Dixon v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 9, 2025

S26A0052. DIXON v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Brandi Dixon was convicted of felony murder in

connection with the stabbing death of Ebony Smith. 1 Dixon

contends that the evidence presented at her trial was legally

insufficient and that the trial court erred by denying her motion for

a directed verdict of acquittal. She also claims that her trial counsel

provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and that the trial

court abused its discretion by overruling her objection during the

1 Smith was killed on July 15, 2018. In October 2018, a Bibb County
grand jury indicted Dixon for malice murder and felony murder based on
aggravated assault. At a trial from March 29 to 31, 2022, the jury found Dixon
not guilty of malice murder and guilty of felony murder, and the trial court
sentenced her to serve life in prison. Dixon, through new counsel, filed a timely
motion for new trial, which she later amended. In June 2025, the trial court
denied the motion. Dixon filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was
docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2025 and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
State’s redirect examination of a witness and by failing to strike

certain testimony. As explained below, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the

evidence presented at Dixon’s trial showed the following. In 2017

and 2018, both Smith and Dixon were dating George Duehart, who

was known as “Little Man”; Duehart testified that neither woman

knew about the other’s relationship with him. In the fall of 2017,

however, Smith and her sister encountered Dixon at a ballfield and

noticed that Dixon was “pointing” at them. And during the summer

of 2018, Dixon came to Smith’s house and asked Smith’s son if “Little

Man” was staying there. When the son said that he was not, Dixon

left.

On July 15, 2018, Duehart hosted a party at a house in Macon,

which Smith and Dixon both attended. A friend of Duehart’s who

was also at the party saw Dixon standing at the top of a hill near the

house, while Smith and her friend Ashley Oliver were standing near

the bottom of the hill. Dixon was “twirling [a] knife” and “loudly”

and “aggressively” saying: “[W]here the f**k … Little Man at, b**ch

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will think I’m done, they got me f**ked up, I’ll kill me a b**ch

tonight.”

Oliver testified as follows. Although she did not see Dixon with

a knife, she did see Dixon near the top of the hill and overheard a

man say to Dixon, “[O]h, you’re going to cut me?” Smith and Oliver

then went to a store. When they returned, Dixon was near the area

where Smith parked her car. Dixon approached them and said,

“[A]re you here for Little Man[?]” and Smith responded, “[T]hat’s my

man.” Two men then held Oliver back to prevent her from

intervening while Dixon got “in [Smith’s] face” and was being

“aggressive.” Smith told Dixon to “get out [of her] face.” Smith then

reached inside the open passenger-side window of her car and into

the glove compartment, grabbed her pistol, loaded the pistol, and

“fired in the air.” Dixon said, “[O]h, so you’re going to shoot me over

an F’ing man” and then stabbed Smith in the chest with a large

kitchen knife. Smith fell to the ground as Dixon fled. The men who

were holding Oliver released her; Oliver tried to grab the pistol, but

the men grabbed it first and removed the magazine. Oliver put the

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pistol and the knife in Smith’s car and called 911.

Footage from body cameras worn by responding investigators,

which the State introduced into evidence, showed the following.

Investigators found Smith, who had died, on the ground near her

car. They interviewed Oliver, who was crying and very “distraught,”

at the scene. Oliver said that during the altercation, Dixon “kept

saying she had a knife” and she “pulled a knife on [Smith] and

[Smith] was defending herself and she shot [Dixon] and then [Dixon]

stabbed [Smith].” Dixon was leaning against a nearby building; her

forehead was bleeding; and she was crying, saying, “She just shot a

gun at me.” When emergency responders asked where she was hurt,

she said she did not know. One of the responders described the

wound on Dixon’s forehead as “a nick,” and an investigator

mentioned that it seemed like a “minor cut.”

Another investigator testified that he found a pistol and a

kitchen knife in Smith’s car, a shell casing near the car, and a

magazine in the grass nearby. He also testified that there was a

bullet defect above the passenger-side door of the car. The

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investigator photographed Dixon’s forehead injury, and the photos

were admitted into evidence. The investigator opined that, based on

his training and experience, the injury was a cut, not a bullet wound.

The medical examiner who performed Smith’s autopsy testified that

Smith had a four-inch long, four-inch deep stab wound in her chest,

which caused her death.

Dixon did not testify; her theory of defense was self-defense.

2. Dixon contends that the evidence presented at trial was not

constitutionally sufficient to support her conviction for felony

murder based on aggravated assault. She also argues that the trial

court erred by denying her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

These claims fail.

“The test established in Jackson v. Virginia, [443 US 307

(1979)], is the proper standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the

evidence as a matter of constitutional due process and for evaluating

whether the trial court erred by denying a defendant’s motion for a

directed verdict of acquittal.” Rooks v. State, 317 Ga. 743, 750

(2023). Under that test, we view all of the evidence presented at

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trial in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider whether

any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the crime of which she was convicted. See id. at

751. “This limited review leaves to the jury the resolution of

conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the credibility

of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made from basic facts

to ultimate facts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Dixon asserts that the evidence was not sufficient as a matter

of constitutional due process because the State failed to disprove

beyond a reasonable doubt her claim of self-defense. Arguing that

Smith was the aggressor, Dixon points to Oliver’s testimony that

Smith fired her pistol before Dixon pulled out a knife. But the jury

was authorized to disbelieve that testimony and to instead credit

other evidence showing that Dixon did not act in self-defense. In

this respect, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict, showed that in the months before the murder, Dixon

initiated encounters with Smith and her family, which authorized

the jury to infer that Dixon suspected that Smith was in a

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relationship with Duehart. At Duehart’s party, a witness saw Dixon

“twirling” a large kitchen knife, asking where Duehart was, and

threatening to “kill … a b**ch.” And Oliver testified that Dixon later

“aggressive[ly]” confronted Smith about Duehart and got “in

[Smith’s] face,” while two men held Oliver back to prevent her from

helping Smith. Although Oliver also testified that Smith then

grabbed her pistol and “fired in the air” before Dixon pulled out her

knife, Oliver told investigators at the scene that Dixon “pulled a

knife on [Smith] and [Smith] was defending herself and she shot

[Dixon] and then [Dixon] stabbed [Smith].” It was for the jury to

assess Oliver’s credibility (as it also assessed the credibility of other

witnesses) and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See Rooks,

317 Ga. at 751. See also Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 (2020)

(“[Q]uestions about the existence of justification are for the jury to

resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in support of a

justification defense and accept evidence that a [killing] was not

done in self-defense.” (quotation marks omitted)).

In sum, the evidence presented at trial and recounted above

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was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject Dixon’s claim of

self-defense and to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

felony murder based on aggravated assault, and the trial court did

not err by denying her motion for a directed verdict. See OCGA

§ 16-3-21(b)(3) (“A person is not justified in using force [in self-

defense] if he ... [w]as the aggressor.”); Gibbs, 309 Ga. at 564

(holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s

conviction for felony murder based on aggravated assault where he

shot and killed the armed victim, despite conflicting evidence as to

whether the defendant or the victim drew and fired his weapon

first); Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 562 (2020) (holding that even if

the jury believed the defendant’s assertion that the victim fired first,

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the

defendant was the initial aggressor, such that he was not entitled to

a finding of justification).

3. Dixon also argues that her trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by advising her not to testify

at trial. As explained below, Dixon has not met her burden of

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establishing that trial counsel performed deficiently, so this claim

fails.

To prevail on her ineffectiveness claim, Dixon must establish

that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and

that she suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984); Woods v. State, 322 Ga. 365,

367 (2025). To prove deficient performance, Dixon must show that

counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Woods, 322 Ga. at 367 (quotation marks

omitted). See also Strickland, 466 US at 687–91. To “overcome the

strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance fell within a

wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” Woods, 322 Ga. at

367 (quotation marks omitted), Dixon must show that no reasonable

lawyer would have done what her lawyer did, or would have failed

to do what her lawyer did not, see Warren v. State, 314 Ga. 598, 602

(2022). “[C]ounsel’s decisions about trial tactics and strategy in

particular may not form the basis of an ineffectiveness claim unless

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they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney

would have followed such a course.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

To prove prejudice, Dixon must establish a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial

would have been different. See Strickland, 466 US at 694. We need

not address both parts of the Strickland test if Dixon does not meet

her burden of establishing one. See Strickland, 466 US at 697;

Woods, 322 Ga. at 367.

Here, Dixon briefly testified at the motion for new trial hearing

that about a week before trial, counsel “wanted [Dixon] to testify,

and [she] was ready to testify”; during the trial, however, “he told

[her] not to get on the stand”; and Dixon “wanted to tell [her] side.”

Dixon offered no testimony about the reasons why trial counsel

advised her not to testify after the trial began, and she did not call

counsel to testify at the hearing. Nor did Dixon testify as to what

she would have said, had she decided to testify at trial.

“Whether to testify in one’s own defense is a tactical choice to

be made by the defendant after consultation with h[er] lawyer, and

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trial counsel’s advice to a defendant not to testify is a strategic

decision.” Morgan v. State, 321 Ga. 495, 504 (2025). In the absence

of evidence showing that counsel’s advice not to testify was patently

unreasonable, we presume that such advice was reasonably

strategic. See Woods, 322 Ga. at 369; Newman v. State, 309 Ga. 171,

176 (2020). Even assuming that the trial court credited Dixon’s

testimony that trial counsel advised her not to testify at trial, Dixon

has presented no evidence showing that counsel’s advice was so

patently unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have given

it. And we see nothing in the record indicating that such advice was

unreasonable, under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly,

Dixon has not overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s advice

fell within the range of reasonable professional conduct, so she has

not established that counsel performed deficiently, and her claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See Woods, 322 Ga. at 369

(holding that the appellant failed to show that trial counsel

performed deficiently by allegedly advising him not to testify at trial

because the record was “silent as to what advice, if any, counsel gave

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[the appellant] on that topic”); Newman, 309 Ga. at 175–76

(“[B]ecause [the appellant] did not ask his trial counsel any

questions at the motion for new trial hearing about the reasons why

[the appellant] decided to testify, we presume that any reason

relating to trial counsel’s advice to [the appellant] about testifying

was strategic and would not amount to ineffective assistance.”).2

4. Dixon asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by

overruling her objection to testimony from Smith’s sister during the

State’s redirect examination of her. We conclude that any such error

was harmless.

By way of background, the prosecutor elicited the sister’s

2 Dixon does not appear to contend that she was not adequately informed

of her right to testify. But we note on that point that the trial court advised
Dixon, among other things, that she had the right to testify, “nobody c[ould]
stop [her] or prevent [her] from testifying,” and Dixon “and not [her] lawyer
[was] the one who decides whether or not” she would testify. The trial
transcript shows that Dixon confirmed that she understood and that she
“personally” did not want to testify.
Dixon also mentions in passing in her appellate brief that she testified
at the motion for new trial hearing that trial counsel met with her only a
handful of times before trial and “refused to consider evidence she believed was
exculpatory.” To the extent she seeks to raise claims of ineffectiveness on these
grounds, she offers no argument to support them. Thus, any such claims are
deemed abandoned under Supreme Court Rule 22. See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 321
Ga. 222, 225–27 (2025).
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testimony on direct examination that she and Smith encountered

Dixon at a ballfield and noticed that Dixon was “pointing” at them;

the sister also said that she took a baseball bat to the ballfield “[i]n

case [Dixon] came up there and tried to jump on [Smith].” On cross-

examination, Dixon’s counsel asked Smith’s sister about the

timeframe during which she and Smith encountered Dixon; counsel

also elicited the sister’s testimony that she had never heard Dixon

threaten Smith and that Smith carried a gun because the

neighborhood where she lived was dangerous. On redirect, the

prosecutor said that the sister “mentioned being [at the ballfield] for

protection,” i.e., to protect Smith from Dixon, and asked, “Between

the two of you [the sister and Smith], who would have been the one

to respond to any kind of aggression?” Dixon’s counsel objected on

the ground that the question went beyond the scope of his cross-

examination; the trial court overruled the objection. The sister

replied, “Me.”

Assuming without deciding whether the trial court abused its

discretion by overruling Dixon’s objection, we conclude that any such

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error was harmless. “A non-constitutional error is harmless if it is

highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”

Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 799, 806 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

The sister’s answer to the prosecutor’s question was brief, and she

conveyed only that Smith was less likely than her to respond to some

sort of aggressive conduct. That point was essentially cumulative of

other evidence (admitted without objection and unchallenged on

appeal) that Smith did not have a reputation for violence, including

the sister’s testimony on direct examination that Smith did not have

a reputation for being aggressive and Duehart’s similar testimony

that he had never known Smith to be aggressive or violent. Thus, it

is highly probable that the sister’s one-word answer to the

prosecutor’s question did not contribute to the verdict. See, e.g., id.

(assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting certain testimony and concluding that any error was

harmless because the testimony was cumulative of other evidence at

trial); Monroe v. State, 315 Ga. 767, 779 (2023) (assuming without

deciding that the admission of certain testimony was erroneous and

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holding that any error was harmless because the testimony was

brief and cumulative of other evidence).

5. Finally, Dixon claims that the trial court abused its

discretion by overruling her request to strike certain testimony from

the medical examiner on the ground that the prosecutor did not

comply with OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4), which provides, as pertinent

here, that the prosecutor shall permit the defense to inspect and

copy an expert witness’s “report of any physical or mental

examinations and of scientific tests or experiments,” or “[i]f the

report is oral or partially oral,” the prosecutor “shall reduce all

relevant and material oral portions of such report to writing and

shall serve opposing counsel with such portions.” As explained

below, this claim fails.

During the prosecutor’s direct examination of the medical

examiner, who was qualified as an expert witness, the prosecutor

sought to elicit the examiner’s testimony about her review of the

photographs of the injury to Dixon’s forehead after the stabbing and

whether that injury was a gunshot wound. Dixon’s trial counsel

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objected, arguing that although the State had provided the defense

with the medical examiner’s autopsy report, the State had not

provided a report regarding the examiner’s opinion about the cause

of Dixon’s forehead injury. See OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4). Outside of

the presence of the jury, the prosecutor conceded that no such report

was provided, and the trial court sustained the objection and

excluded the medical examiner’s opinion about Dixon’s injury.

The jury was then brought back into the courtroom, and the

prosecutor asked the medical examiner about the differences

between stab wounds and gunshot wounds. The examiner testified

that stab wounds are “usually linear in shape” while gunshot

wounds are “round or ovoid in shape” and “have a marginal

abrasion.” The prosecutor also elicited the medical examiner’s

testimony that a “graze gunshot wound” is often “an elongated kind

of oval shape” and is “very superficial” because “it just scrapes along

the skin surface.” When the prosecutor then asked whether a graze

gunshot wound would look different than a cut, Dixon’s counsel

objected and moved “to strike this testimony.” The trial court

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sustained the objection and said that it was “not going to strike

anything.” The prosecutor then ended her direct examination.

Notably, the trial court sustained Dixon’s objection to the

medical examiner’s testimony about her examination of the

photographs of Dixon’s injury and whether that injury was a

gunshot wound, and the prosecutor did not ask any further

questions about the examiner’s review of the photos or her opinion

about the cause of Dixon’s injury. 3 Rather, the prosecutor asked

only about the general differences between stab wounds and

gunshot wounds, and the medical examiner testified about some of

the typical characteristics of those wounds and how they are usually

shaped. The medical examiner’s testimony on those points was

based entirely upon her own experience studying and observing the

general features of various stab wounds and gunshot wounds. Thus,

the testimony did not convey the results of a “physical or mental

examination[]” or “scientific test[] or experiment[]” within the

3 We express no opinion as to the trial court’s ruling sustaining Dixon’s

objection to, and thus excluding, the medical examiner’s testimony about the
photos of Dixon’s injury and the cause of the injury.
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meaning of OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4), such that disclosure was not

required. See Green v. State, 307 Ga. 171, 176–77 (2019) (explaining

that an expert witness’s opinion that was based “almost entirely

upon his own observations and measurements of the available

evidence, as well as application of established principles of

mathematics and physics to those measurements,” “did not

constitute a ‘scientific test or experiment’ requiring disclosure”

under OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4)). Because the testimony that Dixon

challenges was not subject to the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-

4(a)(4), the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding not to

strike the testimony on the ground that the prosecutor failed to

comply with the statute. See Green, 307 Ga. at 176–77. 4

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

4 Dixon also mentions in her brief in this Court that the trial court should

have given “some type of limiting instruction” regarding the medical
examiner’s testimony. Dixon did not ask for a limiting instruction at trial. And
she makes no argument in her brief about what any such instruction should
have said or why the trial court should have given it. Accordingly, this claim
is deemed abandoned under Supreme Court Rule 22. See, e.g., Byrd, 321 Ga.
at 225–27.
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