CourtListener 10680467

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 6, 2025

S25Y0598. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHEN DANA MORRISON,
JR.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of Special Master Adam Marshall Hames, who

recommends that the Court accept the petition for voluntary

surrender of license filed by Stephen Dana Morrison, Jr. (State Bar

No. 525180), after the filing of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4-

227 (c). In his petition, Morrison requested that he be allowed to

voluntarily surrender his license for his admitted violations in

connection to a personal injury case of Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II)

(b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule

4-102 (d).

In his petition, Morrison, who has been a member of the State
Bar since 1993, admitted that he represented two clients, who later

died, in a personal injury matter and on January 2, 2020, settled the

clients’ claims for $27,500. At the end of January, the funds were

deposited in Morrison’s trust account, and he was aware that before

he was able to release the funds to the clients’ estates, he was

obligated to determine if Medicare had any claim to the funds.

However, Morrison failed to resolve any potential Medicare claim

and never distributed the settlement funds to the clients’ estates.

Instead, Morrison, during a period in which he was suffering from

mental and emotional issues, converted the funds for his own

personal use. Morrison states that he is attempting to obtain funds

sufficient to repay the clients’ estates and is “currently seeking a

loan[] to propose a repayment plan to rectify his grievous error and

make full restitution.”

Based on his conduct, Morrison admitted to violating Rule 1.15

(I) (a)1 by failing to hold the clients’ settlement funds separate from

1 Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides, in relevant part, “[a] lawyer shall hold funds

or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s possession

2
his own funds and by failing to appropriately safeguard those funds,

and Rule 1.15 (II) (b)2 by failing to keep and maintain records on his

trust account and by improperly withdrawing settlement funds for

his own personal use. The maximum penalty for a violation of each

of these Rules is disbarment.

After the State Bar responded and recommended that the

Special Master accept Morrison’s petition for voluntary surrender of

license, the Special Master issued his report and recommendation,

recommending that this Court accept the petition for voluntary

surrender of license. The Special Master agreed that Morrison’s

admitted conduct as outlined in his petition supported violations of

Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b). The Special Master further noted

that the American Bar Association has published Standards for

in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own funds or
other property. . . . Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts . . .
and appropriately safeguarded.”

2 Rule 1.15 (II) (b) directs that “[r]ecords on . . . trust accounts shall be so

kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each
client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts
for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned
lawyer’s fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as
such.”
3
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which are instructive in determining

the appropriate sanction in disciplinary cases, see In the Matter of

Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), and that in imposing a

sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, the ABA Standards

provide that disciplinary authorities should consider the duty

violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the potential or actual injury

caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existing aggravating or

mitigating factors. See ABA Standard 3.0. The Special Master then

found that Morrison violated a duty to his clients, that he acted

knowingly and intentionally, and that he caused serious injury to

the clients. Regarding aggravating factors, the Special Master found

that Morrison had a dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a

pattern of misconduct by making material misrepresentations about

the status of the funds, and had substantial experience in the

practice of law.3 See ABA Standard 9.22 (b), (c), and (i). In

3 Although the State Bar stated in its response that, in aggravation,

Morrison had a prior disciplinary offense, his clients were vulnerable victims,
and he was indifferent to paying restitution, see ABA Standard 9.22 (a), (h)
and (j), the Special Master determined that there was not sufficient evidence
to make a finding on these factors.
4
mitigation, the Special Master noted that Morrison had accepted

responsibility for his actions, but the Special Master did not tie this

finding to one of the mitigating factors set forth in ABA Standard

9.32.

The Special Master then stated that based on his findings, a

sanction of disbarment was supported by the ABA Standards. See

ABA Standard 4.11 (disbarment is generally appropriate when a

lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or

potential injury to a client); ABA Standard 5.11 (a) and (b)

(disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in serious

criminal conduct, including misappropriation or theft, or when a

lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously

adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice); ABA Standard

4.41 (disbarment is generally appropriate where the lawyer fails to

perform services for a client which causes potentially serious injury);

ABA Standard 4.61 (disbarment is appropriate where a lawyer

knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer).

5
Although the Special Master expressed concern that Morrison did

not admit that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4),4 as alleged by the State

Bar in its formal complaint, the Special Master ultimately

recommended that the petition for voluntary surrender of license

should be accepted, as such a sanction is consistent with other cases

involving similar Rule violations. Further, the Special Master

recommended that this Court impose a condition that, if Morrison

ever applies for readmission, he is required to make full restitution

of all funds converted.

Having reviewed the record, we agree to accept Morrison’s

petition for voluntary surrender of license. See, e.g., In the Matter of

Middleton, 316 Ga. 825 (890 SE2d 712) (2023) (accepting petition for

voluntary surrender of license where attorney admitted to violating

Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.15 (II) (b) by failing to disburse client funds

and incrementally withdrawing settlement proceeds for personal

4 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides, in relevant part, that “[a lawyer may not]

engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.” The maximum penalty for a violation of GRPC 8.4 (a) (4)
is disbarment.

6
use); In the Matter of Webster, 318 Ga. 27 (896 SE2d 546) (2023)

(accepting petition for voluntary surrender of license where attorney

admitted to violating Rule 1.15 (I) (a) and (c) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b)

by failing to safeguard fiduciary funds, failing to maintain complete

records of account funds, and withdrawing funds from a trust

account for personal use). And while we recognize that Morrison did

not address the alleged Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation in his petition, we

note that the State Bar has no objection to the petition and that

Morrison’s proposed voluntary surrender of his license is

tantamount to disbarment, so he would not receive greater

discipline even if he had admitted to violating Rule 8.4 (a) (4). Thus,

his failure to address this additional alleged Rule violation does not

change our decision to accept the petition. See In the Matter of Joshi,

318 Ga. 20, 26 (896 SE2d 531) (2023) (on Special Master’s report and

recommendation, accepting petition for voluntary surrender of

license and noting that “although this resolution leaves unaddressed

the additional misconduct allegedly committed by Joshi, . . . even if

that alleged misconduct were addressed and Joshi were found to

7
have committed additional Rules violations, the maximum sanction

that could be imposed for such — disbarment — would be no

greater”).

While the Special Master recommended an additional

repayment condition be included as part of the discipline imposed

should Morrison seek readmission, “the GRPC do not contemplate

allowing the Court to accept a petition for voluntary discipline and

adding conditions to the petition that are more stringent than those

requested.” In the Matter of McCall, 314 Ga. 200, 208 (875 SE2d 765)

(2022). So we do not impose this additional condition. If Morrison

seeks readmission, whether he has paid full restitution may be

considered in assessing whether to grant a certificate of fitness for

readmission.5 See, e.g., In the Matter of Clarke, 309 Ga. 187, 187 (844

SE2d 724) (2020) (granting certification and noting that the

applicant “has since paid full restitution to the [client’s] estate” even

5 We note that Morrison admitted to converting $27,500 of his client’s

funds and that the Bar asserts that he has been “indifferent to making
restitution” but that the Special Master did not make a finding as to the
amount of restitution owed to make the clients’ estate whole.
8
though no such condition was imposed when the petition for

voluntary surrender of license was accepted). See also Bar

Admission Rules Part A § (d) (4) (requiring the Fitness Board to

confirm whether the applicant owes restitution to the Client

Security Fund).

Accordingly, it is ordered that the name of Stephen Dana

Morrison, Jr. be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to

practice law in the State of Georgia. Morrison is reminded of his

duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. Peterson, CJ, Warren,
PJ, and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson,
JJ, concur.

321 Ga. 526
FINAL COPY

S25Y0598. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHEN DANA MORRISON,
JR.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of Special Master Adam Marshall Hames, who

recommends that the Court accept the petition for voluntary

surrender of license filed by Stephen Dana Morrison, Jr. (State Bar

No. 525180), after the filing of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4-

227 (c). In his petition, Morrison requested that he be allowed to

voluntarily surrender his license for his admitted violations in

connection to a personal injury case of Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II)

(b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) found in

Bar Rule 4-102 (d).

In his petition, Morrison, who has been a member of the State

Bar since 1993, admitted that he represented two clients, who later

died, in a personal injury matter and on January 2, 2020, settled the
clients’ claims for $27,500. At the end of January, the funds were