Creech v. Barrett Financial Group LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Bonnie Creech,
Plaintiff,
v.
Barrett Financial Group LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-22-00871-PHX-SMB
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Clarification, and
Amendment (Doc. 148) of the Court’s prior Order granting summary judgment (Doc. 144).
The Court denies the Motion for the following reasons.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order.” Motorola, Inc. v.
J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003). However,
“[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored,” id., and “are appropriate only in rare
circumstances.” 333 W. Thomas Med. Bldg. Enters. v. Soetantyo, 976 F. Supp. 1298, 1302
(D. Ariz. 1995). Accordingly, “[a] motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask
the court to rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Id.
(citation modified). Instead, these motions are only appropriate where the Court: “(1) is
presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision
was manifestly unjust”; (3) is presented with “an intervening change in controlling law”;
or (4) is otherwise presented with “other, highly unusual, circumstances warranting
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reconsideration.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263
(9th Cir. 1993).
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves for limited reconsideration. She does not seek reconsideration of
the Court’s conclusion that John Hegglin is entitled to summary judgment or the Court’s
Local Rule 56.1 ruling. (Doc. 148 at 14.) Rather, she only argues the Court errantly
entered judgment in Kind Lending LLC’s favor. (Id. at 2.) In its Order, the Court granted
summary judgment in Kind Lending LLC’s favor as to Plaintiff’s sole Arizona Consumer
Fraud Act (“ACFA”) claim against the entity. (Doc. 144 at 14.) The Court explained that
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint only alleged Kind Lending LLC violated the ACFA
through Hegglin. (Id. at 11.) Because the Court found no genuine issue as to whether
Hegglin violated the ACFA, it similarly found that Kind Lending LLC could not be liable.
(Id.)
Plaintiff argues the Court overlooked that the Fourth Amended Complaint also
alleges that Kind Lending LLC directly violated the ACFA. Tellingly, Plaintiff does not
point to one allegation under the heading “CLAIM ONE A.R.S. §§ 44-1521 to 44-1534.
Violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (Defendants Kind Lending, LLC, & John
Hegglin)” to support this argument. (Doc. 138 at 18.) Nor can she. After asserting Kind
Lending LLC violated the ACFA, Plaintiff’s only allegations against the entity are in
reference to Hegglin’s liability: “Kind lending, LLC through Hegglin violated the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act”; “Kind lending, LLC, through Hegglin, failed in its duty of care”;
“Such conduct is actionable conduct under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act against
Hegglin individually and against Kind Lending, LLC, by virtue of their apparent or actual
respective agency relationship.” (Id. at 19–20.) Thus, the Court rightfully entered
judgment in Kind Lending LLC’s favor because Plaintiff premised these allegations on
Hegglin’s liability.
Plaintiff cannot cure this defect by citing various paragraphs in the “General
Allegations” portion of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Such a Frankenstein attempt to
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plead Kind Lending LLC’s direct liability does not pass Rule 8 muster. “Factual
allegations, however detailed, must be tied to corresponding causes of action.” Gibson v.
City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1293 (9th Cir. 2026). This is especially true where there
are multiple defendants. See Tamraz v. Bakotic Pathology Assocs., LLC, No.
22-CV-0725-BAS-WVG, 2022 WL 16985001, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2022) (“To
comply with Rule 8(a)(2), a plaintiff suing multiple defendants must allege the basis of his
claims against each defendant.” (citation modified)). The Court cannot be expected to
wade through Plaintiff’s general allegations and pick and choose which facts support which
Defendant and which claim. That is Plaintiff’s responsibility. And because Plaintiff is
represented, there is no reason to relax this requirement. But see Tompkins v. EMC Mortg.
Corp., No. CV 10-608-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 11629509, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 14, 2010)
(noting “that the requirements of Rule 8 are relaxed with respect to pro se litigants”). For
these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint does not give
Kind Lending LLC fair notice of the grounds upon which it directly violated the ACFA.
Because this is Plaintiff’s fourth time amending her Complaint, the Court will not grant her
further leave.
Accordingly, the Court will not reconsider its entry of judgment in Kind Lending
LLC’s favor.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.
148).
Dated this 6th day of August, 2026.
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