Humphrey v. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
DION KIRK HUMPHREY,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE U.S. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00193-SLG
ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION RE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Before 	the 	Court 	at 	Docket 	33 	is 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment, Defendants being the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) and
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) (hereafter
“Defendants”). Self-represented Plaintiff Dion Humphrey responded in opposition
at Docket 36, with a supplemental brief in opposition at Docket 37. 	Defendants
replied at Docket 38.1 	Also before the Court at Docket 39 is Mr. Humphrey’s
motion regarding “Ineffictive [sic] Assistance of Counsel Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Subsection 921(33)(B) [sic].” 	Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 42,
1 Mr. Humphrey also filed a reply to Defendants’ reply at Docket 40. Mr. Humphrey is cautioned
that, generally, if he is the non-moving party, he is limited only to one response. If he is the
moving party, he may file a reply after Defendants have filed a response to his motion.
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and Mr. Humphrey did not reply.2 	Oral argument was not requested and was not
necessary to the Court’s determination of these motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dion Humphrey is a resident of Alaska and attempted to purchase
a firearm from a licensed dealer in Alaska in mid-2022, but was denied “following
a mandatory check of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(‘NICS’).” 3 	Between 1989 to 1997, Mr. Humphrey was convicted in the state of
Washington of five offenses, which involved taking a vehicle without permission,
burglary, and controlled substances.4 	In 2003, Mr. Humphrey was convicted of
three felonies in the state of Washington, including assault in the second degree,5
which alleged Mr. Humphrey “did intentionally assault [three people] with a deadly
weapon, to-wit: an automobile,” in violation of the Revised Code of Washington
(“RCW”) 	§ 	9A.36.021(1)(c). 6 	Eighteen 	years 	later, 	in 	December 	2021, 	a
Washington court vacated and set aside all three of those felony convictions. 7
Then, in June 2022, a Washington court restored Mr. Humphrey’s “right to possess
2 Mr. Humphrey also filed a Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Against Defendant(s) in Accordance with Fed. R. Evid. Rule 201 at Docket 45, but it is unclear
what he is requesting.
3 Docket 1 at ¶ 5; Docket 33 at 2.
4 See Docket 1-3.
5 See Docket 1-3; Docket 1-7; Docket 13-1 at 1.
6 Docket 1-7 at 1.
7 Docket 13-1 at 2-3.
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firearms 	in 	the 	State 	of 	Washington 	insofar 	as 	that 	right 	was 	lost 	by” 	his
aforementioned convictions from 1989 to 2003, including the assault in the second
degree.8
The FBI has responsibility for administering NICS.9 “When the FBI conducts
a NICS check, it . . . [can] track individuals’ criminal records. . . . If the FBI
determines that a potential transferee may not possess [a] firearm, it so notifies
the licensee.”10 	Upon denial of “a NICS-related firearm purchase,” a person can
apply to the Voluntary Appeal File (“VAF”).11 	The VAF “is designed for firearm
purchasers who believe they are legally allowed to buy firearms, but . . . have been
denied more than once.”12 When a person applies for the VAF, “FBI personnel will
research [the person’s] case.”13 	If the FBI determines that the person has no
firearms prohibitions, it will assign the person a Unique Personal Identification
Number (“UPIN”) in the VAF to provide in future firearms transactions. 14
8 Docket 1-3.
9 Docket 10 at 4.
10 Docket 10 at 4 (emphasis in original).
11 Docket 10 at 5.
12 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Firearm-Related Challenge (Appeal) and Voluntary Appeal File
(VAF), https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/more-fbi-services-and-
information/nics/national-instant-criminal-background-check-system-nics-appeals-vaf (last
visited Dec. 8, 2023) [hereafter “VAF Process”].
13 VAF Process, supra note 12.
14 VAF Process, supra note 12.
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After Mr. Humphrey was denied his firearm purchase in 2022, he applied for
the VAF with the FBI.15 	The FBI sent two responses to Mr. Humphrey, both
deeming him ineligible for the VAF and thereby denying him a UPIN that would
allow him to purchase firearms.16 The FBI’s first response informed Mr. Humphrey
that he was ineligible pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as someone “who ha[d]
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.”17 The FBI also informed Mr. Humphrey that, despite the fact
his 2003 convictions had been recently vacated, “[v]acated remains a conviction.”18
The FBI’s second response informed Mr. Humphrey that he was ineligible
for the VAF pursuant to Alaska Statute (“AS”) § 11.61.200(a)(1), which prohibits a
person from possessing “a firearm capable of being concealed on one’s person
after having been convicted of a felony . . . by . . . a court of another state.”19 The
response also stated that Mr. Humphrey did not fall under any exception to AS §
11.61.200(a)(1) because of his 2003 conviction for felony assault in the second
15 See Docket 33 at 2-3; Docket 1-2; Docket 1-4.
16 Docket 1-2; Docket 1-4.
17 Docket 1-2 at 1; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The FBI’s first response also stated that the court
order Mr. Humphrey sent to the FBI showing his firearm possession rights had been restored
lacked a restoration of his firearms rights lost by his 2003 convictions. Mr. Humphrey
subsequently obtained an amended court order that restored the rights lost by his 2003
convictions and submitted it to the FBI, after which the FBI sent him its second response. See
Docket 1-2 at 1; Docket 1-1; Docket 1-3; Docket 1-4.
18 Docket 1-2 at 1.
19 Docket 1-4.
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degree.20 The FBI concluded its second response by informing Mr. Humphrey that
he is “ineligible to purchase or possess a firearm in the state of Alaska” and that it
will take “no further action” in his case.21
Mr. Humphrey filed a complaint in this Court challenging the ban on his
possession of firearms pursuant to the Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
and seeking declaratory relief.22 	Mr. Humphrey then filed an amended complaint
asserting that Defendants had misinterpreted Washington and Alaska state law
with regard to his ability to possess firearms, given that his prior Washington
convictions had been set aside.23 	In June 2023, Defendants informed Mr.
Humphrey they had discovered that he had two 2010 convictions for Domestic
Violence (“DV”) Assault and Family Violence pursuant to Anchorage Municipal
Code 	(“AMC”) 	sections 	8.10.010.B.1 	and 	8.10.050, 	respectively.24 	These
20 Docket 1-4 (citing AS § 11.61.200(b)(1)(C)). Defendants assert that what the FBI meant is
that Mr. Humphrey’s assault conviction, which involved an assault with an automobile against
three people, is similar to a violation pursuant to AS § 11.41, which covers “Alaska’s crimes
against a person.” The exception provided by AS § 11.61.200(b)(1)(C) does not apply to a
person if that person was convicted of “a violation of AS 11.41 or . . . a similar law . . . of another
state.” Defendants claim that Mr. Humphrey’s assault conviction is similar to AS §
11.41.220(a)(1)(B), “Assault in the third degree,” which criminalizes “recklessly caus[ing]
physical injury to another person by means of a dangerous instrument.” Defendants therefore
contend that Mr. Humphrey does not have an exception to the prohibition on possessing
firearms concealable on one’s person. See Docket 10 at 10-12.
21 Docket 1-4.
22 Docket 1.
23 Docket 19 at 1. It appears that Mr. Humphrey intended to incorporate his original complaint
since his amended complaint alleges only this one claim.
24 Docket 33 at 5; Docket 33-2 at 2; Docket 34 at ¶ 22.
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convictions 	resulted 	from 	an 	assault 	perpetrated 	on 	January 	2, 	2009.25
Defendants assert that these convictions qualify as misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence (“MCDVs”) and thus prohibit Mr. Humphrey from possessing
any firearms pursuant to federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 26
In 	addition, 	Defendants 	maintain 	that 	Mr. 	Humphrey’s 	Washington
conviction 	for 	assault 	in 	the 	second 	degree 	continues 	to 	prohibit 	him 	from
possessing a concealable firearm pursuant to Alaska law, despite the fact that the
conviction has been set aside and the State of Washington has restored Mr.
Humphrey’s firearm possession rights for that conviction.27 It appears that the FBI
has kept the assault in the second degree as a prohibitor on Mr. Humphrey’s NICS
record pursuant to Alaska state law, and that it also added his MCDVs as a
prohibitor pursuant to federal law.28 Based on these two items, Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment in which they also incorporated their arguments from
their previous motion to dismiss, requesting that the Court also dismiss Mr.
25 See Docket 33-1 at 4.
26 Docket 33 at 5; Docket 33-2 at 2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) prohibits any person “who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing any
firearms or ammunition.
27 Docket 33 at 10-13; Docket 33-2 at 1-2.
28 See Docket 34 at ¶¶ 1, 21-23 (declaration from Celeste Cochran, FBI custodian of records,
asserting that Mr. Humphrey “is prohibited from possessing a handgun under Alaska state law
and is prohibited from . . . possessing . . . all firearms under federal law”) (hereinafter “Cochran
Declaration”).
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Humphrey’s constitutional claims.29 	Subsequently, Mr. Humphrey filed a motion
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his Alaska state court case that
resulted in his 2010 MCDV convictions.30
JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this is a
civil action with certain claims arising under federal law: 18 U.S.C. § 925A, 18
U.S.C. § 922, the Second Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 925A, any person denied a firearm pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 922(t), and
who was not prohibited from receipt of a firearm pursuant to [§
922(g)], may bring an action against the State or political subdivision
responsible for providing the erroneous information, or responsible for
denying the transfer, or against the United States, as the case may
be, for an order directing that the erroneous information be corrected
or that the transfer be approved, as the case may be.
It appears that Mr. Humphrey brings his claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(t),
which governs how a firearm may be transferred after a NICS background check
is initiated. 31
29 Docket 33 at 1-2, 4 & n.2.
30 Docket 39.
31 See Docket 1 at ¶¶ 12-20 (Compl.); Docket 19 at ¶ 1 (Am. Compl.). The Government also
acknowledges that Mr. Humphrey challenges his NICS firearm denial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
922(t), and that his claim is thus reviewable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 925A. Docket 22 at 2.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	The burden of
showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact lies with the movant.32
If the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate “specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”33 The non-moving party may
not rely on “mere allegations or denials”; rather, to reach the level of a genuine
dispute, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.”34 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a
court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws
“all justifiable inferences” in the non-moving party’s favor.35 	“[W]here the party
moving for summary judgment has had a full and fair opportunity to prove its case,
but has not succeeded in doing so, a court may enter summary judgment sua
sponte for the nonmoving party.” 36
32 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
33 Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-
49 (1986).
34 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253 (1968)).
35 Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).
36 Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (first citing Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685
F.2d 309, 311 (9th Cir. 1982); and then citing Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328
F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses Mr. Humphrey’s motion regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel before turning to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
I. 	Motion Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In 	Mr. 	Humphrey’s 	motion, 	he 	appears 	to 	contend 	that 	his 	attorney
pressured him into pleading guilty to the MCDVs on the day Mr. Humphrey’s trial
was scheduled to begin, when he had his 16-month-old son with him in court.37
Mr. Humphrey also asserts that his defense counsel failed to inform him that a
guilty plea to an MCDV would deprive him of his firearm possession rights.38
However, any claim for post-conviction relief regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel must be filed with the state court. 39 	The Court notes, however, that Mr.
Humphrey is likely time-barred from obtaining such post-conviction relief at this
time.40 	Because the claim is not properly before the Court, the Court denies Mr.
37 Docket 39 at 2.
38 Docket 39 at 2.
39 See AS § 12.72.030(a) (“An application for post-conviction relief shall be filed with the clerk at
the court location where the underlying criminal case is filed.”).
40 See AS § 12.72.020 (outlining time limitations on applications for post-conviction relief).
Further, construing Mr. Humphrey’s motion as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas relief does
not permit the Court to consider his claims. There is no evidence that Mr. Humphrey was “in
custody” for the MCDVs when he filed the motion. See Wright v. Alaska, 47 F.4th 954, 959 (9th
Cir. 2022) (noting that, “to challenge [an] Alaska conviction under § 2254, [a petitioner] must
demonstrate that (1) he was ‘in custody’ at the time he filed his § 2254 petition, and (2) that
custody was ‘pursuant to’ the Alaska judgment.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a))).
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Humphrey’s motion regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of his counsel in
state court.
II. 	Motion for Summary Judgment
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants raise three arguments:
(1) that Mr. Humphrey’s 2010 MCDV convictions federally prohibit him from
possessing any firearms; (2) that Mr. Humphrey’s Washington state conviction for
assault in the second degree, which was set aside, prohibits him from possessing
concealable firearms pursuant to Alaska state law; and (3) that Mr. Humphrey’s
constitutional claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.41
a. Mr. Humphrey’s MCDV Convictions
Defendants first assert that Mr. Humphrey’s 2010 MCDV convictions for DV
Assault and Family Violence federally prohibit him from possessing any firearms
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).42 	That statute prohibits any person “who has
been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from
possessing 	any 	firearms 	or 	ammunition.43 	The 	FBI 	did 	not 	identify 	these
41 Docket 33 at 7-14.
42 Docket 33 at 7-8.
43 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
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convictions when it denied Mr. Humphrey’s VAF application in 2022; rather, these
convictions were first raised in June 2023. 44
Mr. Humphrey’s 2010 MCDV convictions under the Anchorage Municipal
Code do not prohibit him from possessing firearms under federal law. Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” means an
offense that
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, Tribal, or local law; and
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or
former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is
cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent,
or guardian, by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim, or by a person who has a current or recent
former dating relationship with the victim.45
However, § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) did not define an MCDV to include misdemeanors
under “local law” until the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2022 added that term
on March 15, 2022. 46 	Because “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits
retroactive application of penal legislation” 47 —and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) is
penal legislation—only those individuals who were convicted under local law of an
44 See Docket 33 at 5; Docket 33-2 at 1-2.
45 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).
46 See Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 1104(a), 136 Stat. 49, 921 (2022); United States v. Pauler, 857
F.3d 1073, 1075-78 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that MCDVs under local and municipal law did not
qualify as federal prohibitors under the prior version of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)).
47 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994).
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MCDV on or after March 15, 2022, would be federally prohibited from possessing
a firearm. 	Mr. Humphrey’s local law MCDV convictions occurred in 2010.48
Therefore, this federal firearm prohibition does not apply to him.
b. Mr. Humphrey’s Washington State Conviction
Defendants 	next 	assert 	that 	Mr. 	Humphrey’s 	2003 	Washington 	state
conviction for assault in the second degree, which was set aside by the State of
Washington and for which his firearm possession rights were restored, prohibits
him from possessing concealable firearms pursuant to Alaska state law.49 	In
support, Defendants cite to Alaska Statute (“AS”) § 11.61.200(a), which prohibits
a person from possessing “a firearm capable of being concealed on one’s person
after having been convicted of a felony . . . by . . . a court of another state.”
Exceptions to this rule are found at AS § 11.61.200(b)(1), which exempts a person
from this prohibition if:
(A) the person convicted of the prior offense on which the action is
based received a pardon for that conviction;
(B) the underlying conviction upon which the action is based has been
set aside under AS 12.55.085 or as a result of post-conviction
proceedings; or
(C) a period of 10 years or more has elapsed between the date of the
person's 	unconditional 	discharge 	on 	the 	prior 	offense 	or
adjudication of juvenile delinquency and the date of the violation
of (a)(1) of this section, and the prior conviction or adjudication of
juvenile delinquency did not result from a violation of AS 11.41 or
of a similar law of the United States or of another state or territory.
48 Docket 33-1 at 2-4.
49 Docket 33 at 10-13.
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Defendants contend that “[a]lthough AS 11.61.200(b)(1)(B) provides an
exception to the prohibitions of AS 11.61.200(a) when an underlying conviction
has been set aside ‘as a result of post-conviction proceedings,’ Plaintiff does not
qualify under this exception.”50 Defendants assert that the exception applies “only
for set asides and post-conviction relief as contemplated by Alaska law.”51 	They
maintain 	that 	“[a]ny 	broader 	interpretation 	of 	the 	statute—for 	example, 	an
interpretation that would include any and all post-conviction relief from other
jurisdictions—would produce an illogical, absurd, and potentially dangerous result
for the Alaskan community.”52 	Defendants note that post-conviction proceedings
under 	Alaska 	law 	“are 	narrow 	and 	limited in 	scope,” 	but 	that 	the 	State 	of
Washington 	allows 	for 	post-conviction 	relief 	for 	certain 	offenses 	“based 	on
passage of time and reformed criminal history,” which Alaska does not.53 	They
50 Docket 33 at 10. At the initiation of this case, the FBI had denied Mr. Humphrey’s request to
be added to the VAF pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), AS § 11.61.200(a)(1), and AS §
11.61.200(b)(1)(C). Docket 1-2; Docket 1-4. The FBI has since corrected Mr. Humphrey’s
records to reflect that he no longer has a felony for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See
Docket 33 at 13-14 n.4. And while Defendants maintain that AS § 11.61.200(a)(1) is still a
prohibitor, it appears that, after some questioning by the Court, they no longer consider the
exception pursuant to AS § 11.61.200(b)(1)(C) to be relevant, but only that of AS §
11.61.200(b)(1)(B). See Docket 16 at 1; Docket 18; Docket 33 at 10-13.
51 Docket 33 at 11 (emphasis added).
52 Docket 33 at 11.
53 Docket 33 at 11-12 (first citing AS § 12.72.010; and then citing RCW § 9.94A.640).
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highlight 	that 	“there 	are 	no 	post-conviction 	proceedings 	analogous 	to 	RCW
9.94A.640 . . . under Alaska law.” 54
But Defendants’ position that only convictions set aside on bases authorized
by Alaska law runs afoul of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.55
“A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory
authority 	over 	the 	subject 	matter 	and 	persons 	governed 	by 	the
judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.” A State may
not disregard the judgment of a sister State because it disagrees with
the reasoning underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong on the
merits. 	On the contrary, “the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of
action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the
legal principles on which the judgment is based.”56
Moreover, the statute expressly applies to out-of-state convictions; 	logically, it
must also apply to out-of-state convictions that are set aside. In the instant case,
the State of Washington, pursuant to RCW § 9.94A.640, set aside Mr. Humphrey’s
assault conviction that he received in a Washington state court.57 	And the State
of Washington also expressly restored his right to possess firearms for that
conviction pursuant to RCW § 9.41.040(4). 58
54 Docket 33 at 12.
55 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
56 V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404, 407 (2016) (emphasis added) (first quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); and then quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)).
57 See Docket 13-1 at 1-3. The Washington state order provides: “The guilty verdict for every
offense listed in paragraph 3.1 is set aside.” Docket 13-1 at ¶ 3.2. The list in paragraph 3.1
includes Mr. Humphrey’s conviction for assault in the second degree. Docket 13-1 at ¶ 3.1.
58 Docket 1-3 at 1-2 (stating that “[t]he court finds defendant is eligible for restoration of right to
possess firearms pursuant to RCW 9.41.040(4)” and ordering restoration of right for Mr.
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Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	exception 	laid 	out 	in 	AS 	§
11.61.200(b)(1)(B) applies to Mr. Humphrey and that there is no prohibition against
Mr. Humphrey from possessing any firearm pursuant to Alaska law.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there is currently no federal
or state prohibition on Mr. Humphrey’s right to possess a firearm.
c. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims
Finally, 	Defendants 	request 	that 	the 	Court 	dismiss 	Mr. 	Humphrey’s
constitutional claims pursuant to the Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.59 However, the Court
does not reach Mr. Humphrey’s constitutional claims because the Court grants him
relief on other grounds.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Regarding
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is DENIED, and that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED; instead, the Court grants summary judgment to
Plaintiff. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
Humphrey’s 2003 assault conviction). Defendants also appear to assert that Mr. Humphrey’s
firearm rights have not been restored pursuant to Alaska law because the Washington
Restoration Order provides that it “does not restore the defendant’s right to possess firearms
under the laws of the United States or of any other State.” Docket 33 at 12 (quoting Docket 1-3
at 2). But when the Washington conviction was set aside, Mr. Humphrey was no longer
prohibited from possessing concealed firearms in Alaska based on that conviction by virtue of
AS § 11.61.200(b)(1)(B).
59 Docket 33 at 13-14; Docket 1 at ¶¶ 21-39.
Case 3:22-cv-00193-SLG Document 46 Filed 12/08/23 Page 15 of 16

Case No. 3:22-cv-00193-SLG, Humphrey v. FBI, et al.
Order re Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion re Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Page 16 of 16
 	The 	FBI 	shall 	correct 	the 	erroneous 	NICS 	information 	regarding 	Mr.
Humphrey’s 	2010 	MCDVs 	to 	reflect 	that 	they 	are 	not 	federal 	firearm
prohibitors;
 	The 	FBI 	shall 	correct 	the 	erroneous 	NICS 	information 	regarding 	Mr.
Humphrey’s set-aside Washington state conviction for assault in the second
degree to reflect that it is not a firearm prohibitor under Alaska law;
 	Plaintiff’s constitutional claims pursuant to the Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments are dismissed without prejudice; and
 	Any other pending motions are DENIED as moot.60
The Clerk of Court shall enter a final judgment for Plaintiff accordingly.
DATED this 8th day of December, 2023, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
60 See Docket 30; Docket 31; Docket 35; Docket 45.
Case 3:22-cv-00193-SLG Document 46 Filed 12/08/23 Page 16 of 16