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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 5, 2026

S25A1220. ADAMS v. THE STATE.

LAND, Justice.

Tony Adams, Jr. was convicted of malice murder and other

crimes in relation to the stabbing and shooting death of his mother,

Belinda Woodson. 1 On appeal, Adams argues that his trial counsel

1 The crimes occurred on May 10, 2018. On July 16, 2018, a Dooly County

grand jury indicted Adams, charging him with malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 3-4), possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5), and possession of a knife
during the commission of a felony (Count 6).
At a trial from October 25 through 28, 2021, a jury found Adams guilty
on all counts. On November 2, 2021, the trial court sentenced Adams to serve
life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1, a 20-year sentence
for Count 4 (consecutive to Count 1), a five-year sentence for Count 5
(consecutive to Count 1), and a five-year sentence for Count 6 (consecutive to
Count 4). Count 2 was vacated by operation of law. Although the trial court
purported to merge Count 3 into Count 2 for sentencing purposes, it should
have instead been merged into Count 1 because Count 2 was vacated. However,
we decline to correct the error because a correction would have no impact on
Adams’s sentence. See Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 153 (2023) (where “the
trial court’s incorrect nomenclature did not affect [a]ppellant’s sentence,”
“there is no sentencing error to correct”).
Adams filed a timely motion for new trial on November 1, 2021, which
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to

properly investigate Adams’s competency to stand trial, failing to

raise an insanity defense, and stating during Adams’s direct

examination in front of the jury “Are you for real here today? Are

you expecting us to believe all this nonsense?” Adams also argues

that the trial court erred by denying his motion to conduct a post-

judgment competency hearing. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for resentencing.

The evidence presented at trial showed that Adams lived with

Woodson and her husband, Tyrone Woodson (“Tyrone”). Tyrone

testified that, on the morning of May 10, 2018, while he was at work,

he got a call from Woodson about Adams “acting up.” He advised

Woodson to call the police and ask that Adams “be removed from the

house.” Woodson told Tyrone that she spoke with the police but they

was later amended through new counsel on July 30, 2024. Following a hearing
on January 14, 2025, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as
amended, on April 14, 2025. Adams timely filed a notice of appeal on April 21,
2025. This case was docketed to the August 2025 term of this Court and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
“said nothing could be d[one] about it that day.”2 Tyrone came home

at lunch, thought “everything was all right” between Woodson and

Adams, and then returned to work.

Tyrone further testified that, when he arrived home around

7:30 p.m., things at the house were “like normal.” But then Adams

broke a window in his room, and Woodson became upset and called

the police. Around 10:20 p.m., two officers came to the house, but

Adams was not removed. 3

After the officers left, Tyrone went into the primary bedroom,

and Woodson brought him a sandwich. Woodson went back towards

the kitchen, and then there was a “commotion.” Tyrone testified that

Woodson ran back into the bedroom, tripped, and fell on the bedroom

2 An officer testified that Woodson came into the Vienna police station

around 10:30 a.m. that morning “to make a complaint” about Adams and said
that she “wanted [Adams] to leave.” The officer went to the house and spoke
with Adams, who seemed “calm.” He advised Woodson that, since Adams had
been living at the house, his removal was “a matter that [Woodson] had to go
talk to the Magistrate Court Judge on.” He testified that no threats had been
made and that, when he left the house, neither Woodson nor Adams seemed
upset.
3 These officers testified that they spoke to Woodson and Adams and

concluded that they could not “force [Adams] to leave” because there was “no
intent to commit a crime when he broke the window.” When the officers left,
“[t]here was no sign of aggression” and nobody was “threatening anybody.”
3
floor. Adams, who was “running behind” Woodson, got “on her back,

like trying to stab her.” Adams stabbed Woodson twice before Tyrone

was able to take the knife from him. Tyrone “thought for sure that

[Woodson] had r[u]n out the door,” because he no longer saw her and

she was not answering him. 4 Adams ran towards his room and then

back towards Tyrone, so Tyrone ran out the front door. As he did,

Tyrone heard “two or three” gunshots.5

Across the street at a neighbor’s house, Irving Young, Evokeyo

Lundy, and Joseph Smith were outside in the yard. Lundy testified

that he heard a woman “scream out,” the men heard gunshots, and

Tyrone came running out of his house towards them. Tyrone told the

men to call the police because Adams had either “killed himself or

he killed his mother.” Adams then ran out of the house after Tyrone,

holding a gun and calling out, “pop, I got this. I got this.” Tyrone

“took off running again” towards another neighbor’s house. Tyrone

told the second neighbor that he had taken a knife from Adams

4Woodson instead had gone into the bathroom; the water was still
running when investigators arrived at the scene.
5 Tyrone testified that, to his knowledge, there were no guns in the house.

4
because Adams was “sticking his mama.” Tyrone placed the knife in

a bag, gave it to the neighbor, and told him to call the police.

Meanwhile, Smith attempted to talk to Adams and tried to calm him

down. Lundy testified that Adams then “aim[ed] the gun … and

sho[t] himself” in the arm before returning to his house.

At 11:02 p.m., the two officers who responded to the earlier call

about the broken window responded to a report of “shots fired” at

Woodson’s house. Adams ran up to the patrol cars to speak with the

officers, who noticed that Adams had “a piece of clothing wrapped

around his left arm.” Adams told them that Woodson “had tried to

stab him, and he took the knife from her. … when he took the knife,

she shot him in the arm, and he took the gun away from her.” Adams

then told one of the officers that “when he took the gun, he done

what needed to be done, and she was dead.” The other officer

handcuffed Adams and placed him in the back of his patrol vehicle.

He then went inside the house to check on Woodson and found her

lying face down on the floor between the bedroom and bathroom with

a gun by her left hand. Woodson was pronounced dead at the scene,

5
and a medical examiner testified at trial that Woodson’s cause of

death was multiple gunshot and sharp force wounds.

An investigator who responded to the scene testified that the

blood stain around Woodson’s body indicated that she was standing

in the door between the bathroom and bedroom when she was killed.

He recovered a Jiminez Arms 9mm firearm from Woodson’s hand

and noted that the direction in which the firearm was laying did not

“look right” and made “no sense for someone who held a gun in that

hand.” The investigator located several cartridge casings and bullets

inside the bedroom and hallway, as well as a cartridge casing and

some blood stains on a table in Young’s yard.6 In Adams’s bedroom,

the investigator found a gun box containing a box of 9mm

ammunition, which matched the make and caliber involved in the

shooting, as well as a safe box containing a “bunch of knives.” 7 He

6 A firearms examiner testified that the seven 9mm cartridge casings

recovered from the scene – including the one from Young’s yard – and the four
bullets – including the one removed from Woodson’s body – were all fired from
the Jiminez Arms 9mm pistol.
7 Fingerprints were lifted from the box of ammunition, and the crime lab

confirmed that two of the fingerprints were Adams’s.
6
also noted a “blood drip trail” that had been left by someone who had

traveled from Young’s yard into Woodson’s bedroom.

Adams was taken to the Dooly County Jail, where he was

advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436

(1966), and subsequently interviewed by law enforcement. The

investigator who interviewed Adams testified that Adams could

read and write, did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs

or alcohol, and was responsive to the questions asked during the

interview. Adams initially claimed that Woodson came from the

kitchen with a knife, that he took it and “stabbed her … a few times”

before she ran back towards the bathroom and shot him in the arm

as he was standing in the hallway. Adams then “got the gun” from

Woodson and shot her several times. He claimed that he never shot

the gun outside.

Later, when confronted with the ballistics evidence, Adams

eventually conceded that Woodson did not shoot him. He then

admitted that he shot himself in the arm outside in the neighbor’s

yard, returned to his house, and then placed the gun in Woodson’s

7
hand because he needed “some type of … defense in [his] way.”

Adams testified in his own defense at trial, where he again

admitted to stabbing and shooting Woodson. Following these

admissions, his trial counsel inquired into Adams’s motive. Adams

testified that there was a “situation between me, my mother, and

the money that was with my mother” and that he “was setup. … my

mother activated the anger in me.” He claimed that he was not

“there in the spirit” when he killed Woodson, that his “body had a

criminal in it” and committed the crimes, and that he could not

remember the situation. Adams attributed his actions to the fact

that he had previously been “hit with needles and blood” and was

“drug-abused and date raped.” When asked why he shot himself in

the arm, Adams stated it was because of a “clear possession.

Possession. An exorcism.” Adams’s counsel then asked, “Really.

Seriously. Are you for real here today? Are you expecting us to

believe all this nonsense?” to which Adams replied, “A hundred

percent.”

1. Adams argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because

8
he failed to properly investigate Adams’s competency to stand trial,

failed to raise an insanity defense, and stated during Adams’s direct

examination in front of the jury, “Are you for real here today? Are

you expecting us to believe all this nonsense?” We are unpersuaded.

For Adams to prevail on his ineffective assistance claims, he

must show that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that the

deficiency prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US

668, 687 (1984). To show deficiency, Adams must establish that his

trial counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way

considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing

professional norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted). The law “recognizes a ‘strong

presumption’ that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant

bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Evans v. State,

315 Ga. 607, 611 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). And

“hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial

counsel, and a lawyer second-guessing his own performance with the

benefit of hindsight has no significance for an ineffective assistance

9
of counsel claim.” Taylor, 315 Ga. at 649 (citation and punctuation

omitted).

To satisfy the prejudice prong, Adams “must prove that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency,

the result of the trial would have been different.” Scott v. State, 322

Ga. 395, 400 (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted). If Adams

“fails to make a sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the

prejudice prong, we need not address the other prong.” Id. “In

reviewing a ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we

defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly

erroneous, but we apply the law to the facts de novo.” Payne v. State,

314 Ga. 322, 329 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) Adams argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to properly investigate his competency to stand

trial. We disagree.

On June 21, 2018, the trial court ordered a mental health

evaluation to determine Adams’s competency to stand trial. Adams

was evaluated by the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health on

10
March 21, 2019 and was found competent. The report noted that

Adams “reported a recent history of mental health symptoms” but

that the symptoms resulted from his “significant illicit drug use,”

and that Adams’s test results indicated that he was “grossly feigning

his psychiatric symptoms.” The report also stated that, although

Adams “might be experiencing some depression or anxiety related

to his current legal situation, his symptoms do not appear to be

adversely affecting his understanding of his legal situation” and

concluded that Adams had “the capacity to understand the nature

and object of the proceedings against him, comprehend his own

condition in reference to the proceedings, and … assist his attorney

in providing a proper defense.”

“The threshold for competency is easily met in most cases.”

Gray v. State, 309 Ga. 850, 855 (2020) (cleaned up). We ask whether,

at the time of trial, the defendant was “capable of understanding the

nature and object of the proceedings, comprehends his own condition

in reference to those proceedings, and is able to assist his counsel in

providing a proper defense.” Id. Generally speaking, “a trial

11
counsel’s decision to for[]go or curtail further investigation of an

accused’s mental health, even when there has been a previous

mental hospitalization, is reasonable when an expert has

determined that the defendant is fit to stand trial.” Sullivan v. State,

308 Ga. 508, 513 (2020) (cleaned up).

Here, Adams has failed to establish that it was objectively

unreasonable for trial counsel not to further investigate his

competency to stand trial. Prior to trial, Adams underwent a mental

health evaluation, and the findings not only deemed him competent

to stand trial but also concluded that he was “feigning” his

psychiatric symptoms. Although the evaluation was performed two

years before the trial, counsel testified that he “never saw or heard

or observed anything in [his] interaction with [Adams] that would

have … given [him] any reason to suspect [Adams’s] competency” to

stand trial, and Adams does not point to any evidence arising

subsequent to the report which would indicate that his mental

12
health had changed since it was issued. 8 Under these circumstances,

trial counsel did not perform deficiently in forgoing a second

competency opinion. See Sullivan, 308 Ga. at 514 (“Given this

record, even if other attorneys might have explored the mental issue

further, we cannot conclude that the investigation by and tactical

judgment of [a]ppellant’s attorney was outside the wide range of

reasonably effective assistance.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)).

(b) Adams argues that trial counsel also rendered ineffective

assistance by not raising an insanity defense. We disagree.

“An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a

question of trial strategy, and trial strategy, if reasonable, does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Brooks v. State, 309 Ga.

630, 637 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Taylor, 315

8 Although Adams points to the testimony of a nurse at the Dooly County

Jail where Adams was incarcerated prior to trial that she referred Adams to
Middle Flint Behavioral Services for a mental health evaluation where he was
prescribed medication, the nurse also testified that Adams never made any
comments that she perceived as “delusion[al],” that she sent him to behavioral
services because he “wanted to change his name,” and that his behavior was
consistent with “just being a difficult person.”
13
Ga. at 647–49 (holding that trial counsel’s decision not to raise an

insanity defense was not an objectively unreasonable trial strategy

where counsel considered a psychological report that defendant was

not suffering from a delusion at the time of the crimes, ceased

additional investigation into defendant’s mental health, and decided

against raising additional evidence that could have supported an

insanity defense).

At the hearing on Adams’s motion for new trial, trial counsel

testified that his defense theory at trial was one of self-defense.

There was some evidence presented at trial to support this theory,

including that Woodson was upset with Adams, Adams’s testimony

that Woodson stabbed and shot him, and that her body was found

with a gun. 9

Meanwhile, there was nothing in Adams’s mental health

evaluation or in trial counsel’s interactions with Adams that led

9 As noted above, however, Adams admitted to investigators during his

interview that he stabbed and shot Woodson, shot himself in the arm, and then
placed the gun back in her hand. The physical evidence at the scene and several
eyewitnesses corroborated this version of events.
14
counsel to believe that Adams suffered from insanity. In fact, his

mental health evaluation concluded that his mental status at the

time of Woodson’s murder was the result of intoxication, that Adams

“was able to distinguish right from wrong,” and that he “was not

operating under a delusional compulsion that overmastered his will

to commit the alleged offense.” Accordingly, trial counsel’s decision

to pursue a defense theory of self-defense instead of an insanity

defense was objectively reasonable, see Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164,

168 (2008) (trial counsel’s decision to pursue a self-defense strategy

instead of an insanity defense was reasonable where psychiatrist

who examined defendant concluded that he was not legally insane),

and Adams’s claim of ineffective assistance therefore fails.

assistance when he asked him, in front of the jury during direct

examination, “Are you for real here today? Are you expecting us to

believe all this nonsense?” We disagree.

During trial counsel’s direct examination of Adams, Adams

was asked about his motive for killing Woodson. He testified that

15
his mother “activated the anger in [him],” that he was not “there in

spirit” when he killed her, that he had previously been “drug-abused

and date raped,” and that he shot himself in the arm because of a

“possession” and “exorcism.” This led to trial counsel’s questions

indicating that Adams’s testimony was “nonsense.”

During the hearing on Adams’s motion for new trial, trial

counsel testified that he originally prepared to present a self-defense

theory at trial but agreed that he “may have had to change trial

strategies” once Adams testified that he shot and stabbed his

mother.

Even assuming that trial counsel’s comments amounted to

deficient performance, Adams has failed to show that he was

prejudiced. He merely argues that the questions “cast doubt on [his]

testimony and credibility” and were “disparaging to” his case. Even

if we accept that argument, the jury was authorized to discredit

Adams’s testimony without these questions, and there was

significant evidence that Adams killed Woodson without any valid

excuse or justification presented at trial. Thus, it is not reasonably

16
likely that counsel’s questions affected the outcome of Adams’s trial.

See Taylor, 315 Ga at 650–51 (assuming without deciding that trial

counsel’s performance was deficient, “[w]e cannot say that there is a

‘reasonable probability’ that [defendant] would have received a

lighter sentence” where evidence of defendant’s guilt, which

included his own admissions, was strong).

2. Adams also argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to conduct a post-judgment competency hearing to determine

whether he had been competent to stand trial. Because we conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we reject this

argument.

Adams’s trial concluded on October 28, 2021. On July 30, 2024,

as part of his amended motion for new trial, Adams moved the court

to conduct a post-judgment competency hearing. In its order denying

Adams’s motion for new trial, the trial court denied Adams’s request

for the hearing. Specifically, the trial court held:

The record before this court contains an evaluation of
[Adams] two and a half years before trial that he was
competent to stand trial and criminally responsible. His

17
attorney found no reason to believe he was incompetent
when working with him prior to and during the trial. At
present, [Adams] is some three years and five months
post-trial, and the court does not believe such an inquiry
at this late date would be informative.

In Cane v. State, 285 Ga. 19, 21–22 (2009), we considered

whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s

post-trial motion that a psychiatric examination was necessary

because “his incompetency was indicated by the ‘emotional and

obsessive behavior’ he demonstrated at trial and at the hearing on

his motion for new trial regarding his ‘unreasonable’ belief that his

statements to the police had been edited.” But the appellant “did not,

either prior to or during trial, raise the issue of incompetency or seek

a hearing regarding his competency, and our examination of the

record fail[ed] to reflect anything that would have required the trial

court to make a sua sponte inquiry about it.” Id. at 22. We concluded

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

appellant’s motion. Id.

While Adams did raise an issue concerning his competency

prior to trial, the mental health evaluation declaring him competent

18
to stand trial was presented to and reviewed by the trial court.

Throughout the investigation and during the trial, Adams agreed

that he understood the proceedings against him. And Adams’s

counsel testified that he found no reason to believe that Adams was

incompetent prior to or during the trial. Even if Adams’s self-serving

testimony could have been interpreted to support his claim of

incompetence, it was within the trial court’s discretion to assess

Adams’s demeanor and other conduct at trial to determine whether

there was a question about his competency. And here, the trial court

had been presented with a mental health evaluation that opined

that Adams was largely feigning his psychiatric symptoms.

Moreover, Adams has not provided expert opinions or medical

records to counter the pre-trial competency determination. 10 Thus,

we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Adams’s

motion for a post-judgment competency hearing.

3. Finally, although Adams does not raise the issue on appeal,

10 As discussed above, the testimony of the nurse from the Dooly County

Jail did not support Adams’s argument that he was mentally incompetent.
19
the trial court erred when it convicted him of both malice murder

(Count 1) and aggravated assault premised on a stabbing (Count 4),

instead of merging the latter into the former. “Even when no party

raises a merger error, if we note such an error, we have the

discretion to correct it on direct appeal.” Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691,

696 (2017). We exercise that discretion here.

OCGA § 16-1-7(a) affords a defendant with substantive
double jeopardy protection by prohibiting multiple
convictions and punishments for the same offense. OCGA
§ 16-1-7(a)(1) prohibits a defendant from being convicted
of more than one crime if one crime is included in another,
and aggravated assault is included in the crime of malice
murder when the former is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts.

Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 665, 666 (2017) (cleaned up).

Adams was convicted of malice murder for the shooting death

of Woodson and of aggravated assault for stabbing her with a knife.

The medical examiner testified that Woodson’s cause of death was

multiple gunshot wounds and sharp force wounds. Although there

was an interval between the stabbing and the shooting, this was not

a case where the stabbing was a non-fatal injury. Based on the

20
evidence presented at trial, the record shows that the stabbing

contributed to the death. Because the aggravated assault conviction

was established by the same facts as the malice murder conviction,

except that the malice murder conviction also required proof of

malice aforethought, the aggravated assault conviction was

included in the malice murder conviction and merged into it. See

Douglas v. State, 321 Ga. 739, 750 (2025). As such, we hereby vacate

Adams’s conviction and sentence for Count 4.

Also, the trial court sentenced Adams to serve five years for the

possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 6), to

run consecutively to the aggravated assault sentence (Count 4).

Because we are vacating the aggravated assault conviction, the

sentence on Count 6 cannot run consecutively to the sentence for

Count 4. As such, we hereby vacate the sentence pertaining to Count

6 and remand for the trial court to resentence Adams on that count,

which could run consecutively to another of the remaining counts.

See Ellington v. State, 314 Ga. 335, 346 (2022) (remanding for

resentencing because the sentence for a vacated conviction would

21
have run consecutively with two other sentences).

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case
remanded for resentencing. All the Justices concur.