IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT DAVID ARKIN

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26Y1361
In the Matter of Robert David Arkin
Decided: October 14, 2026
P ER CURIAM .
This disciplinary matter is currently before the Court on
the report and recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review
Board (“Review Board”), which was asked to review the report
and recommendation of Special Master Noah H. Pines at the
request of Robert David Arkin (State Bar No. 021575) pursuant
to Bar Rules 4-214 and 4-216. In his report, the Special Master
reviewed an amended petition for voluntary discipline filed by
Arkin and rejected it, concluding that Arkin should receive a
three-year suspension with four conditions for reinstatement,
rather than the six-month suspension with three conditions for
reinstatement requested by Arkin, for his violations of Rules 1.2,
1.3, 1.4, 1.7, 1.15(I), 1.15(II), 1.16, 3.2, and 8.4(a)(4) and (5) of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”) found in Bar Rule
4-102(d) in connection with five separate matters. The maximum
penalty for a violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.7, 1.15(I), 1.15(II), and
8.4(a)(4) and (5) is disbarment, whereas the maximum penalty for
a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 3.2 is a public reprimand. Arkin
filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report pursuant to Bar
Rule 4-214(c), but instead of analyzing the Special Master’s
conclusions of law and the recommended sanction as requested by
Arkin, 	the 	Review 	Board 	recommended 	that 	the 	case 	be
remanded back to the Special Master for a more complete analysis

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of the conditions for reinstatement. Both Arkin and the State Bar
have filed exceptions to the Review Board’s report in this Court.
For the reasons discussed below, we reject the Review Board’s
report and recommendation, accept the Special Master’s report
and recommendation, and impose a three-year suspension with
conditions, though we modify the conditions the Special Master
proposed.
1. 	Procedural History
In July 2024, the State Bar filed formal complaints against
Arkin. Prior to an evidentiary hearing, Arkin filed a petition for
voluntary discipline. The Special Master held an evidentiary
hearing on April 16–17, 2025, after which Arkin amended his
petition for voluntary discipline. In his amended petition, Arkin
admitted to violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7, 1.15(I), 1.15(II), 3.2,
and 8.4(a)(5). Arkin sought a six-month suspension with the
following conditions for reinstatement: (1) reach an agreement
with two of his former clients “to make regular payments towards
full restitution”; (2) provide certification from a psychologist or
similar therapist that he is fit to practice law; and (3) identify an
experienced attorney who can provide regular monitoring of his
law practice to ensure his ongoing fitness to practice law. The
Special Master issued his report and recommendation on May 1,
2026.
2. 	Special Master’s Report and Recommendation
(a) Findings of Fact
The Special Master made the following findings of fact
based on facts stipulated by Arkin and the State Bar, the evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing, and Arkin’s admissions in
his petition for voluntary discipline.

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State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) No. 7788: In
October 2020, a client retained Arkin to assist her in connection
with locating a life insurance policy, in which she thought she was
the named beneficiary, and paid him a $2,000 retainer. Arkin’s
associate and his legal assistant performed some work on the
matter; however, they were unable to locate any insurance policy
benefiting 	the 	client. 	The 	client 	then 	terminated 	the
representation and requested a refund, after she could not reach
anyone at the law firm. During the representation, the client also
did not receive an invoice. The client’s file was closed on March 2,
2021, and the balance on the retainer at the time was $1,182.50.
On March 11, 2021, Arkin entered a final notation on the account
regarding the retainer balance, in which he stated that he
provided no services to the client, was unfamiliar with the matter,
and would mail a check representing the balance of the retainer
to the client. However, it was not until March 20, 2025 – four
years after the file was closed – that Arkin, through counsel, sent
the client a refund of the $2,000 retainer she paid.
SDBD No. 7789: In 2017, a client hired Arkin to file a
lawsuit against several defendants. Arkin eventually filed the
lawsuit in Fulton County Superior Court; however, one of the
defendants removed the case to federal court. The federal court
concluded that the case should proceed in state court, and the case
was remanded back to Fulton County Superior Court. However,
Arkin subsequently determined that he should have filed the case
in DeKalb County Superior Court, and he assured the client he
would 	effectuate 	that 	transfer. 	A 	consent 	order 	was 	issued
transferring the case to DeKalb County Superior Court and
requiring the client to pay transfer costs within 20 days. However,
Arkin did not notify the client that transfer costs were due; the
client did not pay those costs; and one of the defendants filed a
notice to memorialize the automatic dismissal of the case. Despite

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the automatic dismissal, the client then paid the full transfer
costs and the case was then transferred from Fulton County to
DeKalb County. Several of the defendants then filed motions to
dismiss based on the automatic dismissal, and while Arkin filed
an “omnibus response,” the case was ultimately dismissed.
In April 2020, Arkin re-filed the lawsuit in Gwinnett
County Superior Court, and almost a year later, he filed a motion
to serve one of the defendants via publication, which was granted,
but the court ultimately dismissed that defendant from the
lawsuit, noting that “nearly three (3) months have lapsed and no
proof of service as to this purported defendant has been filed.”
Arkin also failed to discuss discovery requests with the client and
never responded to the discovery requests. Two defendants filed
motions to compel, citing Arkin’s failure to respond to their
discovery requests, his failure to request an extension of time to
respond, and his failure to respond to their good faith efforts to
resolve the discovery dispute. Arkin did not respond to the
motions to compel, and the defendants filed motions to dismiss.
Arkin did not respond to the motions to dismiss, and the Gwinnett
court 	entered an 	order granting 	the 	defendants’ motions 	to
dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice. Without telling
the client, Arkin had another attorney file a notice of appeal on
behalf of the client and his company. That same day, the clerk of
court filed a letter notifying the new attorney that the notice of
appeal was deficient, but the new attorney failed to correct those
deficiencies. 	Arkin 	never 	informed 	the 	client 	that 	another
attorney would be appealing on his behalf or otherwise working
on his case. The Gwinnett court entered an order dismissing the
appeal as to the remaining defendants and awarded attorney fees
and expenses against the client in the amount of $51,096.61. The
client did not find out that the case was dismissed until he went
on the court website to check on the status of the case. The client

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hired another attorney to pursue a claim against Arkin and
ultimately negotiated an agreement in June 2024 for Arkin to pay
him $100,000. As of the date of the hearing before the special
master, the client had received $69,500 from Arkin.
SDBD 7790: The client, who was 79 years old at the time
of the Special Master’s report, was the primary beneficiary of a
trust, for which his mother served as trustee until her death in
March 2017. Following the resignation of the successor trustee,
the client consulted with Arkin about the trust, but Arkin failed
to explain to the client that he could be his own trustee. Instead,
in January 2019, Arkin was appointed trustee. Arkin did not
terminate his representation of the client once he became trustee,
and he did not get written informed consent from the client
regarding the apparent conflict of interest. Arkin continued to act
as the client’s attorney.
In February 2019, Arkin transferred $91,212.07 from the
trust’s investment account to a Wells Fargo brokerage account,
and approximately a month later, Arkin transferred $89,834.96
of the trust’s assets to a SunTrust account owned by Robert Arkin,
LLC. In January 2020, the client hired another attorney and
requested an accounting from Arkin but did not receive one. The
client then filed a civil suit against Arkin and his law firm and
ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the client and removed Arkin as trustee. The court also ordered
Arkin and his law firm to pay $89,834.96 to the client as a
successor trustee, and to pay $18,890.00 in attorney fees. To date,
Arkin has not paid the judgment or attorney fees, and he claimed
at the hearing before the Special Master that the funds he took
were to reimburse his law firm for expenses that the client
directed him to pay. However, Arkin has not provided a complete
accounting.

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SDBD No. 7791: In addition to other IOLTA and operating
accounts, 	Arkin 	maintained 	an 	IOLTA 	account 	with
SunTrust/Truist Bank and an IOLTA account with Coastal States
Bank. In August 2022, the State Bar received notice regarding an
overdraft on the Truist account. Arkin claimed that the overdraft
was a result of a clerical error. However, in his amended petition,
he admitted commingling funds through a deposit of $20,631.57
of personal funds into his IOLTA account, which he allowed to
remain there.
SDBD No. 7792: In September 2019, a client hired Arkin
to defend him in a federal civil suit and paid him $2,000.00. Arkin
also represented two other defendants in the lawsuit and filed
answers on their behalf. But, in May 2020, Arkin sent a letter to
the three defendants regarding his intent to withdraw; the court
granted his motion to withdraw that same month. The client
proceeded pro se, failed to appear at a pre-trial hearing, and filed
a motion to be dismissed as a party to the case. On November 2,
2021, the client rehired Arkin for $10,000. However, Arkin failed
to file anything on behalf of the client to explain why the client
missed the pre-trial hearing, and in December 2021, the court
found the client in default for failing to comply with the pre-trial
instructions and with a show-cause order. The court also denied
the client’s motion to be dismissed as a defendant. Arkin texted
the client to say that he would file a motion to reconsider the
finding of default, but he never did. The court ultimately awarded
$834,799.79 against the client, who did not know about the
judgment until the opposing lawyer garnished his savings and
checking account for $24,000. When the client learned about the
garnishment, he reached out to Arkin, who never responded. The
client, who is a retired Vietnam War Veteran on a fixed income,
hired another lawyer to try and stop the garnishment, but that
lawyer 	was 	not 	successful. 	During 	the 	second 	period 	of

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representation, Arkin did not file anything on behalf of the client
except for an entry of appearance.
(b) Arkin’s additional evidence
The Special Master noted that at the evidentiary hearing,
Arkin testified that he suffered from a psychological disability
from 2018 until 2023 — which occurred as a result of his divorce,
the death of his brother and a work colleague, and a COVID-19
diagnosis 	— 	and 	that 	until 	about 	January 	2024, 	“he 	felt
emotionally immobilized, was not thinking clearly, and was not
representing his clients.” Arkin “accepted responsibility for his
actions” and was “embarrassed by his conduct.” Arkin described
personal and work-related issues that, in his mind, led to these
disciplinary cases. A board-certified psychologist who treated
Arkin during the relevant time-period, Arkin’s ex-wife, and a
Rabbi, all testified on Arkin’s behalf as well.
(c) 	Conclusions of Law
The Special Master noted that there was no dispute that

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Arkin’s acts and omissions violated Rules 1.2,1 1.3,2 1.4,3 1.7(a)4
and (b),5 1.15(I),6 1.15(II),7 3.2,8 and 8.4(a)(5).9
1 Rule 1.2 provides, in relevant part, that a “lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as
required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued.”
2 Rule 1.3 provides, in relevant part, that a “lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client … [and] shall not
without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or
willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”
3 Rule 1.4 provides, in relevant part, that a lawyer shall “promptly
inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the
client’s informed consent … is required”; “reasonably consult with the client
about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished”; “keep
the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter”; and “promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information.”
4 Rule 1.7(a) provides, in relevant part, that a “lawyer shall not
represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the
lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer’s duties to another client, a former client,
or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation, except
as permitted in (b).”
5 Rule 1.7(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f client informed
consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a
significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former
client gives informed consent confirmed in writing” after meeting certain
requirements.
6 Rule 1.15(I) provides, in relevant part, that “upon request by the
client or third person, [lawyer] shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding [client or third person’s] property” being held by attorney.
7 Rule 1.15(II) provides, in relevant part, that “no personal funds
should ever be deposited in a lawyer’s trust account, except that unearned
attorney’s fees may be so held until the same are earned.”
8 Rule 3.2 provides, in relevant part, 	that a “lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the
client.” 9 Rule 8.4(a)(5) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be a violation

9
Beyond what Arkin had stipulated to, the Special Master
also concluded, as relevant to the arguments Arkin raises here,
that Arkin violated additional Rules as follows. First, in SDBD
7790, he violated Rule 1.15(I)(a) by commingling funds belonging
to the trust with funds in his business/operating account, instead
of keeping them in his IOLTA account; Rule 1.15(II)(a) and (b)
when he administered funds for payment of trust expenses from
his operating account, not the IOLTA account where he had
moved the funds; and Rule 8.4(a)(4) 10 and (5) when he misused
the trust funds he transferred from the Wells Fargo account into
his IOLTA account and when he failed to pay the attorney fee
award against him within 15 days of the order. 	In addition, in
SDBD No. 7792, Arkin violated Rule 1.2(a) when he failed to
abide by the scope of the representation by failing to respond to
the show-cause order and by failing to adequately consult with
the client about the impact of the client missing the pre-trial
hearing, the impact of the default on the client’s case, and the
impact of the judgment against the client. Arkin violated Rule 1.3
by failing to file anything in response to the show-cause order and
failing to file the motion for reconsideration of the court’s entry of
the default against the client. Arkin also violated Rule 1.16(d) 11
by failing to refund the unearned fee the client paid for the second
period 	of 	representation 	since 	Arkin 	only 	filed 	an 	entry 	of
of the [Rules] for a lawyer to … fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute
rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer
within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment.”
10 Rule 8.4(a)(4) provides that it shall be a violation of the Rules for a
lawyer to “engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation.”
11 Rule 1.16(d) provides that “[u]pon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s
interests.”

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appearance and took no other action.
(d) ABA Standards
Looking to the American Bar Association’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for guidance in determining the
appropriate level of discipline, see In the Matter of Breault, 318
Ga. 127, 136 (2024), the Special Master found that Arkin had a
duty to his clients to consult and communicate with them and to
perform the work for which he was hired but that he failed to do
so. The Special Master found that he also violated his duties to
safeguard trust funds and to avoid conflicts of interest.
Regarding Arkin’s mental state, the Special Master found
that 	the 	majority 	of 	Arkin’s 	actions 	were 	knowing, 	not
inadvertent or negligent, as he made the decisions in the client’s
cases and refused to communicate with his clients. The Special
Master found that Arkin also controlled his IOLTA account and
client and fiduciary property. As for the injury caused, the Special
Master noted that one client ended up with over $50,000 in
attorney fees awarded against him; that another client had a
judgment of over $800,000 entered against him; and that all of his
clients were involved in stressful situations that were only made
worse 	by 	Arkin’s 	failure 	to 	adequately 	represent 	them,
communicate with them, and respond to lawyers who were hired
to assist these clients after they terminated his representation.
The Special Master also concluded that under the relevant
ABA Standards, the presumptive penalty was a suspension. See
ABA Standards 4.12 (dealing improperly with client property);
4.32 (conflicts of interest). The Special Master noted that whether
it was from anxiety or stress, Arkin violated his duties to his
clients, multiple times in multiple matters, by failing to diligently
represent them, failing to consult with them, and failing to

11
communicate with them.
Next, as for the aggravating factors, the Special Master
considered Arkin’s prior disciplinary history, as he received an
investigative panel reprimand in 1995 and a formal letter of
admonition in 2019. See ABA Standard 9.22(a). In addition, the
Special 	Master 	found 	that 	Arkin 	committed 	a 	pattern 	of
misconduct and multiple offenses, see ABA Standard 9.22(c) and
(d); that two of his clients were vulnerable victims because they
were elderly , see ABA Standard 9.22(h); and that Arkin had
substantial experience in the practice of law, as he was admitted
to the Bar in 1987, see ABA Standard 9.22(i). Finally, the Special
Master determined that Arkin showed indifference to making
restitution to any of his clients. ABA Standard 9.22(j).
As for mitigating factors, the Special Master considered
Arkin’s personal and emotional problems, see ABA Standard
9.32(c); his physical disability based on his COVID-19 diagnosis,
see ABA Standard 9.32(h); his mental disability, as it affected his
conduct as it related to his clients, see ABA Standard 9.32(i); his
remorse, see ABA Standard 9.32(l); and the remoteness of his
prior offenses, see ABA Standard 9.32(m).
(e) 	Recommendation of Discipline
As for the level of discipline, the Special Master noted that
Arkin admitted to violating eight Rules, including six Rules that
authorize disbarment as the maximum sanction; that Arkin had
committed additional Rule violations; and that Arkin’s conduct
spanned five separate cases involving four different clients. The
Special Master also noted that this Court has previously imposed
lengthy 	suspensions 	and 	even 	disbarment 	for 	similar 	Rule
violations and under similar circumstances. See In the Matter of
Morgan, 303 Ga. 678, 680 (2018) (on petition for voluntary

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discipline, 	imposing 	two-year 	suspension 	with 	conditions 	on
reinstatement for lawyer who was suffering from personal and
emotional problems and violated Rules 1.15(I), 1.15(II), and
8.4(a)(4)); In the Matter of Hentz, 300 Ga. 413, 414–15 (2016) (on
special master’s report and recommendation, imposing a two-year
suspension 	with 	conditions 	for 	reinstatement, 	including
restitution and certification of fitness to practice law, on lawyer
who was suffering from personal and emotional problems and
violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), and 9.3 in five matters and who
had received prior discipline); In the Matter of Peterson, 290 Ga.
794, 	795–96 	(2012) 	(on 	special 	master’s 	report 	and
recommendation, imposing three-year suspension with conditions
for 	reinstatement 	on 	lawyer 	who 	suffered 	from 	physical
impairment and violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), and 8.1(a) in two
matters and who had prior discipline in the form of two letters of
admonition); In the Matter of Lieb, 289 Ga. 168, 170 (2011) (on
special master’s report and recommendation, disbarring attorney
with one prior instance of discipline who violated Rules 1.2, 1.3,
1.4, 1.16(d), 3.2, and 9.3 in three matters and who submitted
evidence of his mental disability in mitigation); In the Matter of
Bagwell, 286 Ga. 511, 511 (2010) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline 	and 	imposing 	a 	two-year 	suspension 	with
reinstatement conditioned upon certification of fitness to practice
law, where lawyer was suffering from mental impairments and
violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2 in five matters); In the Matter of
Edmunds, 284 Ga. 97, 98–99 (2008) (on special master’s report
and 	recommendation, 	imposing 	three-year 	suspension 	with
conditions on lawyer suffering from mental health issues who
violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.15(II) in eight matters).
The Special Master concluded that based on the record, a
six-month suspension was not appropriate and rejected Arkin’s
amended petition in which he sought a six-month suspension with

13
conditions. Instead, the Special Master recommended a three-
year suspension with conditions for reinstatement including that
Arkin must: (1) provide proof of payment of restitution to the
client in SDBD No. 7789 per the settlement agreement he entered
into with the client; (2) reach agreements with the clients in
SDBD No. 7790 and 7792 to make regular payments toward full
or agreed upon restitution; (3) obtain (within six months of
reinstatement) certification from a psychiatrist or psychologist
that he is fit to practice law; and (4) identify an experienced
attorney who can provide regular monitoring of his law practice
to ensure his ongoing fitness to practice law. The Special Master
noted that recommending discipline in this matter had been a
difficult task, as it was clear that Arkin was truly remorseful for
what occurred and accepted responsibility, and that while Arkin’s
actions were knowing, the Special Master did not believe that he
intended to harm his clients. The Special Master concluded,
however, that, “whether from anxiety, from other psychological or
physical factors, or from incompetence,” Arkin severely harmed
several of his clients and the legal profession.
3. 	Exceptions to Special Master’s Report
(a) Arkin’s Exceptions and Request for Review Pursuant to
Rule 4-214(c)
Arkin raised four exceptions to the Special Master’s report.
First, 	Arkin 	claimed 	that 	the 	Special 	Master’s 	bases 	for
concluding that he violated Rules 1.15(I)(a), 1.15(II)(a) and (b),
and 8.4(a)(4) in SDBD No. 7790 were clearly erroneous based on
the record. Because the record evidence, he claimed, clearly
showed that he did not commingle trust funds with business
funds, the Special Master erred in basing Rule violations on this
conclusion.

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Second, Arkin argued that the Special Master’s basis for
concluding that he violated Rules 1.2 and 1.3 in SDBD No. 7792
was refuted by the record. Arkin claimed that filing a response to
the 	court’s 	show-cause 	order 	was 	outside 	the 	scope 	of 	his
representation, and that the evidence showed that once he re-
entered the case, his agreed-to representation was enumerated
only as filing an entry of appearance, reviewing the case docket,
filing a motion for additional time to amend the client’s motion to
dismiss, and filing a dispositive motion on the client’s behalf.
Third, Arkin argued that the Special Master’s conclusion
that the majority of his actions were knowing, not inadvertent or
negligent, was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Rather, the record supported the finding that during the majority
of the relevant time period, he was negligent – i.e., he failed “to
heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result
will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” See
ABA Standards, III: Black Letter Rules (Definitions).
As a final matter, Arkin argued that because some of the
Special Master’s conclusions were clearly erroneous, the Special
Master’s recommended length of sanction needed reconsideration
by the Review Board. Arkin claimed that this Court most recently
addressed the appropriate period for a suspension in a case with
facts similar to those presented here in In the Matter of Kirby, 312
Ga. 341, 343 (2021) (approving a petition for voluntary discipline
seeking a six-month suspension for an attorney who admitted
violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 in four separate client
matters, where the attorney suffered personal and emotional
problems and “various challenges ... in managing his practice and
his 	stress”). 	Similarly, 	Arkin 	claimed 	that 	this 	Court 	has
approved six-month suspensions in other recent, similar cases.

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See In the Matter of Johnson, 303 Ga. 795, 798–800 (2018) (on
special master’s report and recommendation, imposing six-month
suspension for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15(I), 1.16(d), and
5.5(a) in connection with seven client matters, where attorney
had prior disciplinary history, but in mitigation was found to have
suffered personal and emotional problems); In the Matter of
Brantley, 299 Ga. 732, 733–35 (2016) (on special master’s report
and 	recommendation, 	imposing 	180-day 	suspension 	with
conditions on reinstatement for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4,
1.15(c), 	1.16(d), 	5.5(a), 	8.1, 	and 	9.3 	in 	connection 	with 	five
disciplinary matters, where attorney had five prior disciplinary
actions, 	but 	in 	mitigation 	suffered 	personal 	and 	emotional
problems).
(b) State Bar’s Response
The Bar responded that all of Arkin’s exceptions lacked
merit. The Bar contended that the evidence in this case supported
the 	Special 	Master’s 	conclusion 	that 	Arkin 	violated 	Rules
1.15(I)(a), 1.15(II)(a) and (b), and 8.4(a)(4) in SDBD No. 7790, as
the evidence showed that Arkin paid trust expenses from his
operating account, which authorized the Special Master to infer
that he commingled business funds with client funds. As for the
Rule 1.15(II)(a) and (b) violations, the Bar contended that the
evidence 	showed 	that 	Arkin 	paid 	trust 	expenses 	from 	his
operating account, meaning he did not administer those expenses
from his trust account, had never fully accounted for the funds,
and could not pay the client the $89,834.96 owed. Thus, the
Special Master could easily infer that Arkin used the funds for his
personal use in violation of Rule 1.15(II)(b). See In the Matter of
Lemoine, 322 Ga. 463, 474 (2025) (holding that Special Master
was authorized to infer that attorney used fiduciary funds for his
own personal expenses and livelihood based on testimony that,

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among other things, only some of the IOLTA transfers he had
made had been authorized). Finally, the Bar contended that
Arkin failed to explain how the Special Master’s Rule 8.4(a)(4)
conclusion 	was 	clearly 	erroneous, 	as 	the 	record 	plainly
demonstrated that he violated this Rule through engaging in
dishonesty 	and 	misrepresentation 	by 	misappropriating 	the
client’s trust funds.
Next, the Bar contended that the Special Master properly
concluded that Arkin violated Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3 in SDBD No.
7792. The client’s understanding of the scope of representation
was that Arkin would get him out of “trouble” in the federal case,
and it would be reasonable for him to believe that Arkin would do
anything necessary to improve the situation, which would include
Arkin addressing the show-cause order.
As for his third exception, the Bar responded that the
Special Master’s findings as to Arkin’s mental state were proper,
and Arkin himself either readily admitted that he either acted
knowingly in several instances or did not contest the finding that
he acted knowingly. The Bar also noted that it was unclear how
Arkin could have acted “knowingly” most of the time but only
acted “negligently” in very specific instances if he was being
impacted by personal difficulties that severely impacted his
ability to practice law.
Finally, 	the 	Bar 	argued 	that 	the 	Special 	Master’s
recommendation of a three-year suspension was appropriate, and
Arkin failed to distinguish this case from the numerous cases
cited by the Special Master in support of his recommendation.
The 	cases 	cited 	by 	Arkin, 	the 	Bar 	argued, 	are 	also
distinguishable. First, the Bar noted that Arkin violated more
than twice the amount of Rules as the attorney in Kirby and also
involves, 	among 	other 	things, 	an 	attorney 	with 	two 	prior

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instances of discipline, a six-figure judgment against a client due
to Arkin’s failure to perform the work, and the complete dismissal
of a client’s case due to Arkin’s inaction. In addition, the Bar
argued that in Johnson the respondent violated fewer Rules
(including only one trust account violation in a single matter);
none of the Rule violations involved dishonesty; the respondent
timely refunded all unearned attorney fees and costs to his
clients; and the respondent completed a consultation with the
Law Practice Management Program of the State Bar, as well as
legal education courses to better his legal practice. 303 Ga. at 799.
Finally, in Brantley, the Bar asserted that there were “various
significant factors in mitigation,” and most of the violations
involved improper or incomplete communication with clients, the
affected clients had not suffered lasting harm, and the violations
resulted from negligence, not willful behavior. 299 Ga. at 734–35.
Accordingly, the State Bar urged the Review Board to reject
Arkin’s exceptions and to adopt the Special Master’s report and
recommendation.
4. 	Review Board’s Report and Recommendation
The Review Board noted that while it extensively reviewed
the findings of facts, conclusions of law, and application of the
ABA 	Standards, 	it 	would 	provide 	no 	analysis 	because 	its
recommendation 	was 	to 	remand 	to 	the 	Special 	Master.
Specifically, the Review Board noted that the Special Master
imposed as a condition to reinstatement that “[Arkin] must reach
agreements with two of his clients to make regular payments
towards full or agreed upon restitution.” However, the Review
Board noted that there were no findings by the Special Master of
what full restitution would be to the client in SDBD No. 7792 if
an agreement could not be reached. Specifically, the Review
Board noted that the Special Master found that the client paid

18
$10,000 to Arkin for work that he did not do, the client had a
judgment 	for 	over 	$800,000 	against 	him, 	and 	$24,000 	was
garnished from him. However, the Review Board found that it
was unclear what restitution amount should be levied against
Arkin in favor of the client.
Similarly, 	the 	Review 	Board 	was 	skeptical 	of 	the
practicality of the third and fourth conditions the Special Master
recommended, because (1) the third condition was ambiguous as
to whether the psychiatric or psychological evaluation was to
occur six months prior to reinstatement or within six months of
Arkin’s reinstatement to the legal profession; and (2) the fourth
condition could be hard to enforce, as it “may be too idealistic
despite the merits and safeguards it may entail.”
Accordingly, the Review Board made no recommendation
of discipline, because it believed the Special Master’s report to be
incomplete. Thus, it instead recommended that the case be
remanded back to the Special Master for a complete analysis and
additional fact finding on the issues of restitution and Arkin’s
reinstatement after a suspension or disbarment.
5. 	Exceptions Filed in this Court
In 	his 	exceptions, 	Arkin 	continues 	to 	raise 	the 	four
arguments that he made in the proceedings below regarding the
Special Master’s report and recommendation. He asks the Court
to enter a sanction commensurate with the nature of the actions
here, or, alternatively, to remand to the Special Master after
reversing the conclusions that are contrary to the record evidence.
The State Bar has filed a response to those exceptions, similar to
the one it filed before the Review Board.
The State Bar has also filed exceptions in this Court,
contending 	that 	a 	remand 	is 	unnecessary 	in 	these

19
circumstances.12 As the State Bar notes, this Court exercises “the
ultimate discretion in disciplinary proceedings,” In the Matter of
Turk, 	267 	Ga. 	30, 	31 	(1996), 	and 	this 	power 	extends 	to
determining conditions for reinstatement. See In the Matter of
Barge, 264 Ga. 498, 499 (1994) (“Under Georgia’s system of
attorney 	discipline, 	the 	ultimate 	decision 	on 	all 	questions,
including reinstatement, has always been made by this [C]ourt.”).
Thus, it contends that the Court can alter all conditions for
reinstatement as it deems appropriate, and the extensive fact
finding made by the Special Master in his report provides the
Court with the information it needs to complete this task. See In
the Matter of Melnick, 319 Ga. 730, 735 n.9 (2024) (rejecting the
Review Board’s recommendation that the disciplinary case be
remanded to the Special Master to recommend “an exact and
specific punishment” since “there [was] no need to remand to the
Special Master because no additional fact finding [was] necessary
in this matter and this Court exercises the ultimate discretion in
disciplinary proceedings”). Furthermore, the Bar contends that
remanding to determine the amount of “full restitution” due to
the client in SDBD No. 7792 would require the Special Master to
delve into the underlying merits of that legal matter which goes
beyond 	the 	fact 	finding 	typically 	required 	in 	disciplinary
proceedings. Such an undertaking, the Bar argues, would be more
typical for a malpractice lawsuit. The Bar further notes that the
issue of what constitutes “full restitution” will only be relevant if
the Bar and Arkin cannot come to an agreement. Finally, as for
the 	third 	and 	fourth 	conditions 	of 	reinstatement, 	the 	Bar
contends that this Court can simply accept, strike, or alter those
conditions as it deems appropriate without remanding the case
12 The State Bar also argued that the Review Board lacks authority to
remand to the Special Master, but we do not address this argument as it is
unnecessary given our ultimate conclusion in this matter.

20
given its plenary authority over matters of attorney discipline.
Arkin 	responds 	that 	should 	this 	Court 	reject 	his
arguments, a remand would be necessary. Specifically, he claims
that 	should 	this 	Court 	accept 	the 	Special 	Master’s
recommendation, it would have an insufficient record with which
to 	calculate 	a 	potential 	restitution 	amount 	needed 	for
reinstatement. Further, Arkin argues that the Bar raises serious
due process concerns in noting that restitution will only become
relevant at the time of reinstatement.
6. 	Analysis
At the outset, we note that this Court “generally defers to
the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the
special master unless those findings or determinations are clearly
erroneous.” In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 416 (2022).
However, “we review de novo the conclusions of law reached below
on what rules were violated and what level of discipline is
appropriate.” In the Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 258 (2023).
Under this framework, having reviewed the record and briefs
filed before this Court, we conclude that Arkin’s exceptions to the
Special Master’s report and recommendation lack merit.
We first address the argument that the Special Master
erred in concluding that in SDBD No. 7790 Arkin violated Rule
1.15(I)(a) by holding funds belonging to the trust in his operating
account, instead of his IOLTA account; Rule 1.15(II)(a) and (b)
when he administered funds for payment of trust expenses from
his operating account, not the IOLTA account where he had
moved the funds; and Rule 8.4(a)(4) when he misused the trust
funds he transferred from the Wells Fargo account into his IOLTA
account. Here, the record supports the Special Master’s finding
that Arkin violated Rule 1.15(I)(a) by not keeping the trust money

21
separate, 	given 	that 	he 	made 	several 	payments 	from 	his
operating account for trust expenses. Thus, Arkin’s argument to
the contrary lacks merit. Moreover, Rule 1.15(II)(a) and (b)
provide that all funds held by a lawyer for a client shall be
deposited in and administered from a trust account and that
lawyers are prohibited from using funds withdrawn from trust
accounts for their own personal use. Because the evidence shows
that Arkin paid trust expenses from his operating account and
never fully accounted for all the funds he transferred, there is no
error in the Special Master’s conclusions. There is also no error in
the Special Master’s conclusion that Arkin violated Rule 8.4(a)(4)
based on his failure to pay back and fully account for all of the
funds that he transferred into his operating account, and Arkin
does not explain how the Special Master’s findings in this regard
are clearly erroneous.
Arkin’s claim that the Special Master erred in concluding
that he violated Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3 by failing to respond to the
show-cause order also lacks merit. As the Bar noted in its
response, the Special Master had the discretion to credit the
testimony of the client in SDBD No. 7792 that he hired Arkin to
address the show-cause order over that of Arkin. And the record
shows that Arkin testified that it was possible that the client
expected him to respond to the show-cause order. Moreover, the
omission of this specific task in the retainer agreement did not
somehow absolve Arkin of the responsibility of responding to the
show-cause order because failing to respond to it would (and did)
frustrate the overall objectives of the representation.
As for Arkin’s mental state, we agree with the Special
Master’s determination that the majority of Arkin’s actions were
knowing. Arkin himself admits that he acted knowingly in certain
circumstances, including when he failed to provide an accounting

22
in SDBD No. 7790, and when he failed to file a motion for
reconsideration in SDBD No. 7792. Moreover, in cases involving
a failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing 	a 	client, 	ABA 	Standard 	4.42 	provides 	that 	a
suspension is warranted regardless of whether the attorney
knowingly failed to perform services or simply engaged in a
pattern of neglect. Accordingly, Arkin’s third enumeration fails.
We also reject Arkin’s argument that this Court should
impose a six-month suspension. 13 The aggravating factors and
the 	cases 	cited 	by 	the 	Special 	Master 	support 	a 	lengthier
suspension, particularly given the number of Rule violations with
respect to multiple clients, even when considering the mitigating
factors, including Arkin’s mental and physical health during the
relevant time period. See, e.g., Hentz, 300 Ga. at 413 	(lawyer
suffering 	numerous 	personal 	problems 	received 	a 	two-year
suspension with conditions for reinstatement of restitution and
certification that he was fit to practice, for his violations of Rules
1.2, 1.3, 1.16(d), and 9.3 in five client matters); Edmunds, 284 Ga.
at 99 (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a
three-year 	suspension 	with 	reinstatement 	conditioned 	on
certification that lawyer was fit to practice law, based on lawyer’s
violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.15(II) in eight matters and
where lawyer was suffering from personal problems at the time);
In the Matter of Simpson, 284 Ga. 446, 447 (2008) (imposing four-
13 We also note that the determination of whether to impose a three-
year suspension, as the Special Master recommended, or impose the sanction
of disbarment was a close call. Although we afford no deference to a special
master’s recommendation of discipline, see In the Matter of Toombs, 324 Ga.
472, 482 (2026), we note that the Special Master’s report and recommendation
in this matter was exceptionally thorough and thoughtful and that the State
Bar did not seek a more severe sanction in its filings before the Review Board
or this Court.

23
year suspension with conditions for readmission for lawyer who
violated Rules 1.3, 1.15(I)(a) and (b), 1.15(II)(a) and (b), and
8.4(a)(1) 	in 	three 	matters 	and 	was 	suffering 	from 	mental
impairment). 	Moreover, 	the 	cases 	cited 	by 	Arkin 	are
distinguishable, including that in Kirby, the attorney committed
fewer Rule violations, violated no trust account rules, and the
harm to his clients based on his misconduct was less severe. See
312 Ga. at 343.
Turning 	now 	to 	the 	Review 	Board’s 	recommendation,
because this Court has “inherent and exclusive power to regulate
the practice of law, it is this [C]ourt that must exercise the
ultimate discretion in disciplinary proceedings,” Turk, 267 Ga. at
31, we conclude that it is not necessary for the Court to remand
to the Special Master to modify the conditions for reinstatement.
As for the condition that Arkin must reach an agreement with the
clients in SDBD Nos. 7790 and 7792 to make regular payments
toward full or agreed upon restitution, we disagree with the
Review Board that further fact finding is necessary. While we
recognize the Review Board’s concern with the ambiguous nature
of a condition that requires restitution without identifying a
specific amount, 14 neither the Bar nor Arkin claimed that they
would have any difficulty reaching an agreement with the clients
regarding the amount owed. In addition, this Court frequently
imposes 	restitution 	as 	a 	condition 	of 	reinstatement 	without
providing a specific dollar amount. See In the Matter of Patel, 321
Ga. 523, 526 (2025) (disbarring attorney and providing that no
readmission would be considered without full restitution having
14 While Arkin also now makes this argument, he raised no such
concerns before the Review Board. In fact, we note that in his amended
petition, he specified as a condition for reinstatement that he “reach [an]
agreement with [the clients in SDBS Nos. 7790 and 7792] to make regular
payments toward full restitution,” without offering any specific amounts owed.

24
been made by Patel without specifying exact amount); In the
Matter of Roberson, 273 Ga. 651, 655 (2001) (generally stating,
“prior to submitting any petition for re[admission], [disbarred
attorney] shall make full restitution to the estate of all moneys he
received in regard to his representation of the estate”).
Next, with regard to the third condition, we clarify that
Arkin must obtain a certificate of fitness to practice law from a
licensed psychologist or psychiatrist as a condition precedent to
his reinstatement. See, e.g., In the Matter of Moore, 300 Ga. 407,
409 (2016) (conditioning reinstatement “upon [lawyer] providing
a 	detailed, 	written 	evaluation 	by 	a 	licensed 	psychologist 	or
psychiatrist certifying that he is mentally competent to practice
law”). Finally, we decline to impose a condition on Arkin that he
must identify an experienced attorney to monitor his law practice
to ensure his ongoing fitness to practice (for what appears to be
an 	indefinite 	period). 	Regular 	practice-monitoring 	is 	not 	a
sanction provided for by the Rules. See In the Matter of Meaney,
298 Ga. 136, 137 (2015) (holding, in reciprocal discipline case,
that “the use of a practice monitor” during a probated portion of
a suspension is “a sanction not provided for by the [Rules in
Georgia]”). Instead, because Arkin’s misconduct at least relates
in part to the management of his law practice, and because he will
be permitted to operate his own law practice once his suspension
has been lifted, we direct Arkin upon reinstatement to have his
law 	practice 	evaluated 	by 	the 	State 	Bar’s 	Law 	Practice
Management Program and to implement its recommendations
within six months of his reinstatement. See In the Matter of
Sammons, S26Y0848, slip op. at 13 (Aug. 11, 2026) (2026 WL
2298993, *6). We also encourage Arkin to use other resources
available from the State Bar that are designed to prevent a future
failure to meet the professional obligations of a Georgia lawyer.

25
7. 	Conclusion
Having reviewed the record and the filings in this Court,
we agree with the Special Master that a three-year suspension is
appropriate and is consistent with sanctions imposed in similar
cases. We also conclude that there is no need to remand this
matter to the Special Master as recommended by the Review
Board. At the conclusion of the three-year suspension, Arkin may
seek reinstatement by demonstrating to the State Bar’s Office of
General 	Counsel 	that 	he 	has 	met 	the 	conditions 	for
reinstatement; specifically prior to seeking reinstatement Arkin
must submit (1) proof of payment of restitution to the client in
SDBD No. 7789 per the settlement agreement he entered into
with the client; (2) proof that Arkin has reached agreements with
the 	clients 	in 	SDBD 	Nos. 	7790 	and 	7792 	to 	make 	regular
payments toward restitution; and (3) a written evaluation by a
licensed psychologist or psychiatrist certifying that Arkin is
mentally competent to practice law. If the State Bar agrees that
the conditions have been met, it will submit a notice of compliance
to this Court, and this Court will issue an order granting or
denying reinstatement. Should the Court grant his petition for
reinstatement, Arkin must arrange for an evaluation by the State
Bar’s Law Practice Management Program, and within six months
of his reinstatement, implement its recommendations. Arkin is
reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219(b).
Three-year suspension with conditions. All the Justices
concur.