In the Matter of the Complaint of William Martz et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
In the Matter of the COMPLAINT of
William Martz and Jane Martz, as
owners of a Nautique vessel, for
Limitation of Liability.
Case No. 3:20-cv-00152-SLG
ORDER RE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Before the Court at Docket 80 is Claimant Andrew Horazdovsky’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 	Limitation
Plaintiffs William Martz and Jane Martz (collectively, “the Martzes”) responded in
opposition at Docket 86, to which Mr. Horazdovsky replied at Docket 91. The Court
heard argument on the motion on March 8, 2023.
BACKGROUND
On June 25, 2020, the Martzes initiated the present action under the
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq., seeking to limit their
personal liability to the value of their recreational vessel, a 21-foot 1998 Correct
Craft Air Nautique (the “Nautique”) with an estimated value of $15,000, for tort and
maritime claims that Claimant Andrew Horazdovsky has brought against them in
Alaska state court.1 Both the state and federal court actions arise from a collision
1 Docket 1 at 2, ¶ 3, 3–4, ¶¶ 11, 13–14.
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on Flat Lake on June 9, 2018, between the Nautique, being operated by the
Martzes’ adult son, Reagan Martz, and an inflatable raft being towed by another
vessel operated by Andrew Horazdovsky.2 	Jennifer Horazdovsky was on the
inflatable raft at the time of the collision and was fatally injured.3
Mr. Horazdovsky brought the state court action on behalf of himself, the
Estate of Ms. Horazdovsky, and their minor son against Reagan, William, and Jane
Martz, among others, seeking damages and alleging the following 14 causes of
action: (1) strict vicarious joint and several liability pursuant to Alaska Statute
05.25.040; (2) watercraft owners’ liability pursuant to federal law; (3) watercraft
operator’s liability pursuant to federal law; (4) watercraft owners’ and operator’s
liability for negligence per se pursuant to federal law; (5) watercraft owners’ and
operator’s liability for recklessness pursuant to federal law; (6) watercraft owners’
and operator’s liability for prejudgment interest; (7) negligence; (8) watercraft
owners’ and operator’s liability for negligence per se pursuant to Alaska state law;
(9) negligent infliction of emotional distress: preexisting duty; (10) negligent
infliction of emotional distress: bystander; (11) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; 	(12) 	recklessness; 	(13) 	battery 	and/or 	assault; 	and 	(14) 	negligent
entrustment.4
2 Docket 1 at 3–4, ¶¶ 7–14.
3 Docket 1 at 3, ¶ 10.
4 Docket 1-1 at 3–4, ¶¶ 16–17, 8–13, ¶¶ 42–82. The action in state court is Horazdovsky v. Martz,
et al., Case No. 3AN-20-06488CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed June 4, 2020).
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Section 30529(c) of the Limitation of Liability Act provides that “[w]hen an
action has been brought under this section . . . all claims and proceedings against
the owner related to the matter in question shall cease.”5 	Additionally, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule F(3) provides that “[o]n application of
the 	plaintiff 	the 	court 	shall 	enjoin 	the 	further 	prosecution 	of 	any 	action 	or
proceeding against the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property with respect to any claim
subject to limitation in the action.” 	Accordingly, on June 30, 2020, upon finding
that the Martzes had complied with the procedural requirements necessary to
initiate an action to limit liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30529, the Court appointed
a trustee to hold title to the vessel and enjoined all claims against the Martzes and
their property that were subject to limitation, including those claims in the state
court action.6
The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment.7 	The Court
granted Mr. Horazdovksy’s motion for summary judgment after finding that the
Martzes had failed to file for limitation of liability in a timely fashion. 	The Court
dismissed the complaint as untimely, vacated the June 30, 2020, injunction, and
entered a final judgment.8
5 Formerly cited as 46 U.S.C. § 30511.
6 Docket 17 at 5-6.
7 Docket 39, Matter of Martz, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120 (D. Alaska 2020).
8 Docket 39, Docket 40, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 1134.
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The Martzes pursued an appeal to the Ninth Circuit and this Court denied
the Martzes’ motion for an injunction pending appeal.9 The Ninth Circuit, however,
granted the Martzes’ motion for an injunction pending appeal and reinstated the
Court’s June 30, 2020, injunction for the duration of the appeal. 10 On the merits of
the appeal, the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed and remanded the Court’s
dismissal, holding that the six-month statute of limitations in § 30529(a) did not
begin to run until Mr. Horadovsky filed suit in state court. 11 	Because the Martzes
filed their limitation of liability action two weeks after the state court action was
filed, their action was timely.12 The mandate issued on June 1, 2022, and the case
was reopened in this Court. 13 On July 11, 2022, the Court reinstated the injunction
staying the state civil case against the Martzes.14
Mr. Horazdovsky filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). He is seeking dismissal of this
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) and for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.15
9 Docket 53, Matter of Martz, No. 3:20-cv-00152-SLG, 2020 WL 7034319, at *6 (D. Alaska Nov.
30, 2020).
10 Docket 54.
11 Martz v. Horazdovsky, 33 F.4th 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2022).
12 33 F.4th at 1168.
13 Docket 57.
14 Docket 60.
15 Docket 80 at 1. Mr. Horazdovsky asserts that the Court should dismiss the case pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; however, because the
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JURISDICTION
As discussed in more detail below, the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333.16
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. 	Rule 12(c) Judgment on the Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” 	“[T]he pleadings are closed for the purposes of Rule 12(c) once a
complaint and answer have been filed, assuming, as is the case here, that no
counterclaim or cross-claim is made.”17 	“Judgment on the pleadings is properly
granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”18 When deciding such a motion, the court
“accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”19 	A court may consider
pleadings have closed in this case, Rule 12(h)(2)(B) provides that the proper vehicle for this claim
is a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c).
16 “We [in the Ninth Circuit] use the terms ‘admiralty’ and ‘maritime’ interchangeably, as the
relevant caselaw often uses both words without apparent distinction.” Adamson v. Port of
Bellingham, 907 F.3d 1122, 1125 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries, Inc.,
489 F.3d 978, 982 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007)).
17 Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
18 Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).
19 Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020).
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documents relied on in a complaint without converting the motion for judgment on
the pleadings to one for summary judgment.20
II. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
When, as here, a party has raised an issue with respect to the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(c), the Court will treat the motion as
if it had been brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).21 	Subject matter jurisdiction
“delimits” the power of federal courts.22 	Because it “involves a court’s power to
hear a case, [it] can never be forfeited or waived.” 23 	The objection that a court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of litigation by any
party, including by the court sua sponte.24 “If the court determines at any time that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”25
III. 	Failure to State a Claim
After 	the 	pleadings 	have 	closed, 	a 	party 	may 	seek 	judgment 	on 	the
pleadings pursuant to a Rule 12(c) motion for failure to state a claim on which relief
20 See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
21 5C CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, F EDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1367
(3d ed. April 2023 Update).
22 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).
23 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.
625, 630 (2002)).
24 Id. at 506. 	See also id. at 513 (“[Federal] courts, including this Court, have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a
challenge from any party.”).
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
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can be granted.26 When a party uses Rule 12(c) in this manner, the analysis under
Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to the analysis pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).27
Accordingly, “a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint,
taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.”28 Nonetheless, “the trial court
does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations in a complaint or legal
claims asserted in the form of factual allegations.”29
DISCUSSION
I. 	Jurisdiction
Mr. Horazdovsky contends that there are no circumstances under which the
Martzes can receive relief under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, so the Court
should dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 30 	The heart of this
argument is the alleged overlap between the Limitation of Liability Act and the state
law claim for negligent entrustment. The Court’s analysis accordingly begins with
a brief overview of each area of law.
When a vessel is involved in an accident, the Limitation of Liability Act limits
the liability of the vessel’s owner to the value of that vessel and any pending
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B).
27 McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988).
28 Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg.
Inc., No. C 10–04341 CRB, 2011 WL 6140912, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011)).
29 In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016).
30 Docket 80 at 1–2.
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freight.31 Congress enacted the Limitation of Liability Act to promote investment in
the American shipbuilding industry as it sought to compete with Great Britain in
response to several incidents in which a vessel owner was held liable for significant
monetary damages without proof that the owner was negligent or at fault. 32
Accordingly, to benefit from this limitation of liability, the statute requires that the
owner establish that the damage occurred “without the privity or knowledge of the
owner.”33
Whereas the Limitation of Liability Act accords the owner of a vessel a
federal remedy to limit their liability, negligent entrustment is a state law tort claim
that serves as a vehicle for an aggrieved party to recover from the owner of a
vessel. The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that as a general rule, the owner
of a vehicle is liable for negligent entrustment if the owner knowingly supplies,
entrusts, permits, or lends their vehicle to an “incompetent or habitually careless
driver.”34 	Mr. Horazdovsky alleges in his state court case that the Martzes are
liable for negligent entrustment because they supplied the Nautique to their son
31 46 U.S.C. § 30523.
32 Martz v. Horazdovsky, 33 F.4th 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2022) (first citing Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d
379, 383 (7th Cir. 1992); and then citing Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 108–
10 (1871)).
33 46 U.S.C. § 30523(b).
34 Neary v. McDonald, 956 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Alaska 1998) (citations omitted).
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“when they knew or should have known” that he would operate the vessel in a
manner “involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself or others.”35
Mr. 	Horazdovsky’s 	motion 	focuses 	on 	the 	reference 	to 	the 	owner’s
knowledge 	in 	both 	the 	Limitation 	of 	Liability 	Act 	and 	the 	tort 	of 	negligent
entrustment. According to Mr. Horazdovsky, “if a shipowner knows enough to be
liable for negligent entrustment, he knows too much to be eligible to limit liability
under the Act.”36 	Mr. Horazdovsky maintains that if the Martzes knew or should
have known that their son should not have been entrusted with their boat, they not
only committed the tort of negligent entrustment but also had knowledge sufficient
to vitiate their entitlement to limit their liability. On the other hand, Mr. Horazdovsky
maintains, if the Martzes were not negligent in entrusting their boat to their son,
then they do not need the protections of the Limitation of Liability Act because they
would not be liable at all to Mr. Horazdovsky.37 	In either case, according to Mr.
Horazdovsky, “there exists no circumstance” under which the Martzes “are entitled
to relief under the Limitation of Liability Act” and, “[a]s such, the district court is
without 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	in 	the 	captioned 	case 	and 	it 	should 	be
dismissed.”38
35 Docket 1-1 at 13, ¶¶ 79–82.
36 Docket 80 at 6 (quoting Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1992)).
37 Docket 80 at 3–4.
38 Docket 80 at 4.
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Mr. Horazdovsky relies on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Joyce v. Joyce39
to support this argument.40 In that case, a woman filed suit in Illinois state court to
recover for her injuries from a boating accident. 	The only claim that she brought
against the owner of the boat was for negligent entrustment. 	The owner of the
boat sought the protections of the Limitation of Liability Act in district court and the
district court dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.41
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, explaining that “[g]iven the nature of the tort of
negligent entrustment, it is clear that the Limitation of Shipowner’s Liability Act
affords no protection to [the shipowner].” Because “the district court could not do
anything to affect either party,” the Circuit held it “was correct to dismiss the suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”42
A few years later, however, the Seventh Circuit recognized that although
“Joyce states that the dismissal was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” “[t]his
contention is likely inaccurate.” 43 	The Seventh Circuit acknowledged two earlier
decisions by the Supreme Court that had each held “that failure to demonstrate
lack of privity or knowledge does not divest the district court of jurisdiction.” 44 The
39 975 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1992).
40 Docket 80 at 6.
41 975 F.2d at 381–82.
42 Id. at 385.
43 Complaint of McCarthy Bros. Co./Clark Bridge, 83 F.3d 821, 827 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996).
44 83 F.3d at 827 n.1 (first citing Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 534–35 (1931); and then citing
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Supreme Court explained that whether “the pleadings and evidence disclosed that
the injury complained of was occasioned with the privity and knowledge of the
shipowner” “did not present a jurisdictional question” because “a determination
thereof either way” would have been a determination “upon the merits in the proper
exercise of . . . jurisdiction.”45
Indeed, 	it 	is 	the 	Admiralty 	Clause 	of 	Article 	III 	of 	the 	United 	States
Constitution that confers admiralty jurisdiction upon the federal judiciary in cases
such as this one involving an accident on the navigable waters of the United
States.46 	“Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 codified this grant of exclusive
original jurisdiction . . . .”47 A party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction
must demonstrate that the tort occurred on navigable waters and that it bears a
“significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.” 48 	The boating accident at
issue in this case occurred on Flat Lake, a part of Big Lake, and the parties do not
dispute that this waterway is a navigable water. 49 	Moreover, the Supreme Court
Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 386 (1941)).
45 Langnes, 282 U.S. at 534–35; see also Just, 312 U.S. at 386 (“When the jurisdiction of the court
in admiralty has attached through a petition for limitation, the jurisdiction to determine claims is
not lost merely because the shipowner fails to establish his right to limitation.”).
46 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
47 Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443 (2001).
48 In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, 570 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982)).
49 Docket 1-1 at 4, ¶ 17 (Mr. Horazdovsky’s complaint filed in Alaska state court provides that
“[t]he United States Coast Guard determined in 1975 that . . . the entire waterway of Big Lake,
Alaska is navigable waters of the United States because those waters are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible
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has long recognized that where, as here, there is a collision of two recreational
boats on the navigable waters of the United States, the collision bears a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity that is sufficient to confer admiralty
jurisdiction.50 Accordingly, the Court has admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to § 1333.
The Court acknowledges, however, that the case law addressing jurisdiction
for purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act has not been clear. This is because
in 1911, the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Harmon that the Limitation of
Liability Act served as an independent basis for jurisdiction.51 	In that case, the
owner of a steam barge sought to limit its liability arising from the collision of the
barge with a railway drawbridge, causing damage to both the barge and the
bridge.52 At the time the case was decided, however, admiralty jurisdiction did not
extend to claims of damage to a land-based object such as a bridge.53 Analyzing
the legislative intent and purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act, the Supreme
Court held that the expansion of the jurisdictional reach of the Act beyond the
for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce”); Docket 1 at 3, ¶¶ 6–7 (Martzes’ complaint
filed in this Court recognizes that Big Lake is a navigable water).
50 See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674–75 (“The federal interest in protecting maritime
commerce cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals
actually engaged in commercial maritime activity. This interest can be fully vindicated only if all
operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to uniform rules of conduct.” (emphasis in
original)).
51 222 U.S. 96 (1911).
52 Id. at 99–100.
53 Id. at 101.
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parameters of admiralty jurisdiction would best achieve the Act’s goal of improving
the competitiveness of American shipbuilding.54
After 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	decided 	Richardson 	v. 	Harmon, 	Congress
expanded the scope of admiralty jurisdiction to be coextensive with the Supreme
Court’s holding by enacting the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 30101, which accorded federal courts admiralty jurisdiction over “cases of injury
or damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even
though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land.”55 And in 1990, the
Supreme Court held that it is 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) that grants a federal district court
jurisdiction over a limitation of liability suit brought pursuant to the Limitation of
Liability Act.56
The Ninth Circuit in 1995 considered whether the Limitation of Liability Act
could continue to serve as an independent basis of jurisdiction after Congress
passed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act.57 	The Ninth Circuit explained
that “Congress’ passage of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act has clearly
54 Id. at 103–06 (“Thus construed, the section harmonizes with the policy of limiting the owner’s
risk to his interest in the ship in respect of all claims arising out of the conduct of the master and
crew, whether the liability be strictly maritime or from a tort non-maritime but leaves him liable for
his own fault, neglect, and contracts.”).
55 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a).
56 Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990). In a footnote, the Supreme Court declined to consider
whether the Limitation of Liability Act could serve as an independent basis for jurisdiction because
§ 1333(1) was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 497 U.S. at 359 n.1.
57 Seven Resorts, Inc. v. Cantlen, 57 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1995).
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obviated the rationale behind Richardson’s expansion of the Act.” And “[a]s such,
[the Circuit] view[ed] Richardson as a historical anomaly that cannot be fairly
reconciled with modern admiralty jurisdiction, and conclude[d] that the jurisdiction
conferred by the Act remains coextensive with that of modern admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.”58
In sum, the Court’s jurisdiction over this case arises from the Admiralty
Clause of Article III of the United States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1333, a
source of jurisdiction that is coextensive with the Limitation of Liability Act.
Accordingly, any decision that the Martzes may or may not be entitled to a limitation
of their liability in light of their potential liability for negligent entrustment would be
a decision on the merits pursuant to a proper exercise of the Court’s admiralty
jurisdiction.
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
Mr. Horazdovsky seeks judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted in reliance on the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Joyce, contending that there are no circumstances under
which the Martzes can receive relief under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851.59
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Joyce is distinguishable from this case,
however, because unlike the shipowner in Joyce who faced a single claim for
58 Id. at 773.
59 Docket 80 at 5–7.
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negligent entrustment, Mr. Horazdovksy’s state court action asserts numerous
theories of liability against the Martzes. 	For example, Mr. Horazdovksy asserts
that the Martzes are strictly vicariously liable pursuant to Alaska Statute 05.25.040
for 	their 	son’s 	conduct, 	a 	claim 	that 	would 	impose 	liability 	on 	the 	Martzes
irrespective of whether they knew or should have known that their son’s operation
of their vessel posed an unreasonable risk of physical harm. 60 	Instead, liability
under this state statute turns on whether Reagan Martz was operating the boat
with “the owner’s express or implied consent.”61 Thus, it is conceivable that even
if Mr. Horazdovsky establishes that the Martzes are liable for negligent entrustment
and further establishes that therefore they could not limit their liability for that claim,
the Martzes may still be able to limit their liability on a claim brought pursuant to
Alaska Statute 05.25.040. Indeed, another district court in the Ninth Circuit found
that in a case where the claimant’s state court action asserted numerous theories
of negligence, including vicarious liability, “Joyce [wa]s distinguishable for this
reason alone.”62 The district court in that case agreed with the owner of the vessel
that “vicarious liability . . . does not require knowledge or privity (and is therefore a
claim covered by the Act).”63
60 Docket 1-1 at 8–9, ¶¶ 42–44.
61 AS § 05.25.040.
62 In re Morgan, 3:18-cv-00092-BEN-BGS, 2018 WL 2328367, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2018).
63 Id.
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In 	any 	event, 	the 	Court 	questions 	the 	validity 	of 	the 	premise 	of 	Mr.
Horazdovsky’s contention that the negligent entrustment claim and the limitation
of liability claim are coextensive such that the determination of one claim is
dispositive of the other. This is because the two claims require different parties to
bear the burden of proof in different courts.64 	The negligent entrustment claim
would require Mr. Horazdovsky to prove in Alaska state court that the Martzes
knew or had reason to know that their entrustment of their boat to their son posed
an “unreasonable risk of physical harm.” 65 	The limitation of liability claim would
require the Martzes to prove in federal district court that the damage occurred
without their privity or knowledge.66 As one district court pointed out, the analysis
in 	Joyce 	“conflates” 	two 	“distinct 	questions 	that 	ought 	be 	[sic] 	addressed
independently.”67
Moreover, the key terms of the two claims, while similar, are not identical.
The negligent entrustment claim concerns what the entrustor “knew or should have
64 In re Fun Time Boat Rental & Storage, LLC, 431 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (D. Ariz. 2006) (“When
a shipowner asserts a claim for exoneration or limited liability under the Act, a burden-shifting
framework is employed to evaluate the shipowner’s eligibility for limited liability. 	First, the
claimants seeking to recover damages must demonstrate the shipowner’s liability for their loss,
either by showing the owner’s negligence or the unseaworthiness of the vessel. . . . Only if liability
is established does the burden shift to the shipowner to establish its lack of privity or knowledge.”
(internal citations omitted)).
65 Nelson v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 162 P.3d 1228, 1232 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 390 (1965)).
66 46 U.S.C. § 30523(b).
67 In re Dieber, 793 F. Supp. 2d 632, 635 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Case 3:20-cv-00152-SLG Document 124 Filed 05/05/23 Page 16 of 17

Case No. 3:20-cv-00152-SLG, In re Complaint of Martzes
Order re Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Page 17 of 17
known,” whereas the Limitation of Liability Act concerns “privity or knowledge.”
There is conceivably some room for difference between these terms. 	“As some
courts distinguishing Joyce v. Joyce have already pointed out, . . . the terms privity,
knowledge, 	constructive 	knowledge, 	and 	duty 	to 	know 	often 	have 	different
meanings depending on the state law at issue, the facts, and the meaning of the
terms as they have been defined by different circuit courts interpreting the Act.”68
In sum, accepting the factual assertions in the Martzes’ complaint as true,
the Court finds that the Martzes have stated a plausible claim for relief.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for judgment on
the pleadings at Docket 80 is DENIED.
DATED this 5th day of May 2023, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
68 Jack’s Watercraft Rentals, Inc., Civil Action No. B-12-176, 2013 WL 12155582, at *9 (S.D. Tex.
May 31, 2013). 	The district court for the Southern District of Texas adopted this report and
recommendation at Docket 19 of Case No. 1:12-cv-000176.
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