United Financial Casualty Company v. Alley

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
United Financial Casualty Co., )
)
Plaintiff, ) 3:15-cv-106 JWS
)
vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION
)
Steven Alley, Sr., ) [Re: Motion at docket 7]
)
Defendant. )
)
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 7, proposed intervener defendant Steven Alley, II (“Steven”) moves for
leave to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). Plaintiff United Financial
Casualty Co. (“United”) opposes at docket 10. Steven replies at docket 12. Oral
argument was not requested and would not assist the court.
II. DISCUSSION
United issued a commercial automobile insurance policy (“Policy”) applicable to
a 1982 Western 480 dump truck (“Dump Truck”) owned by Steven Alley, Sr. (“Senior”)
with $750,000 in liability coverage which was in effect at the time of the accident
underlying this litigation. That accident took place on September 18, 2013, when
Senior was driving his 2000 Chevrolet pickup (“Pickup”) from Valdez to Fairbanks and
Case 3:15-cv-00106-JWS Document 16 Filed 09/03/15 Page 1 of 4

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lost control of the Pickup which went off the road. Steven was a passenger in the
Pickup. He was badly injured in the accident. Senior had the Pickup insured with State
Farm Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) pursuant to a State Farm policy
having a liability limit of $50,000/person and $100,000/accident. Stev en suffered
damages in excess of the State Farm liability limit.
Steven’s lawyer made a demand on United for payment of the $750,000 liability
limit under the Policy, asserting that the coverage for the Dump Truck is somehow
applicable to the Pickup. United filed the instant action on June 26, 2015, seeking a
declaration that United has no duty under the Policy to provide liability coverage for the
accident involving the Pickup.
This court has jurisdiction based on the diversity of citizenship between United
and Senior.1
III. DISCUSSION
As pertinent here, Rule 24 provides that if a timely motion is made, the court may
permit intervention in a lawsuit by a party who “has a claim or defense that shares with
the main action a common question of law or fact.”2 The motion is clearly timely. The
common question asserted by Steven is whether the Policy provides coverage for the
accident involving the Pickup.
A leading treatise has explained the extent of the court’s discretion when
assessing a motion to intervene: If there is no right to intervene under Rule 24(a), it is
128 U.S.C. § 1332.
2Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
2
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wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under Rule 24(b), and
even though there is a common question of law or fact, or the requirements of
Rule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied, the court may refuse to allow intervention.”3
United contends that intervention should not be allowed, because Steven himself
has no claim which he could pursue against United. Under the law of Alaska, which
applies here, that is true. In Severson v. Estate of Severson, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that a tort victim cannot maintain an action against the tortfeasor’s insurer.4
Steven argues that this case presents an intra-family tort dispute which should take it
beyond the reach of the basic rule prohibiting the victim from suing the tortfeasor’s
insurer. He cites Myers v. Robertson.5 That case does not support Steven’s position.
There, the issue was whether the availability of insurance should be disclosed to the
jury in an intra-family tort case. The Alaska court wrote:
Without explaining the basic alignment of the parties, and the Robertsons’
role as purely nominal defendants, there was a risk of confusing the jurors
and unfairly prejudicing them against the plaintiff. In reaching this result,
we do not overrule Severson . . . .6
The court now focuses on the text of the rule which governs intervention. It
states that permissive intervention may be allowed when the would be intervener has a
“claim or defense” which shares a common question with the case already before the
37C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1913 (3d ed.)
4627 P.2d 649, 651 (Alaska 1981). See also, Evron v. Gilo, 777 P.2d 182, 187 (Alaska
1989) (declining to re-examine the rule stated in Severson).
5891 P.2d 199, 208 (Alaska 1995).
6Id.
3
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court.7 The word “claim” in this context clearly means a “claim for relief,” which is the
phrase used in Rule 8.8 Here, by virtue of Alaska law, Steven cannot plead a claim for
relief against United. By like token, Steven cannot present a “defense,” because United
has not pled any claim against Steven.
To be sure, Steven has a financial interest in the outcome of United’s suit
against Senior, but having an interest in the outcome is not equivalent to having a claim
or defense. There are many circumstances in which one person may have an interest
in the outcome of litigation against someone else, but yet not have a claim or defense
which could be pled in the litigation. For example, any creditor of a defendant may
have an interest in the outcome of a lawsuit, because the defendant-debtor’s financial
viability affects the creditor’s ability to get paid.
Steven’s lawyer paints a sympathetic picture of Steven’s circumstances.
However, the court declines to allow sympathy for Steven’s situation to trump
adherence to the controlling state substantive law and federal procedural rules.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, this court exercises its discretion to deny the request to
intervene. The motion at docket 7 is DENIED.
DATED this 3rd day of September 2015.
/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
8Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
4
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