CourtListener 10846010

Full text

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 3, 2026

S26Y0042. IN THE MATTER OF OKSANA KLYMOVYCH.

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board, reviewing

the report and recommendation of special master M.J. Blakely and

recommending that respondent Oksana Klymovych (State Bar No.

545028) be suspended for one year for violations of several

provisions of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”),

in connection with her representation of a single client. The special

master’s determination that Klymovych violated the GRPC was

based on the finding that Klymovych was in default. However, after

the special master entered his order, we have clarified that in

attorney disciplinary matters, there is a strong preference for

“deciding cases on their merits.” In the Matter of Alexander, 323 Ga.
50, 54 (2025) (quotation marks omitted); In the Matter of Bonnell,

322 Ga. 585, 590 (2025). And here, the record shows that Klymovych

promptly responded to the Bar when first notified about the client’s

grievance, provided substantive answers to the issues raised,

provided documents regarding the client’s allegations, and

participated in the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, we conclude that

the special master abused his discretion in denying Klymovych’s

motion to open default, and we reverse in part and remand for

further proceedings addressing the merits of Klymovych’s

arguments.

With respect to the issue of default, the record shows that

Klymovych was retained by a client in the summer of 2022 and

deposited client funds in an IOLTA account. In December 2022,

Klymovych returned the funds to the client after the client filed a

grievance with the State Bar. In early 2023, the State Bar and

Klymovych exchanged emails regarding the matter, and Klymovych

provided information and documents about the representation. In

April 2023, the State Bar issued a Notice of Investigation regarding

2
the client’s grievance, and Klymovych provided a written response

in May 2023. On October 24, 2023, a member of the Board emailed

Klymovych with questions about her representation of the client,

and Klymovych responded by email. On October 27, 2023, the State

Bar issued a notice of probable cause finding probable cause to

charge Klymovych with violations of multiple GRPC arising out of

her representation of the client. On December 15, 2023, the State

Bar filed a formal complaint against Klymovych and sought the

appointment of a special master. This Court then appointed a

special master, see Case No. S24B0475 (Dec. 18, 2023), and

Klymovych acknowledged service of the formal complaint on

December 27, 2023. Klymovych did not file a timely answer, and the

State Bar filed a motion for default. A hearing on the motion for

default was set, and Klymovych appeared at the hearing.

On the day of the hearing, Klymovych filed her answer to the

State Bar’s complaint, in which she addressed at length the factual

assertions and violations of the GRPC alleged in the formal

complaint. At the hearing before the special master, Klymovych

3
apologized for her lack of communication; stated that she intended

to engage fully with the State Bar regarding the grievance, noting

the communications she had with the State Bar in 2022 and 2023;

and stated that she misunderstood the appropriate procedures for

disciplinary matters. Klymovych explained that she believed she

had provided answers and explanations to the State Bar that she

felt were sufficient to address the issues raised by the client’s

grievance. Klymovych also noted that she had received her Bar

license and opened her solo practice in 2019, shortly before the onset

of the Covid-19 pandemic, which limited her ability to meet and

learn from other lawyers, and that, as a native Ukrainian, she had

become involved in volunteer work with the Ukrainian community

in Georgia following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022,

including taking on hundreds of immigration cases on behalf of

Ukrainian clients.

Klymovych stated that she had been surprised when the formal

complaint issued, and between her busy schedule as a solo

practitioner and single mother and her misunderstandings about

4
the disciplinary process, she failed to file a timely answer. At the

hearing, Klymovych made an oral motion to open default under

OCGA § 9-11-55(b). See In the Matter of Turk, 267 Ga. 30, 30 (1985)

(holding that OCGA § 9-11-55(b), which governs the process for

opening defaults in civil actions, applies in disciplinary

proceedings). Klymovych argued that “proper cause” existed to open

the default; that she did not willfully fail to file an answer but

misinterpreted the rules; that the materials she had provided to the

State Bar provided a valid defense to the charged violations; and

that she was ready to proceed with the hearing. See generally In the

Matter of Boyd, 315 Ga. 390, 394 (2022) (explaining that “the proper-

case ground for opening a default should be liberally applied so as to

keep with the policy of deciding cases on their merits”). However,

the special master granted the State Bar’s motion for default and

denied Klymovych’s motion to open default.

A few weeks after the hearing, Klymovych filed a “Motion to

Reconsider the Motion to Vacate (Reopen) Default and Motion to

Reopen Default.” In addition to reiterating her assertions from the

5
hearing regarding her request to open default, Klymovych denied

that she had willfully disregarded her obligation to comply with the

appropriate process and asserted that her mishandling of the

disciplinary process was the result of an honest mistake, partially

caused by the fact that she is representing herself in unfamiliar

proceedings, and was not due to any malicious or willful non-

compliance; and that her difficult personal circumstances should be

considered as also having given rise to her inadvertent non-

compliance with the appropriate disciplinary procedure. In response

to Klymovych’s motion to reconsider, the State Bar noted that

Klymovych had admitted at the hearing that she had failed to file a

timely, formal, written answer and argued that her motion should

be denied.

In the special master’s report and recommendation, he found

that the allegations of the formal complaint were admitted by

Klymovych’s default and that a one-year suspension was the

appropriate sanction. On the same day, the special master entered

a brief order denying Klymovych’s motion for reconsideration,

6
noting that Klymovych had admitted at the hearing that she had

failed to file a timely, formal, written answer and that she had

presented no new evidence or argument as to the default issue.

Klymovych filed exceptions to the special master’s report and

recommendation with the Review Board to which the State Bar

responded. The Review Board issued its report and

recommendation, and with respect to the issue of default, concluded

summarily that a default was warranted and that Klymovych failed

to present a meritorious defense.

Having considered the full record and the parties’ filings in this

Court, we conclude that under these particular circumstances, the

special master abused his discretion in refusing to open default. The

record demonstrates that Klymovych actively participated and

cooperated with the State Bar between the time that the grievance

was filed and when the formal complaint was filed a year later;

provided detailed information and documentation regarding her

representation of the client; and provided an explanation for her

failure to timely file an answer. Additionally, recent cases issued

7
after the entry of the special master’s order here, make clear that,

as to attorney disciplinary matters, there “is a strong preference for

‘deciding cases on their merits’”; that “the principle that, when

possible, disciplinary cases should be decided on the merits is

particularly true where the record is clear that the attorney has

attempted to cooperate and participate in the disciplinary

proceedings”; that “defaults in disciplinary cases most often involve

respondents who completely fail to respond to disciplinary

proceedings”; that “the proper-case ground for opening a default

should be liberally applied so as to keep with the policy of deciding

cases on their merits”; and that “Special Masters have very ample

powers to open defaults.” Bonnell, 322 Ga. at 590–92 (cleaned up).

We have further noted that “considerations for determining whether

the proper-case ground should apply include whether the failure to

file a timely answer resulted from ‘willful or gross negligence’ and

whether the other party ‘will be harmed or prejudiced by opening

the default.’” Id. at 591. In this matter, the record would support a

finding that Klymovych’s failure to timely file an answer resulted

8
from an honest misunderstanding of the inadequacy of her

communications with the Bar regarding the grievance, rather than

from any “willful or gross negligence.” Moreover, the State Bar has

not established that there would be any harm or prejudice to it

resulting from the opening of default. Finally, it is not clear that the

Bar is correct in its assertion that Klymovych has failed to establish

the “meritorious defense” condition for opening default. See

generally In the Matter of Mylee, Case No. S25Y0888, slip op. at 21

(January 21, 2026) (stating that in considering the requirements to

open default, “we see good reason in … liberally applying the …

requirement to set up a meritorious defense”). However, we express

no opinion on whether Klymovych’s defenses to the charged Rules

violations will ultimately be meritorious. The Bar also makes no

attempt to argue that a “meritorious defense” has not been

established by reference to the standards established in the relevant

case law, instead simply stating so in a conclusory fashion.

Accordingly, we disagree with the Review Board and hold that

the special master abused his discretion in refusing to open default

9
under these particular circumstances. Therefore, the Court reverses

the special master’s order denying Klymovych’s motion to open

default and remands this matter to the special master with direction

that he decide the merits of the case in accordance with the

applicable rules and law. 1

Reversed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded. All the
Justices concur.

1 We recognize that it may be difficult to proceed on the merits of a case

when the attorney does not respond to the formal complaint according to the
State Bar Rules. However, nothing in this opinion precludes a special master
from setting a final hearing on the merits with the appropriate notice, even if
the attorney does not respond to the formal complaint.

10
PETERSON, Chief Justice, concurring.

I join fully the decision of the Court concluding that the special

master abused his discretion in refusing to open default. I write

separately to explain that the special master’s decision was

nevertheless reasonable at the time that it was made, given the

limited and conflicting guidance this Court had given.

As the Court’s opinion explains, we have a strong preference

for deciding cases on their merits. See Op. at 2 (citing In the Matter

of Alexander, 323 Ga. 50 (2025); In the Matter of Bonnell, 322 Ga.

585 (2025)). This preference is right and good:

Default is a necessary part of the disciplinary process
because many lawyers who commit serious violations
simply refuse to participate in the process. The public
would be at considerable risk if those lawyers were
allowed to evade discipline simply by staying on the
sidelines. But that’s not what happened here, and
enforcing default in these circumstances (instead of
proceeding to the merits) would not protect the public.

Rule 9.3 requires lawyers to “respond to disciplinary
authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules.” The
maximum penalty for violation of that rule is merely a
public reprimand.

11
In the Matter of Sammons, 316 Ga. 885, 893 (2023) (Peterson, P.J.,

concurring in judgment only). And when default follows from a

violation of Rule 9.3 by someone nevertheless responsive to the

process, it often converts violation of a rule punishable only by a

public reprimand into an automatic suspension or disbarment. See

id.

But although we have frequently said that there is a preference

for reaching the merits, see, e.g., In the Matter of Boyd, 315 Ga. 390,

394 (2022) (remanding for the special master to hold a hearing on

opening default), it is only more recently that we have actually been

applying that preference. Alexander issued in November 2025, and

Bonnell in September 2025. But the special master here issued the

last default-related order in February 2025.

And before February 2025, our binding caselaw made clear

that we expected special masters generally to apply precedent

regarding the Civil Practice Act, and that precedent did not clearly

include the heavy thumb we now put on the scale for reaching the

merits. (For the same reason, I don’t fault the special masters in

12
Alexander or Bonnell.) But now we have made clear repeatedly that,

absent willful noncompliance, complete failure to respond, an

attempt to evade the disciplinary process, or something else of like

kind, disciplinary matters should generally be resolved on the

merits and not by default.

In most other contexts, this shift in approach would likely be

improper (or at least require serious consideration of stare decisis).

But the regulation of the practice of law is different. “We have long

held that this Court has the inherent and exclusive authority to

regulate the practice of law in Georgia.” In the Matter of Brown, 319

Ga. 465, 478 (2024). The entire disciplinary process is our process.

When a statute like OCGA § 9-11-55 vests discretion in trial courts

regarding default, that discretion is vested by the General Assembly

through its exercise of the legislative power. See OCGA § 9-11-55

(“At any time before final judgment, the court, in its discretion, upon

payment of costs, may allow the default to be opened … .”). A proper

respect for the separation of powers thus requires us to respect the

full scope of that discretion. But whatever discretion special masters

13
enjoy regarding default in Bar discipline cases is discretion purely

of our own creation in the exercise of our judicial power, and thus

we have more freedom to shift approach than in an ordinary appeal.

Cf. Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer, 316 Ga. 855, 860 n.5 (2023)

(“Although we do generally defer to factual findings by the Hearing

Panel (and ultimately do so here on the critical points), the broad

and discretionary nature of our review in judicial discipline matters

means that we need not always defer even in situations where we

would defer to a factfinder in an ordinary appeal.”). When we see

that the disciplinary system would function better with less

discretion on a certain point, it is not only within our authority to

adjust that discretion, it is our obligation to do so.

One more word on default in disciplinary proceedings. Our

preference for reaching the merits in disciplinary matters means

that a special master’s discretion to deny opening default is

materially narrower than a trial court judge’s similar discretion

under OCGA § 9-11-55. And yet our precedent looks to § 9-11-55 for

guidance. Lawyers, the Bar, and special masters would be much

14
better off with a Bar-specific rule regarding default. To that end, I

would encourage the Bar to consider crafting such a rule.

I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Warren and

Justice Bethel join in this concurrence.