Smith v. Palmer Courthouse et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
KEEN SMITH JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
PALMER COURTHOUSE/GOOSE
CREEK CORR. CNTR.,
Respondent.
Case No. 3:21-cv-00131-RRB
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Keen Smith, Jr., representing himself from Goose Creek Correctional
Center, where he is housed as a pretrial detainee, has filed a habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that the state court is violating his rights in his criminal
case.1 	The Court takes judicial notice2 that, on June 16, 2020, Mr. Smith was
arraigned on the following charges:
(1) “Class A Felony AS11.41.500(a)(1): 	Robbery
1- Armed w/ Deadly Weapon”;
(2) “Class 	B 	Felony 	AS11.61.195(a)(3)(B):
Misc/Weapons 2- Fire Gun At Dwelling”;
1 Docket 1; see also Dockets 2, 4 (Applications to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee).
2 Judicial notice is the “court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without
requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact....” Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019); see also Foster Poultry Farms v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip., Inc., 868 F.
Supp. 2d 983, 990 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“Courts routinely take judicial notice of publicly
available records ... from other court proceedings.”) (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2007) (additional
citation omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
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(3) “Class 	B 	Felony 	AS11.46.300(a)(2)(A):
Burglary 1- Armed With Firearm”;
(4) “Class 	C 	Felony 	AS11.41.220(a)(1)(A):
Assault 3-Cause Fear Of Injury w/ Weap[on]”;
(5) “Class C Felony AS11.46.130(a)(2): Theft 2-
Firearm/ Explosive.”3
In this Court, Mr. Smith seeks the following relief:
I want the courts to review this matter, drop these
charges due to my Constitutional Right being violated
(Sixth Amendment), and file charges against the people
who are wrongfully incarcerating me/charging me because
of all the pain, mental stress, emotional stress, and deaths
I’ve experienced since being incarcerated due to these
charges.4
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
Federal courts have general habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.5 	A petitioner may properly challenge state pretrial detention under
§ 2241.6 But a court must “promptly examine” a habeas petition, and “[i]f it plainly
appears 	from 	the 	motion, 	any 	attached 	exhibits, 	and 	the 	record 	of 	prior
proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss
3 https://records.courts.alaska.gov/eaccess/searchresults, State of Alaska v. Keen Smith,
3PA-20-01154CR.
4 Id. at 8.
5 See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 608 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1999).
6 See Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 885–88 (9th Cir. 2004).
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the motion...” 7 	In conducting its review of a self-represented litigant’s pleadings,
a court must liberally construe the pleadings and give the petitioner the benefit of
the doubt.8
DISCUSSION
A writ of habeas corpus allows an individual to test the legality of being
detained or held in custody by the government.9 The writ “is a vital ‘instrument for
the protection of individual liberty’ against government power.”10 28 U.S.C. § 2241
provides federal courts with general habeas corpus jurisdiction11 over a prisoner
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”12
This habeas statute is the proper avenue for a state prisoner who wishes to
challenge his state custody without a state judgment.13
7 Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District
Courts. 	The same procedural rules for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and § 2255 govern 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.
8 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d
1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
9 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004).
10 Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015); quoting Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008).
11 See Magana-Pizano, 200 F.3d at 608 & n.4.
12 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
13 Stow, 389 F.3d at 885–88 (quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he general grant of habeas authority in § 2241 is available for challenges by a
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Mr. Smith requests that the state charges against him be dropped.14
But a speedy trial claim may be reviewed under § 2241 if a pretrial
detainee is seeking to compel the state to bring him to trial, rather than seeking
dismissal of the charges.15 Thus, although a federal court can order a state court
to bring a petitioner to trial, federal courts do not order that state charges be
dropped.16 	The Court will not, therefore, grant Mr. Smith’s request that his state
criminal charges be dropped.17
Even 	had 	Mr. 	Smith 	requested 	appropriate 	relief, 	however, 	the
Younger 	abstention 	doctrine 	provides 	that 	federal 	courts 	may 	not 	generally
exercise 	jurisdiction 	when 	doing 	so 	would 	interfere 	with 	state 	judicial
state prisoner who is not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment-for example, a
defendant in pre-trial detention or awaiting extradition.”)).
14 Docket 1 at 8.
15 See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–90 (1973)
(“Petitioner does not, however, seek at this time to litigate a federal defense to a criminal
charge, but only to demand enforcement of the Commonwealth’s affirmative constitutional
obligation to bring him promptly to trial.”) (citation omitted).
16 Id.
17 In addition, Mr. Smith asks that this Court “file charges against the people who are
wrongfully incarcerating [and] charging [him],” Docket 1 at 8, but it is well settled that “in
American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” 	Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
619 (1973); see also Gonzalez v. Razo, No. 1:15-cv-01098-DAD-EPG, 2021 WL
1732259, slip op. at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2021) (“the court lack[s] jurisdiction to order the
United States Attorney to file criminal charges against defendants.”).
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proceedings.18 	The core of Younger abstention is that a federal court cannot
interfere with pending state court criminal proceedings, absent a “showing of bad
faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief.”19 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	“limited 	the 	category 	of 	‘extraordinary
circumstances’ to encompass only ‘cases of proven harassment or prosecutions
undertaken 	by 	state 	officials 	in 	bad 	faith 	without 	hope 	of 	obtaining 	a 	valid
conviction,’ or where ‘irreparable injury can be shown.’”20
A federal court
must abstain under Younger if four requirements are met:
(1) 	a 	state-initiated 	proceeding 	is 	ongoing; 	(2) 	the
proceeding implicates 	important state interests; (3) the
federal 	plaintiff 	is 	not 	barred 	from 	litigating 	federal
constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the
federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have
the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with
the 	state 	proceeding 	in 	a 	way 	that 	Younger
disapproves.21
18 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
19 Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
20 Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 85 (1971)); see also Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e
specifically rejected in Carden the argument that a claimed violation of the Speedy Trial
Clause … sufficed in and of itself as an independent ‘extraordinary circumstance’
necessitating pre-trial habeas consideration.”) (citing Carden at 84).
21 San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of
San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 903
(9th Cir. 2019) (“Younger does not “require[ ] a district court to abstain from hearing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of pretrial detention in state
court” where (1) the procedure challenged in the petition is distinct from the underlying
criminal prosecution and the challenge would not interfere with the prosecution, or (2) full
vindication of the petitioner’s pretrial rights requires intervention before trial.”) (citing
Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 764, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2018)).
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The State of Alaska has an important interest in enforcing its criminal
laws, and Mr. Smith’s criminal case in the state court remains ongoing. Mr. Smith’s
claims should continue to be addressed in his state court criminal proceedings.22
For example, in Thomas v. State of Alaska, a criminal defendant appealed the bail
set in his ongoing criminal case.23 There, the defendant, through counsel, argued
before the Court of Appeals for the State of Alaska
that 	the 	Department 	of 	Corrections 	(DOC) 	was 	not
providing “safe and adequate care of persons in their
custody” and was exposing inmates to “unnecessary and
dangerous 	health 	risks” 	in 	light 	of 	the 	COVID-19
pandemic. 	Thomas argued that the suspension of court
rules governing the right to a speedy trial and other court
proceedings, 	together 	with 	the 	pretrial 	detention 	of
criminal defendants under conditions that he alleged did
not meet Center for Disease Control (CDC) guidelines,
constituted a due process violation that entitled him to
relief. 	In particular, Thomas asked the court to order
DOC to comply with CDC guidelines for mitigating the
spread of COVID-19, or in the alternative, to grant his
immediate release.24
Similarly, in In re Humphrey, the California Supreme Court addressed
an appeal on a state petition for writ of habeas corpus from a pretrial detainee:
22 See Brown, 676 F.3d at 900–01 (A “federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
a habeas petition that raises an affirmative defense to state prosecution before trial and
conviction can have the same effect as a direct injunction of ongoing state proceedings.”)
(citing Carden, 626 F.2d at 83).
23 Thomas, v. State of Alaska, Nos. A-13791, 13792, 2021 WL 1535772 (Alaska
App. April 9, 2021).
24 Id., 2021 WL 1535772, at *1.
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The 	common 	practice 	of 	conditioning 	freedom
solely 	on 	whether 	an 	arrestee 	can 	afford 	bail 	is
unconstitutional. Other conditions of release — such as
electronic monitoring, regular check-ins with a pretrial
case manager, community housing or shelter, and drug
and alcohol treatment — can in many cases protect
public and victim safety as well as assure the arrestee’s
appearance at trial. 	What we hold is that where a
financial condition is nonetheless necessary, the court
must consider the arrestee’s ability to pay the stated
amount of bail — and may not effectively detain the
arrestee 	“solely 	because” 	the 	arrestee 	“lacked 	the
resources” to post bail.25
This Court should not interfere with the state trial court’s fact-finding
responsibilities and legal decisions in Mr. Smith’s cases, unless “full vindication of
the petitioner’s pretrial rights requires intervention before trial.”26 	Mr. Smith may
bring his arguments before the state courts, as is his defense attorney, who applied
for a bail review hearing, and has filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in the
state criminal case.27 Thus, this is not a case requiring federal intervention.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. 	This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
25 	In re Humphrey, 482 P.3d 1008, 1012–13 (Cal. 2021) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660, 667, 668 (1983)).
26 Page, 932 F.3d at 903.
27 See https://records.courts.alaska.gov/eaccess/searchresults, 3PA-20-01154CR.
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2. 	The Applications to Proceed Without Prepayment of the Filing
Fee, at Dockets 2 and 4, are DENIED as moot.
3. 	The Court, having concluded that Petitioner has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, DENIES a certificate of
appealability.28 	Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be
addressed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.29
28 See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1). 	Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from--
(a) 	the 	final 	order 	in 	a 	habeas 	corpus 	proceeding 	in 	which 	the 	detention
complained of arises out of process issued by a State court …
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific
issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).
See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705 (2004) (“To obtain a certificate of
appealability, a prisoner must ‘demonstrat[e] that jurists of reason could disagree with the
district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” (citation
omitted); see also Wilson v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We conclude
that the mere fact that a habeas petition is filed pursuant to § 2241(c)(3) does not exempt
that petition from § 2253(c)(1)(A)'s COA requirement
For the reasons set forth in this Order, Mr. Smith has not made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right, or that jurists of reason could disagree with
the district court’s resolution, or that he deserves encouragement to proceed further.
Banks, 540 U.S. at 705. Mr. Smith has not been incarcerated for a substantial time under
federal law, see McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a delay of
three years to be substantial, such that prejudice was presumed), especially considering
the pandemic that delayed criminal proceedings nation-wide. Mr. Smith may continue to
make his arguments in his 2020 state criminal proceedings, as is his attorney in his case.
29 See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); 9th Cir. R. 22-1.
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4. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to enter Judgment accordingly.
Dated at Anchorage, Alaska this 1st day of July, 2021.
/s/ Ralph R. Beistline
RALPH R. BEISTLINE
Senior United States District Judge
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