of receiving a violent injury when he heard gunshots from be-

hind him after seeing Harmon with a gun. See Jackson, 315 Ga. at

549 (1) (a). This, combined with the evidence that Harmon was the

12
shooter, which we discussed in Division 2 (a), was sufficient to sup-

port the denial of a motion for directed verdict on the aggravated

assault count and, ultimately, to support Harmon’s conviction for

that crime. See, e.g., Gobert v. State, 311 Ga. 305, 309-310 (1) (b)

(857 SE2d 647) (2021) (sufficient evidence to support an aggravated

assault conviction where there was evidence that the defendant

fired multiple shots into the car where the victim was riding); Pyatt

v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 742-743 & n.1, 744-745 (1) (784 SE2d 759)

(2016) (sufficient evidence to support aggravated assault convictions

where defendant and others shot into the car where the victims were

riding). This evidence was also sufficient to support the denial of a

motion for directed verdict on, and a conviction for, possession of a

firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault. See Hill,

276 Ga. at 221 (3).

3. Harmon contends that his trial counsel provided constitu-

tionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of

Lawson’s police statement. He asserts that Lawson’s police state-

ment was hearsay that did not fall within any exception, and he was

13
prejudiced by its admission because the statement served only to

improperly bolster Lawson’s and Tammy’s trial testimony.5

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a de-

fendant must show that his counsel’s performance both was defi-

cient (objectively unreasonable under the circumstances) and caused

him prejudice (shown by establishing a reasonable probability that

the result of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s de-

ficient performance). See Lee, 318 Ga. at 420 (6) (citing Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984); Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 221 (2) (892 SE2d 744) (2023)).

When evaluating whether an appellant has established prejudice

5 Harmon also takes issue with the wording of several questions the

State asked Lawson on cross-examination about whether Lawson told police
that he saw Harmon fire the gun (which Lawson denied saying). Harmon con-
tends that the State asked these questions to “mislead” the court into admit-
ting the challenged recording of Lawson’s interview with police as a prior in-
consistent statement. But Harmon does not appear to claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for not objecting to these questions. In any event, for the rea-
sons we discuss later in this opinion, Harmon has not shown that he was prej-
udiced by the admission of Lawson’s police interview, during which Lawson
told police he saw Harmon with a gun and later heard gunshots but did not say
he saw Harmon fire the gun.
14
under Strickland, “we review the record de novo and weigh the evi-

dence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done” rather

than in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Wood v. State,

316 Ga. 811, 812 (1) n.2 (890 SE2d 716) (2023) (quoting Draughn v.

State, 311 Ga. 378, 382-383 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 8) (2021)).

Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by fail-

ing to object to the admission of Lawson’s statement to police, Har-

mon has not established that he was prejudiced by that failure. See

Lee, 318 Ga. at 420 (6). Even without Lawson’s statement to the po-

lice, the evidence against Harmon was still very strong. Lawson tes-

tified that he saw Harmon with a gun when they were arguing and,

even though he did not see Harmon fire the gun, he heard gunshots

from behind as he entered the driver’s side of the car. Tammy also

testified that immediately before shots were fired, she saw Harmon

with a gun and saw him walk to the back of Trantham’s car as Law-

son entered the driver’s seat. Although it is unclear whether Tammy

15
only heard the gunshots or also saw them,6 her testimony—that

Harmon had a gun and was standing behind Trantham’s car when

gunshots rang out—was largely consistent with Lawson’s testimony.

Their testimony about the shooting was further supported by evi-

dence that police found Harmon hiding near the crime scene with a

gun soon after the shooting, and forensic evidence that the fatal bul-

let, and all the bullets and shell casings collected at the crime scene,

matched Harmon’s gun. Given this evidence, Harmon has not estab-

lished a reasonable probability of a different result absent trial coun-

sel’s assumed error of not objecting to the admission of Lawson’s

statement to police.7 See Henderson v. State, 304 Ga. 733, 738 (3) (d)

6 Tammy testified that she did not see Harmon fire the gun but saw him

“waving it around then he fired [it].” But she told police during her third inter-
view on the night of the shooting that Harmon shot at the car twice and ap-
peared to be aiming for the trunk.
7 A word about preserved hearsay objections to the admission of prior

statements to police that were “consistent” with the speaker’s trial testimony
but were not “prior consistent statements” within the meaning of the Evidence
Code. We have evaluated whether admitting such statements was harmless
error by disregarding both the inadmissible hearsay statement and the trial
testimony that the improperly admitted hearsay statement repeated, and then
applying the standard for non-constitutional harmless error. See, e.g., Allen v.
State, 315 Ga. 524, 535 (5) (883 SE2d 746) (2023); McGarity v. State, 311 Ga.
158, 167-168 (3) (856 SE2d 241) (2021); Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 746, 751 (2) (b)

16
(822 SE2d 228) (2018) (concluding that defendant failed to establish

Strickland prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to hearsay be-

cause, given the strong evidence against him, he failed to show that

there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial

would have been different if the jury had not heard the hearsay). See

(838 SE2d 263) (2020) (decided under the old Evidence Code). We have ex-
plained that whether admitting the hearsay statement was harmless error de-
pends on whether it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
jury’s guilty verdict,” so we do not “look to [the witness’s] improperly bolstered
testimony to show that the bolstering error was harmless.” Cowart v. State,
294 Ga. 333, 341-342 (4) (b) (751 SE2d 399) (2013) (citation and punctuation
omitted). In doing so, we may have conflated the improper admission of hear-
say statements that repeated the live witness’s testimony with “bolstering”—
a term that more precisely describes the scenario of one witness vouching for
the credibility of the other. See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 460-461 (2) (b)
(807 SE2d 369) (2017) (“When a witness’s statement does not directly address
the credibility of another witness . . . there is no improper bolstering.”). But we
need not decide here whether this approach is correct, because Harmon’s ar-
gument about admitting this prior statement is made as part of an ineffective
assistance claim under Strickland. Under Strickland’s prejudice standard, we
ask if the defendant has established a “reasonable probability” that the result
of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). Here, had Harmon’s counsel raised a
hearsay objection when the State moved to admit Lawson’s police interview
and the objection were sustained, the jury would not have heard Lawson’s po-
lice interview. But the jury still would have heard Lawson’s and Tammy’s live
testimony and the evidence that Harmon was found with the gun that matched
all the bullets at the crime scene, all of which, as discussed above, was very
strong evidence of his guilt.
17
also Wood, 316 Ga. at 812 (1) n.2; Morris, 317 Ga. at 92-93 (2); Go-

bert, 311 Ga. at 309 (1) (a); Pyatt, 298 Ga. at 742-743 & n.1, 744-745

(1); Walker, 281 Ga. at 165 (10) (c).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided June 11, 2024.

Murder. Richmond Superior Court. Before Judge Jolly.

Lucy D. Roth, for appellant.

Jared T. Williams, District Attorney, John M. Kraft, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,

Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Eric C. Peters, Assistant Attor-

ney General, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 11, 2024