Sims v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0143
James Sims
v.
The State

On appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County
No. 16SC143159

Decided: June 2, 2026

ELLINGTON, Justice.
A Fulton County jury found appellant James Sims, as well
as his co-defendants James Calhoun and Jonathan Banks
(altogether, “the defendants”), guilty of malice murder and other
crimes in connection with the shooting death of Pamela Williams,
the burglary of her home, and other crimes. 1 Sims contends that

1 The crimes occurred on November 30, 2013. On April 12, 2016, Banks
was indicted along with his co-defendants, Calhoun and Sims, by a Fulton
County grand jury for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault (Counts 2); felony murder predicated on burglary (Count
3); aggravated assault (Count 5); burglary in the first degree of the home of
Pamela Williams (Count 6); and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (Count 9). Banks was charged individually with felony murder
predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 4) and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10). Sims was charged
individually with burglary in the first degree of the home of Deborah
Huddleston (Count 8) and Calhoun was charged individually with burglary in
the first degree of the home of Corey Robinson (Count 7). The court severed
Counts 7 and 8, and those charges were not presented to the jury.
the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts and
that the verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence. He
also contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain
evidence and in denying motions to strike the jury panel and to
sever the defendants. Finally, he argues that he received
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. As we explain
further below, with respect to some of these claims of error, Sims
has not made any meaningful argument for why the claim should
prevail based on the applicable law and the specific facts of the
case, and so he has not carried his burden of showing error on
appeal. As to those claims of error that Sims does support with
argument, they fail for the reasons set out below.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts,

After a joint jury trial that began on September 27, 2016, Sims was
found guilty on all charges. The trial court sentenced Sims to life in prison with
the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1); 20 years’ probation,
consecutive to Count 1, for burglary (Count 6); and five years’ probation,
consecutive to Count 6, for the firearm offense (Count 9). The remaining counts
(Counts 2, 3 and 5) merged or were vacated by operation of law.
On November 16, 2016, Sims timely filed a motion for new trial, which
he amended on December 18, 2020, and October 15, 2021. After a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion on July 27, 2023. On July 31, 2023, Sims timely
filed a notice of appeal. On September 3, 2025, this appeal was docketed to the
term beginning in December 2025, and the case was submitted for a decision
on the briefs.
We note the almost seven-year delay in resolving Sims’s motion for new
trial and another two-year delay for the appeal to be docketed in this Court.
The trial court apparently had not ruled on Sims’s first new trial motion, filed
in 2016, when Sims amended that motion in 2020. And after Sims amended
his new trial motion in 2020, he did not file a second amended motion until
almost a year later. We “reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the
criminal justice system, including trial courts and prosecutors as well as
defense counsel and defendants, to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction
motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Owens v.
State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).

2
the trial transcript shows the following. On the evening of
November 30, 2013, the defendants met in front of Sims’s house
in the Amhurst subdivision in Fulton County. The defendants’
movements in and through the neighborhood that evening were
witnessed by Jerry Link, the subdivision’s security officer. At
dusk, the defendants walked the short distance from Sims’s house
to Williams’s house along a “cut,” a makeshift footpath through
neighboring yards in the Amhurst subdivision. At this point, Link
lost sight of the defendants. Williams, who was home alone, called
911 at 8:07 p.m. to report suspicious activity outside her home.
While she was on the phone with the 911 operator and his
supervisor, she reported hearing people ringing her doorbell
repeatedly, her dog barking, and then people entering her home.
Williams hid in the closet of her master bedroom, crouching low
and whispering to the 911 operator as the defendants searched
her home for valuables. Then the 911 operator heard Williams
scream. Shortly thereafter, the telephone connection was lost.
Williams screamed because Banks had discovered her hiding in
the closet. Banks pressed his gun to Williams’s head and shot her.
Although Williams’s alarm system was armed, it was not
triggered when the defendants entered her home because the
patio window through which they entered did not have an alarm
sensor. Instead, the alarm was triggered at 8:20 p.m., shortly
after the police arrived and entered the house. Officer Michael
Guin arrived at Williams’s home at 8:14 p.m. and waited for
backup to arrive. When Corporal Willis Reed arrived, they
entered the home and found Williams breathing but unconscious,
slumped to the floor in her bedroom closet with a gunshot wound
to the head. Guin noticed that Williams had been hiding in a
smaller “closet within the closet” and that her phone had fallen
between her knees. Paramedics transported Williams to Grady
Hospital. She died there on December 2, 2013. The cause of death

3
was a single, contact gunshot wound to the head. The medical
examiner testified that Williams likely would have been sitting
on the floor, looking up at Banks, when he pressed the gun’s
muzzle to her forehead and shot her.
After Banks shot Williams, he and the others fled from the
house on foot and, shortly thereafter, sped out of the
neighborhood in their cars. Banks hid at the home of Sims’s
cousins, Cassandra and Joseph Hockaday. According to the
Hockadays, who gave statements to the police and testified at
trial, Banks admitted to them that he, Calhoun, and Sims had
broken into Williams’s home. Banks confessed that, when he
discovered Williams in her closet, he “accidentally” shot her.
Banks also said he hid the murder weapon “somewhere around
the [Hockadays’] house” but, later, he and Calhoun moved it.
In the following days, Banks called his mother several
times. Banks’s mother asked him whether he had been involved
in the shooting, and Banks admitted that he “was back there.”
After the shooting, Banks told his father that “me and my crew
f***** up.” Banks’s father reported this statement to an
investigator. When Banks’ father asked Banks whether he had
shot and killed someone, Banks responded “I don’t know.” Banks
also asked his parents for money so that he could “get out of
town.” Banks’s father gave the police the street names of five
people in his son’s “crew.” Shortly thereafter, the police obtained
warrants for Banks, Calhoun and Sims, and they were arrested
in mid-December of 2013.
Link, the subdivision’s security officer, testified that,
during the evening of November 30, as he patrolled the
neighborhood in his car, he saw a group of young men, including
Calhoun, Banks, and Sims, standing in front of Sims’s house.
Sims’s and Calhoun’s houses are near each other on the same

4
street, and Banks was staying with Sims. Link saw Calhoun,
Banks, and Sims enter a silver-gray car with two other people at
around 7:40 p.m. He watched the car leave but did not follow it.
About ten minutes later, while Link was patrolling the
subdivision, he saw the same silver-gray car parked on the side of
the road near Williams’s house. Link testified that he saw the
car’s interior lights turn on as several people exited the car. Then
the car sped away. Given that the neighborhood had experienced
“[w]ell over 150” burglaries, Link was suspicious of what he was
seeing. He began scanning the area and saw Banks standing near
a retention pond by Williams’s house. He also spotted a group of
young men, including Calhoun and Sims, standing behind her
house.
Believing that the young men were returning to either
Sims’s or Calhoun’s house by way of the path through the woods,
Link drove back to Sims’s home. When he got there, he did not
see the men, but he saw a red Pontiac and a blue Chevy parked
in front of Calhoun’s house. Link had seen the defendants in those
cars earlier in the day. He testified that he had recorded the tag
numbers of those cars as well as the tag numbers for the silver-
gray car. After a few minutes, Link returned to Williams’s street
to see if he could find the young men. As he passed by the home
of Eddie Muhammad, he spotted a group of young men, including
Calhoun, Banks, and Sims, running through the neighborhood
toward the path that led back to their homes. Then, at 8:22 pm,
Link saw the red and blue cars that had been parked in front of
Calhoun’s and Sims’s houses speed out of the subdivision. Later
that evening, Link shared this information with the police.
The following day, Link discovered a jewelry box lying on
the ground along the path he had seen Calhoun, Banks, and Sims
use to flee after the shooting. Believing that the box may have

5
been stolen from Williams, he called the police to collect it. In
addition to the jewelry box, the police collected a ring box, a black
hooded sweatshirt, and a black skull cap along the path through
the woods near Williams’s home. Link testified that, also on the
day following the shooting, he saw Sims’s mother cleaning out the
garage and disposing of clothing, including an orange jacket
matching one he had seen Sims wearing on the night of the
shooting. Link also saw Calhoun “roaming around[,] looking at
the ground” in the area where Link had discovered the jewelry
box. Link testified that much of what he had seen concerning the
defendants’ movements from the night of the shooting had been
recorded on his car’s dash camera and that he turned those
recordings over to the police. Several of those recordings were
admitted in evidence and played for the jury.
Williams’s immediate neighbors also testified concerning
events on the night of the shooting. Louis Lindo testified that, as
he was standing at the end of his driveway, he saw a group of
young men walking toward Williams’s house. Muhammad
testified that his dogs were barking that evening like someone
was walking by his house. Joshua Williams, who lived next door
to Williams, saw a group of five young men run from behind her
house along the cut between their houses as he was getting
clothes out of the trunk of his car. Yvens Resilard, whose home
was located between Williams’s and Sim’s homes, testified that
around 8:00 p.m., he heard his dogs barking excessively, and
when he went downstairs to check on them, he noticed that his
motion sensor lights were on. Derrick McKnight, who was visiting
his sister, testified that he spotted a group of five young men
lurking outside his sister’s home. McKnight’s sister’s home was
also located between Williams’s and Sims’s homes. When
McKnight turned on the outside floodlights, he saw five young
men wearing dark clothing. One wore a skull cap. McKnight

6
observed the men “scatter” and try to “hide.” The men then all ran
off together in the same direction.
The State also admitted evidence of prior acts involving
Calhoun and Sims. Marcus Greer, who was given immunity from
prosecution in exchange for his cooperation, testified that he,
Calhoun, Sims, and two others broke into Melissa Burke’s home
on January 13, 2013. Burke had been home alone when she heard
the doorbell ring. From her upstairs window, she saw two young
men at her front door. When they continued to ring her doorbell,
Burke called 911. As she did so, the young men climbed through
a second-floor window on the back of her home. They began
searching for things to steal. Burke testified that she hid in the
closet, but one of the young men found her. She saw the closet
door swing open, heard a gunshot, and realized that she had been
shot. The shooter kept firing until his gun ran out of ammunition.
Burke testified that someone said: “Man, she’s dead. Let’s just get
out of here.” As the young men left her home, they triggered her
alarm system. The alarm system did not go off when they entered
the home because they had entered through a window that did
not have an alarm sensor. Burke identified Calhoun at trial as
the man who shot her.
Monica Salinas, who lived in the Cooks Landing
subdivision in Fulton County, testified that on September 18,
2013, she heard a doorbell ring and saw two young men standing
outside her front door. When she did not answer the door, they
rang her doorbell “20, 15 times consistently, just constantly
ringing the doorbell.” Moments later, her dogs started barking in
the back yard. She called 911, and while she was on the phone,
one of the men threw a rock through her window, shattering the
glass. When the men spotted Salinas in the upstairs window, one
threw a rock at her and then fled. Shortly thereafter, the two men

7
were apprehended by the police. Salinas and a sanitation worker
who saw the men fleeing from Salinas’s home identified one of
them as Calhoun.
On October 30, 2013, Corey Robinson’s home in the
Amhurst subdivision was burglarized. The burglars stole laptop
computers, watches, a television, and a jewelry box. The police
recovered a palm print from the home and later matched it to
Calhoun’s palm print.
1. Sims asserts that his “conviction was based upon
insufficient evidence” and that the “State failed to present
competent admissible evidence to the jury at trial that proved
[him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges brought
against him.” When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, “the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979)
(emphasis omitted).
(a) The evidence is sufficient to show that Sims was a party
to the crime of malice murder. A person is guilty of malice murder
if “he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, causes the death of another human being.” OCGA § 16-
5-1(a). See also Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 473 (2019). A jury
may find a defendant guilty of malice murder if the evidence
shows beyond a reasonable doubt either that he directly
committed the crime or that he was a “party thereto.” OCGA § 16-
2-20(a). A person is a party to a crime if, among other things, he
aids or abets in its commission. OCGA § 16-2-20(b)(3). See also
Carter v. State, 314 Ga. 317, 319 (2022). “[P]roof of a shared
criminal intent with the actual perpetrator is necessary to
establish that one is a party to the crime,” Sams v. State, 314 Ga.

8
306, 310 (2022) (citation omitted), and the jury may infer a shared
criminal intent from the defendant’s “presence, companionship,
and conduct before, during, and after the offense,” Jones v. State,
314 Ga. 214, 232 (2022) (citation omitted).
A rational jury could infer from Sims’s actions before,
during, and after the shooting that he shared a common criminal
intent with Banks. With respect to Banks’s criminal intent, the
evidence supports the jury’s finding that he intentionally killed
Williams. The jury could infer from the medical examiner’s expert
testimony concerning Williams’s contact gunshot wound to the
head that Banks had deliberately pressed the gun to her head and
executed her after he discovered her crouched down, hiding in the
closet. And a rational jury could infer from Sims’s actions before,
during, and after the shooting that he, Banks, and Calhoun—
members of a burglary “crew”—had aided and abetted each other
in a common scheme to burglarize homes and to kill any
witnesses. Link saw the defendants lurking together around
Williams’s home before the burglary and then fleeing together
afterward. Link also testified that he saw Sims’s mother
discarding the clothes Sims wore the night of the crimes. Based
on the evidence presented, the jury could also infer that the
burglary crew’s scheme was to verify that a home was empty
before entering it by repeatedly ringing the doorbell. They would
enter the home through windows without alarm sensors. And
they carried firearms because, if they came upon a homeowner,
they would not leave the homeowner alive to identify them. In
fact, Sims had participated in a prior robbery where Calhoun had
similarly shot the homeowner multiple times and left her for dead
after the crew discovered her hiding in her closet. This evidence
was sufficient to support Sims’s conviction for malice murder as a
party to the crime. See, e.g., Scoggins v. State 317 Ga. 832, 837–
39 (2023) (holding evidence sufficient to support defendant’s

9
convictions of malice murder as a party to the crime because he
was present when the victim was shot, witnesses testified that
defendant and the shooter were together most of the day, they
were the last two people seen with the victim before her body was
found, defendant did not seek medical aid for the victim, and he
left the scene with the shooter in the victim’s vehicle); Jones, 314
Ga. at 232 (holding evidence sufficient to support defendant’s
conviction for malice murder as party to the crime when
defendant belonged to a street gang and had a motive to kill the
victim, was present at the scene of the shooting, and was in
contact with the shooter before and after the crime). This claim of
error, therefore, fails.
(b) The same evidence set forth above also supports
Sims’s convictions for burglary, OCGA § 16-7-1(b),2 and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, OCGA
§ 16-11-106(b). 3 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. 614, 617
(2019) (explaining that, because defendant aided in committing
theft and other felonies committed inside the apartment, the
evidence was sufficient to authorize his conviction for burglary);
Scoggins, 317 Ga. at 839 (“Given our conclusion that there was

2 OCGA § 16-7-1(b) provides, in pertinent part:
A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree
when, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony
or theft therein, he or she enters or remains within an occupied,
unoccupied, or vacant dwelling house of another or any
building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other
such structure designed for use as the dwelling of another.
3 OCGA § 16-11-106(b) provides, in pertinent part: “Any person who
shall have on or within arm’s reach of his or her person a firearm or a knife
having a blade of three or more inches in length during the commission of, or
the attempt to commit” any of the listed offenses, including “(1) Any crime
against or involving the person of another; [and] (2) The unlawful entry into a
building or vehicle[.]”

10
sufficient evidence to sustain Scoggins’s murder conviction under
the theory that he was a party to the murder of Daniel, the
evidence was sufficient to support Scoggins’s conviction for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under
that theory, as well.”)
2. Sims contends that the jury’s verdict “is contrary to the
laws and principles of justice and [equity] and is strongly against
the weight of the evidence,” and that the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion as “the thirteenth juror” to grant him a new
trial, citing OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.
Grounds for a new trial under these Code sections
are commonly known as the “general grounds,” and
the two statutes give the trial court broad discretion
to sit as a thirteenth juror and weigh the evidence
on a motion for new trial alleging these general
grounds. Whether to grant a new trial on the general
grounds is a decision left to the sole discretion of the
trial court. Thus, on appellate review, our role is
limited to determining whether the trial court
exercised that discretion, and in the absence of
affirmative evidence to the contrary, we presume
that the trial court did so.

Gines v. State, 324 Ga. 46, 61 (2026)(citations and quotation
marks omitted).
In its order denying Sims’s motion for new trial, the trial
court specifically addressed Sims’s claims “in accordance with the
discretion given the Court by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21” and
concluded:
As to each Defendant, the Court FINDS this is not
an exceptional case in which the evidence

11
preponderates heavily against the verdict, and thus
the Court DECLINES to reverse Defendants’
respective convictions. See White v. State, 293 Ga.
523, 524 (2013) (this “discretion should be exercised
with caution and invoked only in exceptional cases
where the evidence preponderates heavily against
the verdict.”).

Nothing in the record supports Sims’s claim that the trial court
failed to consider his motion or to exercise its discretion as the
thirteenth juror. See Myers v. State, 313 Ga. 10, 14 (2021)
(holding that the trial court’s finding of “this is not an exceptional
case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the
verdict” sufficiently demonstrated the trial court fulfilled “its duty
in ruling on the general grounds to weigh the evidence and
consider the credibility of the witnesses.”). Accordingly, this claim
of error fails.
3. Sims contends the trial court erred in denying a motion
to strike the jury pool after a potential juror “admitted to making
prejudicial statements to members of the jury pool.” Specifically,
Panelist 49 (later selected as Juror 8) made a comment to Panelist
48 that she thought defendants were “guilty.” Panelist 48
brought the matter to the trial court’s attention after the jury had
been selected but before they were sworn and impaneled. Counsel
for all three defendants objected and asked for the entire jury
panel to be stricken as it was likely tainted by these comments.
The remaining potential jurors, however, had already been
dismissed, and there were no other potential jurors available for
jury selection. The trial court ruled that the appropriate remedy
was to strike Juror 8 from the petit jury. Sims objected and asked
the court to strike the entire jury and to restart the jury selection
process. Sims contends the trial court’s ruling constituted

12
reversible error. We disagree.
In assessing whether the trial court should have
excused all members of the jury panel who might
have been privy to any unauthorized comments or
discussions, the appropriate inquiry is whether the
remarks were inherently prejudicial and deprived
appellant of his right to begin his trial with a jury
free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed
opinion.

Slaughter v. State, 289 Ga. 790, 792 (2011) (cleaned up). “But
where the facts establish only gossamer possibilities of prejudice,
prejudice is not inherent.” Kinder v. State, 284 Ga. 148, 150 (2008)
(citation omitted).
The transcript shows that the trial court questioned
Panelist 48, who had not been selected for the jury but who had
heard the comment. Panelist 48 told the trial court that Juror 8,
who had been sitting next to her, leaned over and whispered the
comment to her. Panelist 48 said that, to the best of her
knowledge, Juror 8 had made the comment to her alone. Panelist
48 did not tell anyone about the comment except for the judge’s
clerk. Panelist 48 was “almost positive” that no other juror heard
the comment. Moreover, Juror 8 told the court that she made this
comment to Panelist 48 only. She said that she made the comment
once and voiced no other opinions to anyone else.
In short, the record shows that the person making the
improper comment was stricken from the jury, and the only
person who heard the comment was never seated on the jury.
Further, there is no evidence that any seated juror could have
heard the comment and been prejudiced by it. Consequently, Sims
has not shown that he was denied his right to a fair trial when

13
the court denied his request to dismiss the jury panel and start
jury selection anew. For these reasons, the trial court did not err
in denying Sims’s motion. See Slaughter, 289 Ga. at 792.
4. Sims argues that the trial court erred when it admitted
over objection “other acts” evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-
404(b) which impermissibly placed Sims’ character into evidence.
In his appellate brief, Sims quotes legal authorities pertaining to
the admission of other-acts evidence. However, he does not
describe with any specificity the “other acts evidence” to which he
objected. He does not cite a specific ruling by the trial court
admitting the evidence nor does he cite any pertinent facts,
specific dates, or witness testimony from the trial transcript.4
More significantly, he presents no meaningful legal argument on
the merits of whether the other acts evidence was admissible.
Instead, he quotes text from legal authorities without any
explanation of why the text is pertinent to the facts of the case.
As a general matter, a legal argument in support of a claim
of error on appeal involves the presentation of reasoning based on
the law and the specific facts of the case aimed at persuading a
court that the claim of error has merit. The only such argument
that Sims makes is that the trial court did not detail in its order
denying the motion for new trial certain parts of its reasoning for
admitting the other acts evidence. But a trial court does not need
to make specific findings of fact or conclusions of law when
denying a motion for new trial, so that argument fails. See, e.g.,
Carr v. State, 275 Ga. 185, 187–88 (2002) (trial court not required
to make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law
when denying a motion for new trial). And as to the merits of

4 Sims cites only to the court’s order denying his motion for a new trial,
which summarily concluded that it did not err in admitting the other acts
evidence at trial.

14
Sims’s claim—that the Rule 404(b) evidence was not admissible—
Sims does not make any argument at all. Sims does not identify
by citation to the record any testimony or facts that support his
claim of error, though this Court’s rules require that he do so. See
Supreme Court Rule 19 (1)(e), (g); Rule 22(2). In fact, in his
“Statement of the Case,” Sims does not set “out the material facts
relevant to the appeal” as required by Supreme Court Rule
19(1)(e). Rather, he uses that section to list his enumerations of
error. Although this Court could attempt to deduce what Sims’s
appellate argument concerning the other acts evidence might be
from the record, it is not the function of this Court to make an
appellant’s legal argument for him. See Pierce v. State, 319 Ga.
846, 855 (2024) (“Because Appellant has not specifically identified
the objectionable testimony, has not included any meaningful
legal analysis, and simply makes vague assertions of error and
cites to one large chunk of the transcript, he is not entitled to a
review of this claim.” (cleaned up)). Nor is it “this Court’s job to
cull the record on behalf of [an appellant] to find alleged errors.”
Henderson v. State, 304 Ga. 733, 739 (2018) (cleaned up).
Because Sims has failed to identify what evidence he
claims should not have been admitted or to present a legal
argument in support of this claim of error, he has not met his
burden of showing that the trial court erred in this respect.
Consequently, this claim of error fails. See, e.g., McKoy v. State,
303 Ga. 327, 333 (2018) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a conclusion that
reversible error occurred requires a showing of error and harm
and that an appellant has the burden of proving trial court error
by the appellate record.” (cleaned up)); Swindle v. Swindle, 221
Ga. 760, 762 (1966) (“In order for this court to determine whether
or not a trial judge erred in admitting evidence we must be able
to determine what evidence is claimed to have been illegally
admitted and what objection was made to the evidence at the time

15
it was admitted.”).
5. Sims contends that the trial court erred in
admitting in evidence a life-size replica of Williams’s bedroom
closet because it was not relevant to any issue at trial. Further,
he argues that, even if it was relevant, its probative value was
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” See OCGA § 24-4-403
(“Rule 403”). Sims also contends that the replica was inaccurate,
inherently prejudicial, and likely improperly impacted the
outcome of the trial. Consequently, he argues, the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the state to use the
demonstrative evidence. We disagree.
At trial, the defendants objected to the use of the replica,
asserting that “there was absolutely nothing probative about it.”
After hearing arguments from the State and the defendants, the
court ruled that it would “permit the exhibit and the testimony
related to the exhibit.” Based on the record in this case, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to use the
replica of Williams’s closet as a demonstrative aid.
A trial court has wide discretion in admitting
demonstrative evidence, and a party offering such evidence must
lay “a proper foundation establishing a similarity of
circumstances and conditions.” Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 435
(2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). This requires showing
“not that the conditions of the demonstration are identical to the
actual event at issue, but that they are so nearly the same in
substantial particulars as to afford a fair comparison in respect to
the particular issue to which the test is directed.” Rickman v.
State, 304 Ga. 61, 64 (2018) (citation omitted). “Like any evidence,

16
demonstrative evidence is subject to Rule 403, and should be
excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury.” Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. 543, 548 (2020).
In this case, Officer Guin testified that the closet replica
was to scale and “appears to be the layout of how I remember the
doorframe and the victim laying.” He testified with reference to
the replica about how he entered the bedroom, how he entered the
smaller closet within the bigger closet where Williams had been
hiding, where he saw Williams’s body, where her body was likely
positioned when she was shot, where her cell phone fell, and
where Banks may have been standing when he shot her. The
State contends that the replica helped illustrate the officer’s
testimony and allowed the jury to understand the spatial
relationships in a way that the photographs of the crime scene did
not. As the prosecutor argued in closing, the replica illustrated
how Banks would have entered the smaller closet, turned to face
Williams (who was crouched down), and then pressed his gun
against her head and fired it. The replica, thus, had some
probative value in explaining the sequence of events to the jury.
Sims has not identified any unfair prejudice that resulted
from the use of the closet replica as demonstrative evidence. He
has not pointed to anything in the record to the effect that the
replica was not consistent with the evidence in the case, that it
was inaccurate or misleading, or that the limited presence of the
replica in the courtroom overemphasized certain evidence.
Considering the record as a whole, the trial court’s admission of
this demonstrative evidence was not an abuse of discretion. See
Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. 543, 548 (2020) (concluding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to use
firearms as demonstrative aids given that the demonstration was

17
somewhat probative of the State’s theory of the case, and the jury
was informed the guns were not those used in the alleged crimes).
6. Sims baldly asserts, in a single claim of error, that the
trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial with respect
to (a) the life-sized replica of Williams’s closet; (b) the testimony
of Link concerning “prior bad acts evidence” and “negative
activities”; and (c) the testimony of Sheryl Collins concerning
prior acts by Banks and Sims. In his brief, Sims cites to that
portion of the record where the trial court denied each motion and
then sets forth black letter law pertaining to granting motions for
mistrial generally. However, he does not identify with citation to
the record the pertinent facts or statements at issue. Nor does he
make any legal argument explaining why the trial court’s ruling
constituted reversible error. As we explained in Division 4, it is
not the function of this Court to make an appellant’s argument
for him. Because Sims has failed to carry his burden of showing
that the trial court erred in this respect, the claim of error fails.
See, e.g., McKoy, 303 Ga. at 333.
7. Sims contends the trial court erred by admitting in
evidence over objection a black hoodie (State’s Exhibit 172) “for
lack of foundation and failure to establish chain of custody
through witness Derrick McKnight.” The record does not support
this claim of error.
The trial court did not admit the hoodie through Derrick
McNight; rather, it was properly admitted after the State laid the
foundation for its admissibility through Officer Duncan. Officer
Duncan identified the hoodie and testified that he personally
retrieved it and placed it into an evidence bag. Thereafter, the
State tendered it into evidence, and it was admitted without
objection. We see no error. See McDowell v. State, 309 Ga. 504,
507 (2020) (explaining that, pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-901(a),

18
authentication can be made via testimony of a witness with
knowledge of the item and distinctive characteristics of the item).
8. Sims contends the trial court erred in denying his motion
to sever the defendants’ trials because the court failed to
adequately consider the following factors: (a) whether evidence
offered against the other defendants pursuant to OCGA 24-4-
404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) would have a prejudicial “spillover effect”
on him, (b) whether curative instructions would be sufficient, (c)
whether the jury could compartmentalize evidence that applied
only to him, and (d) the degree to which the defendant’s defenses
were antagonistic. The record does not support this claim of error.
“A trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a
severance in a joint trial.” Ruff v. State, 314 Ga. 386, 386 (2022)
(citation and punctuation omitted). See OCGA § 17-8-4(a).
In ruling on a motion to sever, a trial court should
consider: (1) the likelihood of confusion of the
evidence and law; (2) the possibility that evidence
against one defendant may be considered against
the other defendant; and (3) the presence or absence
of antagonistic defenses. It is incumbent upon the
defendant who seeks a severance to show clearly
that he will be prejudiced by a joint trial, and in the
absence of such a showing, the trial court’s denial of
a severance motion will not be disturbed. We review
a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a severance
motion for an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 386–87 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
On August 19, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on
Banks’s motion to sever the defendants’ trials. Sims and Calhoun
joined the motion and adopted the arguments made by their co-

19
defendant. Sims argued that the 404(b) evidence, which
implicated Calhoun and Banks, would be prejudicial “spillover”
evidence. The State argued at length that severance was not
required, concluding that defendants had not shown prejudice.
The State argued that the evidence was not confusing and that
the defendants’ defenses were not antagonistic given that they all
appeared to be arguing that someone else perpetrated the crimes.
After argument, the trial court denied the motion to sever the
defendants’ trials but granted the motion to sever Counts 7 and
8.
In its order denying Sims’s motion for new trial, the trial
court found as follows:
Here, Defendants were generally charged with the
same crimes, the State presented the same evidence
and fact pattern as to the charged offenses, the jury
was appropriately instructed, the jury returned
separate verdicts, and there is no evidence the jury
was confused in considering the State’s case in
connection with each of the defendants. The Court
FINDS that each [of the] Defendants has failed to
show prejudice or a denial of due process. See Smith
v. State, 308 Ga. 81, 85-87 (2020). While Defendant
Calhoun is correct the State was authorized to
tender Rule 404 (b) evidence against Defendants
Sims and Banks, the Court provided a limiting
instruction before the admission of such evidence to
properly guide the jury’s use of that evidence. See
Brooks v. State, 332 Ga. App. 396 (2015) (rejected
severance claim based on Rule 404 (b) evidence
against co-defendant).

Under the circumstances here, the trial court did not abuse

20
its discretion in denying the motion to sever. The record shows
that it considered the requisite factors set forth in Ruff, supra.
Moreover, the record clearly supported the court’s ruling given
that the primary evidence against the three co-defendants came
from the same sources: Link’s testimony concerning his
observations on the night of the shooting and Banks’s admissions
to the Hockadays. The jury was instructed on the law concerning
mere presence, mere association, and parties to a crime. Further,
the defendants’ defenses were not antagonistic to each other. All
three denied being present and did not shift the blame to each
other. Finally, while Sims asserts that the 404(b) evidence did not
involve him, Greer’s testimony clearly implicates Sims in the
Burke shooting. Sims has not carried his burden on appeal of
showing that he was clearly prejudiced by the joint trial.
Consequently, we see no abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s
denial of the severance motion will not be disturbed
9. Sims contends that the “trial court erred by admitting
prejudicial statements attributed to Banks – over objection –
which implicated Sims in violation of Sims’s Sixth Amendment
Right under the hearsay exception against co-conspirator
[statements] through witness Cassandra Hockaday and Joseph
Hockaday.” Again, in his appellate brief, Sims makes bald
assertions followed by black letter law, but he does not cite to a
specific ruling by the trial court or to any pertinent facts, specific
dates, or specific witness testimony from the trial transcript. At
trial, the Hockadays testified at length and recounted numerous
conversations they had with Banks, testimony which spans
almost 400 pages of trial transcript. Moreover, Joseph Hockaday’s
three-hour-long, video-recorded statement to the police was
played for the jury and the 100-page transcript of that interview
was admitted in evidence. Sims has not identified with citation to
the record specific excerpts from these sources. Moreover, Sims

21
offers no legal argument on the merits of his claim. At most, he
contends that the trial court did not detail in its order denying
the motion for new trial certain parts of its reasoning for
admitting the statements. But, again, a trial court does not need
to make specific findings of fact or conclusions of law when
denying a motion for new trial, so that argument fails. See, e.g.,
Carr v. State, 275 Ga. at 187–88 (2002). Thus, for the same
reasons set forth in Division 4, this claim of error fails. See also
McKoy, 303 Ga. at 333.
10. Sims contends that his counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects: (a)
counsel failed to object to inadmissible prior consistent
statements made by the Hockadays; (b) counsel failed to object to
the admission of evidence concerning Greer’s immunity deal; and
(c) counsel failed to make a Bruton 5 objection to the testimony of
the Hockadays. To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, Sims must demonstrate both that his trial counsel’s
performance was professionally deficient and that he was
prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. State, 313
Ga. 57, 62 (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668,
687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, Sims must show
that trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively
unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the
light of prevailing professional norms. See id. Establishing
deficient performance
is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong
presumption that counsel performed reasonably,
and [the appellant] bears the burden of overcoming
this presumption. To carry this burden, he must

5 Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 (1968).

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show that no reasonable lawyer would have done
what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what
his lawyer did not. In particular, decisions regarding
trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an
ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would
have followed such a course.

Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740–41 (2022) (citations omitted). To
establish prejudice, Sims must prove that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency, the result of
the trial would have been different. See Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2).
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation and punctuation
omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy one.” Id. at 62–63 (citation
and punctuation omitted). “If an appellant fails to meet his or her
burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the
reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.” Taylor
v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (2023) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Sims has not carried his burden of showing that
counsel’s performance was deficient.
(a) Once again, Sims has not identified in his brief with
citation to the record exactly what testimony of the Hockadays
required an objection but, rather, only asserts that the attorney
should have “object[ed] to prior consistent statements” during
their testimony. However, based on the trial court’s order denying
his motion for new trial, Sims appears to be referring generally to
the admission of the recorded statements made by the Hockadays
to the police. At the motion for new trial, Sims questioned trial
counsel about Joseph Hockaday’s videotaped statement, which
was played for the jury. Counsel testified that he believed the
video statement was helpful to the defense. He also believed that

23
Cassandra Hockaday’s written statement was similarly
beneficial. He wanted the jury to see the allegedly coercive
conditions under which the Hockadays spoke to the police about
Banks’s admissions to them, and counsel made a strategic
decision to allow the statements to be admitted for this reason. At
trial, Joseph Hockaday was a reluctant witness and asserted that
he was bullied into giving his statement because the police had
threatened him and his wife with felony charges. Counsel
testified that he did not object at trial “because of strategy” and
that he wanted to “go through this statement with this witness”
to demonstrate the Hockadays were allegedly coerced. Given
counsel’s well-founded and reasonable belief that Sims was best
served by using the statement to his advantage instead of
objecting to it, counsel’s decision amounted to reasonable trial
strategy that does not constitute deficient performance. See
Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 867 (2020) (explaining that trial
counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the introduction
of evidence concerning defendant’s racism because it was helpful
to his defense to show that his racism and use of a racial slur
triggered the victim to violently attack him).
(b) With respect to Greer’s immunity deal, the trial court
properly found that counsel did not perform deficiently, as
counsel had a strategic reason for not objecting to evidence
concerning Greer’s immunity deal and instead to use it in cross-
examination to undermine Greer’s credibility. The prosecutor,
during Greer’s direct examination, read the agreement, including
the term requiring Greer to testify truthfully. Banks cross-
examined Greer at trial on the implications of the agreement,
suggesting that Greer had a motive to lie and to implicate others
to escape prosecution. Trial counsel testified that the immunity
agreement hurt Greer’s credibility because he received a
significant benefit for his testimony. We cannot say that counsel’s

24
strategy was so patently unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have followed such a course. See id. Accordingly,
counsel’s performance in this regard was not deficient.
(c) Sims argues that counsel failed to make a Bruton
objection to the testimony of the Hockadays. Again, Sims does not
identify with citation to the record which specific statements were
allegedly objectionable. We note, however, that none of Banks’
admissions to the Hockadays can be considered testimonial
because they were not intended for use in a future prosecution.
“Bruton held that a defendant’s right to be confronted with
the witnesses against him is violated when he is tried jointly with
a co-defendant who does not testify, and the court admits an out-
of-court statement by the co-defendant that directly inculpates
the defendant.” Allen v. State, 300 Ga. 500, 503 (2017). However,
“the rule set forth in Bruton … does not apply to non-testimonial
out-of-court statements made by such a co-defendant.” Billings v.
State, 293 Ga. 99, 103–104 (2013) (emphasis omitted). A
statement is testimonial if its primary purpose is to establish
evidence for use in a future prosecution, and that was clearly not
the case here. See Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 845 (2015). For
these reasons, any objection to the admission of these statements
on Bruton grounds would have lacked merit, and the failure to
make a meritless objection is not deficient performance. See
Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881, 884–85 (1993).
Because Sims has failed to show that his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient, his claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel fails. See Taylor, 315 Ga. at 647.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.

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