Jason Elridge v. State

FOURTH DIVISION
DILLARD, P. J.,
MERCIER and HODGES, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

January 29, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A1601. ELDRIDGE v. THE STATE.

HODGES, Judge.

Jason Eldridge was convicted of multiple crimes perpetrated on two elderly

people, Floyd Calvin Lee and Rosa Lee (collectively “the Lees”; individually

“Calvin” and “Rosa”) and the neighbors who attempted to help the Lees. Eldridge

appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the trial

court plainly erred in the admission and consideration of victim-impact evidence at

sentencing and that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for battery against

one of the neighbors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,1 the evidence adduced

at trial shows that on the day of the crimes, May 6, 2020, Eldridge’s then 11-year-old

nephew was playing with a football at his grandparents’ house when he heard

something “hit the ground” in Eldridge’s house, which was nearby. Eldridge emerged

from his house and ran toward the nephew with “his hands up and his hair ... all

messed up,” saying “random words.” The nephew testified that because Eldridge

seemed out of his mind, the nephew ran into his grandparents’ house, locked the door,

and told his grandfather Eldridge was chasing him. Eldridge later admitted to using

“illicit drugs[,]” specifically methamphetamine, which a laboratory report confirmed.

While sheltering in the house, the young nephew and the grandfather heard “a

bunch of commotion” at the Lee home nearby. The grandfather also heard Eldridge’s

voice, and he and the nephew heard Rosa “screaming” and calling for help, as well as

two gun shots.

The Lees’ neighbors, father-and-son John and Brandon Carter (collectively,

“the Carters”; individually, “John” and “Brandon”), were outside grilling burgers

when they heard something that sounded like “a piece of wood hitting a tin barn.”

1
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319(III)(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979).
2
They heard a woman screaming and yelling for help and “somebody yelling

motherf–ker this and motherf–ker that.” Brandon grabbed his pistol and as he ran

toward the sounds coming from the Lees’ home, he could see a man with “his hands

around an elderly woman’s wrists . . . [and] she was trying to fight him off[.]”

Brandon recognized the man as Eldridge, and screamed, “what’s going on[?]”

Eldridge ran away and got into a vehicle in the Lees’ carport.

As the Carters approached, Eldridge kicked the car door open and climbed out,

yelling, “I’m going to kill you motherf–kers” and “[y]ou better have brought a gun.”

Eldridge then went “berserk[,]”grabbed a trash can, and threw it at the Carters.

Eldridge charged at John, hitting him in the jaw twice, throwing him off balance, and

knocking off his glasses. Eldridge also grabbed Brandon’s hand in an attempt to get the

pistol. Brandon shifted the pistol to his other hand and shot Eldridge twice to “get

him off[.]” Eldridge did not stagger; he just backed up a few yards and continued to

scream that he was going to kill the Carters. The Carters yelled at him to get on the

ground, but he did not, even though Brandon was attempting to hold him at gunpoint.

Instead, Eldridge picked up a metal fence post and charged at the Carters, “yelling he

was going to kill” them.

3
As Brandon moved around the carport after Eldridge, he saw Calvin, who was

86 years old, lying on the floor in the doorway between the outdoor patio and home’s

screened porch. Calvin was shaking, struggling to breathe, and bleeding heavily from

his head. A bloody wooden 2x4 was nearby. Rosa, who was 82 years old, pointed her

husband’s walking stick at Eldridge, saying, “He killed him. He killed him.” She told

a neighbor that Eldridge had been in her home, trying to find the car keys so he could

take Calvin’s car.2 Calvin later died from his injuries.

When police arrived at the scene, Eldridge, despite having been shot twice, was

still brandishing the metal fence post at the Carters and threatening to kill them.

Eldridge eventually followed officers’ commands to put down the post and lie on the

ground, at which point he was arrested.

Eldridge was charged pursuant to a 14-count indictment, and convicted on

seven of those counts. Of the charges related to the Lees, the jury found Eldridge

guilty of first-degree burglary of their home and of entering Calvin’s automobile. The

jury found Eldridge not guilty, however, of malice murder, two counts of felony

2
Rosa had been diagnosed with dementia, memory loss, and Parkinson’s
disease. She did not testify at trial.
4
murder, and aggravated assault against Calvin; it also found him not guilty of two

counts of exploitation and intimidation of a disabled adult, elder person, or resident.3

As to the charges related to crimes against the Carters, the jury found Eldridge

guilty of two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of terroristic threats; it also

found Eldridge guilty of the battery of John.

The trial court entered a total sentence of 72 years against Eldridge. The crimes

which Eldridge was convicted of committing against the Lees accounted for 22 years

of the sentence; the remaining 50 years were attributable to the crimes against the

Carters. The sentence requires Eldridge to serve 65 years in confinement, with the

remainder on probation.

1. Eldridge contends that the trial court plainly erred by allowing victim-impact

testimony at sentencing related to offenses for which Eldridge was neither convicted

nor sentenced, and for admitting that evidence without cross examination.4 Based on

3
The trial court directed a verdict of not guilty on a count of second-degree
criminal damage to Calvin’s vehicle.
4
Eldridge acknowledges that his aggregate sentence is shorter than the
statutorily permissible maximum, and is not void. See, e. g., Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga.
610, 611(1) (409 SE2d 517) (1991) (“A sentence is void if the court imposes
punishment that the law does not allow.”).
5
this contention of error, he seeks to have his sentence vacated and his case remanded

for resentencing. We find no error.

(a) As an initial matter, Eldridge’s enumeration focuses on two victim-impact

statements or letters. One victim-impact letter was written by the Lees’ son, and was

read into the record by an unsworn employee of the district attorney’s office. Defense

counsel raised no objections. The other letter was not read into the record, although

the State indicated that it could be. The trial court apparently read the letter to itself.

Defense counsel affirmed that she had a copy of this letter and again raised no

objections.

(b) Eldridge asserts for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in

allowing an unsworn employee of the district attorney’s office to read one of the

victim-impact statements into the record because there was no opportunity for cross

examination of the Lees’ son, who wrote the letter.5 Eldridge also argues that there

was no opportunity to cross examine the relative who wrote the letter that was not

read into the record. We find no error.

OCGA § 17-10-1.2(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part,

5
The family “[did not] feel they [could] make it through” reading the
statement themselves.
6
Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection . . . [victim-impact
evidence] shall be subject to cross-examination. The admissibility of the
testimony and evidence in support of such testimony shall be in the sole
discretion of the judge and in any event shall be permitted only in such
a manner as to allow for cross-examination by the defendant and to such
a degree as not to unduly prejudice the defendant.6

First, “it is well settled that the failure to object to unsworn testimony waives

the issue for appeal.” Bennett v. State, 334 Ga. App. 381, 383(1)(a) (779 SE2d 420)

(2015). Second, Eldridge’s counsel also never sought to cross examine either of the

letter writers. When asked if there was anything else to address, Eldridge’s counsel

twice said no. On appeal, Eldridge acknowledges the unavailability of ordinary

appellate review, but asserts that he is entitled to plain error review.

To establish plain error, an appellant must identify an error that
was not affirmatively waived, was clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceeding, and seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

6
See also OCGA § 17-10-1.2(a)(4) (providing that upon a court finding, specific
to the case and witness, that the witness would be unable to testify in person without
exhibiting undue emotion or experiencing severe distress, a written statement may be
submitted so long as the witness is subject to cross examination).

7
proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it
should be.

Tucker v. State, 362 Ga. App. 489, 493-94(1) (869 SE2d 142) (2022) (citations and

punctuation omitted); accord Siders v. State, 320 Ga. 367, 375(3)(b) n. 7 (907 SE2d

645) (2024). Our Supreme Court has defined the bounds of plain error review with

respect to the admission of evidence:

In Georgia, plain error review is limited to the sentencing phase of a trial
resulting in the death penalty, a trial judge’s expression of opinion in
violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, and a jury charge affecting substantial
rights of the parties as provided under OCGA § 17-8-58(b), and, for
cases tried after January 1, 2013, with regard to rulings on evidence, a
court is allowed to consider plain errors affecting substantial rights
although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.
OCGA § 24-1-103(d).This Court will not extend plain error analysis to
other claims of error in the absence of a specific provision by the General
Assembly.

(Citation omitted.) Miller v. State, 309 Ga. 549, 552(2) (847 SE2d 344) (2020). This

case was tried after January 1, 2013. We found no cases, however, discussing plain

error review in the context presented here, where evidence was admitted in the

sentencing phase of a trial not resulting in the death penalty. Even so, we need not

8
decide whether plain error review applies in this context in the instant case because,

even if it did, Eldridge has failed to meet the four prongs of the plain error test,

specifically failing to show any legal error that is “clear and not open to reasonable

dispute,” as discussed below. Tucker, 362 Ga. App. at 493(1).

OCGA § 17-10-1.2(d), provides that “[n]o sentence shall be invalidated because

of failure to comply with the provisions of this Code section. This Code section shall

not be construed to create any cause of action or any right of appeal on behalf of any

person.”

Eldridge argues that this Code section does not apply because an invalid

sentence means a void sentence, and that he is not contending that his sentence is

void. He states that he does not want to invalidate his sentence but instead seeks

vacatur and a remand for resentencing. In analogous situations, however, our appellate

courts have found no error. See Williams v. State, 226 Ga. App. 720(2) (487 SE2d

470) (1997) (citing the language of OCGA § 17-10-1.2(d) to find no error, despite a

defendant’s assertion that the trial court erred in “failing to allow him to cross-

examine the victim pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1.2(c)”); see also Brantley v. State, 268

Ga. 151, 153(3) (486 SE2d 169) (1997) (rejecting defendant’s contention that he was

9
“denied effective assistance of counsel because he was not afforded the opportunity

to review and rebut victim impact statements pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1.2. The

failure to comply with the Code section does not provide a basis for the invalidation

of a sentence. OCGA § 17-10-1.2(d)”); McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 388(10)(c) (477

SE2d 814) (1996) (finding, where defendant argued that the prosecutor, rather than

the trial court, read written questions to defendant allegedly in violation of OCGA §

17-10-1.2(b)(6), that “failure to comply with the procedure in the Code section does

not constitute reversible error absent a constitutional violation. OCGA § 17-10-

1.2(d)”).7 Eldridge has not shown error, plain or otherwise.

(c) Eldridge argues that the trial court impermissibly based his sentence on

victim impact evidence related to crimes of which he was acquitted and for which he

could not be sentenced. Again, Eldridge’s trial counsel raised no objections to the

admission or presentation of the victim impact statement.

The letter that the trial court read silently referred to Calvin’s death as a

murder, but acknowledged that “there is no murder conviction.” The letter discussed

7
These cases cite an earlier version of OCGA § 17-10-1.2(d) (1993). However,
the language in the statute pertinent to the issue at hand, i. e., that no sentence shall
be invalidated for failure to comply with the provisions of this Code section and that
this Code section creates no cause of action or right of appeal, remains the same.
10
the impact of the crimes on Rosa and on the letter-writer herself, who is the Lees’

niece. The letter also expressed frustration about how the case was investigated, and

asked the trial court to impose the maximum permissible sentences on the offenses for

which Eldridge was convicted. The letter that was read into the record discussed, inter

alia, the effect of Eldridge’s actions on the Lees and on their children, grandchildren,

great-grandchildren, and the neighborhood at large. Although the letter acknowledged

that Eldridge was not found guilty of Calvin’s murder, it referenced the impact on the

family from losing Calvin because he was “beaten to death” at the house and stated

that Calvin was “taken from us” because Eldridge wanted to steal Calvin’s car to get

a drug fix.

Although Eldridge was convicted of burglarizing the Lees’ home and of

entering Calvin’s automobile with the intent of committing a theft, he was not

convicted of the murder, aggravated assault, and exploitation and intimidation of

elderly or disabled persons charges.

Both the Supreme Court of Georgia and this Court have determined, however,

“[w]hen sentencing, a trial court may consider any evidence that was properly

admitted during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, and may also consider the

11
conduct and attitude of the defendant during trial.” Blake v. State, 273 Ga. 447,450(4)

(542 SE2d 492) (2001); accord Boney v. Tims, 254 Ga. 664, 665 (333 SE2d 592) (1985);

Jamale v. State, 302 Ga. App. 140, 143-144(2)(b) (690 SE2d 420) (2010).

Acknowledging the above-referenced cases, Eldridge concedes, “there was

admittedly no error . . . in the superior court’s considering evidence that Eldridge had

murdered [Calvin] and attacked Rosa when it imposed sentence, the jury’s not guilty

verdicts on those counts notwithstanding.” Eldridge maintains, however, that the trial

court’s consideration of evidence in the form of the victim-impact statements —

which were admitted during sentencing, rather than during the trial’s guilt-innocence

phase — is not permissible under OCGA § 17-10-1.2(a)(3). OCGA § 17-10-1.2(a)(3)

provides that in non-death-penalty cases, the trial court must allow victim-impact

evidence from someone “having personal knowledge of the crime to testify about the

impact of the crime on the victim, the family of the victim, or the community.”

Eldridge argues that “the crime” refers only to crimes for which a defendant may be

sentenced and that as a result, because his counsel failed to object, this amounts to

plain error.

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Our Court has taken a broader view than the one Eldridge espouses. As

discussed below, Eldridge has not shown any obvious, indisputable error, and at least

some of the impact evidence was duplicative of what the trial court saw on video

during the trial. Further, Eldridge has not shown that the trial court considered

impermissible evidence in imposing its sentence. Finally, Eldridge’s sentence is within

statutory bounds. He has not shown that any plain error altered the outcome of the

proceeding in a way that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Tucker, 362 Ga. App. at 493(1) (citations and

punctuation omitted).

Sentencing considerations include “all aspects of the crime[.]” Ansley v. State,

197 Ga. App. 765 (399 SE2d 558) (1990) (finding that actions that “would have been

admissible at a trial” as part of the course of conduct of a “charged crime ... could be

admitted in the sentencing hearing”) (citation omitted; emphasis added). For

example, in Jamale, the defendant argued that the trial court, in sentencing him,

erroneously considered his possession of a firearm although he was acquitted of “any

offense involving his possession of a firearm.” 302 Ga. App. at 143(2)(b). This Court

found no error, reasoning that even though the defendant had been acquitted of these

13
offenses, “one aspect” of his conviction for robbery by intimidation was testimony

that he had held the victim at gunpoint while an accomplice sought the victim’s

valuables. Id. at 144(2)(b).

Here, “one aspect” of Eldridge’s convictions for burglary of the Lees’ home

and entering their automobile with the intent to commit theft was that, as outlined

above, he attacked the Lees in the course of committing the crimes of which he was

convicted. As a result, we cannot say that the portions of the victim-impact statement

which referenced how Calvin’s death and Rosa’s resulting move to assisted living

affected their family and community were clear, obvious, or indisputable error in light

of Jamale, 302 Ga. App. at 143-144(2)(b), and Ansley, 197 Ga. App. at 765.

Further, contrary to Eldridge’s contentions, there is no indication that the trial

court’s sentence — which was shorter than the maximum allowable — even

encompassed a consideration of the victim-impact statements’ references to charged

crimes of which Eldridge was not convicted. The trial court stated from the bench at

sentencing that, “my job here is to impose sentence on the charges that the jury returned

their verdict of guilty on.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court noted that it, along with

the jurors, had seen video footage at trial of the impact of the crimes on the Lees’ son

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when he arrived at their home and on the police officers who responded to the scene;

the trial court and the jurors also saw video of Eldridge’s behavior at the scene. The

trial court then recounted some of the facts underlying the crimes for which Eldridge

had been convicted: entering the Lees’ home and entering their automobile intending

to steal it; assaulting and threatening the Carters, and striking John. Immediately after

listing the crimes of which Eldridge was convicted, the trial court also said it was very

troubled by the impact of Eldridge’s actions on the neighborhood. The trial court

opined that it was most troubled by Eldridge’s invasion of the security of the Lees’

home — and, indeed, Eldridge was convicted of first-degree burglary. The trial court

then stated that, “[f]or all of those reasons[,]” it was accepting the State’s

recommendation, and it imposed the sentence.

Nothing in the trial court’s actions or express statements indicates that in

imposing its sentence, it relied upon any allegedly impermissible portion of the victim-

impact letters. See Demetrios v. State, 246 Ga. App. 506, 511(4) (541 SE2d 83) (2000)

(citing trial court’s statements from the bench at sentencing, and finding that where

trial court’s “express reasons for imposing sentence did not include” the evidence

defendant argued was impermissible, there were no grounds for reversal because “an

15
appellant must show harm as well as error. Demetrios can show no harm, even if error

existed”), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 118(2) (823 SE2d

974) (2019). Indeed, “trial courts are presumed to consider only relevant, legal

evidence[,]” Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621, 627(6) (713 SE2d 851) (2011), (overruled

on other grounds by Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168 (815 SE2d 38) (2018); see generally

Peek v. State, 234 Ga. App. 731, 732(2) (507 SE2d 553) (1998) (“It is presumed that

a trial judge, when he sits as the trier of fact, considered only legal evidence, unless it

appears from the judgment that the trial judge considered testimony which should

have been excluded.”) We find no error, plain or otherwise.

2. The indictment charged Eldridge with battery for “intentionally caus[ing]

visible bodily harm to John Carter by striking him[.]” Eldridge argues that the State

failed to show that John sustained visible bodily injury as alleged in the indictment and

that, as a result, insufficient evidence supports the battery conviction. We disagree

and affirm.

A defendant “commits the offense of battery when he or she intentionally

causes substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to another.” OCGA § 16-5-

16
23.1(a). As defined in the statute, the term “‘visible bodily harm’ means bodily harm

capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim[.]” OCGA § 16-5-23.1(b).

At trial, John testified that Eldridge punched him in the jaw, injuring him by

leaving a “knot on [his] chin” after the incident. He specifically recounted Eldridge

“charging at” him and “hit[ting him] in the jaw” so hard that it “knocked [him] off

balance and knocked [his] glasses off.” Brandon testified that Eldridge “bolted” at his

father, “screaming obscenities that he was going to f–king kill us. ... [Eldridge]

approached us, he drawed back and hit my father twice[,]” causing him to “stumble”

to the point that Brandon “thought [his father] fell over.”

John’s perception of the knot on his own chin provides circumstantial evidence

that this knot could have been visible to Brandon. Our Court has determined that

“visible bodily harm may be shown through circumstantial evidence.” Penix v. State,

367 Ga. App. 765, 767(1)(b) (888 SE2d 352) (2023) (finding sufficient circumstantial

evidence of visible bodily harm — even where a jailer whom defendant had “pushed

‘pretty hard’ into a ‘corner cut’” testified that she “did not perceive visible bodily

harm to herself[,]” because this “does not mean [visible bodily harm] was not capable

17
of being perceived by another”); accord Miller v. State, 240 Ga. App. 18, 20(3) (522

SE2d 519) (1999) (recognizing that a “conviction based on circumstantial evidence [is]

authorized when every reasonable inference and hypothesis except [that] of guilt [is]

excluded by the evidence[,]” and finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of visible

bodily injury where defendant knocked victim down, dragged her across yard, and

injured her knees). The evidence was sufficient to sustain Eldridge’s battery

conviction.

Judgment affirmed. Dillard, P. J., and Mercier, J., concur.

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