Martin v. Rhodes et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
STEAVIN REED MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIKE RHODES, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:21-cv-00211-RRB
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On September 21, 2021, Steavin Reed Martin, a self-represented prisoner,
filed a Prisoner’s Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil
cover sheet, and a Prisoner’s Application to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee.1
I. 	Complaint
Plaintiff 	names 	“Presiding 	Judge,” 	Assistant 	District 	Attorney 	Diana
Kniazewycz, and Mike Rhodes of Denali Law Group, acting as publicly appointed
counsel, as defendants.2 	Defendants are judicial officers or attorneys appearing
before the Alaska Superior Court in Plaintiff’s ongoing criminal matter State of
Alaska v. Martin, Case No. 3AN-20-09820CR.3
1 Dockets 1–3.
2 Docket 1 at 2.
3 Judicial notice is the “court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a
party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court’s power to accept such a fact.”
B LACK’S L AW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 399
F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Materials from a proceeding in another tribunal are
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Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	since 	his 	arrest 	Defendants 	“have 	continuously
conspired against my 14th Amendment right by excluding me from court hearings,
effectively [eliminating] my ability to exhaust my administrative [remedies]” and
have violated several Alaska statutes.4 He further alleges that Defendant Rhodes
will not file a Motion to Dismiss, because “he doesn’t think it will bear fruit.”5
Additionally, he states: “The courts cannot use Covid 19 as an excuse to postpone
or suspend my inalienable rights at their convenience.”6
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “have continuously violated my 6th
Amendment right to a speedy and public trial” . . . and “All three parties are acting
in [collusion] to deny me this right have violated their oath of office, committing
crimes.”7
For 	relief, 	Plaintiff 	requests 	(1) 	$2,420,000.00 	in 	damages;
(2) $2,420,000.00 in punitive damages; (3) an order dismissing his state court
charges; and a (4) declaration that “we made a mistake and agree to dismiss and
or pay.”8
appropriate for judicial notice.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 201.
4 Docket 1 at 3.
5 Docket 1 at 3.
6 Docket 1 at 3.
7 Docket 1 at 5.
8 Docket 1 at 8.
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The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff’s pending criminal matter State
of Alaska v. Martin, Case No. 3AN-20-09820CR commenced December 20, 2020.9
Plaintiff faces three charges: 	(1) Theft in the First Degree, a Class B Felony;
(2) Vehicle Theft in the First Degree, a Class C Felony, and (3) Violating Conditions
of Release, a Class B Misdemeanor.10
II. 	Screening Requirement
Federal law requires a court to conduct an initial screening of a civil
complaint filed by a self-represented prisoner seeking a waiver of the prepayment
of the filing fee. In this screening, a court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that the action:
(i) 	is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) 	fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) 	seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.11
To determine whether a complaint states a valid claim for relief, courts
consider whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter that, if accepted
as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”12 	In conducting its
9 Supra note 4.
10 Id.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b).
12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). 	In making this determination, a court may consider “materials that are submitted
with and attached to the Complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citing Lee v. L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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review, a court must liberally construe a self-represented plaintiff’s pleading and
give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.13 Before a court may dismiss any portion
of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint
and an opportunity to amend or otherwise address the problems, unless to do so
would be futile.14
III. 	Discussion
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statute that “is not itself a source of substantive
rights,” but provides “a method for vindicating rights [found] elsewhere.”15 For relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must “plead that (1) the defendants acting under
color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or
federal statutes.”16 	To act under the color of state law, a complaint must allege
that the defendants acted with state authority as state actors.17 	Furthermore, a
defendant must be eligible for suit. 	Plaintiff fails to plead this required element;
therefore, the Complaint must be dismissed.
13 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,
1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
14 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v. Lund,
845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)).
15 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979)).
16 Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
17 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941)).
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a. 	Defendant Rhodes
A lawyer appointed to represent a criminal defendant in a state court
proceeding is "as a matter of law, . . . not a state actor."18 Such a lawyer, whether
from the Office of Public Advocacy, Public Defender’s Office, or by contract is “no
doubt, 	paid 	by 	government 	funds 	and 	hired 	by 	a 	government 	agency.
Nevertheless, his function was to represent his client, not the interests of the state
or county.”19 	It does not matter that a state criminal defense lawyer is paid from
public funds. “Except for the source of payment, . . . the duties and obligations are
the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal
aid or defender program.”20 This means that because a criminal defense lawyer’s
duty and loyalty are to his client, not the state, a court appointed attorney is not a
state actor for purposes of Section 1983.
Mike Rhodes is an attorney with Denali Law Group, a contractor of the Public
Defender’s Office. 	The Complaint seeks damages from the attorney due to his
alleged actions as his court appointed attorney. 	Mr. Rhodes, as court appointed
counsel to the indigent, is not a state actor as a matter of law. Therefore, he cannot
be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
18 See Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
814 (2003).
19 Id., citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (recognizing that the public defender
performs “a lawyer’s traditional functions” in the lawyer’s traditional adversarial role).
20 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318–19.
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b. 	Defendant “Presiding Judge”
A state court judicial officer is a state actor. 	However, “[j]udges and those
performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for
acts performed in their official capacities.”21 	Moreover, judicial immunity extends
to preclude prospective injunctive relief against a state court judge for acts or
omissions made in that judge’s official capacity.22 	This judicial immunity is
immunity from lawsuit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and it
cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.23
“Presiding Judge” is a judicial officer in the Alaska Superior Court. 	The
Complaint seeks damages from the attorney due to his alleged actions as the
presiding judge in Plaintiff’s ongoing state court criminal matter. “Presiding Judge,”
as a judicial officer, is immune from suit as a matter of law. Therefore, he cannot
be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (in determining
if an action is judicial, courts focus on whether “(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function;
(2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then
pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a
confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity.”). “These factors are to be construed
generously in favor of the judge and in light of the policies underlying judicial immunity.”
Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076.
22 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
23 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
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c. 	Defendant Kniazewycz
District attorneys are state actors; however, prosecuting attorneys are
immune from suit. 	Prosecutorial immunity protects government attorneys when
they are acting pursuant to their judicial role as an advocate for the state
performing functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.”24 	A prosecutor’s absolute immunity extends to “initiating a prosecution
and presenting the State’s case,”25 including eliciting witness testimony, arguing
motions, and pretrial court appearances.26
However, “[a] prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory
functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a
prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.”27
Further, a prosecutor can be held accountable for malicious prosecution. 	But for
any such claim to go forward, a claimant must provide plausible factual details and
more than just conclusory allegations.28 	Most importantly, a claim for malicious
prosecution cannot proceed until the termination of the prior criminal proceeding
24 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
25 Id.
26 See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1991).
27 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (stating that pleadings which “are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. 	While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
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has occurred in favor of the accused.29 	This “avoids parallel litigation over the
issue of probable cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the possibility of the claimant
[sic] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation
of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.”30
Diana Kniazewycz is the Assistant District Attorney for the State of Alaska.
The Complaint seeks damages from the attorney due to her alleged actions as the
prosecuting 	attorney 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	ongoing 	state 	court 	criminal 	matter.
Ms. Kniazewycz, as a prosecuting governmental attorney, is immune from suit as
a matter of law. Therefore, she cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV. 	Conclusion
Plaintiff has failed to name a proper state actor or a state actor that is not
immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	No other defendants could be
substituted under the alleged facts; therefore, amendment is futile, and the
Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. 	This action shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failing to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, seeking relief from a
defendant who is immune from suit, and the futility of amendment.
29 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 47, 484 (1994).
30 Heck, 512 at 484.
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2. 	All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
3. 	A dismissal under these circumstances would be a strike as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, et al., 590 U.S.
___, 140 S. Ct. 172 (2020).31
4. 	The Clerk of Court shall issue a final judgment.
DATED this 29th day of November, 2021, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Ralph R Beistline
RALPH R. BEISTLINE
Senior United States District Judge
31 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner who files more than three actions or appeals in any
federal court in the United States which are dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, from bringing any other actions without
prepayment of fees unless the prisoner can demonstrate that he or she is in “imminent danger of
serious physical injury.”
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