CourtListener 10680431

Full text

321 Ga. 696
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S24G1246. DATES et al. v. CITY OF ATLANTA.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Kierra Dates filed an action against the City of Atlanta (“the

City”) after her minor son was injured on City property. Prior to

filing suit and within the time required by law, Dates sent an ante

litem notice to the City, see OCGA § 36-33-5 (“municipal ante litem

notice statute”), claiming a loss in a nonspecific amount. She later

provided a supplemental ante litem notice outside the time required

by statute claiming a loss of $1,000,000. After the trial court

dismissed Dates’s complaint for failure to comply with the

requirements of the municipal ante litem notice statute, Dates

appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Dates’s

first notice was not specific enough to satisfy the municipal ante

litem notice statute. It also held that Dates’s second notice was

untimely because the tolling provision for actions brought by minors

did not apply to municipal ante litem notices. See OCGA § 9-3-90
(b). We granted certiorari to consider whether the tolling provision

for actions brought by minors applies to the municipal ante litem

notice statute1 and conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly

determined that the minor tolling provision does not apply to OCGA

§ 36-33-5.

1. On June 1, 2020, Dates’s eight-year-old son, J. D., was

playing at Howell Park — owned by the City — when a rotten tree

branch fell and injured his leg. On June 12, 2020, Dates sent an ante

litem notice to the City, advising it of her intent to assert a claim

and stating that “[t]he amount of the loss claimed is in excess of

$500,000.” Over a year later, on July 9, 2021, Dates sent a

supplemental ante litem notice stating that “[t]he amount of the loss

claimed is $1,000,000.” Dates then filed her complaint on November

23, 2021.

The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Dates’s first notice did

1 In granting certiorari, we posed the following question: Is the time for

filing an ante litem notice under OCGA § 36-33-5 subject to tolling under
OCGA § 9-3-90 (b), such that the plaintiff’s supplemental ante litem notice was
timely? Oral argument was held on May 14, 2025.
2
not comply with the specificity requirements of the municipal ante

litem notice statute, OCGA § 36-33-5 (e),2 and that her second notice

was untimely under OCGA § 36-33-5 (b).3 In opposition to the

motion, Dates asserted, in part, that the time limit to submit an ante

litem notice should be tolled under OCGA § 9-3-90 (b)4 — because

her son was a minor at the time of the incident — and that,

accordingly, her supplemental notice complied with the timing

requirements of the statute.

On September 29, 2022, the trial court granted the City’s

2 OCGA § 36-33-5 (e) provides, in relevant part: “The description of the

extent of the injury required in subsection (b) of this Code section shall include
the specific amount of monetary damages being sought from the municipal
corporation. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
3 OCGA § 36-33-5 (b) provides:

Within six months of the happening of the event upon which
a claim against a municipal corporation is predicated, the person .
. . having the claim shall present the claim in writing to the
governing authority of the municipal corporation for adjustment,
stating the time, place, and extent of the injury, as nearly as
practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury. No action
shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal
corporation until the cause of action therein has first been
presented to the governing authority for adjustment.
(Emphasis added.)
4 OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) provides, in relevant part: “[I]ndividuals who are

less than 18 years of age when a cause of action accrues shall be entitled to the
same time after he or she reaches the age of 18 years to bring an action as is
prescribed for other persons.”
3
motion to dismiss, concluding that Dates’s first ante litem notice

failed to state the amount sought with sufficient specificity and that

the amendment could not correct the defect because it was untimely;

Dates appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,

holding, in relevant part, that the time for filing an ante litem notice

under OCGA § 36-33-5 is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-90

(b), relying primarily on Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale, 308 Ga.

210 (839 SE2d 541) (2020). See Dates v. City of Atlanta, 371 Ga. App.

824, 825 (1) (903 SE2d 289) (2024). In Ragsdale, this Court

concluded that “[a]s the ante litem notice requirement of [the

Georgia Tort Claims Act,] OCGA § 50-21-26[,] is not a statute of

limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA §

9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem

notice period.” 308 Ga. at 213. The Court of Appeals then extended

the “rationale” of Ragsdale to OCGA § 36-33-5.5 See Dates, 371 Ga.

5 Although it is true that, in Ragsdale, we declined to resolve the question

of whether OCGA § 36-33-5 is subject to tolling, we explained that we did so

4
App. at 825-26 (1).

In so doing, the Court of Appeals disapproved a number of its

cases in which it had held that an ante litem notice is a statute of

limitation that is subject to tolling, noting that in Ragsdale, this

Court clarified “that an ante litem notice is not a statute of

limitation and that Barrett’s holding [a Court of Appeals decision] to

the contrary was implicitly overruled long ago by its decision in City

of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635 (452 SE2d 488) (1994).”6 Dates,

371 Ga. App. at 826 (1).

2. In considering whether the time for presenting an ante litem

notice under OCGA § 36-33-5 can be tolled under the minor tolling

provision, OCGA § 9-3-90,7 we start by analyzing the text of the

because that issue “[was] not before us” and that “we leave that question to a
case that squarely presents it.” Id. at 215 n.9.
6 The Court of Appeals disapproved of Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga. App. 544

(533 SE2d 109) (2000); Jacobs v. Littleton, 241 Ga. App. 403 (525 SE2d 433)
(1999); Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga. App. 234 (257 SE2d 209) (1979); Barnum v.
Martin, 135 Ga. App. 712 (219 SE2d 341) (1975); and City of Barnesville v.
Powell, 124 Ga. App. 132 (183 SE2d 55) (1971). See Dates, 371 Ga. App. at 826
(1) n.6.
7 We note that we did not grant certiorari as to whether Dates’s first ante

litem notice – claiming an amount of loss “in excess of $500,000” – complied
with the requirements of OCGA § 36-33-5 (e). Thus, in analyzing the tolling

5
relevant statutes. “When we consider the meaning of a statute, we

must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and

said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751

SE2d 337) (2013) (cleaned up). “To that end, we must afford the

statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the

statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read

the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an

ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. at 172-73 (1)

(a) (cleaned up).

With these basic principles in mind, we turn to the text of the

municipal ante litem notice statute. The plain language of OCGA §

36-33-5 (b) says that an injured party should provide notice to a

municipality “[w]ithin six months of the happening of the event upon

which a claim against a municipal corporation is predicated.”

Nothing in the statute addresses whether any tolling provision

applies to extend the time to present a claim to a municipality.

issue on review before us, we will assume without deciding that Dates’s first
notice was ineffective.
6
This absence is particularly notable when the municipal ante

litem notice statute is considered in its relevant context. Another

statute within the same title of the Georgia Code (“Local

Government”) — OCGA § 36-11-1 — governs the ante litem notice

requirement for losses involving counties. The county ante litem

statute explicitly provides: “All claims against counties must be

presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or

the same are barred, provided that minors or other persons laboring

under disabilities shall be allowed 12 months after the removal of the

disability to present their claims.” (Emphasis added.) Id. This shows

that the General Assembly knows how to carve out an ante litem

notice exception for minors, yet it chose not to do so in the municipal

ante litem notice statute. See State v. Wierson, 321 Ga. 597, 600 (2)

(a) (___ SE2d ___) (2025) (considering the insanity-defense statutes’

relevant contexts and noting that the General Assembly chose to

include explicit exceptions in other adjacent Code sections but did

not do so for the insanity-defense statutes). And as we have recently

explained, “[g]enerally, when two statutes deal with the same

7
subject matter, are grouped together, and use largely the same

language, but one includes an additional provision that the other

does not, this is strong evidence that the omission was intentional.”

Id. at 601-02 (2) (a). This textual difference supports a conclusion

that the minor tolling provision does not apply to OCGA § 36-33-5.

The other relevant statute — the minor tolling provision in

OCGA § 9-3-90 — also does not say whether it applies to ante litem

notice requirements like OCGA § 36-33-5. OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) states:

Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 9-3-
33.1 [relating to childhood sexual abuse claims],
individuals who are less than 18 years of age when a
cause of action accrues shall be entitled to the same time
after he or she reaches the age of 18 years to bring an
action as is prescribed for other persons.

Dates argues that subsection (b) refers to extending the time for

minors to “bring an action” to after the minor reaches the age of 18

such that the minor “shall be entitled to the same time . . . as is

prescribed for other persons.” And under OCGA § 36-33-5 (b), “[n]o

action shall be entertained . . . until the cause of action therein has

first been presented.” So it can be argued that the presentment

requirement is a condition precedent to “bring[ing] an action” such
8
that the tolling statute should apply.

However, we note that OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) refers to extending

the time for “bring[ing] an action” and OCGA § 36-33-5 addresses

when an action “shall be entertained.” This distinction suggests that

tolling refers to the individual’s time to bring the action, whereas

the municipal ante litem notice statute addresses when a court can

“entertain” an action. These distinct terms support the conclusion

that the minor tolling statute and the municipal ante litem notice

statute involve different parts of the litigation process, such that the

minor tolling statute does not apply to the municipal ante litem

notice statute.

Ragsdale is instructive on how to resolve this textual question.

In Ragsdale, we considered whether the time for filing an ante litem

notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1),

was subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, which provides for

tolling of “[t]he running of the period of limitations” when the tort

arises from a crime. 308 Ga. at 211. We explained that the statutory

reference to “the period of limitations” was to statutes of limitation

9
and that ante litem notice provisions act as a “condition precedent”

for bringing suit, rather than as a statute of limitation subject to

tolling under the criminal tolling statute. Id. at 212 (relying on

Maxwell, 264 Ga. at 636, where we held that the municipal ante

litem notice statute is a “condition precedent to bringing suit against

a municipal corporation” and “not itself a six-month statute of

limitations”).

In addition, we pointed out that “[t]he General Assembly could

have expressly provided for such tolling, as it did . . . in the case of

the ante litem notice requirement applicable to actions against

counties, but it did not do so. Compare OCGA § 36-11-1.” Ragsdale,

308 Ga. at 213. And we rejected Ragsdale’s argument that the

General Assembly acquiesced in a long line of Court of Appeals cases

holding that the tolling statutes apply to ante litem notice

requirements. Id. at 215. Ultimately, we concluded that because

OCGA § 9-3-99, by its own terms, only applied to toll statutes of

limitation, “the time for filing an ante litem notice under OCGA §

50-21-26 (a) (1) is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99.” Id. at

10
215.

We follow the reasoning in Ragsdale to reach a similar

conclusion in this case. The minor tolling provision, OCGA § 9-3-90

(b), refers to extending the “time . . . to bring an action.” In Ragsdale

we explained that “[a] statute of limitation has as its purpose the

limiting of the time period in which an action may be brought” and

described it “as a rule limiting the time in which a party may bring

an action for a right which has already accrued.” Ragsdale, 308 Ga.

at 211-12. Thus, we conclude that OCGA § 9-3-90 (b)’s extension of

the “time . . . to bring an action” is referring to tolling statutes of

limitation. Because we have held in Maxwell, 264 Ga. at 636, that

OCGA § 36-33-5 is not a statute of limitation but rather a condition

precedent to bringing an action, it follows that OCGA § 9-3-90 (b)

does not apply to toll the time in which a minor must provide an ante

litem notice to a municipality.8 See Ragsdale, 308 Ga. at 213 (“As

8 Dates also argues that because the General Assembly acquiesced by

inaction to the “settled construction” in Court of Appeals decisions that have
long applied the tolling statutes to OCGA § 36-33-5, we should also follow those
now-overruled Court of Appeals decisions. A similar argument was made and

11
the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a

statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as

OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante

litem notice period.”). Because Dates’s supplemental ante litem

notice was untimely and was not tolled by the minor tolling

provision, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in

affirming the dismissal of the case.

Judgment affirmed. Peterson, C. J., Warren, P. J., and Bethel,
Ellington, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ., concur.

rejected in Ragsdale, and we reject Dates’s arguments here for the same
reasons. See Ragsdale, 308 Ga. at 215 & n.8 (Court of Appeals decisions in
contravention of Maxwell, which “implicitly disapproved Barrett’s conclusion
that an ante litem notice requirement is a statute of limitation,” “ha[ve] not,
by any stretch, become a settled construction of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a)”).
12
Decided June 10, 2025.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 371 Ga. App.

824.

Sexton Weldon Law Firm, Jonathan P. Sexton, Jacob A.

Weldon, for appellants.

Robert D. Steinberg, Tracey L. Hackett, Mohamad P. Nielsen,

for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 10, 2025

S24G1246. DATES et al. v. CITY OF ATLANTA.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Kierra Dates filed an action against the City of Atlanta (“the

City”) after her minor son was injured on City property. Prior to

filing suit and within the time required by law, Dates sent an ante

litem notice to the City, see OCGA § 36-33-5 (“municipal ante litem

notice statute”), claiming a loss in a nonspecific amount. She later

provided a supplemental ante litem notice outside the time required

by statute claiming a loss of $1,000,000. After the trial court

dismissed Dates’s complaint for failure to comply with the

requirements of the municipal ante litem notice statute, Dates

appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Dates’s

first notice was not specific enough to satisfy the municipal ante

litem notice statute. It also held that Dates’s second notice was
untimely because the tolling provision for actions brought by minors

did not apply to municipal ante litem notices. See OCGA § 9-3-90

(b). We granted certiorari to consider whether the tolling provision

for actions brought by minors applies to the municipal ante litem

notice statute1 and conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly

determined that the minor tolling provision does not apply to OCGA

§ 36-33-5.

1. On June 1, 2020, Dates’s eight-year-old son, J. D., was

playing at Howell Park – owned by the City – when a rotten tree

branch fell and injured his leg. On June 12, 2020, Dates sent an ante

litem notice to the City, advising it of her intent to assert a claim

and stating that “[t]he amount of the loss claimed is in excess of

$500,000.” Over a year later, on July 9, 2021, Dates sent a

supplemental ante litem notice stating that “[t]he amount of the loss

claimed is $1,000,000.” Dates then filed her complaint on November

1 In granting certiorari, we posed the following question: Is the time for

The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Dates’s first notice did

not comply with the specificity requirements of the municipal ante

litem notice statute, OCGA § 36-33-5 (e),2 and that her second notice

was untimely under OCGA § 36-33-5 (b).3 In opposition to the

motion, Dates asserted, in part, that the time limit to submit an ante

litem notice should be tolled under OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) 4 – because her

son was a minor at the time of the incident – and that, accordingly,

2 OCGA § 36-33-5 (e) provides, in relevant part: “The description of the

Within six months of the happening of the event upon which a
claim against a municipal corporation is predicated, the person . .
. having the claim shall present the claim in writing to the
governing authority of the municipal corporation for adjustment,
stating the time, place, and extent of the injury, as nearly as
practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury. No action
shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal
corporation until the cause of action therein has first been
presented to the governing authority for adjustment.

(Emphasis added.)
4 OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) provides, in relevant part: “[I]ndividuals who are

less than 18 years of age when a cause of action accrues shall be entitled to the
same time after he or she reaches the age of 18 years to bring an action as is
prescribed for other persons.”
3
her supplemental notice complied with the timing requirements of

the statute.

On September 29, 2022, the trial court granted the City’s

motion to dismiss, concluding that Dates’s first ante litem notice

failed to state the amount sought with sufficient specificity and that

the amendment could not correct the defect because it was untimely;

Dates appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,

holding, in relevant part, that the time for filing an ante litem notice

under OCGA § 36-33-5 is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-90

(b), relying primarily on Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale, 308 Ga.

210 (839 SE2d 541) (2020). See Dates v. City of Atlanta, 371 Ga. App.

824, 825 (1) (903 SE2d 289) (2024). In Ragsdale, this Court

concluded that “[a]s the ante litem notice requirement of [the

Georgia Tort Claims Act,] OCGA § 50-21-26[,] is not a statute of

limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA §

9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem

notice period.” 308 Ga. at 213. The Court of Appeals then extended

4
the “rationale” of Ragsdale to OCGA § 36-33-5.5 See Dates, 371 Ga.

App. at 825-26 (1).

In so doing, the Court of Appeals disapproved a number of its

cases in which it had held that an ante litem notice is a statute of

limitations that is subject to tolling, noting that in Ragsdale, this

Court clarified “that an ante litem notice is not a statute of

limitation and that Barrett’s holding [a Court of Appeals’s decision]

to the contrary was implicitly overruled long ago by its decision in

City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635 (452 SE2d 488) (1994).”6

Dates, 371 Ga. App. at 826 (1).

2. In considering whether the time for presenting an ante litem

notice under OCGA § 36-33-5 can be tolled under the minor tolling

5 Although it is true that, in Ragsdale, we declined to resolve the question

of whether OCGA § 36-33-5 is subject to tolling, we explained that we did so
because that issue “[was] not before us” and that “we leave that question to a
case that squarely presents it.” Id. at 215 n.9.
6 The Court of Appeals disapproved of Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga. App. 544

(533 SE2d 109) (2000); Jacobs v. Littleton, 241 Ga. App. 403 (525 SE2d 433)
(1999); Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga. App. 234 (257 SE2d 209) (1979); Barnum v.
Martin, 135 Ga. App. 712 (219 SE2d 341) (1975); and City of Barnesville v.
Powell, 124 Ga. App. 132 (183 SE2d 55) (1971). See Dates, 371 Ga. App. at 826
(1) n.6.
5
provision, OCGA § 9-3-90,7 we start by analyzing the text of the

relevant statutes. “When we consider the meaning of a statute, we

must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and

said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751

SE2d 337) (2013) (cleaned up). “To that end, we must afford the

statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the

statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read

the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an

ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. at 172-73 (1)

(a) (cleaned up).

With these basic principles in mind, we turn to the text of the

municipal ante litem notice statute. The plain language of OCGA §

36-33-5 (b) says that an injured party should provide notice to a

municipality “[w]ithin six months of the happening of the event upon

which a claim against a municipal corporation is predicated.”

7 We note that we did not grant certiorari as to whether Dates’s first ante

litem notice – claiming an amount of loss “in excess of $500,000” – complied
with the requirements of OCGA § 36-33-5 (e). Thus, in analyzing the tolling
issue on review before us, we will assume without deciding that Dates’s first
notice was ineffective.
6
Nothing in the statute addresses whether any tolling provision

applies to extend the time to present a claim to a municipality.

This absence is particularly notable when the municipal ante

litem notice statute is considered in its relevant context. Another

statute within the same title of the Georgia Code (“Local

Government”) – OCGA § 36-11-1 – governs the ante litem notice

requirement for losses involving counties. The county ante litem

statute explicitly provides: “All claims against counties must be

presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or

the same are barred, provided that minors or other persons laboring

under disabilities shall be allowed 12 months after the removal of the

disability to present their claims.” (Emphasis added.) This shows

that the General Assembly knows how to carve out an ante litem

notice exception for minors, yet it chose not to do so in the municipal

ante litem notice statute. See State v. Wierson, --- Ga. ---, --- (2) (a) (-

-- SE2d ---) (2025) (considering the insanity-defense statutes’

relevant contexts and noting that the General Assembly chose to

include explicit exceptions in other adjacent code sections but did

7
not do so for the insanity-defense statutes). And as we have recently

explained, “[g]enerally, when two statutes deal with the same

subject matter, are grouped together, and use largely the same

language, but one includes an additional provision that the other

does not, this is strong evidence that the omission was intentional.”

Id. at --- (2) (a). This textual difference supports a conclusion that

the minor tolling provision does not apply to OCGA § 36-33-5.

The other relevant statute – the minor tolling provision in

OCGA § 9-3-90 – also does not say whether it applies to ante litem

notice requirements like OCGA § 36-33-5. OCGA § 9-3-90 (b) states:

Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 9-3-33.1
[relating to childhood sexual abuse claims], individuals
who are less than 18 years of age when a cause of action
accrues shall be entitled to the same time after he or she
reaches the age of 18 years to bring an action as is
prescribed for other persons.

Dates argues that subsection (b) refers to extending the time for

minors to “bring an action” to after the minor reaches the age of 18

such that the minor “shall be entitled to the same time . . . as is

prescribed for other persons.” And under OCGA § 36-33-5 (b), “[n]o

action shall be entertained . . . until the cause of action therein has
8
first been presented.” So it can be argued that the presentment

requirement is a condition precedent to “bring[ing] an action” such

that the tolling statute should apply.