CourtListener 10846048

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 21, 2026

S25A1234. PHILLIPS v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

A DeKalb County jury found Eureon Phillips guilty of felony

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Tiffany Valkoun. 1 Phillips contends that the evidence was

1 The crimes occurred on September 13, 2019. On January 16, 2020, a

DeKalb County grand jury returned an indictment charging Phillips with the
malice murder of Valkoun (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (Count 2), felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), arson in the first
degree (Count 5), concealing the death of another (Count 6), possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 8). Antisa Columbus and Lonzell Guffie were
also named in the indictment, having been charged with arson in the first
degree (Count 5) and concealing the death of another (Count 6). Phillips was
tried separately, and at the time of his trial, the cases against his co-indictees
remained pending.
At the conclusion of a jury trial that began on May 10, 2023, the jury
found Phillips guilty on all counts, except malice murder (Count 1). On May
31, 2023, the trial court sentenced Phillips to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for felony murder (Count 3); twenty years in prison,
concurrent to Count 3, for aggravated assault (Count 4); twenty years in
prison, concurrent to Count 3, for arson in the first degree (Count 5); 10 years
in prison, concurrent to Count 3, for concealing the death of another (Count 6);
and, five years in prison, consecutive to Count 3, for possession of a firearm
insufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict, that the trial court erred

in denying Phillips’s motion for a mistrial, and that the trial court

erred when it denied defense counsel’s request to play two witness

statements to the jury in their entirety. For the reasons explained

below, we see no merit to these claims of error and affirm.

1. Phillips contends that the State’s evidence was insufficient

as a matter of constitutional due process to support the jury’s verdict

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307,

318–319 (1979). In assessing this claim of error, “we view all of the

evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts

and consider whether any rational juror could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which

he was convicted.” Moulder v. State, 317 Ga. 43, 46–47 (2023). And

“[w]e leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies

during the commission of a felony (Count 8). The remaining counts (Counts 2
and 7) were vacated by operation of law or merged. Phillips timely filed a
motion for new trial on May 30, 2023, which he amended on September 2, 2024.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on November
21, 2024. Phillips timely filed a notice of appeal on December 16, 2024, which
he amended on February 26, 2025. The case was docketed in this Court to the
August 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences

to be derived from the facts.” Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891

(2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “As long as there is

some competent evidence, even [if] contradicted, to support each fact

necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be

upheld.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2018) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

So viewed, the evidence presented at trial showed that on

September 13, 2019, police responded to a 911 call concerning a loud

explosion in a DeKalb County neighborhood. When they arrived,

they found a van engulfed in flames. After the fire was extinguished,

they discovered a burned body inside the van. Investigators later

determined that the charred remains belonged to Valkoun and that

the van had been loaned to her by its owner, her father, Alan

Valkoun. The medical examiner testified that Valkoun’s cause of

death was a gunshot wound to the back of the head and that the

burns to her body had occurred post-mortem.

An arson investigator testified that the fire had been started in

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the van’s passenger compartment, that the gas tank was intact, and

that the odor of gasoline emanated from the van’s interior. A forensic

chemist confirmed the presence of gasoline on Valkoun’s clothing

and on materials cut from the van’s interior.

Investigators reviewed surveillance video recordings from

Valkoun’s apartment complex and observed her and another woman

entering and leaving the apartment on September 13. The video

recordings also showed the van leaving the complex. The video

recordings as well as information gleaned from Valkoun’s cell phone

records led investigators to the woman who had been with her prior

to her death, Antisa Columbus. Valkoun’s cell phone data showed

that she had been communicating with Columbus shortly before

leaving her residence.

Columbus testified at trial that she was Valkoun’s friend and

that she was dating Phillips at the time of the crimes. Columbus

testified that, when the police first interviewed her, she told them

she was not involved in Valkoun’s death. She said she lied because

she was “terrified” of Phillips. Columbus recounted how she

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occasionally borrowed the van to get to and from work. On the day

of the murder, Columbus borrowed the van and drove it to Phillips’s

residence on Rosewood Road in DeKalb County. Columbus,

Valkoun, and Phillips were together in front of Phillips’s residence.

According to Columbus, the three argued about Valkoun’s intention

to return the van. Valkoun then spit on Phillips, and Phillips

responded by pulling a gun out of his pocket and hitting her on the

head with it. Columbus testified that Phillips’s gun discharged,

killing Valkoun. Columbus testified that she and Phillips changed

their clothes and cleaned Valkoun’s blood off themselves. Phillips

then enlisted his friend, Lonzell Guffie, to help him dispose of the

body.

Guffie testified that he was a long-time friend of Phillips and

that Phillips contacted him on September 13, telling him that he had

a job for him to do. Phillips picked Guffie up and the two drove to a

gas station where Phillips purchased gas which he pumped into a

gas can. Thereafter, they drove to a house where the van was

parked. Phillips told Guffie to drive the van, but when he got in, he

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found a body inside. He tried to refuse, but Phillips said he would

kill him if he did not do as he was told. Guffie testified that he drove

the van while someone else, a person he suspected was Phillips’s

girlfriend, sat in the back seat. After they got out of the van, Guffie,

at Phillips’s direction, poured gas on the body. Someone threw a

burning match and a fire erupted. Guffie admitted he sustained

burns to his chest and stomach from the fire. Phillips then drove

Guffie back where he had picked him up. On the way, he told Guffie

that he had shot Valkoun in the back of the head. Guffie testified

that Phillips confided that “he put the gun in the back of [Valkoun’s]

head[,] and the gun went off.” He threatened to kill Guffie if he called

the police. After Phillips threatened Guffie’s life again the following

day, Guffie turned himself in to the police.

Cell site location data subpoenaed by investigators from

Valkoun’s, Columbus’s, and Phillips’s cell phone providers

corroborated witness testimony concerning the evening’s events.

The data showed that all three cell phones were in the same area of

DeKalb County at the time of the murder. The data also showed

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Columbus’s and Phillips’s cell phones traveling together both before

and after the 911 call reporting the burning van. At trial, Phillips

stipulated to being a convicted felon.

Phillips challenges the sufficiency of this evidence by asserting

that the “testimony of the State’s crucial witness [Antisa Columbus]

was impermissibly bolstered by the State,” and that the jury must

have had “substantial doubts as to the State’s case” because it

acquitted Phillips of malice murder. Neither of Phillips’s assertions

constitute grounds for showing that the evidence was insufficient as

a matter of due process because the assertions do not challenge

whether there was some competent evidence, even if contradicted,

to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case. See, e.g.,

Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. at 891; Jones v. State, 304 Ga. at 598.

Consequently, this claim of error fails.

2. Phillips argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for a mistrial when a State’s witness, Sergeant Drew Collins,

impermissibly commented on the truthfulness of Columbus during

direct examination. For the following reasons, this claim of error is

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without merit.

During examination of Sergeant Collins, the prosecutor asked

about the statements that Columbus had given him:

Q: When she talked to you initially[,] was she truthful?
A: No, not initially.
Q: Then was she later truthful in that same statement?
A: Yes.

Defense counsel objected, arguing that the State was “[a]sking

the witness for his opinion on someone’s credibility, that’s the

province of the jury.” The trial court responded: “He [Sergeant

Collins] can’t make a determination of credibility. He can tell what

he found in his investigation. You may want to restate that question

so that it does not appear that he is trying to say whether or not that

individual was credible or not.” After the prosecutor then asked five

questions related to Columbus’s phone records, defense counsel

asserted that he had a motion to make outside the presence of the

jury. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing

that the State was using Sergeant Collins to bolster the credibility

of the State’s “star witness,” Columbus, by vouching for her

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truthfulness. After a brief recess, the trial court denied the motion

and announced that it would give curative instructions.

Assuming, without deciding, that this claim of error was

adequately preserved for appellate review, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial as the trial

court’s curative instruction was sufficient to counter any alleged

harm caused by the witness’s brief statement. “The decision to grant

a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be

disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is

essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” Perkins v.

State, 313 Ga. 885, 896 (2022) (cleaned up). “Trial courts are vested

with great discretion to grant or deny mistrials because they are in

the best possible position to determine whether one is warranted.”

Allen v. State, 315 Ga. 524, 533 (2023) (cleaned up). Where a trial

court “elects to give a curative instruction, [this Court] will not grant

a new trial unless it is clear that the [trial] court’s instruction failed

to eliminate the effect of the prejudicial comment.” Williams v. State,

301 Ga. 712, 717 (2017).

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The trial court gave the following curative instructions:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before you went to
lunch you heard some testimony from Sergeant Collins.
Sergeant Collins gave some testimony regarding what he
believed about statements made by Antisa Columbus.
Please disregard any characterization of those
statements. As members of the jury, you alone are the
triers of fact and you alone may determine the credibility
of the witnesses in this trial.
In deciding this, you may consider all of the facts and
circumstances of the case including the witness’s manner
of testifying, their intelligence[2], their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts about which they testify,
the nature of the facts about which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case, and
their personal credibility as you observe it.

In its final charge to the jury, the trial court repeated this

admonition in the instruction concerning the credibility of

witnesses.

The curative instructions were adequate to cure any harm for

the following reasons. First, we note that “qualified jurors under

2 Although Jackson has not raised the following as a claim of error, this

Court has expressed concern with respect to the portion of the charge
concerning witness “intelligence”; nevertheless “we have held that, “even
assuming the better practice is to omit intelligence as one of the factors in the
credibility charge, its inclusion is not reversible error.” Jackson v. State, 318
Ga. 393, 404 (2024).
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oath are presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court,” Allen

v. State, 277 Ga. 502, 504 (2004), and Phillips has not argued that

the jury would have been confused or misled by this instruction as

given. Second, the instruction was sufficient to cure the harm

alleged. The investigator’s testimony contained no reference to

specific statements by Columbus that the investigator expressly

believed were truthful or untruthful. The exchange was brief and

did not characterize Columbus’s trial testimony as being truthful.

Moreover, during her own trial testimony, Columbus characterized

her first statement to the investigator as untruthful because she was

afraid of Phillips. Thus, the jury could view the investigator’s

testimony as simply recounting what Columbus had told him about

her reasons for revising her statement. For these reasons, we see no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny Phillips’s

motion for a mistrial and instead to give curative instructions. See

Williams, 301 Ga. at 717.

3. Phillips further asserts that the trial court erred in

restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of Guffie and

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Columbus by not allowing their recorded “witness statements to be

played to the jury in their entirety.” Because the jury did not hear

the statements in full, Phillips argues, the jury could not determine

if the witnesses, especially Columbus, were being truthful. We

disagree.

Phillips has not identified any ruling from the trial court that

expressly limited his cross-examination of any witness, including

questions counsel posed concerning Columbus’s first statement to

the police. Instead, he took issue with the trial court’s ruling

permitting him to play for the jury only those portions of the

witnesses’ recorded interviews that were inconsistent with the

witnesses’ trial testimony. The trial court explained to defense

counsel that he must comply with the evidentiary rule governing the

admission of prior inconsistent statements before he could introduce

extrinsic evidence of out-of-court witness statements. 3 Phillips has

3 Phillips has not shown that the court’s ruling in this respect was
erroneous. Indeed, pursuant to OCGA § 24-6-613(b),
[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness
shall not be admissible unless the witness is first afforded an

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not identified any law that supports his contention that he was

entitled to play the witness interviews in their entirety.

Specifically, the record shows that Phillips initially asked to

have portions of the recorded interviews of Guffie and Columbus,

both witnesses for the prosecution, played for the jury. The record

shows that the trial court permitted the defense to play portions of

these interviews, in the presence of the jury, to refresh the

witnesses’ recollections or to impeach them during cross-

examination. However, the trial court did not permit Phillips to play

the interviews in their entirety. The record also shows that counsel

initially conceded that this was the correct procedure. Nevertheless,

he later renewed his motion to play the statements to the jury in

their entirety. Again, the court denied the motion. Moreover, in its

order denying Phillips’s motion for new trial, the trial court

opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement
and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate
the witness on the prior inconsistent statement or the interests of
justice otherwise require.
See also OCGA § 24-8-801(d)(1)(A) (prior inconsistent statements meeting
requirements of OCGA § 24-6-613(b) are not hearsay if the declarant testifies
at trial and is subject to cross-examination).
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reiterated its ruling, “which was simply that any prior statements

were admissible only if inconsistent with the [the witnesses’] trial

testimony.” The trial court further noted that

[Phillips] has not pointed to exactly what within the prior
statements he is alleging the jury did not hear from the
stand. Both witnesses were cross-examined at length and,
since the prior statements were not admitted into
evidence and no proffer of their contents was made at trial
or at the new trial hearing, the [c]ourt could only
speculate what is contained within them that was not
testified to at trial.

Assuming without deciding that Phillips preserved this claim

of error for ordinary review, we see no abuse of discretion.4 “Like

most questions about the admissibility of evidence, the scope of

cross-examination is committed in the first instance to the sound

discretion of the trial court, and we review a limitation of cross-

examination only for an abuse of that discretion.” Lucas v. State, 303

Ga. 134, 136–37 (2018). Here, the record does not show that the trial

court improperly curtailed the scope of cross-examination. Rather,

4 See Walker v. State, 301 Ga. 482, 488 (2017) (discussing the necessity

of a proffer when evaluating whether a ruling excluding evidence has been
preserved for ordinary appellate review pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-103(a)(2)).
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the record shows that, in accordance with OCGA § 24-6-613(b), the

trial court permitted Phillips to cross-examine Guffie and Columbus

with their prior inconsistent statements within the bounds of the

law. See Lucas, 303 Ga. at 137–40. For these reasons, we discern no

abuse of discretion.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.