USA v. Keehn

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TERRY LEE KEEHN, II,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM
FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION1 REGARDING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
REQUEST FOR A FRANKS HEARING
[Docket Nos. 38, 40]
I. 	MOTIONS PRESENTED
Before the Court is Terry Lee Keehn, II’s, motion to suppress evidence.2 Keehn
seeks suppression of all evidence derived from a warrant-authorized search of his home and his
pickup truck.3 The government opposes.4 Keehn’s application includes a request for a Franks
hearing.5 The Court concludes that the substantial preliminary showing necessary for a Franks
hearing has not been established. 	For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies the Franks
hearing request and recommends that the District Court, after independent review, deny the motion
to suppress at Docket No. 38.
1 This report and recommendation is being issued as a final report and recommendation. Pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3), any objections will be considered by the District Court Judge, who will accept,
reject, or modify the recommendation, or resubmit the matter to the Magistrate Judge for additional
consideration and recommendations.
2 Docket No. 38.
3 Id.
4 Docket No. 45.
5 Docket No. 40; Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 1 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 2
II. 	SUMMARY
This motion addresses a possession with intent to distribute count that developed
near the end of a three month sex trafficking investigation. 	Keehn seeks suppression of
methamphetamine and heroin found in an olive green backpack discovered in his pickup truck
pursuant to a search warrant issued by a state court magistrate. This Court recommends that the
District Court, after independent review, find that in regards to the search for drugs and drug related
material, the state court warrant was not supported by probable cause. Notwithstanding, this Court
recommends against suppression because the exclusionary rule does not apply where information
in the record establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the drugs would have been
discovered inevitably by lawful means. 	Here, the state court warrant authorizing the search of
Keehn’s home and pickup truck for sex trafficking related devices, such as cell phones, computers,
and other electronic devices with internet access capability, was supported by probable cause. This
finding leads to the conclusion that the police inevitably would have discovered the drugs when
they inspected the olive green backpack for the electronic devices. In the alternative, this Court
recommends against suppression because, although the warrant application was not supported by
probable cause that drugs would be found in the pickup truck, the good faith exception applies.
The issuing state court magistrate’s warrant here was not so defective as to drugs and drug related
materials as to render official reliance on it entirely unreasonable.
Keehn 	does 	not 	directly challenge the issuing magistrate’s 	probable 	cause
determination that probable cause existed to search his home and pickup truck for drugs. Instead,
he brings a motion asking for a Franks hearing because he alleges the probable cause determination
was based on unreliable, misleading, and stale information about sex trafficking.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 2 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 3
This report and recommendation will review the Alaska State Troopers’ factually
dense search warrant application, evaluate Keehn’s various Fourth Amendment challenges, and
explain why this Court recommends against suppression of the drug related evidence found in the
olive green backpack.
III. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	The Indictment
On February 18, 2016, the grand jury returned a true bill to a one count first
superseding indictment charging Keehn with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more
of actual methamphetamine and with possession with intent to distribute heroin, all in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (C).6
On May 19, 2016, the grand jury returned a true bill to a second superseding
indictment. 	The second superseding indictment carries the existing drug trafficking offense
forward, and adds five sex trafficking counts.7 The return of the second superseding indictment
does not impact this Court’s analysis of Keehn’s motion to suppress or his motion for a Franks
hearing.
B. 	Trooper Sergeant Mike Ingram’s Search Warrant Application
The charge against Keehn depends on evidence obtained from the warrant-
authorized search of his home and his pickup truck. Alaska State Trooper Mike Ingram executed
the affidavit supporting the search warrant.
This is what Ingram said in his sworn search warrant application.
6 Docket No. 20.
7 Docket No. 52.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 3 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 4
1. 	The text message
On October 22, 2015, Ingram received a copy of a text message sent by a
confidential source (CS) to an FBI Agent.8 In the October 10, 2015 text, the CS alleged a man
involved in sex trafficking activity threatened and harassed a woman who was engaged in
prostitution related activities without his consent in Wasilla.9 The CS said the man used cell phone
number (907) 795-3148 to generate the text.10 	Ingram traced that number to Keehn and then
located his residence.11 But Ingram determined that Keehn no longer lived there.12 Subsequent
efforts by the FBI Agent to record conversations with Keehn were unsuccessful because the agent
was unable to contact Keehn.13 Accordingly, Ingram broadcast a “police locate” for Keehn.14
2. 	The first police contact with Keehn
On December 1, 2015, a Wasilla police officer responded to the “locate.”15 This
officer reported advising Keehn that Keehn’s “25 year old daughter, Sara Johnston,” died early
that morning from injuries sustained in an automobile accident.16 The Wasilla officer reported
that Keehn now lived at 1670 Kinzi Circle, #4, in Wasilla, Alaska, and that his phone number was
still (907) 795-3148.17 This number was the same as the one generating the text message the CS
8 Docket No. 38-1 at 8.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.; Ingram’s affidavit refers to “Glass Warrant 3AN15-2539SW” in connection with the
attempted recordings. Alaska requires a warrant to record conversations using a confidential informant.
State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
14 Docket No. 38-1 at 8.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 9.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 4 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 5
gave to the FBI Agent.18 Within 24 hours, Ingram determined that vehicles associated with Keehn
and with his wife, Casey Keehn, were parked outside the Kinzi Circle address.19
3. 	The second police contact with Keehn
On January 2, 2016, a second Wasilla police officer reported contact with Keehn.20
The Wasilla officer was serving an eviction notice at the Kinzi Circle address when he encountered
Keehn, Keehn’s wife, and a woman named Sharon Southwell.21 Keehn’s 2008 red Ford F-250
pickup truck was parked outside the residence. 22 Keehn gave the officer a new Wasilla address
and confirmed his phone number was still (907) 795-3148. 23 This number was the same number
Keehn provided to the first Wasilla officer in December, as well as the number the CS provided to
the FBI Agent in October. 	While the officer was serving the eviction notice, two unidentified
people told the officer there was methamphetamine in Keehn’s Kinzi Circle residence.24 These
two reports were never corroborated because no search occurred. The officer advised Ingram that
everything had been removed from the Kinzi Circle address to a storage facility and that the locks
to the residence had been changed.25 Near the end of the encounter, the officer arrested Southwell
on an outstanding probation revocation warrant in a drug case.26
Ingram interviewed Southwell after her arrest. Southwell said she was friends with
the Keehns, that she met them through family, and that she was visiting from Soldotna.27
18 Id. at 8-9.
19 Id. at 9.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 5 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 6
Southwell told Ingram she was aware that Johnston recently died in an automobile accident.28
Southwell said Johnston had lived in Wasilla, but did not know if Johnston was associated with
Keehn.29 Southwell denied any personal involvement in the commercial sex trade.30
4. 	Scott Hagy alleges Keehn was running a prostitution enterprise
On January 7, 2016, Ingram met with Scott Hagy in Wasilla because Hagy claimed
Keehn “was running a prostitution enterprise.”31 Hagy said he was Johnston’s stepfather.32 He
told Ingram that Johnston had been working for Keehn as a prostitute when she died.33 A woman
named Ashley Hunter admitted to Hagy that she worked as a prostitute for Keehn and that Keehn
used the Kinzi Circle residence for prostitution related activities.34 Hagy then asserted that Hunter
accused Keehn of falsely claiming to be related to Johnston when she died in the accident so he
could receive notification as her next of kin.35 Hagy advised Ingram that Johnston had a cell phone
when the accident happened.36 Hagy indicated that Johnston used two phone numbers.37 One was
(907) 521-2606.38
Finally, Hagy showed Ingram several text messages he alleged Keehn sent to
Johnston’s sister immediately after Johnston’s death.39 In these text messages, the texter advised
the sister of Johnston’s fatal automobile accident, reported that Johnston had lived with Keehn and
his wife, and offered to speak with the sister if “she wanted to talk.”40 These messages came from
28 Id.
29 Id. at 9-10.
30 Id. at 10.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 11.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 10.
40 Id.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 6 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 7
Keehn’s (907) 795-3148 number.41 	The (907) 795-3148 number matched the number the CS
provided to the FBI Agent in October, the number Keehn gave to the first Wasilla officer in
December, and the second Wasilla officer in January.42
5. 	Johnston’s Galaxy cell phone
Ingram went to the wrecking yard where Johnston’s car was towed after the
accident to look for Johnston’s phone.43 	He found a badly damaged Galaxy cell phone in
Johnston’s wrecked vehicle.44 Ingram removed the SIM card.45 A search of the SIM card revealed
that the phone number for the Galaxy cell phone was (907) 521-2606.46 	This was one of the
numbers Hagy said Johnston used.47 The search of the SIM card also revealed that (907) 795-3148
was included in the cell phone contact list under the name “You Know !!!!2.”48 	The
(907) 795-3148 number was the same number the CS provided to the FBI Agent in October, the
same number Keehn provided to the Wasilla officers in December and January, and the same
number used to generate the text messages informing the sister of Johnston’s death.49 Finally, the
Galaxy cell phone contact list included the number (907) 414-3467, which Ingram linked to Casey
Keehn.50
41 Id.
42 Id. at 8-10.
43 Id. at 10-11.
44 Id. at 11.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 8-11.
50 Id. at 11.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 7 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 8
6. 	Drug paraphernalia found in Keehn’s hotel room ten days before Ingram’s
warrant application
Ingram learned that Keehn and his wife rented a room at the Aspen Hotel in
Soldotna the evening of January 3, 2016.51 After the Keehns checked out, the hotel decided not
to rent to them again “because they found evidence of drug use (used needles and a broken meth
pipe) along with blood” in the room after the Keehns departed.52 This was ten days before Ingram
applied for a warrant to search Keehn’s Anchorage residence for drugs.
7. 	The third police contact with Keehn
On January 11, 2016, a Kenai police officer reported contact with Keehn and his
wife at the Quality Inn on the Kenai Peninsula.53 	Keehn called the police because the hotel
manager refused to return his deposit.54 	Keehn and his wife were in his 2008 red Ford F-250
pickup truck when the Kenai officer arrived.55 Keehn provided the Kenai officer with an address
of 1670 Kinzi Rd., #4, in Wasilla.56 	Keehn said his phone number was (907) 795-3148 and
Keehn’s wife said her phone number was (907) 414-3467.57 Ingram recognized that both numbers
were contacts in Johnston’s Galaxy cell phone. 	The (907) 795-3148 number Keehn provided
matched the number the CS provided the FBI Agent and the number Keehn provided to the Wasilla
officers on two separate occasions.
8. 	Keehn’s recorded conversations with Southwell
Because jail calls are recorded, Ingram reviewed well over thirty recordings of
phone calls Southwell made to Keehn following her January 2, 2016 probation revocation arrest.
51 Id. at 12.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 11.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 8 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 9
a. 	“Turning tricks”
During a January 4, 2016 call to Keehn at (907) 795-3148, Keehn told Southwell
he was in the Aspen Hotel near Kenai/Soldotna and that his wife had lied to him about “turning
tricks” in his room with “Kelly.”58 Keehn told Southwell that he did not want that kind of activity
happening in his hotel room anymore.59
b. 	“Hookers”
Ingram listened to a second jail call from Southwell to Keehn that occurred on
January 4, 2016.60 In this recording, Keehn related that he had a “long talk” with Casey Keehn,
and said he was tired of having “hookers” as roommates.61 	He indicated that future living
arrangements would be limited to “him, [Southwell] and Casey” because “the place was always a
mess and he was tired of cleaning up after everyone.”62
c. 	“His Anchorage girls”
Ingram listened to a third jail call from Southwell to Keehn, which occurred on
January 5, 2016. In the third call, Keehn said that “he is having his Anchorage girls . . . over to
his place in a minute to show them everything they need to do online and phone wise so he does
not have to do it anymore” because he is “givin’ it up.”63 Keehn explained that he is doing this
“so I can show them how to set up their own account for what I do . . . so I’m not going to do that
for them no more,” that “they need to learn how to do it for themselves.”64 When Keehn repeated
58 Id. at 11-12.
59 Id. at 12.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 9 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 10
that he’s “givin’ it up,” Southwell replied “well good . . . then I won’t get questioned about that
stuff.” Keehn promised to focus exclusively on Southwell and Casey Keehn.65
9. 	Southwell plans to live with Keehn following her release
Ingram listened to over thirty jail calls between Southwell and Keehn from
January 2, 2016 to January 7, 2016.66 From these calls, Ingram learned that Southwell would be
released from custody, returned to felony probation supervision, and would live in Anchorage with
the Keehns in their new apartment near Strawberry Road.67 The apartment would be rented in
Casey Keehn’s name so Southwell could live with Terry and Casey Keehn and “there would not
be a connection on paper between Southwell and Terry Keehn when Southwell gets out of jail.”68
The address of this apartment was 2131 W. 80th Avenue, Apartment 2.69
10. 	Keehn’s vehicles and Southwell are spotted at Keehn’s Anchorage address
Ingram drove by the 2131 W. 80th Avenue, Apartment 2, residence on January 13,
2016, and saw Southwell outside smoking a cigarette.70 	He also saw the 2008 red Ford F-250
pickup truck registered to Keehn parked in front of the apartment complex, as well as a Chevrolet
Blazer registered to Southwell parked in parking space number two.71
11. 	Keehn’s prior contacts with the criminal justice system
Ingram described Keehn’s contact with the criminal justice system. These contacts
included multiple arrests for violent crimes, sexual crimes, contempt of court, resisting arrest,
property crimes, driving offenses (including a DUI), escape, and weapons offenses.72 Ingram also
65 Id.
66 Id. at 12-13.
67 Id. at 13.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 10 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 11
detailed Keehn’s criminal record, which included a conviction for using a telephone to convey a
threat, a felony burglary, a DUI, a deceptive practices conviction, interfering with a report of
domestic violence, two misdemeanor assaults, and a domestic battery.73
12. 	Ingram’s training and experience with the internet and sex trafficking
Ingram outlined his training and experience in sex trafficking investigations,74 and
opined that “it is common for pimps to utilize the internet to set up advertisements of the women
to advertise them for the commercial sex trade” on Craigslist and on Backpage.com.75 	Ingram
offered no information linking sex trafficking activity to drug trafficking or to drug use.
13. 	Ingram’s search request
Based on all of the foregoing, Ingram asked to search 2131 W. 80 th Avenue,
Apartment 2, and the 2008 red Ford F-250: (1) for all electronic devices with internet capability,
because such devices are used to facilitate prostitution related activities; (2) for drugs based on the
two anonymous tips from January 2, 2016 that methamphetamine was in an upstairs bedroom at
the Wasilla residence and the needle, meth pipe, and blood found on January 3, 2016, in the
Soldotna hotel room; and (3) for guns because both Keehn and Southwell were convicted felons.76
14. 	Ingram’s search request was granted
Alaska State District Court Judge Gregory Motyka granted Ingram’s search warrant
request and authorized the search of 2131 W. 80th Avenue, Apartment 2, and the 2008 red Ford
F-250 for all electronic devices with internet capability, drugs, drug related material, and
concealable firearms.77
73 Id.
74 Id. at 7.
75 Id. at 12.
76 Id. at 13-14.
77 Id. at 1-3.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 11 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 12
15. 	Results of the search
Ingram executed the search warrant on January 13, 2016.78 	Pursuant to that
warrant, he seized four laptops, two iPods, one Wi-Fi hotspot, one Micro SD card, a vial of
testosterone, and some processed marijuana from Keehn’s home.79 Pursuant to that warrant, he
also seized three cell phones and an olive green backpack from Keehn’s pickup truck.80 Ingram’s
search of the backpack uncovered methamphetamine, heroin, drug packaging material, and two
digital scales.81 No weapons were found.82
C. 	Keehn’s Motion and the Government’s Response
1. 	Keehn’s motion
Keehn asks the Court to suppress all evidence derived from the warrant-authorized
search of his home and his pickup truck.83 	Keehn does not directly challenge the issuing
magistrate’s probable cause determination regarding drugs and drug related materials. Instead, he
argues that the warrant is flawed because it was based on unreliable, misleading, and stale
information. 	In particular, he asks for a Franks hearing because the misleading information
allegedly included a material misstatement and several material omissions.84 Keehn asserts that
the warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights for several reasons. First, Keehn contends that,
if the material misstatement is stricken and if the material omissions are included, the issuing
magistrate’s probable cause determination is negated.85 	Second, Keehn asks that the CS’s
78 Id. at 4.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Docket No. 38.
84 Id. at 11-12, 18.
85 Id. at 11-12.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 12 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 13
allegation be excised from the warrant as unreliable.86 Third, Keehn asserts that his wife never
consented to the seizure of Johnston’s belongings, and the seizure of Johnston’s belongings was
outside the scope of the warrant.87 	Fourth, Keehn argues that the information in Ingram’s
supporting affidavit was unconstitutionally stale.88 	Finally, he contends that his post-arrest
statement must be suppressed because it was tainted by the unconstitutional search of his home
and his pickup truck.89
2. 	The government’s response
The government opposes Keehn’s suppression request, as well as his request for a
Franks hearing.90 	The government contends that Keehn has failed to establish the requisite
preliminary showing of deliberate or reckless misstatement or omission required for a Franks
hearing.91 It asserts, without conceding, that if the affidavit included misleading information, that
misleading information was not material to the probable cause determination.92 It argues that the
CS’s anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated,93 that Keehn’s unsupported allegation that
Casey Keehn did not consent to the seizure of Johnston’s belongings is directly contradicted by
Ingram,94 that the information in the affidavit was not stale,95 and that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation to taint Keehn’s post-arrest statements.96
86 Id. at 12-16.
87 Id. at 18-19.
88 Id. at 21-22.
89 Id. at 22-23.
90 Docket No. 45.
91 Id. at 12-18.
92 Id. at 12-18, 21-23.
93 Id. at 18-21.
94 Id. at 23.
95 Id. at 25-26.
96 Id. at 26.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 13 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 14
IV. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Resolution of the lawfulness of this search, as well as the parties’ competing claims
regarding Ingram’s search warrant application, implicates the following standards:
A. 	Probable Cause
An issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination must be affirmed if there is
a “substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]” probable cause existed.97 	Probable cause exists
whenever the totality of the circumstances establish “a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.”98
The 	process 	does 	not 	deal 	with 	hard 	certainties, 	but 	with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated
as 	such, 	practical 	people 	formulated 	certain 	common-sense
conclusions 	about 	human 	behavior; 	jurors 	as 	factfinders 	are
permitted to do the same – and so are law enforcement officers.99
Thus, probable cause is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
rules.”100 Instead, it is a “fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts.”101 Search warrants frequently are drafted “by nonlawyers (sic) in the midst and
haste of a criminal investigation.”102 “A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants [would] tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial
officer before acting.”103 Accordingly, the standard of review is “less probing than de novo review
and shows deference to the issuing magistrate's determination.”104
97 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) overruled on other grounds by United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
98 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
99 Id. at 231.
100 Id. at 232.
101 Id.
102 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
103 Id.
104 United States v. Hernandez, 937 F.2d 1490, 1494 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Angulo–Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 14 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 15
B. 	Franks Hearing
There is a presumption of validity with respect to an affidavit supporting a search
warrant.105 A Franks hearing requires more than a mere allegation of bad faith.106 Instead, the
Ninth Circuit has established five requirements for a Franks hearing:
(1) 	the 	defendant 	must 	allege 	specifically 	which
portions of the warrant affidavit are claimed to be false [or which
facts were omitted];
(2) 	the defendant must contend that the false statements
or omissions were deliberately or recklessly made;
(3) 	a detailed offer of proof, including affidavits, must
accompany the allegations;
(4) 	the veracity of only the affiant must be challenged;
[and]
(5) 	the challenged statements must be necessary for
probable cause.107
These requirements derive from Franks v. Delaware.108 	Franks holds that the
Fourth Amendment requires a hearing to test the veracity of a search warrant affidavit only when
a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a search warrant affidavit contained
material false statements, made either deliberately or in reckless disregard to the truth, which, if
excised, would negate the probable cause finding.109 	Suppression is required if, at the Franks
hearing, 	the 	defendant 	both 	establishes 	the 	alleged 	perjury 	or 	reckless 	disregard 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence, and demonstrates that, without the materially false information,
105 Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
106 United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1982).
107 United States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. DiCesare,
765 F.2d 890, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1985)).
108 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
109 Id. at 155-56.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 15 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 16
the warrant would not have issued.110 This holding has been extended to facts that are deliberately
or recklessly omitted from a warrant application, which, if included, negate the probable cause
determination.111
But a Franks hearing is not available for the asking. Instead, the party requesting
a Franks hearing must establish the material falsehood or the material omission by witness
affidavit or by other reliable witness statements.112 If such support is missing, the Franks hearing
applicant must satisfactorily explain why it is missing.113 Conclusory allegations or a desire to
cross-examine the affiant will not support a Franks hearing request.114
C. 	Evidentiary Hearing
An evidentiary hearing is required whenever the movant “allege[s] facts with
sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that contested
issues of fact exist.”115 It is not enough for the movant to raise the issue and note the government’s
burden of proof.116
D. 	Inevitable Discovery and the Good Faith Exceptions
If a warrant lacks probable cause, evidence obtained during its execution ordinarily
should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.117 However, the exclusionary rule encompasses
the following two exceptions.
110 Id. at 156.
111 United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985).
112 Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Harris, 914
F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Walesak, 783 F.2d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 n. 14 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Carrion, 463 F.2d 704, 706 (9th Cir.
1972)). 116 Howell, 231 F.3d at 620-21.
117 United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 16 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 17
1. 	Inevitable discovery doctrine
First, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the exclusionary rule does not require
suppression if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite the
Fourth Amendment violation, the challenged evidence would have been ultimately or inevitably
discovered by lawful means.118
2. 	Good faith exception
Second, the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized pursuant to a
defective search warrant where the police officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on the
issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination.119 	The good faith exception precludes
suppression unless the supporting affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”120
V. 	ANALYSIS
For all the reasons set forth below, this Court denies Keehn’s Motion for a Franks
hearing at Docket No. 40 and respectfully recommends that the District Court, after independent
review, deny the Motion to Suppress at Docket No. 38. In particular, this Court concludes that:
• 	a Franks hearing is not warranted because Keehn has failed to make a
substantial preliminary showing that Trooper Ingram’s supporting affidavit
deliberately or recklessly contained material falsehoods or material omissions
impacting the probable cause determination;
• 	the issuing magistrate properly relied on the CS’s anonymous tip because it was
sufficiently corroborated by independent police investigation;
• 	the information the issuing magistrate relied on was not stale;
• 	although Ingram’s supporting affidavit did not establish probable cause to
search Keehn’s residence and vehicle for drugs, drug paraphernalia, or
118 United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431 (1984)).
119 Underwood, 725 F.3d at 1085 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)).
120 Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 17 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 18
concealable firearms, it did establish probable cause to search for cell phones,
computers, and other electronic devices with internet access capability;
• 	suppression of the drugs and drug paraphernalia is not required because the
undisputed facts establish that the drugs and drug paraphernalia would have
been inevitably discovered during a lawful search of the olive green backpack
for cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices with internet access
capability;
• 	in the alternative, suppression of the drugs and drug paraphernalia is not
required because Ingram’s supporting affidavit, as it relates to the drugs and
drug paraphernalia, was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;
• 	Keehn has not alleged facts with sufficient definiteness and clarity to require an
evidentiary 	hearing 	on 	whether 	(1) Johnston’s 	belongings 	contained
exculpatory evidence, (2) Casey Keehn did not consent to the seizure of
Johnston’s belongings, and (3) his post-search statements were the product of a
Fourth Amendment violation.
What follows is this Court’s rationale for these conclusions.
A. 	Keehn Has Failed to Establish a Basis for a Franks Hearing
Keehn contends Ingram deliberately or recklessly misstated a material fact and
omitted material facts from the warrant application.121 	Keehn argues that if the material
misstatement is stricken and the material omissions are included, the issuing magistrate’s probable
cause determination is negated.122 	Keehn identifies the material misstatement as Ingram’s
description of Scott Hagy’s self-identification as Johnston’s stepfather.123 	Keehn identifies the
three material omissions as (1) an alleged improper demand by Ingram to Keehn before the search
warrant was issued that Johnston’s belongings be returned to Hagy;124 (2) an alleged improper
seizure by Ingram of Johnston’s belongings during execution of the search warrant;125 and
121 Docket No. 38 at 11-12.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 16-17.
124 Id. at 18.
125 Id. at 18-19.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 18 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 19
(3) Ingram’s alleged failure to catalogue the absence of “any indication of illegal conduct” during
law enforcement’s “numerous trips to the various residences.”126
Keehn supports his request for a Franks hearing with his counsel’s sworn
declaration which avers only, “[t]o the best of my knowledge and belief, there is no relation
between Scott Hagy and Sara Johnston.”127 Keehn does not offer factual support for any of his
material omission allegations.
On these facts, this Court concludes that a Franks hearing is not warranted because
Keehn has failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that Ingram’s supporting affidavit
deliberately or recklessly contained material falsehoods or material omissions impacting the
probable cause determination.
1. 	It is Ingram’s veracity and not Hagy’s that matters in a Franks hearing request
The question presented with any Franks hearing request is whether the affiant
deliberately or recklessly misled the issuing magistrate. It is the veracity of the affiant that matters,
not the veracity of the hearsay informant.
When the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient
to comprise probable cause [in connection with a Franks hearing
request], the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful
showing. 	This does not mean truthful in the sense that every fact
recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable
cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received
from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant’s
own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. But surely
it is to be truthful in the sense that the information put forth is
believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.128
Thus, even if Hagy misstated his relationship with Johnston (and this is not clear from the record),
it is Ingram’s veracity and not Hagy’s, that matters when determining whether Keehn is entitled
126 Id. at 18.
127 Docket No. 39 at 1.
128 Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65 (emphasis, citation, and quotation marks omitted).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 19 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 20
to a Franks hearing. In this instance, a Franks hearing is not appropriate without a further showing
that Ingram deliberately or recklessly included the alleged falsehood in his affidavit.129 	Here,
counsel’s supporting declaration challenged only Hagy’s veracity, and then only on information
and belief. 	No reason is proffered for doubting Ingram’s veracity when he relates Hagy’s self-
identification as Johnston’s stepfather. A challenge to Hagy’s veracity alone does not constitute
the substantial preliminary showing needed for a Franks hearing.
2. 	Keehn has failed to establish the alleged omissions
Next, Keehn offers no support for his claim that Ingram demanded that Keehn
return Johnston’s property to Hagy either before applying for the search warrant or while executing
the warrant. 	Indeed, the government proffers Ingram’s sworn declaration denying any contact
with Keehn before execution of the warrant, and a contemporaneous memorandum describing how
Johnston’s property was retrieved from Keehn’s home.130 Ingram avers that he had no direct or
indirect contact with Keehn before service of the search warrant, and his contemporaneous
memorandum 	indicates 	that 	Keehn’s 	wife 	gave 	him 	permission 	to 	retrieve 	Johnston’s
belongings.131
Likewise, Keehn offers no support for his claim that Ingram failed to tell the issuing
magistrate about the absence of “illegal conduct” during the numerous law enforcement visits at
“the various residences.”132 Indeed, Keehn’s claim is inconsistent with the content of Ingram’s
affidavit. 	For example, Ingram described Keehn’s three non-criminal contacts with the Wasilla
129 Perdomo, 800 F.2d at 921.
130 Docket Nos. 45-2; 45-3.
131 Id.
132 Docket No. 38 at 18.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 20 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 21
police and the Kenai police.133 	He also included Southwell’s denial that she engaged in
prostitution related activities despite knowing Keehn.134
What Keehn seems to be asking for is a Franks hearing to determine whether these
omissions “possibly misled the issuing judge.”135 But, as we have seen, this does not constitute
the substantial preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing under controlling Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit authority.
3. 	The alleged misstatement and omissions are not material
Even if Keehn substantially established the alleged misstatement and the alleged
omissions, which he has not, his request still would be denied because the misstatement and the
omissions simply were not material to the probable cause determination. A substantial preliminary
showing of recklessness or deliberate falsity is meaningless under Franks, “if, when material that
is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient
content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause.”136 In this instance, even
without the alleged misstatement and the three alleged omissions, this Court finds there is an
abundance of probable cause to support the search of Keehn’s home and pickup truck for
computers, cell phones, and any other electronic devices that have internet capability for the
following reasons.
a. 	Hagy’s relationship with Johnston was not material to the probable
cause determination in this case
An FBI Agent provided Ingram with an anonymous tip from a CS about threatening
and harassing behavior by a man allegedly involved in sex trafficking activity from Keehn’s cell
133 Docket No. 38-1 at 8-10.
134 Id.
135 Docket No. 38 at 18.
136 Chesher, 678 F.2d at 1362 (quoting Franks 438 U.S. at 171-72).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 21 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 22
phone.137 Hagy reported that Keehn was running a prostitution enterprise and that Johnston had
died in an automobile accident while returning from a “date” arranged by Keehn.138 Hagy also
related that Ashley Hunter admitted working as a prostitute for Keehn and that Keehn used the
Kinzi Circle address for “in call” prostitution related activities.139
Cell phone texts confirmed that the text messages were sent from Keehn’s cell
phone to Johnston’s sister after Johnston’s death. 	The texter indicated that Johnston lived with
Keehn.140 A review of Johnston’s SIM card confirmed that her contacts included phone numbers
for Keehn and his wife.141 	Finally, recorded phone calls between Keehn and Southwell about
“turning tricks,” “hookers,” his business, and “his Anchorage girls coming over to his place in a
minute to show them everything they need to know about going on line,” all corroborated tips from
the CS and Hagy, as well as Keehn’s alleged association with prostitution.142 Keehn’s assertion
during the jail calls that he was “giving it up,” even if true, does not obviate the corroborative value
of the recorded phone calls.
Regardless, Hagy’s relationship to Johnston is immaterial to the probable cause
determination in this case.
b. 	The failure to reference the alleged improper seizure of Johnston’s
belongings or non-criminal conduct during police visits to Keehn’s
residences was not material to the probable cause determination in this
case
Putting aside the absence of any affidavits or other proffers establishing the alleged
omissions, any impropriety related to the seizure of Johnston’s belongings, or any lack of criminal
137 Docket No. 38-1 at 8.
138 Id. at 10.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 11.
142 Id. at 11-12.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 22 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 23
conduct during police visits with Keehn is not material to whether probable cause existed for the
search of Keehn’s residence for computers, cell phones, or other electronic devices for evidence
of sex trafficking.
4. 	This Court concludes that Keehn has failed to make the required substantial
preliminary showing necessary for a Franks hearing
For these reasons, this Court denies his request at Docket No. 40 for a Franks
hearing. 	Keehn has failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that Ingram’s affidavit
contained misstatements or omissions that were material to the issuing magistrate’s probable cause
determination.
B. 	The CS’s Anonymous Tip was Corroborated by Independent Police Investigation
Keehn asserts that the CS’s anonymous tip to the FBI Agent should be excised from
the affidavit as unreliable. Keehn contends that the CS’s tip was not sufficiently corroborated, and
that the probable cause determination in this instance relied too much on the word of an unknown
and unreliable informant.143
Keehn’s argument might have some weight if the issuing magistrate relied
exclusively on the CS’s anonymous tip.144 But that is not what happened here. There is nothing
in the law that precludes the police from pursuing an investigation based on an anonymous tip, as
long as it is corroborated.
[T]he veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis
largely unknown, and unknowable . . . 	Yet, such tips, particularly
when supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently
contribute to the solution of otherwise perfect crimes. 	While a
conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is
143 Docket No. 38 at 12-16.
144 The Court readily accepts Keehn’s characterization that the CS’s tip was anonymous. Docket
No. 38 at 15; See also United States v. Morales, 252 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (tip considered
anonymous where it is unclear whether the source was known or unknown); United States v Thomas, 211
F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (FBI tip to police considered anonymous because the tip did not include
the identity of the source or fact supporting the tip).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 23 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 24
required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no
place for anonymous citizen informants is not.145
Here, a CS alleged that a prostitute was threatened and harassed by a man engaged
in sex trafficking activity. Ingram corroborated the CS’s anonymous allegation that there was a
man engaged in sex trafficking activity near Wasilla with assertions by Scott Hagy and Ashley
Hunter, with the SIM card search results, with the recorded phone calls between Keehn and
Southwell, and finally with Keehn’s use of the number (907) 795-3148.
Under these circumstances, there is no basis to excise the CS’s anonymous
allegation from the supporting affidavit. 	It was perfectly proper for the issuing magistrate to
consider the anonymous allegation in conjunction with the other information developed during
Ingram’s independent investigation that corroborated the CS’s tip about a man involved in sex
trafficking activity.
C. 	The Information in Ingram’s Supporting Affidavit was not Stale
Keehn contends that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because the
information the issuing magistrate relied upon was stale. 	Generally speaking, the information
contained in a supporting affidavit must be current enough to demonstrate that probable cause
exists at the time of the search.146 The supporting affidavit must be based on facts “so closely
related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that
time.”147
But, as the government readily demonstrates, the mere lapse of time does not
control the staleness analysis.148 Instead, staleness must be evaluated “in light of the particular
145 Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38.
146 United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1997).
147 Id. (citing Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1968) (quoting Sgro v. United
States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932))).
148 United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 24 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 25
facts of the case and the nature of the criminal activity and property sought.”149 	When “the
evidence sought is of an ongoing criminal business . . . greater lapses of time are permitted if the
evidence in the affidavit shows the probable existence of the activity at an earlier time.”150
Here, only three months elapsed between the initial anonymous tip about alleged
sex trafficking activity in Wasilla and Ingram’s search warrant application. 	In the two weeks
immediately preceding the warrant application, Ingram averred that he listened to recorded calls
where Keehn discussed “turning tricks,” “hookers,” and “having his Anchorage girls coming over
to his place . . . to show them everything they need to do online . . . so he does not have to do it
anymore.”151 These recordings readily corroborate the information supplied by the CS’s tip, by
allegations from Hagy and from Hunter, and by the results of the SIM card search of Johnston’s
phone.
For all these reasons, the information contained in the supporting affidavit used by
the issuing magistrate to evaluate Ingram’s request to search Keehn’s home and pickup truck for
cell phones, computers, and other devices with internet capability for evidence of sex trafficking
constitutionally was not stale.
D. 	The Search for Drugs, Drug Related Materials, and Concealable Firearms was not
Supported by Probable Cause
The issuing magistrate’s finding of probable cause is entitled to great deference and
his determination must be accepted if, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a fair
probability that drugs, drug related material, and concealable firearms would be found in Keehn’s
149 Id. (quoting United States v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1991)).
150 United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Greany, 929 F.2d at
525)). 151 Docket No. 38-1 at 12.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 25 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 26
home or in his pickup truck.152 The Court finds that Ingram’s warrant affidavit does not support
a finding of probable cause that drugs, drug related material, or firearms would be found.
A careful reading of the supporting affidavit in the light most favorable to
sustaining the probable cause determination reveals only three facts to support a probable cause
finding to search Keehn’s pickup truck and residence for drugs and drug related materials. The
first is a tip from two unnamed individuals of unknown reliability on January 2, 2016, who alleged
methamphetamine was in an upstairs bedroom at Keehn’s prior Wasilla address.153 The second is
a tip from a January 4, 2016 report by the cleaning staff from a Soldotna hotel who found “evidence
of drug use (used needles and a broken meth pipe) along with blood” in a room rented to Keehn
and his wife.154 The third fact is that a convicted drug felon was living with the Keehns following
her January 8, 2016 release from custody for an undescribed probation violation.155
Uncorroborated hearsay information from anonymous tipsters is entitled to little or
no weight if the information is entirely uncorroborated and lacks any indication of reliability.156
Here, Ingram’s supporting affidavit offered no basis for the issuing magistrate as to the “basis of
knowledge” or the “veracity” of the two anonymous tipsters.157 The mere presence of a housemate
with a felony drug conviction, even one recently released for an unexplained probation revocation,
does not corroborate the anonymous tips. Was the revocation for drug use or drug sales; was the
revocation for a minor technical violation; was the revocation petition even pursued? 	While a
report of drug use and drug paraphernalia found ten days earlier in a hotel room has some
152 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
153 Docket No. 38-1 at 9.
154 Id. at 12.
155 Id. at 14.
156 United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1994).
157 	See Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38 (discussing the issuing magistrate’s continuing obligation to
assess the veracity and basis of knowledge of the person supplying the anonymous tip).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 26 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 27
corroborative value, it does not sufficiently corroborate a probability that drugs or drug related
material will be found in a pickup truck and residence more than a 100 miles from the hotel room.
Moreover, Ingram claimed extensive experience investigating sex trafficking
crimes.158 	However, 	he 	offered 	no 	information 	that 	enabled 	the 	issuing 	magistrate 	to
independently evaluate any claim linking sex trafficking to drug use or drug sales. 	Likewise,
Ingram claims extensive experience investigating drug trafficking activity, but still fails to offer
any information to enable the issuing magistrate to independently assess the probability that drugs
or drug related materials likely would be found in a pickup truck and residence more than 100
miles away.
Similarly, a careful reading of the supporting affidavit in the light most favorable
to sustaining the probable cause determination reveals only one basis for the issuing magistrate’s
finding of probable cause to search the residence for concealable firearms — the status of Ingram
and Southwell as convicted felons. 	Ingram’s supporting affidavit contains absolutely no other
information, anonymous or otherwise, suggesting any probability that concealable firearms would
be found in Keehn’s home or vehicle.
E. 	Inevitable Discovery and the Good Faith Exception Preclude the Exclusionary Rule
In sharp contrast, Ingram’s request to search Keehn’s home and pickup truck for
cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices with internet access capability was amply
supported by probable cause. The issuing magistrate knew that Ingram was a twelve year veteran
of the Alaska State Troopers with extensive experience investigating a variety of crimes, including
crimes associated with sex trafficking.159 He knew from Ingram that devices used to connect to
158 Docket No. 38-1 at 7.
159 Id.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 27 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 28
the internet frequently are used in sex trafficking crimes.160 He learned of an anonymous tip from
a CS that a man had threatened and harassed a prostitute for working in Wasilla without his
consent.161 Ingram told the issuing magistrate that the harassment described in the anonymous tip
was linked to Keehn’s cell phone;162 that Scott Hagy accused Keehn of running a prostitution
enterprise; that Sara Johnston worked for Keehn as a prostitute;163 that Keehn admitted that
Johnston lived with him;164 that a self-proclaimed prostitute confirmed to Hagy that Johnston
worked for Keehn as a prostitute;165 that Johnston’s cell phone confirmed that Johnston had
Keehn’s contact information;166 that Keehn’s recorded phone calls with Southwell discussed
“turning tricks,” “hookers,” and “his girls”; and that Southwell would be living with Keehn and
his wife immediately after her release from custody.167 All of this information enabled the issuing
magistrate to independently evaluate Ingram’s claim that probable cause existed to search Keehn’s
home and pickup truck for cell phones, computers, and other devices with internet capability for
evidence of sex trafficking.
In United States v. Ross,168 the Supreme Court held that a lawful search of a
premises extends to the entire area where the objects to be searched for might be found.169 The
search “is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to
complete the search.”170 Thus, a warrant that authorizes law enforcement to search a residence or
160 Id. at 14.
161 Id. at 8.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 10.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 10, 11.
167 Id. at 12.
168 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
169 Id. at 820.
170 Id. at 820-21.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 28 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 29
a vehicle for certain objects “also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and
containers” in which those objects might be found.171
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its
limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets,
drawers, and containers, in the case of a home. . . must give way to
the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at
hand. 	This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we
believe it must.172
In the present case, law enforcement was tasked with searching Keehn’s home and
pickup truck for cell phones, computers, and other devices with internet capability for evidence of
sex trafficking. It was reasonable for them to believe that these items might be concealed in the
olive green backpack found in Keehn’s pickup truck.
The inevitable discovery doctrine precludes application of the exclusionary rule in
this case when the government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite the
absence of probable cause to search for drugs or drug related material, the drugs inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means.173 	Ingram’s search warrant return establishes that the
drugs and drug related materials were discovered during a search of the olive green backpack found
in Ingram’s pickup truck.174 Law enforcement was lawfully allowed to search the backpack for
cell phones, computers, and other devices with internet capability for evidence of sex trafficking.
Under these circumstances, this Court finds that the discovery of the methamphetamine and the
heroin in the backpack was inevitable and protected from suppression by the inevitable discovery
doctrine. The Court bases this finding on Ingram’s search warrant return, which indicates that the
171 Id. at 821.
172 Id. at 821-22.
173 Merriweather, 777 F.2d at 506.
174 Docket No. 38-1 at 4.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 29 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 30
olive green backpack contained methamphetamine, heroin, drug packaging materials, and two
digital scales.175
In addition, and in the alternative, this Court finds that the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the drugs and the drug related evidence found in
the olive green backpack. Evidence obtained under an invalid warrant should not be suppressed
if the officers obtaining the warrant and performing the search relied in good faith on the warrant’s
validity.176 “The inquiry is one of objective reasonableness . . . whether a reasonably well-trained
officer would have known that this particular search warrant was illegal despite the magistrate
judge’s authorization.”177
While this Court has determined that this warrant did not lawfully authorize the
search of Keehn’s home and pickup truck for drugs and drug related material, it was not entirely
unreasonable for Ingram to rely on the issuing magistrate’s contrary determination. Evidence of
drug use and drug paraphernalia was found in a Soldotna hotel room rented to Keehn and his wife
just ten days earlier. Two anonymous tipsters claimed that Keehn’s Wasilla residence contained
methamphetamine eleven days earlier. 	Finally, a convicted drug felon recently moved into
Keehn’s Anchorage residence. This information was sufficient to allow an objectively reasonable
law enforcement officer to believe there was probable cause to search for drugs and drug related
material pursuant to the warrant. Moreover, the warrant was not facially deficient; Ingram did not
mislead the magistrate; and there is no indication that the magistrate abandoned his judicial role.178
For this additional and alternative reason, the exclusionary rule does not require
suppression of the drugs and drug related material found in the olive green backpack.
175 Id.
176 Clark, 31 F.3d at 835 (citing United States v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1993)).
177 Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).
178 Id.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 30 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 31
F. 	Keehn has not Established the Need for an Evidentiary Hearing on the Issue of his
Wife’s Alleged Consent to the Seizure of Johnston’s Belongings
Finally, framing the issue as a scope question, Keehn contends that Ingram
exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing items allegedly belonging to Johnston.179 However,
what he outlines factually is a seizure pursuant to a purported consent by Casey Keehn, the
defendant’s wife.180 	But Keehn does not discuss the law of consent, nor does he request an
evidentiary hearing on the question of Casey Keehn’s consent. Finally, and most importantly, he
fails to include a sworn declaration from Casey Keehn attesting to the claim that she did not
consent to the seizure.
The government opposes Keehn’s description of the events surrounding the seizure
of Johnston’s belongings, and contends that Casey Keehn freely and voluntarily consented to the
seizure. 	In particular, the government asserts that Keehn’s “naked unsupported allegation” is
directly contradicted by Ingram’s contemporaneously prepared supplemental report describing his
rationale for seizing Johnston’s belongings.
Further, I had Casey Keehn enter the apartment to show me where
Sara Johnston’s personal items were located. She pointed to a box
in the living room and gave me permission to seize [Sara Johnston’s]
belongings.181
Of course, a seizure is unconstitutional when it is not authorized under the terms of
a validly issued warrant or when the seizure is not exempted from the warrant requirement.182
Although Keehn asked for a Franks hearing in connection with his challenge to the warrant, he
never requested an evidentiary hearing in connection with his lack of consent/scope of the warrant
179 Docket No. 38 at 18-21.
180 Id.
181 Docket No. 45-3.
182 United States v. Ewain, 88 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 140-41 (1990)).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 31 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 32
challenge. 	Moreover, and more importantly, Keehn failed to provide a sworn declaration from
Casey Keehn so this Court actually could determine whether a genuinely contested issue of fact
exists.183 Without a sworn declaration from Casey Keehn, this Court is unwilling to conduct an
evidentiary hearing, particularly when the issue is framed as a seizure exceeding the scope of the
warrant.184 Under these circumstances, this Court concludes that Keehn has not alleged facts with
sufficient definiteness and clarity to require an evidentiary hearing on the question of Casey
Keehn’s alleged lack of consent to the seizure of Johnston’s belongings.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court concludes that Keehn has failed to
establish a substantial preliminary showing needed for a Franks hearing. 	Keehn has not
demonstrated that Sergeant Ingram’s search warrant application contained misstatements or
omissions made either deliberately or recklessly. Nor has he established that alleged misstatement
and omissions, individually or cumulatively, were material to the issuing magistrate’s probable
cause determination. 	Consequently, this Court denies Keehn’s request for a Franks hearing at
Docket No. 40.
This Court likewise denies any suggestion that an evidentiary hearing is necessary
to resolve Casey Keehn’s alleged lack of consent to Ingram’s seizure of Johnston’s belongings.
Keehn has failed to allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity for this Court
to conclude that there is a contested issue of fact to be resolved.
Finally, this Court recommends that the District Court, after independent review,
deny Keehn’s motion to suppress evidence at Docket No. 38. Although Ingram’s affidavit failed
to demonstrate probable cause to search Keehn’s home and pickup truck for drugs and for drug
183 Howell, 231 F.3d at 620.
184 Docket No. 38 at 18.
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 32 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 33
related materials, it readily demonstrated abundant probable cause to search for cell phones,
computers, and other electronic devices with internet access capability as evidence related to sex
trafficking. There is no basis to excise the anonymous tip by the CS from Ingram’s application
because it was sufficiently corroborated by independent police investigation. 	The information
supporting the warrant was not stale, and there is no basis to suppress Keehn’s post-arrest
statements because the seizure of the drugs and drug related material was lawful.
Finally, despite the invalid authorization to search for drugs and drug related
materials, the inevitable discovery doctrine and the good faith exception preclude suppression of
the drugs and drug related material found in the olive green backpack. 	The undisputed record
establishes that the drugs and the drug related materials inevitably would have been discovered
pursuant to the authorization to search for cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices
with internet access capability. In the alternative, the authorization to search for drugs and drug
related materials was not so deficient as to preclude objectively reasonable officers from relying
on the issuing magistrate’s authorization.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2016, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Kevin F. McCoy
Kevin F. McCoy
United States Magistrate Judge
Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2) and D. Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a), a party
seeking to object to this final finding and recommendation shall file written objections with the
Clerk of Court no later than the CLOSE OF BUSINESS on June 6 2016. Pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 59(b)(3), objections will be considered first by the District Court Judge, who will then
accept, reject, or modify the recommendation, or resubmit the matter to the Magistrate Judge for
additional consideration. Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s findings of fact may be treated
as a procedural default and waiver of the right to contest those findings on appeal. 	Miranda v.
Anchondo, et al., 684 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit concludes that a district court
is not required to consider evidence introduced for the first time in a party’s objection to a
magistrate judge’s recommendation. 	United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 33 of 34

United States v. Keehn 	Final R&R re Docket Nos. 38, 40
Case No. 3:16-cr-00004-TMB-KFM 	Page 34
Objections and responses shall not exceed five (5) pages in length, and shall not merely reargue
positions presented in motion papers. Rather, objections and responses shall specifically designate
the findings or recommendations objected to, the basis of the objection, and the points and
authorities in support. Response(s) to the objections shall be filed on or before the CLOSE OF
BUSINESS on June 13, 2016. The parties shall otherwise comply with provisions of D. Alaska
Loc. Mag. R. 6(a).
Reports and recommendations are not appealable orders. 	Any notice of appeal
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.
See Hilliard v. Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986).
Case 3:16-cr-00004-TMB Document 56 Filed 05/23/16 Page 34 of 34