Taffether Hopson v. Capital One Auto Finance, Division of Capital One, N.A.

THIRD DIVISION
DILLARD, P. J.,
GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules

May 20, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0367. HOPSON v. CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE,
DIVISION OF CAPITAL ONE, N.A.

GOBEIL, Judge.

In June 2025, Taffether Hopson, proceeding pro se, filed suit against Capital

One Auto Finance, a division of Capital One, N. A. (“Capital One”), alleging claims

for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, securities fraud, and declaratory judgment.

Capital One moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted the motion and

dismissed Hopson’s suit with prejudice. In the instant appeal, Hopson, still

proceeding pro se, alleges in part that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint
and failing to liberally construe her pro se pleadings as required under Georgia law.

For the reasons that follow, we now affirm.1

On appeal, we review the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
de novo. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the
complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled
to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and
(2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce
evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a
grant of the relief sought. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings
are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all
doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party’s
favor.

Mayorga v. Benton, 364 Ga. App. 665, 666 (875 SE2d 908) (2022).

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Hopson’s “Notice of Non-Filing [of Capital One’s appellee’s brief] and
Motion to Submit for Decision on Appellant’s Brief” is DENIED AS MOOT. The
appeal was docketed on September 9, 2025, Hopson filed her initial brief on
September 22, 2025, and Capital One filed a timely appellee’s brief on Monday,
October 20, 2025. See Court of Appeals Rule 23(b) (“To be considered, appellee’s
brief should be filed within 40 days after the appeal is docketed or 20 days after the
appellant’s brief is filed, whichever is later.”); Court of Appeals Rule 3 (“When a
filing deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, an official state or national holiday, ... the
deadline is extended to the next business day.).
2
So viewed, in June 2022, Hopson entered into a retail installment sales contract

for the purchase of a 2017 Toyota Rav 4 for $32,975.46. The transaction was financed

and the loan was assigned to Capital One. Under the terms of the contract, Hopson

was required to make monthly payments to Capital One. Hopson later attempted to

rescind the loan by sending a “Bill of Exchange” to Capital One in March 2025,

claiming to “revoke” Capital One’s security interest and “invoke” Capital One to pay

the entire financial obligation of the contract. Hopson also directed Capital One to

“[r]eturn all prior payments on the debt note made on behalf of [Hopson], as this was

an oversight, no longer shall [Hopson] continue to participate in such activities being

deemed as an enemy of the state.” Capital One continued to request monthly

payments.

Thereafter, on April 21, 2025, Hopson sent an “Opportunity to Cure” letter

instructing Capital One “to apply principals’ balance to principals’ account ... to

offset the entirety of the debt obligation.” According to Hopson, Capital One did not

respond. Hopson then sent a third letter directing Capital One to “apply the tender

of payment to the account.” Hopson also warned that if she did not get a response

within 14 business days, she intended to file suit. Capital One did not process or

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accept Hopson’s Bill of Exchange and continued to request payment, and Hopson

continued making payments.

In June 2025, Hopson, proceeding pro se, filed suit against Capital One, alleging

claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, securities fraud, and declaratory

judgment. Capital One moved to dismiss the complaint under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Hopson’s

suit with prejudice. Thereafter, Hopson filed motions seeking a stay and for

supersedeas, which the trial court also denied. The instant appeal followed.

1. Hopson alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims despite her

tendering “a lawful Bill of Exchange as tender of payment.” In her complaint, Hopson

alleged that Capital One breached the terms of the contract by “[f]ailing to accept

lawful tender,” failing to acknowledge the “discharge or offset of debt,” and

continuing to demand payments from Hopson. Her contention is without merit.

A “bill of exchange” is not a legal document or legal tender. See, e.g., Hesed-El

v. Aldridge Pite, LLP, 2021 WL 5504969, at *3(I)(C)(4) (11th Cir., Nov. 24, 2021)

(unpublished) (holding that a bill of exchange “quite plainly is not real money”).

Although it appears that we have not directly addressed this issue, Thomas v. Servbank

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provides a helpful example. 2023 WL 9226936 (S. D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2023)

(unpublished). In that case, the plaintiff sent several letters asking the Chief Financial

Officer (“CFO”) of a bank to “apply the principal’s balance ... to the principal’s

account# for set off,”and then sent two letters of “Default Judgment” to the bank

when the CFO did not apply the “balance ... for set off” as the plaintiff instructed. Id.

at *1-2(I). In granting the bank’s motion to dismiss, the district court concluded the

plaintiff’s “complaint [was] devoid of facts plausibly suggesting any entitlement to

relief.” Id. at *4(III). Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff’s claims were

rooted in frivolous sovereign citizen theories, and the “bills of exchange” that the

plaintiff issued as an attempt to pay his debt were not valid payment, “but rather a

worthless piece of paper.” Id. at *8(III)(C). See also Harp v. Police & Fire Fed. Credit

Union, 2023 WL 5152625, at *3(III)(A) (E. D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2023) (unpublished)

(dismissing with prejudice breach-of-contract claim where it was clear from the

complaint’s exhibits that plaintiff’s “bill of exchange” was not valid legal tender for

payment of credit card debt, and “rather than a legally enforceable document noting

an existing debt that [defendant] owed to her, [plaintiff] simply handwrote an array of

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financial buzzwords on her credit card statement and tried to pass this off to

[defendant] as valid legal tender for her credit card debt” (citation modified)).

In short, Hopson has not identified any specific contractual provision that was

breached and to the extent that she argues that repeatedly sending instructions “to

apply principals’ balance to principals’ account ... to offset the entirety of the debt

obligation” amounted to legitimate performance under the contract, her assertion is

completely devoid of merit. The trial court therefore properly dismissed Hopson’s

claim for breach of contract for failure to state a claim.

2. In a related claim of error, Hopson asserts that the trial court erred in

dismissing her unjust enrichment claim despite allegations that Capital One “retained

benefits without lawful basis.” In her complaint, Hopson alleged that Capital One was

unjustly enriched because it continued to demand and retain loan payments from

Hopson even after her lawful tender of payment. As previously discussed in Division

1, Hopson’s “bill of exchange” and letters to Capital One did not constitute legal

documents or legal tender. Second, “[a]n unjust enrichment theory does not lie where

there is an express contract.” Cox v. Athens Regional Med. Ctr., 279 Ga. App. 586,

593(3) (631 SE2d 792) (2006). In her complaint, Hopson specifically alleged that she

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“entered into a valid and binding contract for the financing of a motor vehicle.”

Because a valid contract existed between Hopson and Capital One, the trial court did

not err in dismissing Hopson’s unjust enrichment claim. See id. (affirming dismissal

of unjust enrichment claim because of the existence of a valid contract between the

parties).

3. Hopson next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her securities

fraud claim under OCGA § 10-5-51 because Capital One “omitted material facts

regarding ownership and lienholder status.” Again, we find no error.

In the first instance, OCGA § 10-5-51 covers “[f]raudulent acts by investment

advisers.” Specifically, the statute prohibits “a person that advises others for

compensation, either directly or indirectly, or through publications or writings, as to

the value of securities or the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling

securities or that, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or

promulgates analyses or reports relating to securities” from engaging in fraudulent

conduct. OCGA § 10-5-51(a). The complaint alleges no facts showing that Capital

One qualifies as an investment adviser. In fact, OCGA § 10-5-2(17)(F) specifically

excludes banks from the definition of an investment advisor.

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In any event, Hopson has failed to point to any valid legal authority to support

her claim that a lender must disclose securitization or that securitization is unlawful.

See Milner v. New Am. Funding LLC, 2024 WL 1957342, at *3(II)(B)(2) (N. D. Ga.

Apr. 1, 2024) (unpublished) (“numerous courts over the last several years have

squarely rejected the patently frivolous notion that ‘securitization’ or nondisclosure

of securitization constitutes any material credit term or gives the borrower any

recourse to avoid paying their mortgage”). And even accepting as true Hopson’s

allegation that the loan was securitized, Hopson has failed to show how any such

securitization would have any impact on her rights and obligations under the contract.

The trial court thus did not err in dismissing Hopson’s claim for securities fraud.

4. Hopson alleges that the trial court erred in ignoring her “redressed contract”

and allowing Capital One to enforce the terms of the original sales contract. Although

difficult to follow, the “redressed contract” that Hopson appears to reference is the

original contract that she attached to the Bill of Exchange and sent to Capital One in

March 2025, on which she handwrote “I Revoke” on several pages and marked with

a stamp that reads “[f]or presentation to the United States Treasury, for conversion

to book-entry securities[.]” In the bottom right corner of some of the pages, there is

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another stamp that reads “CANCELED.” According to Hopson, she modified or

rescinded the original contract via this “redressed contract.” However, “[i]t is

elemental that it is not possible to have a unilateral modification of a contract

previously entered into between the parties.” Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v.

Berlye, 202 Ga. App. 358, 361(2) (414 SE2d 499) (1991). As a result, this claim is

without merit.

5. Hopson broadly asserts that “the trial court erred in failing to liberally

construe [her] pro se pleadings,” thereby denying her “the protections owed to self-

represented litigants.” However, as previously discussed in Divisions 1 through 4, the

trial court properly dismissed Hopson’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief,

and even liberally construing the pleadings, Hopson’s claims were without merit and

dismissal of her complaint was warranted.

6. Finally, Hopson argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims

without allowing discovery, which foreclosed her ability to present evidence in

support of her substantive claims and deprived her of due process. OCGA § 9-11-

12(j)(1) provides that: “If a party files a motion to dismiss before filing an answer and

pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, discovery shall be stayed until the

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ruling of the court on such motion[.]” Capital One filed a motion to dismiss on July

28, 2025, which automatically stayed discovery. The trial court dismissed Hopson’s

complaint on August 22, 2025. See OCGA § 9-11-12(j)(1) (“The court shall decide

the motion to dismiss within 90 days following the conclusion of briefing on such

motion.”). As a result, the trial court did not err by staying discovery upon the filing

of the motion to dismiss. In any event, Hopson has “not articulated any evidence

which [she] hope[s] such discovery would uncover that would be relevant to” the

issues here. Hawkins v. Blair, 334 Ga. App. 898, 901(2) (780 SE2d 515) (2015). As a

result, this claim also fails.2

2
Hopson mentions her declaratory judgment claim and OCGA § 9-4-2 in her
initial brief in the same section as her arguments about the “redressed contract,” but
she does not include this as a separate claim of error. See McCarney v. PA Lex Glen,
LLC, 336 Ga. App. 271, 274(3) (784 SE2d 438) (2016) (“An appealing party may not
use [her] brief to expand [her] enumeration of errors by arguing the incorrectness of
a trial court ruling not mentioned in the enumeration of the errors.”) ( punctuation
omitted). In any event, as explained above, Hopson has failed to show that any of her
claims state “a cognizable basis for relief.”
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Hopson’s complaint.3

Judgment affirmed. Dillard, P. J., and Pipkin, J., concur.

3
As Capital One highlights, Hopson’s briefs are replete with inaccurate
citations — which due to their nature appear to be fabricated by artificial intelligence.
Capital One asserts that use of these citations constitutes an abandonment of
Hopson’s claims. In this instance, we do not find that Hopson abandoned her claims.
However, we take this opportunity to remind Hopson that all litigants — even pro se
ones — are responsible for verifying what they file before this Court. Her failure to do
so has caused Capital One and this Court to expend unnecessary efforts to discern her
claims. See Mattox v. Prod. Innovations Research, LLC, 807 FSupp3d 1341, 1354(V) (E.
D. Okla. 2025) (“Before this Court, artificial intelligence is optional. Actual
intelligence is mandatory.”). Hopson is cautioned that further use of fictitious legal
citations may result in sanctions. See Court of Appeals Rule 7(e)(2) (“The panel of
the Court ruling on a case, with or without motion, may by majority vote to impose a
penalty not to exceed $10,000 against any party and/or a party’s counsel in any civil
case in which there is a direct appeal ... that is determined to be frivolous.”); see also
Court of Appeals Rule 7(a) (inherent power of Court).
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