Tabb v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0953
Joseph Tabb
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County
No. 19SC168889

Decided: June 2, 2026

PETERSON, Chief Justice.
Joseph Tabb appeals his convictions for malice murder and
other offenses related to the shooting death of Ryan Robinson.1
On appeal, Tabb argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his murder conviction, that the trial court abused its

1 Robinson was found dead on the night of January 31, 2019. In June
2019, a Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment charging Tabb with
malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony murder (Counts 2–4), armed
robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 6),
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 8). The State nolle prossed
Counts 4 and 8 before trial, and at a trial held in June and July 2022, the jury
found Tabb guilty of all remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Tabb to
serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive
life sentence on Count 5, and a consecutive five-year sentence on Count 7. The
remaining counts were either vacated by operation of law or merged for
sentencing purposes. In July 2022, Tabb timely filed a motion for new trial,
which he amended in October 2025, and the trial court denied it in January
2026, following a hearing. Tabb timely filed a notice of appeal, and his appeal
was docketed to this Court’s April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
discretion by requiring him to be shackled during trial, and that
his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm because the trial
evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the improper-
restraint claim was not preserved for appellate review, and Tabb
failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts,
the trial evidence showed the following. Robinson frequently gave
rides to people in exchange for money. On January 27, 2019,
Kiona Woody contacted Robinson through Facebook to coordinate
a ride for Tabb, whom she was dating at the time. Woody testified
that she frequently saw Tabb with a gun and took several pictures
of him in which he had a gun on him.
In the January 27 messages, Woody asked Robinson to pick
up Tabb from Henry’s Pack-a-Sack and drop him off at her
residence. She indicated that Tabb would be wearing green pants,
a black jacket, and “Polo boots.” Video footage from the
surveillance system at Henry’s Pack-a-Sack showed a man
wearing green pants, a jacket, and boots get into Robinson’s car
on January 27, and Robinson’s car departing the parking lot soon
thereafter. Woody confirmed that Robinson drove Tabb to her
residence on January 27.
On January 31, Robinson drove Zakiyah McCoy and some
of her friends to a club. McCoy and her friends left their bags in
Robinson’s car because he was supposed to pick them up later.
Robinson and McCoy exchanged messages after he dropped her
off. Robinson sent his last message at 11:08 p.m., and he did not
respond to McCoy’s other texts or come back for her as planned.
Around the time that Robinson was driving McCoy and her
friends to the club, Woody contacted Robinson to arrange another
ride for Tabb to her residence. Robinson was scheduled to pick up

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Tabb around 10:50 p.m. and was initially directed to meet Tabb
at Henry’s Pack-a-Sack. But at Tabb’s request, Woody directed
Robinson to meet Tabb at the “Orange Store,” which was near
Henry’s Pack-a-Sack. Woody last communicated with Robinson
around 11:10 p.m., asking if he had located Tabb. When Tabb did
not arrive at her residence, Woody texted Robinson, but he did
not reply.
Sometime before midnight, Robinson was found dead in his
car in a driveway behind an abandoned apartment complex,
located approximately 0.2 miles from the Orange Store. When
police arrived at the crime scene, Robinson was still buckled into
the driver’s seat, the car was turned off, and the keys were
missing. Police found some of Robinson’s personal items,
including his driver’s license, but found no cell phone. Police
observed that Robinson was shot several times, and an autopsy
revealed that he had seven gunshot wounds and died from
wounds to his torso and right arm.
Police recovered seven shell casings from around the car
and noticed a bullet hole in the driver’s side door and damage to
the passenger side headrest that indicated that a gun was fired
from the rear passenger side toward Robinson. Four bullets were
recovered from Robinson’s torso during the autopsy.
A couple days after the shooting, Tabb arrived at Woody’s
residence, stating that he had killed Robinson. 2 Tabb later
elaborated to Woody, explaining that he robbed Robinson of $25,
and that he killed Robinson because he “knew my name.” Tabb’s
cell phone records showed that his cell phone was around the area

2 Police talked to Woody several times after the crime, but she initially
did not tell police about Tabb’s admission. She did not report Tabb’s admission
to police until December 2021.

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of the crime scene during the time of the shooting.
A firearms expert testified that the recovered casings were
consistent with being fired by a Smith & Wesson 9mm pistol, and
that the bullets recovered from Robinson’s torso were likely all
fired from the same firearm, which could have been a Smith &
Wesson 9mm pistol. 3
Tabb was later arrested, and during a custodial interview
in which he was read his Miranda 4 rights, Tabb denied knowing
Woody, denied that she ever arranged rides for him, denied ever
being in Robinson’s car, and denied being in any photographs
taken by Woody. The investigator testified that the gun shown in
some of those photographs appeared to match the characteristics
of a Smith & Wesson 9mm firearm.

1. The evidence was sufficient to support Tabb’s
convictions.
Tabb argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish
his murder conviction, because, among other things, the State
failed to prove that Tabb caused Robinson’s death, there was no
physical or forensic evidence tying Tabb to the murder, and no
eyewitnesses placed him at the scene of the crime. He argues that
the evidence against him was entirely circumstantial and merely
created a suspicion of guilt, which was insufficient to convict him.
We disagree.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter
of constitutional due process, we view the evidence presented in
the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether a rational

3 Although McCoy had left her gun (a 9mm firearm) in Robinson’s car,
and it was never recovered, the gun was ruled out as a possible murder weapon.
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).

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trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319
(1979). Questions about the weight and credibility of evidence, the
inferences to be drawn from it, and the resolution of any conflicts
or inconsistencies in the evidence are left to the jury. See
Anderson v. State, 319 Ga. 56, 59 (2024). “Due process allows for
a conviction to rest on circumstantial evidence alone, but under
Georgia statutory law, a conviction that rests only on
circumstantial evidence cannot stand unless the evidence
‘excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt
of the accused.’” Lee v. State, 322 Ga. 44, 56 (2025) (quoting OCGA
§ 24-14-6; punctuation omitted). “Whether an alternative
hypothesis is reasonable, and whether the circumstantial
evidence excludes any such hypotheses, are questions for the jury,
and we will not disturb the jury’s findings unless they are
insupportable as a matter of law.” Id. at 56–57 (cleaned up).
Here, the evidence was constitutionally sufficient. As a
preliminary matter, Tabb told his former girlfriend, Woody, that
he shot and killed Robinson. Tabb’s statement is direct evidence
of guilt, defeating his claim that the case was entirely
circumstantial. See Green v. State, 322 Ga. 617, 620–21 (2025) (a
case is not entirely circumstantial under OCGA § 24-14-6 if the
trial evidence includes a defendant’s admissions, which constitute
direct evidence of guilt). And although Tabb challenges Woody’s
testimony, her credibility and the weight to be given to her
testimony was a matter for the jury to determine. See Anderson,
319 Ga. 59.
To the extent Tabb’s statement constituted a confession as
opposed to a mere incriminating admission, it needed to be
corroborated. See Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 760 (2025) (a
confession is an admission to committing the entire criminal act

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with no facts to mitigate or justify the act, and confessions need
to be corroborated under OCGA § 24-8-823). See also Hood v.
State, 311 Ga. 855, 858–59, 866 (2021) (defendant’s statements to
witnesses that he killed the victims, without adding any facts to
mitigate or justify the act, were confessions requiring
corroboration). But “no specific manner of corroboration of the
confession is required, and corroboration in any particular is
sufficient.” Hooper v. State, 313 Ga. 451, 455–56 (2022) (quotation
marks omitted).
Here, Tabb’s statement was sufficiently corroborated.
Woody testified that on the night of Robinson’s death, Tabb had
asked her to have Robinson pick him up from Henry’s Pack-a-
Sack and then changed the requested location to the Orange
Store, which was nearby. Henry’s Pack-a-Sack was the location
where Robinson had picked up Tabb a few days earlier, as
testified to by Woody and confirmed by surveillance footage from
the store. Cell phone tower evidence placed his phone at the scene
of the crime, and evidence showed that Robinson stopped
communicating with Woody and McCoy at the time he was
scheduled to pick up Tabb. Additionally, Robinson was shot by a
weapon that was consistent with one that Tabb was previously
photographed carrying. This evidence was sufficient to
corroborate Tabb’s statement, and the evidence as a whole was
sufficient to support Tabb’s convictions.

2. Tabb failed to preserve his claim that the trial court
abused its discretion in requiring him to be visibly
shackled.
Tabb argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
requiring him to be visibly shackled during his trial, because the
trial court failed to balance the need for security measures with
protection of Tabb’s constitutional rights and failed to consider

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alternative security measures. The record shows that Tabb did
not object to the shackling at trial and therefore did not preserve
this issue for review. See Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 723–24
(2022). See also Brooks v. State, 309 Ga. 630, 638 (2020) (noting
limited types of unpreserved claims that are subject to plain error
review and holding that this Court has not extended plain error
analysis to other claims of error in the absence of a specific
legislative provision).

3. Tabb has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was
ineffective on any of the grounds he alleges.
Tabb argues that trial counsel was ineffective on several
grounds. None of these grounds have merit.
To prevail on any of his claims, Tabb must show both that
his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that
he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient
performance, Tabb must “overcome the strong presumption that
counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable
professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Mims v. State,
304 Ga. 851, 855 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). Our review of
counsel’s performance applies an objective reasonableness
standard, and is not limited to any subjective reasons offered by
counsel for her conduct. See Lane v. State, 312 Ga. 619, 623
(2021). To demonstrate prejudice, Tabb must establish “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Mims, 304 Ga. at 855 (quotation
marks omitted). The failure to meet either of the prongs is fatal
to an ineffectiveness claim. See Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733

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(2015). In considering an ineffectiveness claim, we review a trial
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 534 (2010).

(a) Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to or
mitigate victim-impact statements.
Tabb argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to testimony from Robinson’s mother that constituted
improper victim-impact testimony, because evidence about the
emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family is generally
inadmissible, as it is generally not relevant to the issues in the
guilt/innocence phase of a trial and is likely to engender the jury’s
sympathies. See Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 363 (2020); Lucas v.
State, 274 Ga. 640, 643 (2001). Trial counsel was not deficient.
After Robinson’s mother testified about Robinson’s work,
including that he earned money by driving people, the prosecutor
asked her how her life had changed since Robinson’s death.
Robinson’s mother responded:
It’s a struggle. It has been a nightmare. I lost myself.
I lost possessions. I can’t maintain a regular job
anymore. I just miss his smile, his conversation.

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified
that she was aware that it was improper to admit victim-impact
testimony but decided not to object to the mother’s testimony
because she did not believe it was necessary. Trial counsel
believed that interrupting the testimony of the mother, who was
crying, would have a negative effect on the jury, as the jury
seemed to connect with her.
Although Robinson’s mother’s testimony may have been
inadmissible, it was brief, and trial counsel’s reasons for not

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objecting are objectively reasonable. Accordingly, this claim fails.
See Cox v. State, 306 Ga. 736, 743 (2019) (trial counsel’s decision
not to object to the State’s victim-impact argument was
reasonable where the argument was brief and counsel did not
want to “draw more attention” to it). See also Moon v. State, 288
Ga. 508, 516 (2011) (“the making of objections falls within the
realm of trial tactics and strategy and thus usually provides no
basis for reversal of a conviction” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).

(b) Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the
admission of an in-life photograph of Robinson.
Tabb argues that trial counsel was also ineffective for
failing to object when the State moved to admit a photograph of
Robinson during his mother’s testimony. We disagree.
The photograph at issue was a neutral, in-life photograph
of Robinson alone. The mother’s testimony about the photograph
was brief, and the trial transcript does not indicate that she was
excessively emotional in identifying Robinson.
Tabb acknowledges that an in-life photograph may be
relevant but argues that trial counsel’s lack of objection to the
photo or effort to reduce its prejudicial impact amounted to
deficient performance. In support of his argument, Tabb cites
Boyd v. State, 284 Ga. 46, 48 (2008), for the point that “every effort
should be made to proffer a photograph of the victim alone.” But
the State did proffer a photograph of Robinson alone. Tabb also
relies on Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828 (2016), for the proposition
that the State should have sought to admit the photograph
through someone other than the victim’s mother. In Ragan, we
noted case law describing a “better practice” to admit a
photograph through “nonrelated witnesses,” and concluded that

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the court erred in admitting five photographs of the victim,
including some with the victim’s children, through the testimony
of the surviving spouse, because the photographs had a
“cumulative prejudicial effect” and scant probative value. Id. at
833.
But the “better practice” noted in Ragan did not establish
a categorical rule that a victim’s relative can never identify an in-
life photograph of the victim. Indeed, in a case involving
circumstances similar to those in this case, we distinguished
Ragan and concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing the victim’s mother to identify a single photograph of
the victim, alone in a neutral background, where the mother did
not have a strong emotional reaction during her identification
testimony. See Lofton, 309 Ga. at 355–56. Because there was only
a single, neutral photograph of the victim alone here, just like in
Lofton, Tabb has not demonstrated that the photograph of
Robinson was inadmissible. As a result, he has failed to show that
trial counsel’s failure to object to its admission was deficient. See
Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758, 762–63 (2018) (counsel is not
deficient for failing to make a meritless objection).

(c) Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to a
detective’s testimony regarding cell tower location data.
Tabb argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to Detective Gordon Payne’s testimony about cell tower
data—evidence that placed Tabb near the scene of the crime
around the time of the murder—because Detective Payne was
never qualified as an expert. Tabb’s claim fails.
On direct examination, Detective Payne testified that he
requested the cell phone records for the phone number Tabb was
known to use, and that the tower data he obtained showed Tabb

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was around the crime scene during the time of the murder. He did
not testify about the underlying science or technology used to
make this determination. Although Detective Payne testified that
“every cell phone tower is broken into three sides, what’s called
three azimuths,” he later clarified that the basis of this knowledge
was from reviewing the cell phone data record.
At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel said she
did not object to Detective Payne’s testimony on direct because he
was not testifying as an expert and was instead referring to what
the data showed him. Trial counsel contrasted this with a
situation in which a person would testify as to how the cell tower
technology worked.
Trial counsel’s evaluation that Detective Payne’s testimony
on direct examination did not constitute expert testimony was
objectively reasonable and, therefore, she was not deficient for
failing to object to it. See Shells v. State, 323 Ga. 527, 540–41
(2026) (police analyst’s testimony about the location of the
defendants’ cell phones during the timeframe of the crimes was
admissible as lay witness testimony where analyst was not
testifying about the underlying science of cell phone location data
and was instead plotting points based on cell phone records). See
also Moody v. State, 316 Ga. 490, 531 (2023) (nurse’s testimony
that based on her experience defendant did not appear to be
mentally deficient was admissible as lay evidence under Rule
701); Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 781–84 (2022) (investigator’s
testimony that holes he observed could have been consistent with
.40-caliber projectile and that blood drops indicated certain
information about how the crime was committed was admissible
as lay evidence under Rule 701 based on investigator’s prior
professional experience).
Tabb argued below that trial counsel’s own questions to

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Detective Payne concerned matters that “only an expert would
know,” and the trial transcript shows that trial counsel elicited
testimony from Detective Payne about how cell phone tower
technology worked. But Tabb does not argue on appeal that trial
counsel was ineffective in her cross-examination of Detective
Payne, instead arguing only that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to Detective Payne’s testimony. Therefore, this
claim fails.

(d) Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the
visible shackling of Tabb.
Tabb argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the trial court’s order that Tabb be shackled during his
trial. This claim fails.
Prior to trial, the trial court questioned Tabb and trial
counsel as to their interactions, and trial counsel said that Tabb
was combative and used profanity. When asked, Tabb said he did
not know whether he could be calm and cooperative during his
trial. The trial court recounted that it had received several reports
that Tabb was combative in jail, including allegations that he
attempted to start fires, and received a report that Tabb had
planned to “buck-up” during trial, which the trial court took to
mean that he would be combative, belligerent, and disruptive.
When asked again if he could be calm and cooperative, Tabb was
unresponsive. Based on this exchange, the court determined that
Tabb would remain shackled until there was some other security
device that could be placed on Tabb in order “to ensure the safety
of everyone involved.”
The trial court did not specifically say at that point what
security device was used, but later (after jury selection was
completed) clarified that Tabb’s hands were shackled and he had

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a leg “brace” on. The trial court also noted that Tabb had become
combative when deputies tried to put the leg brace on and
repeated that its decision to shackle Tabb was based on his
combative history that involved over 30 behavioral incidents in
jail, including aggravated assault on inmates and arson. The trial
court later instructed the jury that the use of restraints had no
bearing on Tabb’s guilt or innocence and should not be considered
during its deliberations.
We have previously stated that “no person should be tried
while shackled except as a last resort.” Hill v. State, 308 Ga. 638,
644 (2020) (cleaned up). “A trial judge has the discretion to take
account of special circumstances, including security concerns,
that may call for shackling, but any such determination must be
case specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns,
say, special security needs or escape risks, related to the
defendant on trial.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The trial
court’s decision to shackle a defendant must “be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny to determine if there was an essential state
interest furthered by compelling a defendant to wear shackles
and whether less restrictive, less prejudicial methods of restraint
were considered or could have been employed.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). “While this Court is deferential to the security
determinations of a trial court, the record must provide a basis
for those determinations.” Id.
Here, the record shows that Tabb was shackled due to
particular, case-specific security concerns. The trial court listed
many of those reasons on the record, namely that Tabb exhibited
combative and violent behavior throughout his incarceration and
had indicated that he planned to be combative at trial. Tabb does
not challenge any of these grounds showing that he posed a
security risk. Instead, he argues that the trial court should have

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considered less restrictive means and trial counsel should have
objected when the court did not. But the record shows that the
trial court said Tabb would remain shackled until some other
security device could be found that would still “ensure the safety
of everyone involved.”
Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing
that Tabb was a safety concern because of his aggressive
behaviors, including those she witnessed personally, and that the
trial court handled the situation “appropriately.” She stated that
she did not object to any of the court’s procedures because she
believed it was a necessary safety precaution. Because it was not
objectively unreasonable to view Tabb’s restraints as a “last
resort,” trial counsel’s failure to object was not objectively
unreasonable. Therefore, Tabb’s claim fails.

4. Tabb was not entitled to a new trial based on
cumulative prejudice.
Tabb argues that he was entitled to a new trial based on
the cumulative prejudice resulting from the trial court errors and
ineffective assistance of counsel alleged above. See State v. Lane,
308 Ga. 10, 14 (2020) (courts are to ‘‘consider collectively the
prejudicial effect of trial court errors and any deficient
performance by counsel — at least where those errors by the court
and counsel involve evidentiary issues”). But there is not a single
error in this case, so the cumulative prejudice analysis does not
apply. See Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 573, 579 (2021).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.

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