Merritt v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 4, 2025

S25A1207. MERRITT v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

In May 2023, Richard Merritt was convicted of the malice

murder of his mother, Shirley Merritt, and possession of a knife

during the commission of a crime. He appeals these convictions,

arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support the

convictions, that counsel provided ineffective assistance related to

his cross-examination of Merritt’s ex-wife, that counsel provided

ineffective assistance in closing argument, that he is entitled to a

new trial because the trial court failed to make the necessary

findings to justify his legs being shackled throughout trial, that the

State committed a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83

(1963), and that the cumulative effect of instances of counsel’s

deficient performance and trial court errors requires a new trial.
Because the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions;

Merritt has failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was

deficient in any of the ways he alleges; Merritt has waived his claims

based on his shackling and on Brady; and there are no instances of

trial counsel deficiency or trial court error to consider cumulatively,

we affirm Merritt’s convictions.1

1. The following evidence was presented at trial. On January

18, 2019, Merritt, who was an attorney, pled guilty to 34 felony

counts in Cobb County, including theft, elder exploitation, and

forgery, related to his theft of money from his clients.2 He was

1 Shirley was killed in February 2019. In June 2019, a DeKalb County
grand jury indicted Merritt for malice murder, two counts of felony murder,
two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a knife during
the commission of a felony. At a jury trial in May 2023, the jury found Merritt
guilty on all counts. Merritt was sentenced to life in prison without parole for
malice murder and a consecutive five years for possession of a knife during the
commission of a felony. All other counts were vacated or merged. Merritt
timely filed a motion for new trial in June 2023 and amended it with new
counsel in September 2024. In January 2025, after an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied Merritt’s motion. Merritt filed a timely notice of appeal. The
appeal was docketed to this Court’s August 2025 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.

2 In January 2018, this Court accepted Merritt’s voluntary surrender of

his license based on his admission that he failed to promptly disburse
settlement funds to one of his clients. See In the Matter of Merritt, 302 Ga. 874

2
sentenced to serve 15 years in prison and 15 years on probation. He

was not taken into custody immediately after his sentencing but was

released subject to GPS monitoring and directed to turn himself in

to begin serving his sentence by 5:00 p.m. on February 1, 2019.

Although Merritt had been married, by the time of his sentencing,

he and his former wife, Jennine Minicozzi, were divorced, and

Merritt lived with his mother.

On the morning of February 1, Merritt met Minicozzi and their

daughter at a doctor’s office for their daughter’s appointment.

According to Minicozzi, Merritt’s “demeanor was very strange” at

the doctor’s appointment and he “was very quiet and didn’t look at

anybody or say anything.” Merritt’s GPS monitoring data showed

that after the doctor’s appointment, he returned to Shirley’s house,

arriving around 9:30 a.m. Five hours after that, at about 2:30 p.m.,

he left the house, driving toward Tennessee. Merritt drove Shirley’s

car, rather than his own, and he took Shirley’s cell phone, as well as

(2018).

3
his own. The last time either phone was active was around 4:00 p.m.

on February 1. At 4:14 p.m., Merritt cut off his GPS ankle monitor

at a truck stop.3 The person who was monitoring his ankle monitor

got an alert and arrived at the truck stop around 4:40 p.m. The

monitor was in a trash can, and Merritt was gone. Merritt did not

report to begin his prison sentence at 5:00 p.m. as required.

After Merritt failed to report on February 1, Merritt’s lawyer

for the theft charges called Minicozzi. She called Mike Jefcoat, a

close family member of Shirley, who tried to reach Shirley, but

Shirley did not respond to calls or text messages. Early the next

morning, Minicozzi and Jefcoat went to Shirley’s house. Using

Minicozzi’s key, Jefcoat entered the house and found Shirley dead at

the bottom of the stairs to the basement. She had stab wounds on

her back, torso, neck, and face, which an expert later concluded were

consistent with having been made with a kitchen knife. The blade

of the knife, which was longer than three inches, had broken off in

3 Merritt later testified that he “got rid” of both cell phones “around the

time that [he] cut the ankle monitor off.”
4
her face and the handle was found near her body. She had also

suffered a blunt-force injury that was consistent with having been

made by a 35-pound dumbbell that was found near her body. Her

cause of death was a combination of “a blunt impact injury and stab

wounds.” There were no signs of forced entry or struggle in the

house. Law enforcement began a search for Merritt, and he was

found and arrested seven months later in September 2019; he had

been living under a false identity in Nashville, Tennessee. 4

Merritt testified at trial, giving the following account of

Shirley’s death. In January 2019, leading up to his sentencing for

the theft crimes, Merritt believed that “somebody was out to get

[him].” He noticed that suspicious cars began driving by Shirley’s

house, and he and Shirley had gotten phone calls from unknown

callers who hung up. Also, a cartoon mocking the judge and

4 While in prison, Merritt sent letters to his brother saying that “any

fingerprints that may exist are easily explained” because the dumbbells were
his and he “regularly use[d] the knife in question to prepare food.” At trial,
there was no testimony about fingerprints on the dumbbell, but an expert
testified that they were not able to get sufficient contact DNA to test from the
dumbbell. An expert also testified that they were not able to retrieve any
fingerprints from the knife handle.
5
prosecutors involved in Merritt’s theft case was sent to Shirley’s and

Minicozzi’s houses.5 According to Merritt, on the afternoon of

February 1, two men knocked on the door of Shirley’s house. When

Merritt answered the door, the men pointed a gun at him and

ordered him to let them inside. He complied. The men told him to

go to the basement. One of the men kept a gun pointed at Merritt,

while the other man pointed his gun at Shirley. All four people

began walking down the stairs to the basement, and Shirley began

to cry. One of the men told her to be quiet and pushed her down the

rest of the stairs. She hit her head on the wall and had trouble

getting up. The man got a dumbbell from the basement and

“proceeded to bludgeon [her] with it”; then he went upstairs, got a

kitchen knife, and stabbed her with it “repeatedly.” The men then

showed Merritt pictures of Minicozzi and their children and said, “If

5 The cartoon was admitted into evidence at trial. The cartoon featured
drawings of people in a courtroom, with four men, labeled as Merritt, the judge,
the district attorney, and the assistant district attorney, each saying
something indicating that although Merritt harmed his victims, he would not
be punished.

6
you say a single word, they’re next.” The men left, and Merritt fled.

He did not report this incident to the police, warn Minicozzi and the

children, or report to serve his prison sentence as required, because

he was afraid the men were watching him and would hurt Minicozzi

and the children if he spoke to anyone. He did not know the two

men, but he assumed they were motivated to attack him because of

his theft crimes and he believed that they had “cased the house

before” the attack because they seemed to know where the basement

was.

The jury found Merritt guilty of murdering his mother and all

of the other charged crimes.

2. Merritt asserts that the evidence was not sufficient as a

matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions

because the evidence was circumstantial and no DNA or fingerprints

linked him to the crimes. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 318–

19 (1979). When assessing this claim, “we view all of the evidence

presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and

consider whether any rational juror could have found the defendant

7
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was

convicted.” Moulder v. State, 317 Ga. 43, 46–47 (2023).

“[T]he fact that the State did not produce certain types of

evidence does not mean that the evidence was insufficient. Although

the State is required to prove its case with competent evidence, there

is no requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of

evidence.” Jones v. State, 319 Ga. 758, 761–62 (2024) (cleaned up).

As detailed above, ample evidence of Merritt’s guilt was presented

at trial, including GPS data and Merritt’s own testimony showing

that Merritt was with his mother on the day she was stabbed and

bludgeoned to death, which was the same day Merritt was supposed

to begin serving his prison sentence, and evidence that after her

death, Merritt fled to another state with his mother’s car and cell

phone, cut off his ankle monitor and “got rid” of the cell phone, and

began living under the guise of a fake identity. The evidence

presented at trial was sufficient to support Merritt’s convictions for

8
murdering his mother and possessing a knife during that murder.6

See, e.g., Young v. State, 305 Ga. 92, 94 (2019) (holding that the

evidence, which included evidence that the appellant and victim had

“participated in an unsuccessful mediation” as part of their

“contentious divorce” days before the victim’s death and the

appellant fled and “remained in hiding until he was arrested,” was

constitutionally sufficient to support the appellant’s murder

conviction).

To the extent Merritt also argues that the evidence was not

sufficient to support his convictions under OCGA § 24-14-6, we

similarly reject that argument. OCGA § 24-14-6 says: “To warrant

a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not

only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude

every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the

6 See OCGA § 16-5-1(a) (“A person commits the offense of murder when

he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes
the death of another human being.”); OCGA § 16-11-106(b) (“Any person who
shall have on or within arm’s reach of his or her person … a knife having a
blade of three or more inches in length during the commission of, or the
attempt to commit: (1) Any crime against or involving the person of another …
and which crime is a felony, commits a felony … .”).
9
accused.” “Whether a hypothesis raised by the defendant is

reasonable is a question committed principally to the factfinder.”

Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 714 (2022).

The hypothesis offered by Merritt at trial was that victims of

the theft crimes were threatening him, including by sending a

cartoon, and two men associated with these victims killed his

mother. The jury was authorized to reject this hypothesis, which

was supported only by Merritt’s testimony, as unreasonable,

particularly because the evidence showed that there were no signs

of struggle in Shirley’s house and Merritt’s story required the jury

to believe that although the men brought guns to the house, they

used household items to kill Shirley, and although they were angry

at Merritt (not his mother), they brutally murdered her and left him

unharmed and free to leave. See, e.g., Shellman v. State, 318 Ga.

71, 76 (2024) (holding that the jury was authorized “to reject as

unreasonable” the appellant’s claim that he was shot outside the

house, “lost consciousness, and was then moved into the bedroom

and planted with incriminating ballistics evidence”). Thus,

10
Merritt’s claim fails.

3. Merritt argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance

in three ways related to his cross-examination of Minicozzi.

Specifically, Merritt argues that counsel provided ineffective

assistance by not objecting to—and instead asking further questions

about—Minicozzi’s testimony that Merritt had been violent toward

her, that Merritt’s crimes “ruined” her life and caused her “trauma,”

and that their daughter’s doctor “didn’t like” Merritt’s “aura” and

“behavior” at the appointment on the day of the murder.

To establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

Merritt must show both that trial counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984).

Trial counsel’s performance was deficient if it was
objectively unreasonable ... considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional
norms. And to prove prejudice under Strickland, a
defendant must establish a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would
have been different.

Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 708 (2025) (cleaned up). “If [the

11
appellant] fails to establish one of these two prongs, we need not

examine the other.” Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 494 (2024).

(a)(i) During cross-examination, counsel asked Minicozzi if

Merritt had a “reputation for being a violent man.” She responded:

“No. But he had a very, very scary temper.” Counsel clarified:

“Okay. But as you said, he did not have a reputation for physical

violence, correct?” Minicozzi responded: “He was physically violent

with me once” and explained that “towards the end of [their]

marriage,” they had an argument and Merritt “pushed [her] to the

ground and [she] hit [her] head on the bed.” Counsel then asked

some follow-up questions, eliciting Minicozzi’s admission that she

did not call the police or make a report. She also testified that she

did not file for divorce after that incident but later filed for divorce

because “he ruined our lives” by committing the theft crimes.

Counsel noted that he had not “seen a single report where

[Minicozzi] mentioned that there was an issue in [their]

relationship,” and Minicozzi responded that she “didn’t talk about it

because it was very scary.” She testified that “in the couple of

12
months before he was arrested” for the theft crimes, “his behavior

changed” and “he started drinking very heavily, and showing us the

temper that was very scary.” She described a night when she and

her son were scared and “looking for somewhere to run and hide”

from Merritt.

Counsel again elicited Minicozzi’s admission that she did not

mention Merritt’s alleged violence to the police or “anybody,” and

again, she explained that she did not tell anyone “because it was so

scary.” She also testified that she “blocked a lot of it out” and that

she only recently remembered the incidents because she had been

“working on it intensely in therapy, and a lot of the trauma ...

surfaced later as [she] dealt with the years of trauma that he put

[her] through.” Counsel asked Minicozzi if she “hate[d]” Merritt,

and she responded, “Of course.”

Counsel then asked Minicozzi more about Merritt’s behavior at

the medical appointment, and she testified that at the end of the

appointment the doctor walked her and her daughter to their car

because the doctor “didn’t like the way [Merritt’s] aura was and his

13
behavior.” After this testimony, Merritt’s trial counsel elicited

Minicozzi’s admission that she did not “make any type of report of

[Merritt] acting strange or being scared.”

During closing argument, counsel acknowledged Minicozzi’s

allegation of Merritt’s violence, pointing out that Minicozzi said she

had only recently remembered these incidents in therapy. Counsel

asserted that “repressed memories are unreliable” and urged the

jury to apply “common sense,” emphasizing that Minicozzi “hates

her ex-husband” and “wanted to see him prosecuted.”

(ii) At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified

that he asked Minicozzi about Merritt’s reputation for violence

because Merritt told him that Minicozzi “would not say that he was

violent towards her.” Minicozzi’s answer surprised counsel, but he

did not object or argue that her answer was non-responsive because

he had “dealt with” Minicozzi before and thought that the best

approach was to handle it “without the court’s intervention” and

instead ask follow-up questions designed to show that Minicozzi’s

story was “fabricated.” Counsel also testified that he did not object

14
to Minicozzi’s testimony about her life being “ruined” and about

being “traumatized” and having to “undergo intense therapy”

because, “by this point in time, she was on the stand for a minute;

and I think it was clear that she was overdramatizing her

relationship, and whatever she said that [Merritt] did to her” and

“trying [to] throw dirt on [] Merritt.”

When asked about Minicozzi’s testimony about the daughter’s

doctor, counsel testified that he viewed Minicozzi’s “statements

attributed to the doctor about having concerns” as “clearly hearsay,”

but explained that he chose not to object because “again, [] Minicozzi

… was dramatic about everything” and there was “nothing to

support” her testimony, which would make the jury “wonder about

her credibility” and see that “she was doing whatever she could” to

help convict Merritt. Counsel also explained that Minicozzi “broke

down in tears one time or two” on the stand, so he did not want “to

be mean to her” or “try to beat her up,” elaborating that he

“probably” could have “been more aggressive towards her,” but he

“wasn’t going to give her another reason to cry, another reason to try

15
to draw more sympathy.”

(b) Merritt argues that counsel’s approach to dealing with

Minicozzi’s testimony about Merritt’s violence against her, the effect

Merritt’s crimes had on her, and the doctor’s perception of Merritt

at the appointment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel

because counsel should have objected, rather than ask follow-up

questions, once Minicozzi gave this testimony. Even assuming an

objection to each of these portions of Minicozzi’s testimony would

have been successful, trial counsel’s strategy of choosing not to

object was not objectively unreasonable, as explained below.

(i) As to Minicozzi’s testimony about Merritt’s violence toward

her, although her answer surprised counsel, eliciting an unexpected

response is not necessarily deficient performance, especially when

counsel had no reason to anticipate the response based on his

reasonable preparation for that witness’s cross-examination.

Counsel’s decision to ask Minicozzi about Merritt’s reputation for

violence was based on information his client gave him, and Minicozzi

herself admitted that she had not told anyone about the violence

16
before that testimony. See Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 786 (2022)

(“[A]lthough counsel’s question led to an unanticipated result,

Pritchett has failed to demonstrate that the decision to ask the

question fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional

conduct.”); Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 357–58 (2009) (holding

that counsel’s decision to call a witness who counsel believed, based

on pre-trial discussions, would support the defense theory, was not

patently unreasonable even though “trial counsel was surprised” by

the witness’s testimony, which supported the State’s theory of the

crime). And counsel’s strategic decision to deal with Minicozzi’s

unexpected testimony by drawing out the fact that she had never

told anyone about this violence before and was motivated to share

(or even fabricate) this information now because she “hate[d]”

Merritt was not objectively unreasonable. See Gomez v. State, 301

Ga. 445, 459 (2017) (holding that counsel’s decision not to object to

“unexpected testimony” but instead to show the jury that the

testimony was incorrect was not “patently unreasonable”).

(ii) Merritt’s claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance

17
by failing to object to Minicozzi’s testimony that Merritt “ruined” her

life and caused her “trauma” fails for similar reasons. Counsel’s

decision to use this testimony to emphasize Minicozzi’s hatred of

Merritt helped further undermine the credibility of any negative

testimony she gave about him. Moreover, this testimony was

focused on how Merritt’s theft crimes (not the alleged murder)

affected Minicozzi, and the jury was well aware of Merritt’s theft

crimes. Indeed, Merritt’s own defense theory was predicated on

showing that the effect of the theft crimes had been so devastating

that it motivated two men to come to Shirley’s house with guns.

Thus, counsel’s decision not to object to Minicozzi’s testimony was

not objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Burke, 320 Ga. at 709

(explaining that not objecting to inadmissible testimony may be

“part of a reasonable trial strategy if the objectionable evidence, for

example, undermines an unfavorable witness’s testimony”).

(iii) As to Minicozzi’s testimony about the doctor’s perception

of Merritt’s behavior, as noted in Division 1 above, Minicozzi

testified based on her own observations that at the doctor’s office

18
Merritt’s “demeanor was very strange” and he was “very quiet.”7

Counsel could have reasonably concluded that there was nothing to

be gained by objecting to Minicozzi’s testimony about the doctor’s

similar opinion about Merritt’s “behavior” and “aura,” particularly

in light of counsel’s strategy to avoid being too “aggressive” toward

Minicozzi. Further, counsel again used this testimony to undermine

Minicozzi’s credibility by pointing out that she did not report

Merritt’s strange behavior to anyone before trial. This decision was

not objectively unreasonable. See Troutman, 320 Ga. at 498

(holding that counsel’s decision not to object to a reference to

unadmitted photographs was not deficient when the jury had

already heard testimony about “[t]he substance of the unadmitted

photos,” so “counsel had little to gain by objecting” and objecting

“would serve only to highlight” the undesirable evidence).

Given all of the above, Merritt has failed to show that his trial

counsel’s performance related to Minicozzi’s testimony was

7 Merritt does not argue that counsel should have objected to this
testimony.
19
deficient, and these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail.

See Burke, 320 Ga. at 709.

4. Merritt argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance

during closing argument by comparing Merritt’s case to two other

high-profile murder cases and by displaying a PowerPoint slide with

Merritt’s booking photograph.

(a) As to the first argument, Merritt failed to raise it in his

motion for new trial, where he was represented by new counsel and

thus “afforded the opportunity to raise claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel through motion counsel.” Mahdi v. State,

312 Ga. 466, 469 (2021). Although Merritt questioned trial counsel

about this issue at the hearing on the motion for new trial,

“questioning during the motion-for-new-trial hearing, by itself, is

insufficient to amend a motion for new trial to add a claim where the

trial court did not rule on the claim.” Allen v. State, 317 Ga. 1, 12–

13 (2023). And in its order denying Merritt’s motion for new trial,

the trial court did not address any claim that counsel provided

ineffective assistance by comparing this case to two other cases.

20
Because Merritt failed to raise this claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel “at the earliest practicable moment,” he has forfeited this

claim. Id. at 13.

(b) As to the second argument, Merritt’s counsel testified at

the motion for new trial hearing that he used Merritt’s booking

photograph in a PowerPoint slide that he displayed during closing

argument. Counsel explained that there was nothing in the image

indicating it was a booking photo and no one testified that the

picture came from Merritt’s booking. Instead, counsel explained,

this was “the best photo” he had of Merritt, describing it as a “pretty

decent picture” of Merritt, in which Merritt is “wearing a suit” and

has a “low, nice, and clean [hair]cut.” The PowerPoint slide was

admitted into evidence at the motion for new trial hearing, and the

photograph matches counsel’s description of it.

There is no evidence that the photograph itself indicated that

it was a booking photo, that the jury knew it was a booking photo,

or that it was an otherwise prejudicial photo. Counsel’s decision to

use this photograph, which counsel described as a “pretty decent

21
picture” of Merritt, in his closing argument was not objectively

unreasonable. See Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 298 (2021)

(explaining that “[w]ith respect to closing argument, defense counsel

is permitted wide latitude” and is not ineffective simply because

another attorney might have made a different choice).

5. Merritt argues that he is entitled to a new trial because his

legs were shackled throughout trial and the trial court failed to

make any specific findings at trial justifying the shackling. Because

Merritt did not object to his shackling at trial, this claim is not

preserved for appellate review. See Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 724

(2022).8

6. Merritt claims that the State violated Brady v. Maryland,

373 US 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a second cartoon related to

Merritt’s theft convictions. At the motion for new trial hearing,

Merritt’s trial counsel testified that during the murder trial, he

8 Although Merritt has not preserved this claim for appellate review, we

remind trial courts that “a defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights prohibit the use of physical restraints … absent a trial court
determination that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular
trial.” Tavarez v. State, 319 Ga. 480, 487 n.7 (2024).
22
received a message from the attorney who represented Merritt in his

theft case stating that a second cartoon related to Merritt’s theft

crimes had been sent to that attorney while Merritt was in

Tennessee and that attorney had given the cartoon to law

enforcement. Merritt’s trial counsel did not raise the issue of the

second cartoon when he learned about it at trial, nor did Merritt’s

post-conviction counsel raise a claim in Merritt’s motion for new

trial that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue at trial

that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose the cartoon.9

Because Merritt learned about the second cartoon during his trial,

but failed to raise a claim that the State’s alleged suppression of this

cartoon violated Brady until this appeal, this claim is waived. See

Battle v. State, 301 Ga. 694, 697–98 (2017) (“Battle does not dispute

that he did not raise this Brady claim at trial or in his motion for

9 Although Merritt did not raise a claim under Brady in his motion for

new trial, the second cartoon was discussed at the motion for new trial hearing
as support for Merritt’s claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to call as a witness the lawyer who represented him in the
theft case. The court rejected this claim in its order denying Merritt’s motion
for new trial, and Merritt does not raise this claim on appeal.
23
new trial, as amended; therefore, he has waived the right to raise

this objection in the present appeal.”).

7. Merritt’s final claim—that he is entitled to a new trial due

to the cumulative prejudicial effect of all the instances of deficient

performance on the part of trial counsel and trial court errors—fails

because he has not demonstrated a single instance of deficient

performance or trial court error; thus, there is nothing to consider

cumulatively. See Burke, 320 Ga. at 713.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

24