Federal Trade Commission v. Noland, Jr., et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Federal Trade Commission,
Plaintiff,
v.
James D Noland, Jr., et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-20-00047-PHX-DWL
ORDER
This case was filed on January 8, 2020 (Doc. 1) and terminated on September 18,
2023 (Docs. 593, 596). The Individual Defendants appealed, challenging only certain
aspects of the relief, and on November 24, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. (Doc. 617-1.)
The mandate has now issued. (Doc. 617.)
On March 2, 2026, the Individual Defendants filed a Rule 60(b) motion. (Doc. 618.)
The Court ordered a response (Doc. 619), and the FTC responded (Doc. 620).
On March 23, 2026, the Individual Defendants filed a motion for recusal (Doc. 623),
an oversized “emergency” motion to stay the judgment pending resolution of the Rule
60(b) motion (Doc. 625), and a motion seeking leave to exceed the page limitation for the
stay motion (Doc. 624).
Regarding the recusal motion, the Individual Defendants do not cite any case
holding that recusal is warranted whenever a litigant files a Rule 60(b) motion premised on
allegations of fraud committed by a court-appointed receiver. Rather, they attempt to
distinguish Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Liteky holds that “opinions
Case 2:20-cv-00047-DWL Document 626 Filed 03/24/26 Page 1 of 2

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of
the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. The Individual Defendants do not attempt to
point out any display of “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” by the undersigned
judge—indeed, they state that they “do not contend that this Court harbored any actual bias
against them” and move for recusal only because “the fraud upon the court claims now
presented require this Court to make findings that are in direct tension with express factual
findings already made in this Court’s own published rulings” and due to the alleged
“structural conflict” that arises when a court-appointed receiver is accused of fraud. (Doc.
623.) The Court is unaware of any legal authority suggesting that recusal is necessary in
this circumstance. Cf. S.E.C. v. Princeton Economics Int’l, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 113
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying recusal request even though the movant sought to raise claims
of misconduct by a court-appointed receiver). Nor have the Individual Defendants
identified any authority supporting their position—In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d
164 (1st Cir. 2001), is inapposite because the recusal request in that case stemmed from
the judge’s decision to participate in an on-the-record interview with a newspaper reporter
to discuss a ruling in the underlying case. Id. at 166. Thus, the motion for recusal is denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the recusal motion (Doc. 623) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to exceed page limitation (Doc. 624)
is granted.
Dated this 24th day of March, 2026.
Case 2:20-cv-00047-DWL Document 626 Filed 03/24/26 Page 2 of 2