Franke et al v. Boyle

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
GORDON FRANKE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN BOYLE, in his capacity as
Commissioner of the State of Alaska,
Department of Natural Resources,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:23-cv-00085-SLG
ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court at Docket 7 is Defendant John Boyle’s Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 1 	Plaintiffs responded in
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss at Docket 8, to which Defendant replied at
Docket 11. Oral argument was held on November 7, 2023.2
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Gordon Franke and John Frost each own property adjacent to
Campbell Lake in Anchorage, Alaska.3 	They assert that their properties were
“never owned by the Territory or State of Alaska”; rather, the federal government
1 See also Docket 7-1 (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss).
2 Docket 19.
3 Docket 1 at ¶¶ 10-12.
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transferred ownership to private parties before Alaska became a state.4 However,
a section line from a government survey crosses each of Plaintiffs’ properties.5
The State of Alaska has alleged that it has valid easements along these section
lines that derive from federal legislation enacted in the mid-1800s and legislation
enacted by the Territory of Alaska in 1923.6 	In 2019, the State of Alaska
Department of Natural Resources and the Municipality of Anchorage issued a joint
statement declaring that the public could lawfully traverse these “unvacated
section line easements” to access Campbell Lake through Plaintiffs’ properties.7
Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against Defendant in his official capacity as the
Commissioner 	of 	the 	State 	of 	Alaska 	(the 	“State”) 	Department 	of 	Natural
Resources to challenge the validity of the easements.8 	They allege violations of
the 	Supremacy 	Clause, 	Fourteenth 	Amendment, 	Fifth 	Amendment, 	Fourth
Amendment, and the Alaska Constitution.9 	Plaintiffs ask for declaratory and
injunctive relief; specifically, they seek a declaration that the State’s asserted
section line easements are invalid, Plaintiffs’ properties are “free and clear of such
purported 	right-of-way,” 	Defendant’s 	enforcement 	of 	the 	easements 	violates
4 Docket 1 at ¶ 13.
5 Docket 1 at ¶ 15.
6 Docket 1 at ¶ 2.
7 Docket 1 at ¶¶ 16-17, 23-27. See Docket 1-1 (joint statement).
8 Docket 1 at ¶¶ 5, 22-26.
9 Docket 1 at ¶¶ 36-60.
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Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and “a permanent injunction preventing the State
from interfering with Plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their lands, including enforcement of
their possessory rights as landowners.”10
Defendant’s motion seeks dismissal of this action, arguing immunity from
Plaintiffs’ suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.11
JURISDICTION
This Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims that arise
under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	The Court may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
asserting the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 12 	“Under Rule 12(b)(1), a
defendant may challenge the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations in [either a facial
attach or a factual attack]. Defendant’s motion presents a facial attack to Plaintiffs’
jurisdictional allegations.13 A court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to
10 Docket 1 at 16.
11 Docket 7.
12 See Docket 7; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
13 Docket 7-1 at 6-7.
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dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines
whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s
jurisdiction.” 14 	However, courts “do not accept legal conclusions in the complaint
as true.” 15
II. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”16 	The United States Supreme Court
“ha[s] repeatedly held that this immunity also applies to unconsented suits brought
by 	a 	State’s 	own 	citizens.”17 	This 	“principle 	of 	sovereign 	immunity 	is 	a
constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power” that “applies regardless of the
nature of the relief sought.”18 	Further, “[a] suit against a governmental officer in
his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity itself.” 19
14 Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130,
1133 (9th Cir. 2013)).
15 Lacano Invs., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (citing
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009)).
16 U.S. Const. amend. XI.
17 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004) (citations omitted).
18 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 100 (1984) (citation omitted).
19 Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing McRorie v. Shimoda,
795 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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However, there are exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) it can
be waived by consent;20 (2) it can be abrogated by Congress acting in the exercise
of its enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment;21 and
(3) pursuant to Ex parte Young, it “does not bar actions when citizens seek only
injunctive or prospective relief against state officials” for ongoing violations of
federal law.22 	The Young exception operates pursuant to a legal “fiction”—“when
a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from
violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes.”23 “Not
all actions that solely seek prospective relief against state officials fall within the
Young exception, however.”24 	“[W]hen ‘the state is the real, substantial party in
interest,’ as when the ‘judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury
or domain, or interfere with public administration,’” the Young doctrine does not
apply.25
20 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 (citation omitted).
21 Id.; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000) (“Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . grant[s] Congress the authority to abrogate the States’ sovereign
immunity.”).
22 Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1072 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
23 Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (quoting Pennhurst, 465
U.S. at 114 n.25).
24 Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1072 (citing Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.
261 (1997)).
25 Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy, 563 U.S. at 255 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 & n.11).
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DISCUSSION
Because Plaintiffs sued the Commissioner in his official capacity, Plaintiffs’
suit is equivalent to a suit against the State. 	Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity requires dismissal of the
complaint because Plaintiffs have filed the functional equivalent of a quiet title
action against the State that Defendant maintains is barred from proceeding in
federal court.26
Defendant relies on Lacano Investments, LLC, v. Balash and Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho.27 In Lacano, the federal government issued a patent to the
plaintiffs in certain streambeds before Alaska became a state.28 	The State
subsequently 	determined 	that 	the 	waterways 	above 	the 	streambeds 	were
navigable waters at statehood and that the streambeds were therefore owned by
the State under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 and the Alaska Statehood Act.29
The plaintiffs sued the State officials who made the navigability determinations,
seeking 	a 	declaratory 	judgment 	that 	the 	State’s 	navigability 	determinations
violated federal law and an injunction prohibiting the State from claiming title to the
26 Docket 7-1 at 1-2, 7-8.
27 Docket 7-1 at 8-9.
28 Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1070.
29 Id. (first citing 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a); and then citing Act to Provide for the Admission of the
State of Alaska into the Union, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339, 343 § 6(m) (1958) (“Alaska
Statehood Act”)).
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land beneath the waterways.30
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint on
Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, relying on Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe
of Idaho. 31 In Coeur d’Alene, the Coeur d’Alene Tribe sued the State of Idaho and
state officials in federal court seeking to quiet title to “the submerged lands and
bed of Lake Coeur d’Alene and [to] the various navigable rivers and streams that
form part of its water system.”32 The Tribe also sought a declaratory judgment
establishing the Tribe’s exclusive right to use and occupy the submerged lands, as
well as a permanent injunction prohibiting Idaho from infringing on the Tribe’s rights
to the land.33
The Lacano court explained that in Coeur d’Alene, the Supreme Court’s
“principal opinion recognized that ‘[a]n allegation of an ongoing violation of federal
law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the
Young fiction.’”34 	But the Supreme Court held that the Coeur d’Alene “case was
‘unusual in that the Tribe’s suit [was] the functional equivalent of a quiet title action
which implicates special sovereignty interests.’”35 That was because “substantially
30 Id. at 1070-71.
31 Id. at 1072-74.
32 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 264.
33 Id. at 265.
34 Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1072 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 281).
35 Id. at 1073 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 281).
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all benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State to the Tribe” and
the relief the Tribe sought had “consequences going well beyond the typical stakes
in a real property quiet title action,” including to “diminish, even extinguish, the
State’s control over a vast reach of lands and waters long deemed by the State to
be an integral part of its territory.”36 	Both the principal opinion and Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Coeur d’Alene recognized that “the Tribe’s action was
‘the functional equivalent of an action to quiet . . . title to the bed of Lake Coeur
d’Alene,’ which was not acceptable under the Eleventh Amendment” as “[a] federal
court cannot summon a State before it in a private action seeking to divest the
State of a property interest.”37 Accordingly, the Young exception was inapplicable
and the Eleventh Amendment precluded the Tribe’s action against Idaho in federal
court because “if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho’s sovereign interest in its lands
and waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any
conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury.”38
Similar to the tribe in Coeur d’Alene, the Ninth Circuit held that the Lacano
“[p]laintiffs’ action implicates precisely the same sovereignty interests as in Coeur
d’Alene itself” because the plaintiffs “allege they are ‘fee simple owners’ of the
streambeds beneath the navigable waters, seek to lift the ‘cloud’ from their
36 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 282.
37 Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1072-73 (first citing Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 281; and then
quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
38 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 287.
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properties, and request that a federal court return ‘full use and enjoyment of their
property.’”39 	As such, “[t]he relief [p]laintiffs request ‘is close to the functional
equivalent of quiet title’” because if the Ninth Circuit ruled “in [p]laintiffs’ favor, the
‘benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State’ to [p]laintiffs.”40
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that “[f]ederal courts lack jurisdiction over all
actions where a plaintiff seeks relief that is ‘close to the functional equivalent of
quiet title’ over submerged lands that have a ‘unique status in the law’ and which
are ‘infused with a public trust.’”41
The 	question 	in 	this 	case 	is 	whether 	Plaintiffs’ 	suit 	is 	the 	functional
equivalent to an action to quiet title against the State as to the portion of their
properties impacted by the section line easements claimed by the State. 	As in
Lacano, Plaintiffs allege that they are fee simple owners—albeit to the land
underlying their easements and not to submerged land under navigable waters;
and they seek a declaratory judgment lifting the cloud of the easements from their
properties and returning to them the full use and enjoyment of their properties.42
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	this 	suit—challenging 	the 	legal 	validity 	of 	section 	line
easements that the State claims it accepted from the federal government prior to
39 Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1073.
40 Id. at 1073-74 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 282-83).
41 Id. at 1076 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 282-83).
42 Docket 1 at ¶¶ 1-3.
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statehood—is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action. 	Plaintiffs seek
invalidation of the section line easements on their properties and a declaration that
the State’s enforcement of the easements violates Plaintiffs’ state and federal
constitutional rights.43 	Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Plaintiffs argue that Lacano and Coeur d’Alene are “plainly inapplicable” to
this case because both of those cases involved submerged lands under navigable
waters.44 	They point to language in both Lacano and Coeur d’Alene describing
submerged lands as holding a unique status in law and being infused with a public
trust.45 Plaintiffs assert that these cases apply the Eleventh Amendment bar only
to suits against states that seek to quiet title to submerged lands.46
The Court acknowledges that both Lacano and Coeur d’Alene involved title
to submerged lands and not section line easements over private property. But the
same public trust concerns articulated in those cases clearly apply to the section
line easements at issue here. 	The federal government surveys land and creates
a grid “to identify certain plots or grants of land and delineates property in . . .
43 Docket 1 at 16. See also Docket 8 at 2.
44 Docket 8 at 3.
45 Docket 8 at 8 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 283); Docket 8 at 10-11 (quoting Lacano
Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1074-75).
46 Docket 8 at 7-12.
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sections.”47 	“The borders of these sections are called ‘section lines.’”48 	The
section line easements claimed by the State derive from the federal Mining Act of
1866, “[l]ater codified as 43 U.S.C. § 932, Revised Statute 2477 (“R.S. 2477”),”
that granted “[t]he right-of-way for the construction of highways over public lands,
not reserved for public uses.”49 	R.S. 2477 was an “‘offer’ to states to acquire . . .
public easements over certain available . . . public lands.”50
The Alaska territorial legislature accepted this dedication of public
lands for highway purposes in 19 [Session Law of Alaska] 1923,
section 1 of which provided:
A tract of four rods wide between each section of land in the Territory
of Alaska is hereby dedicated for use as public highways, the section
line being the center of said highway.51
“[T]he 1923 act impressed the public lands in Alaska not otherwise reserved for
public uses with section line highway easements.”52
The Lacano and Coeur d’Alene courts’ recognition of the importance of the
public trust implications to submerged lands applies with comparable force to
section line easements. In Coeur d’Alene, the Supreme Court determined that the
47 Docket 1 at ¶ 14.
48 Docket 1 at ¶ 14.
49 Docket 1 at ¶ 20.
50 Docket 1 at ¶ 21.
51 Brice v. State, Div. of Forest, Land & Water Mgmt., 669 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Alaska 1983). A rod
is a measure of distance equal to 16.5 feet. See Definition of “rod,” Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/science/rod-measurement (last visited Jan. 18, 2024).
52 Brice, 669 P.2d at 1315.
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relief sought by the Tribe would have
consequences going well beyond the typical stakes in a real property
quiet title action. . . . The suit would diminish, even extinguish, the
State’s control over a vast reach of lands and waters long deemed by
the State to be an integral part of its territory. 	To pass this off as a
judgment causing little or no offense to Idaho’s sovereign authority
and its standing in the Union would be to ignore the realities of the
relief the Tribe demands.53
The Supreme Court concluded that
[i]t is apparent, then, that if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho’s sovereign
interest in its lands and waters would be affected in a degree fully as
intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its
Treasury. Under these particular and special circumstances, we find
the Young exception inapplicable. 	The dignity and status of its
statehood allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity
and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own courts, which
are open to hear and determine the case.54
In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration 	that 	California 	could 	not 	impose 	taxes 	on 	food 	and 	beverages
purchased at a tribal resort on reservation land.55 	In holding that such relief was
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the
question posed by Coeur d’Alene is not whether a suit implicates a core area of
sovereignty, but rather whether the relief requested would be so much of a
divestiture of the state’s sovereignty as to render the suit as one against the state
53 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 282.
54 Id. at 287-88.
55 223 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2000).
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itself.”56 And “[i]f . . . the requested relief would infringe upon a state’s sovereignty
to such a degree as to render the suit against the state itself, then it is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.”57 	“Applying this understanding of Coeur d’Alene,” the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the relief requested in Agua Caliente “would not affect
California’s sovereignty interests to such ‘a degree fully as intrusive as almost any
conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury.’”58
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Agua Caliente demonstrates that Eleventh
Amendment immunity as applied in Coeur d’Alene is not strictly limited to suits
where the relief requested seeks title to submerged lands. 	If that were the case,
then the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente need not have distinguished the sovereignty
interests in that case from those at issue in Coeur d’Alene. Because the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against states where “the relief requested would be so
much of a divestiture of the state’s sovereignty as to render the suit as one against
the state itself,”59 the universe of requested relief that could so divest the state of
its sovereignty is broader than Plaintiffs claim—it is not limited only to suits
challenging title to submerged lands.60
Here, unlike in Agua Caliente, Plaintiffs’ challenge implicates a comparable
56 Id. at 1048 (emphasis in original).
57 Id. (citing Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 296 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
58 Id. at 1048-49 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 287).
59 Id. at 1048 (emphasis in original).
60 See Docket 11 at 14.
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divestiture of the State’s sovereignty as was present in both Coeur d’Alene and
Lacano. 	For Plaintiffs dispute not just the legal validity of the State’s claimed
easements over their two properties but also the legal validity of all similarly-
created section line easements throughout the state. Plaintiffs maintain that all of
the State’s unvacated section line easements are invalid because the territorial
legislature 	did 	not 	enact 	“site-specific 	acceptance[s] 	coupled 	with 	actual
construction of a highway.”61 They maintain that “the purported 1923 ‘acceptance’
of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way over and upon each and every section line within the
Territory of Alaska was invalid for the reason that such an acceptance goes well
beyond what Congress intended to be the scope of its offer set forth in R.S.
2477.”62 	Although Plaintiffs are not challenging the State’s title to submerged
lands, their challenge here similarly would have “far-reaching and invasive”
impacts, as the relief Plaintiffs seek would invalidate all unvacated section line
easements throughout the state that the State claims were created through R.S.
2477 and 19 SLA 1923 for use as public highways.63 As Defendant notes, granting
Plaintiffs the relief they seek “would entirely divest the state of a type of ‘statutorily
61 Docket 1 at ¶ 24.
62 Docket 1 at ¶ 25. See Alaska Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. United States, 816 F.3d 580, 583-84 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“R.S. 2477 is unusual, as land-grant statutes go, because of its self-executing
nature. No formal document memorializing the grant of a right-of-way needed to be executed
by a federal official. Nor did a State, as the recipient of the grant, need to take any formal steps
to accept the federal government’s grant of a right-of-way. Acceptance of a grant is determined
by state law, and under Alaska law an R.S. 2477 grant could be accepted through public use.”)
63 See Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 282; Docket 7-1 at 3.
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created public right-of-way owned by the state’”64 and would impede the State’s
obligation to “to protect public access to natural resources,” such as Campbell
Lake.65
Defendant invokes the Alaska Constitution’s “common use clause” to argue
that the easements in this case involve comparable sovereignty concerns as the
submerged lands in Coeur d’Alene, as both have a “unique status in the law.” 66
Plaintiffs respond that “the issue of the existence of an easement across private
land does not implicate the common use clause” because “the common use clause
guaranteed the public’s right to use the lake for fishing, although it did not authorize
a trespass across the landowner’s property to get to the lake.”67 	However,
Defendant contends that the State’s section line easements facilitate the public’s
access to Campbell Lake, consistent with its obligations under the common use
clause. 	The Court agrees with Defendant that the common use clause of the
Alaska Constitution is relevant and supports a finding that the sovereignty interests
at issue here—all unvacated section line easements in the State of Alaska—are
64 Docket 11 at 13 (quoting Hilstrand v. City of Homer, 218 P.3d 685, 692 (Alaska 2009) (“A
section-line easement is a statutorily-created public right-of-way owned by the State . . . .” (citing
Alaska Statute 19.10.010)).
65 Docket 7-1 at 9; Docket 11 at 16-18.
66 Docket 7-1 at 9-10 (citing Owsichek v. State of Alaska, Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763
P.2d 488, 492 (Alaska 1988)); see Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 491 (explaining that Article VIII,
section 3, of the Alaska Constitution provides that “[w]herever occurring in their natural state,
fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use”).
67 Docket 8 at 18-19 (quoting Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 494).
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comparable to those in Coeur d’Alene. Accordingly, the Court finds that if Plaintiffs
“were to prevail, [Alaska’s] sovereign interest in its lands . . . would be affected in
a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds
in its Treasury.”68 	As in Coeur d’Alene, the “dignity and status of its statehood”
allows Alaska “to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon
responding to these claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and determine
the case.”69
Plaintiffs also assert that Seneca Nation v. Hochul “mandates” denial of
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.70 In that case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit in federal court by a tribe
against New York State over a single easement that the tribe had granted to New
York over which New York had built part of a highway.71 The tribe argued that the
easement was invalid because New York did not get it approved by the federal
68 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 287. See MacDonald v. Vill. of Northport, 164 F.3d 964, 972-73
(6th Cir. 1999) (The court held that a challenge to a state’s public access right-of-way to Great
Lakes was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because “the state of Michigan has a great
interest in maintaining public access to the Great Lakes, [so] the [plaintiffs’] requested relief
implicated ‘special sovereignty interests.’ Like the Indian tribe’s lawsuit at issue in Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, the [plaintiffs’] action was in some ways similar to a quiet title action because they
sought a declaration that a portion of the 7th Street right-of-way was the ‘lawful property of
Plaintiffs.’”).
69 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 287-88. The Court takes judicial notice of the pending quiet title
action that the State has recently initiated in Alaska state court, State of Alaska, Dep’t of Nat.
Res. v. Franke, et al., Case No. 3AN-23-09060CI. See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
399 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Materials from a proceeding in another tribunal are
appropriate for judicial notice.” (citation omitted)).
70 Docket 8 at 14-17 (citing Seneca Nation v. Hochul, 58 F.4th 664 (2d Cir. 2023)).
71 Seneca Nation, 58 F.4th at 667.
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government.72 	As relief, the tribe sought an injunction requiring state officials to
obtain a valid easement or, alternatively, preventing the defendants from collecting
tolls on the portion of the highway that was on tribal property.73 	The tribe also
requested that all toll money attributable to the portion of the highway on the tribe’s
land be held in escrow until New York obtained a valid easement.74
The Second Circuit concluded that the tribe’s suit could proceed in federal
court; it reasoned that the suit was not comparable to the suit barred by the
Eleventh Amendment in Coeur d’Alene.75 	The Circuit Court explained that the
Seneca Nation
[did] not assert property rights over land to which New York State has
traditionally held the title and [did] not seek a declaration that the
State’s laws and regulations do not apply to the area in dispute.
Therefore, the quiet title exception to Ex parte Young outlined by the
Court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no application here. 76
Seneca Nation is not binding on the Court. 	And it is distinguishable from
Ninth Circuit precedent. As noted above, in Lacano, the Ninth Circuit focused on
whether “[t]he relief [p]laintiffs request ‘is close to the functional equivalent of quiet
title.’” 77 	The Lacano plaintiffs alleged that they were fee simple owners of the
72 Id. at 667-68.
73 Id. at 668.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 674.
76 Id.
77 Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d at 1073 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 282).
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disputed land, sought to “lift the cloud from their properties,” and asked that the
court “return full use and enjoyment of their property.” 78 The Ninth Circuit held that
such relief was the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and therefore was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.79 In contrast, in Seneca Nation, the tribe did
not seek to divest the State of New York of its interest in the portion of the highway
on tribal land. 	Rather, the tribe sought to require New York to secure a valid
easement and to stop collecting tolls for the portion of the highway in question until
a valid easement was obtained.
Here, Plaintiffs seek much the same relief as the plaintiffs in Lacano: to
divest the State of any interest in their properties and return full use and enjoyment
to Plaintiffs by invalidating the State’s asserted section line easements. As noted
above, the relief Plaintiffs seek would invalidate the State’s section line easements
throughout all of Alaska, not just at Campbell Lake. 	Consistent with Ninth Circuit
precedent, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ suit is the “the functional equivalent
of a quiet title action which implicates special sovereignty interests.”80 	As the
Supreme Court held in Coeur d’Alene, this Court recognizes that “[a]lthough the
‘difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that
permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day
78 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
79 Id. at 1073-74.
80 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 281.
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and night,’ this suit . . . falls on the Eleventh Amendment side of the line, and
[Alaska’s] sovereign immunity controls.”81
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at Docket 7 is GRANTED.82 	The Court finds
that according Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint would be futile, as “the
complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” 83 	Accordingly, this case is
DISMISSED without leave to amend and without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to
pursue their claims in state court.84
The Clerk of Court shall enter a final judgment accordingly.
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2024.
/s/ Sharon L. Gleason
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
81 Id. (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974)).
82 The Court declines to address Defendant’s alternative argument that Plaintiffs have not
adequately alleged a violation of federal law, see Docket 7-1 at 10-15, as the Court has
concluded that it lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
83 Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 80 F.4th 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2022). See Lacano Invs., LLC, 765 F.3d
at 1076 (holding that “any amendment would be futile” and “[n]o set of facts pleaded by Plaintiffs
would allow their complaint to proceed, given Coeur d’Alene”).
84 See supra n.69.
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