JOHN DA GROSA SMITH v. RYAN MILLSAP

319 Ga. 175
FINAL COPY

S24C0302. SMITH et al. v. MILLSAP et al.

ORDER OF THE COURT.

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in
this case.

All the Justices concur.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice, concurring.

John Smith’s certiorari petition raises an issue of possible

gravity: whether the broad power of trial courts to order disputed

funds to be paid into the registry of the court pending resolution of

the dispute includes an equally broad power to disburse funds from

the registry before the dispute has been resolved. But this is an issue

of gravity warranting our review in this case only if Smith is correct

that the Court of Appeals actually held that trial courts have such

broad power. He is not.

Although some text in the Court of Appeals’s decision might be

read as Smith does, such a reading requires taking that text out of

the narrow context of the long and complex procedural posture of
this case. That makes all the difference. “[A] decision’s holding is

limited to the factual context of the case being decided and the issues

that context necessarily raises. Language that sounds like a holding

— but actually exceeds the scope of the case’s factual context — is

not a holding no matter how much it sounds like one.” Schoicket v.

State, 312 Ga. 825, 832 (1) (865 SE2d 170) (2021) (punctuation

omitted) (quoting Ga. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency v. City of Sandy

Springs, 337 Ga. App. 340, 340 n.1 (788 SE2d 74) (2016)); see also

American Anesthesiology of Ga. v. Northside Hosp., 362 Ga. App.

350, 357 (1) (867 SE2d 531) (2021) (citing the quoted language as

support for its conclusion that a previous decision “must be read as

limited by its facts”).

So understood, the holding of the Court of Appeals was simply

that the trial court had authority to disburse the funds at issue given

the specific circumstances of this case. This narrow holding was

plainly correct. Accordingly, I concur in the denial of Smith’s petition

for a writ of certiorari.

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I am authorized to state that Justice McMillian joins in this

concurral.

Ordered May 29, 2024.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 369 Ga. App.

430.

Blaska Holm, Jeffrey T. Holm, for appellants.

Gamble Clark, David T. Houtsma, Aaron M. Clark; Krevolin &

Horst, Halsey G. Knapp, Jessica Cino, for appellees.

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Case No. S24C0302

May 29, 2024

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

JOHN DA GROSA SMITH et al. v. RYAN MILLSAP et al.

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in
this case.

All the Justices concur.

Court of Appeals Case No. A23A0651

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk
PETERSON, Presiding Justice, concurring.

John Smith’s cert petition raises an issue of possible gravity:

whether the broad power of trial courts to order disputed funds to

be paid into the registry of the court pending resolution of the

dispute includes an equally broad power to disburse funds from the

registry before the dispute has been resolved. But this is an issue of

gravity warranting our review in this case only if Smith is correct

that the Court of Appeals actually held that trial courts have such

broad power. He is not.

Although some text in the Court of Appeals’s decision might be

read as Smith does, such a reading requires taking that text out of

the narrow context of the long and complex procedural posture of

this case. That makes all the difference. “[A] decision’s holding is

limited to the factual context of the case being decided and the issues

that context necessarily raises. Language that sounds like a holding

— but actually exceeds the scope of the case’s factual context — is

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not a holding no matter how much it sounds like one.” Schoicket v.

State, 312 Ga. 825, 832 (1) (865 SE2d 170) (2021) (quoting Ga.

Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency v. City of Sandy Springs, 337 Ga. App.

340, 340 n.1 (788 SE2d 74) (2016) (citation and punctuation

omitted)); see also Am. Anesthesiology of Ga., LLC v. Northside

Hosp., Inc., 362 Ga. App. 350, 357 (1) (867 SE2d 531) (2021) (citing

the quoted language as support for its conclusion that a previous

decision “must be read as limited by its facts”).

So understood, the holding of the Court of Appeals was simply

that the trial court had authority to disburse the funds at issue given

the specific circumstances of this case. This narrow holding was

plainly correct. Accordingly, I concur in the denial of Smith’s petition

for a writ of certiorari.

I am authorized to state that Justice McMillian joins in this

concurral.

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