Doe DH v. Scottsdale Inns LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jane Doe DH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Scottsdale Inns LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-23-00759-PHX-JJT
ORDER
The Court now resolves multiple pending motions, including Defendant Wyndham
Hotels & Resorts, Incorporated’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 120) and
Defendant Scottsdale Inn LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 124), motions to
exclude Plaintiff Jane Doe DH’s two experts (Docs. 141, 144), and motion for sanctions
related to Plaintiff’s purportedly late disclosures (Doc. 143). These motions have been fully
briefed, and the Court finds it appropriate to resolve them without oral argument. LRCiv
7.2(f). As an administrative matter, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to file under
seal the documents both parties lodged in compliance with the Court’s earlier order dated
October 2, 2025. (See Docs. 145, 154, 156, 158, 162, and 163.)
I. BACKGROUND1
The following facts are undisputed and taken from Wyndham’s Statement of Facts
(Doc. 149 at 1–9, “SOF I”), Plaintiff’s responsive statement to Wyndham’s Statement of
Facts (Doc. 161 at 1–7, “CSOF I”) and additional material facts (Doc. 161 at 7–33, “ASOF
1 The Court references document page numbers as generated by the Electronic Case Filing
system for all record citations herein.
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I”), Scottsdale Inn’s Statement of Facts (Doc. 142 at 1–9, “SOF II”), Plaintiff’s responsive
statement to Scottsdale Inn’s Statement of Facts (Doc. 157 at 1–7, “CSOF II”) and
additional material facts (Doc. 157 at 8–22, “ASOF II”).
Scottsdale Inn2 is a franchisee of Howard Johnson International, Inc (“HJI”), which
is the franchisor of the Howard Johnson brand and not a party to this suit. (SOF I ¶¶ 3, 35;
CSOF I ¶¶ 3, 35.) Wyndham is the parent company of HJI. (SOF I ¶ 3; CSOF I ¶ 3.)
Scottsdale Inn managed the “Howard Johnson” hotel located on East Indian School Road
in Scottsdale, Arizona (the “Hotel”), which opened in March 2012. (SOF II ¶¶ 1–5; CSOF
II ¶¶ 1–5.) The Hotel had exterior-facing rooms, a lobby and a parking area. (SOF II ¶¶ 27–
28; CSOF II ¶¶ 27–28.) It was common for guests to hang out in the parking area or invite
visitors to the Hotel. (SOF II ¶ 32; CSOF II ¶ 32.) To enter the Hotel property by car, guests
and visitors would drive through a singular entrance to the parking area that passed the
lobby. (SOF II ¶ 29; CSOF II ¶ 29.) Visitors were not required to check in with lobby staff.
(SOF II ¶ 33; CSOF II ¶ 33.) During the relevant period, Ms. Kristy Lewis was the general
manager of the Hotel and a total of 12 employees worked there. (SOF II ¶ 34; CSOF II
¶ 34.) None of the Hotel staff received training about the signs of sex-trafficking. (See
ASOF II ¶¶ 80–90.)
Plaintiff was lured into the commercial sex industry at sixteen years old by an older
man named “J.” (SOF II ¶ 7; CSOF II ¶ 7.) She was first trafficked in California where she
lived out of hotels with J. and other girls. (SOF II ¶ 10; CSOF II ¶ 10.) She was later
trafficked to Arizona, and she claims that she stayed in the Hotel between February 2013
and August 2013 five or six times. (SOF I ¶ 9; CSOF ¶ 9; SOF II ¶¶ 1, 39; CSOF II ¶¶ 1,
39.)
During her stays at the Hotel, Plaintiff would check in alone, provide her
government ID, and pay for a single room with cash or prepaid card. (SOF II ¶ 41; CSOF
II ¶ 41.) Only once did Plaintiff check in with another woman who also worked with J., but
J. was never present. (SOF I ¶ 12; CSOF ¶ 12; SOF II ¶¶ 42–43; CSOF II ¶¶ 42–43.) Those
2 PRC Investment LLC and Parimal Parmar are members of Scottsdale Inn (SOF ¶ 4; CSOF
¶ 4), but Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against them (Doc. 152).
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who booked a meeting with Plaintiff, the “johns,” would receive her hotel room number
directly from Plaintiff via text message. (SOF II ¶¶ 46–47; CSOF II ¶¶ 46–47.) Plaintiff’s
meetings occurred only in the privacy of the hotel room. (SOF II ¶ 48; CSOF II ¶ 48.)
Plaintiff did not inform or otherwise indicate to staff that she was being trafficked or needed
help. (SOF I ¶ 29; CSOF I ¶ 29; SOF II ¶¶ 53–54; CSOF II ¶¶ 53–54.) Instead, she stayed
in the hotel room except when she was extending her stay another night with lobby staff or
getting food or supplies. (SOF I ¶ 15; CSOF I ¶ 5; SOF II ¶¶ 14, 52; CSOF II ¶¶ 14, 52.)
Plaintiff kept the “Do Not Disturb” signage on the door of the hotel room and exchanged
towels and trash with staff at the door. (SOF I ¶15; CSOF I ¶ 15; SOF II ¶ 16; CSOF II
¶ 16.) Staff were “sometimes” let into the room by Plaintiff, where she kept lubricants,
condoms, baby wipes, candles and air fresheners. (SOF II ¶ 17; CSOF II ¶ 17.)
On July 24, 2013, police officers conducted a “sting” operation at the Hotel after
discovering Plaintiff’s online advertisements. (SOF I ¶¶ 23–25; CSOF I ¶¶ 23–25; SOF II
¶ 50; CSOF II ¶ 50.) Aside from this one sting operation, there is no evidence that any other
prostitution or sex trafficking arrest was made at the Hotel, and Plaintiff herself observed
no other prostitute or sex trafficking victim at the Hotel while she was there. (SOF II ¶¶ 58–
59; CSOF II ¶¶ 58–59.) Ms. Lewis also recalled no police investigations or calls to the
Hotel regarding prostitution or sex trafficking. (SOF II ¶ 36; CSOF II ¶ 36.)
Fortunately, Plaintiff eventually escaped her association with J. (ASOF I ¶ 24; SOF
II ¶ 26; CSOF II ¶ 26.) On May 3, 2023, nearly ten years after her last stay at the Hotel,
Plaintiff sued Scottsdale Inn and Wyndham under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (“TVPRA”). Scottsdale Inn and Wyndham now
move for summary judgment (Doc. 120, Mot. I (Wyndham’s motion); Doc. 124, Mot. II
(Scottsdale Inn’s motion), to which Plaintiff has responded (Doc. 159, Resp. I; Doc. 155,
Resp. II), and Scottsdale Inn and Wyndham both replied (Doc. 169, Reply I (Wyndham’s
reply); Doc. 171, Reply II (Scottsdale Inn’s reply)).
. . .
. . .
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate
when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ only if it might affect the
outcome of the case, and a dispute is ‘genuine’ only if a reasonable trier of fact could
resolve the issue in the non-movant’s favor.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA,
LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.
Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011). “The Court need not ‘comb
the record’ looking for other evidence; it is only required to consider evidence set forth in
the moving and opposing papers and the portions of the record cited therein.” New Leaf
Publ’g, Inc. v. Top Innovations LLC, No. 2:24-cv-04676-MEMF-SSC, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 208363, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2025) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), (e)(2);
Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001)).
As the moving party, Defendant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] . . .
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477
U.S. at 232. When, as here, the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of proof,
Defendant “must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence
of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving
party does so, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense.
Id. at 1103. Summary judgment is appropriate against a party that “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
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In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the
nonmoving party’s evidence if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.3
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The nonmoving party may not merely rest on its pleadings; it
must produce some significant probative evidence tending to contradict the moving party’s
allegations, thereby creating a material question of fact. Id. at 256–57 (holding that the
plaintiff must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for
summary judgment); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A
summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations
unsupported by factual data.”) (citation modified). “A mere scintilla of evidence will not
do, for a jury is permitted to draw only those inferences of which the evidence is reasonably
susceptible; it may not resort to speculation.” Brit. Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d
946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evidentiary Objections and Motions to Exclude Plaintiff’s Evidence
Scottsdale Inn objects to Plaintiff’s eleventh exhibit to her responsive brief that,
according to Scottsdale Inn, was untimely disclosed on the last day of fact discovery.
(Reply II at 2), and moves for sanctions related to that untimely disclosure (see Doc. 143).
Scottsdale Inn also moves to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s two expert witnesses,
Mr. Robert Cotto and Ms. Rochelle Keyhan (Docs. 141, 144).
Without deciding whether Mr. Cotto and Ms. Keyhan’s testimony and reports are
admissible or whether the disclosure of the emails now used as Plaintiff’s eleventh exhibit
were untimely, the Court will consider that evidence for the purpose of resolving Scottsdale
Inn’s summary judgment motion. It will also consider the portion of Plaintiff’s statement
of facts that she submitted in response to each summary judgment motion notwithstanding
Scottsdale Inn’s objections to many of those facts as duplicative, immaterial, or
3 For the purpose of resolving Scottsdale Inn’s summary judgment motion, the Court will
consider all evidence attached to Plaintiff’s responsive brief to which Scottsdale Inn objects
and moves to exclude, including the expert reports (Docs. 155-7, 155-8) and emails
showing transactions with “Howard Johnson” between April 18, 2013 and May 7, 2013
(Doc. 155-11).
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inadmissible (Reply II at 5) and Wyndham’s objection that the statement exceed the 10-
page limit set by this Court (Reply I at 1–2).
B. Beneficiary Theory of Liability
Under the TVPRA, “an individual who is a victim of [the TVPRA] may bring a civil
action against . . . whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to benefit,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that
person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPRA]),”
known as beneficiary or participant liability. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); Ratha v. Phatthana
Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Ratha I”).
After voluntarily dismissing her claims against PRC Investments LLC and Parimal
Parmar (Doc. 152) and abandoning the perpetrator theory of liability against Scottsdale Inn
(Resp. II, at 2 n.1), what remains of this matter is Plaintiff’s § 1595(a) beneficiary liability
claims against Scottsdale Inn and Wyndham, and vicarious liability claim against
Wyndham as the parent company of Scottsdale Inn’s franchisor. As a threshold matter,
neither Defendant appears to challenge that Plaintiff was a victim of sex-trafficking under
§ 1591 (Mot. II at 2 n.1; see generally Mot. I) or that they knowingly benefited from a
venture4 (see Mot. II at 12; see generally Mot. I). The Court will first address Plaintiff’s
beneficiary liability claim against Scottsdale Inn, then turn to the remaining claims against
Wyndham.
1. Scottsdale Inn
Scottsdale Inn argues that Plaintiff fails to meet the second and third element of
§ 1595(a) because there is no evidence that it engaged in a commercial venture with
Plaintiff’s trafficker, J. (Mot. II at 13.) Plaintiff concedes that J. was not directly involved
in any transaction with Scottsdale Inn and that he was never present at the Hotel. (See
CSOF II ¶¶ 41–43.) She instead argues that Scottsdale Inn participated in a commercial
4 Even if they had, district courts in this Circuit find that the rental of hotel rooms is
sufficient to meet this element. A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d
921, 936 (D. Or. 2020) (“The ‘knowingly benefits financially’ element of § 1595 ‘merely
requires that Defendant knowingly receive a financial benefit’ and the rental of a hotel
room—or royalties from that rental—constitutes a financial benefit sufficient to meet this
element.”).
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venture by renting her hotel rooms, providing her Wi-Fi that she used to post online
advertisements, delivering extra towels to her door, allowing unregistered visitors to access
the Hotel, and failing to have security measures at the Hotel. (Resp. II at 7.) Scottsdale Inn
replies that a “participation in a venture” requires that it “engaged with [J.] directly” or
“had a continuous business relationship with [J.] that either established a pattern of conduct
or constituted a tacit agreement to facilitate his alleged trafficking of Plaintiff.” (Reply II
at 8.)
The TVPRA does not define the terms used in § 1595(a), and absent a statutory
definition, many courts have defined it by attributing “participation” and “venture” their
ordinary meanings. Doe (K.R.D.) v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 798 F. Supp. 3d 1082,
1093 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Of the reported Ninth Circuit cases that reference beneficiary
liability arising under § 1595(a), only one goes so far as to define “participation” as “to
take part,” but it did not define “venture.” Ratha v. Rubicon Res., LLC, 168 F.4th 541, 560
(9th Cir. 2026) (“Ratha II”). No judges in this District have taken up this issue of defining
or applying “participation in a venture” under § 1595(a), and other district courts in this
Circuit and across the country vary in the standards they apply.
To understand these variances, the Court begins by reviewing a case that is among
the first and most widely cited on the matter. In M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.,
the district court of the Southern District of Ohio determined that “participation in a
venture” does not require actual knowledge of participation in the sex trafficking itself, and
that, “[i]n the absence of a direct association, Plaintiff must allege at least a showing of a
continuous business relationship between the trafficker and the hotels such that it would
appear that the trafficker and the hotels have established a pattern of conduct or could be
said to have a tacit agreement.” 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 970 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (“M.A. I”)
(finding allegations that a hotel rented rooms to people it knew or should have known
engaged in sex trafficking is sufficient to meet “participation in a venture”).
The Eleventh Circuit took a different approach. In Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., it
defined “venture” as “a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential
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profit.” 21 F.4th 714, 725 (11th Cir. 2021). This definition requires that a defendant hotel
does more than merely observe signs of sex-trafficking because “observing something is
not the same as participating in it.” Id. at 727. The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed this
standard, holding that “[m]erely renting a hotel room to a trafficker with actual or
constructive knowledge of his trafficking does not constitute ‘participation in a venture’ as
defined by Red Roof.” A.G. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 171 F.4th 1257, 1269 (11th Cir.
2026). “To be liable under § 1595, defendants must take part in a common enterprise to the
extent that they share legal risks and potential profits with traffickers.” Id. at 1268. The
Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the “continuous business relationship” approach
developed in M.A. I, holding that “something more than engaging in an ordinary buyer-
seller transaction is required.’” Id. at 1269.
In a later opinion, the same district court that decided M.A. I reviewed the Eleventh
Circuit’s standard and expressly rejected it, noting that that circuit’s understanding of
“participation” would require “at a minimum, ‘some form of evidence of a defendant’s
actual knowledge of a plaintiff’s presence on the property, plus some overt act to establish
the defendant’s participation to survive summary judgment.’” M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels &,
Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00849, 2025 WL 2696500, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2025)
(“M.A. II”) (citation modified). There, district court determined that, “[t]o require the kind
of blatant, proactive acts . . . that suffice in the Eleventh Circuit, would be to discard the
“should have known” language in Section 1595.” Id. at *18. The district court affirmed its
prior standard developed in M.A. I, holding that a plaintiff can establish “participation in a
venture” “through evidence of a direct association between the trafficking venture and the
defendant . . . like a hotel renting rooms to people they knew or should have known were
engaged in sex trafficking, [or] a continuous business relationship between the trafficking
venture and the hotel such that it would appear that the trafficker and the hotels have
established a pattern of conduct or could be said to have a tacit agreement.” Id. at * 14
The Seventh Circuit recognized these two different approaches and determined that
§ 1591 establishes “the upper limits” of § 1595(a) and should be construed “so that the
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civil remedy does not demand more of the plaintiff than a criminal prosecution demands
of the government.” G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 559 (7th Cir. 2023).
“Participating does not therefore require more than ‘assisting, supporting, or facilitating’ a
venture that violates Section 1591,” nor does it “require direct participation in the sex
trafficking”; it merely requires “a desire to promote the wrongful venture’s success.” Id. at
558–60 (citation modified). To meet this definition of “participation in a venture,” the
Seventh Circuit adopted the M.A. I standard that requires a plaintiff to show, at minimum,
that the defendant “provides assistance, support, or facilitation to the trafficker through
such a continuous business relationship” that permits an inference of a “tacit agreement.”
Id. at 559–60 (citation modified). Courts following this standard have found that providing
standard commercial services to traffickers and actual or constructive knowledge of the
trafficking activities meets “participation in a venture.”
Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit adopted a definition of “participation in a venture” that
closely resembles the one espoused by the Eleventh Circuit. The D.C. Circuit applied its
definition to require either a “common purpose, shared profits and risk, or control” like in
the Eleventh Circuit, or a “direct and continuous relationship that existed between the
parties” like in the Seventh Circuit. Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th 403, 415–16 (D.C. Cir.
2024). In close alignment with the Eleventh Circuit’s stance that “an ordinary buyer-seller
transaction” is insufficient, the D.C. Circuit holds that “purchasing a commodity, without
more, is not ‘participation in a venture’ with the seller.” Id. at 416.
“Finding a consistent standard in the case law for evaluating participation is no
simple exercise.” F.C. v. Jacobs Sols. Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1187 (D. Colo. 2025). In
attempting to make sense of these emerging approaches, district courts are “all over the
map.” Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725. The district courts in this Circuit are no exception.
Some district courts have applied the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of “participation in a
venture.” A.B. v. Interstate Mgmt. Co., LLC, 746 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1006 (D. Or. 2024)
(citations omitted); see Olive v. Mahboubi-Fardi, No. 2:23-CV-04370-JAK (EX), 2025
WL 2946987, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2025) (collecting cases). Several of those courts
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have followed the Eleventh Circuit’s view that “the standard hotel-guest relationship,
standing alone, does not constitute participation in a trafficking venture.” Doe (S.B.C.) v.
Six Continents Hotels, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2025). In
distinguishing between a “passive observer” and “active participant,” those courts require
that defendants must do something more than merely rent a hotel room to “participate in a
venture.” R.T. v. RRI W. Mgmt. LLC, No. 2:24-CV-590, 2025 WL 961531, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 31, 2025) (hotel staff were familiar with the sex-trafficker, ignored a victim’s
visible injuries and a direct plea for help, and served as look-outs for police activity); Doe
(S.A.S.) v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co. Inc., 795 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1308 (W.D. Wash.
2025) (the plaintiff’s “testimony that she was trafficked at the [hotel] by two different men
for a total of 30 to 60 non-consecutive days between 2002 and 2016 is simply not enough”
to withstand summary judgment).
Other district courts have used the definitions found in the TVPRA’s criminal
statute as the “upper limit” or “benchmark” to define “venture,” similar to the Seventh
Circuit’s approach. See K.R.D., 798 F. Supp. 3d at 10945; see also G.G., 76 F.4th at 554
(“[W]e think it safe to assume that Congress did not intend “venture” in Section 1595,
which establishes civil liability, to be any more demanding than “venture” in Section 1591,
which establishes criminal liability.”).
Regardless of how “participation in a venture” is defined among Ninth Circuit
district courts, most have required that a defendant has either a “direct association with
traffickers” or “a continuous business relationship between the trafficker . . . such that it
would appear that the trafficker and [the defendants] have established a pattern of conduct
or could be said to have a tacit agreement.” Doe v. Mindgeek USA Inc., 558 F. Supp. 3d
828, 837 (C.D. Cal. 2021); see also Acevedo v. eXp Realty, LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d 740, 783
(C.D. Cal. 2024). In cases where there is no direct association, a plaintiff must “connect
the dots between [her] experience as a victim of sex trafficking and the specific defendant
5 In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit cited this portion of K.R.D. approvingly.
Croft v. Dolan, No. 24-6150, 2025 WL 3720844, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025) and, while
not precedential, it indicates to this Court that the Northern District of California’s
formulation of “participation in a venture” is not inconsistent with § 1595(a).
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in the lawsuit.” B.J. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 22-CV-03765-MMC, 2023 WL 6120682, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2023). To connect those dots, a plaintiff may show that a defendant
hotel rented rooms to people it knew or should have known were engaged in sex trafficking
with “facts supporting the defendant’s knowledge of the venture in which it allegedly
participated.” Id. (citation modified); see also Mindgeek, 558 F. Supp. 3d at 837; Acevedo,
713 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
In the absence of Ninth Circuit authority, the Court declines to apply any specific
standard or definition of “participation in a venture” and assumes only for the purposes of
resolving the motions that element is met here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s beneficiary liability
claims turn on whether Scottsdale Inn knew or should have known that its rental of hotel
rooms was to someone engaged in sex trafficking.
The Ninth Circuit assumes that the mens rea § 1595(a) imposes is a negligence
standard because “the phrase knew or should have known usually connotes negligence.
And negligence is a less culpable mental state than actual knowledge or recklessness.”
Ratha I, 35 F.4th at 1177 (citation modified). Under the Ninth Circuit’s guidance in Ratha
I, district courts have held that “a plaintiff may not rely solely on general allegations that a
defendant was aware of sex trafficking to establish actual or constructive knowledge of
specific instances of sex trafficking.” S.B.C., 800 F. Supp. 3d at 1143 (citation modified);
see also Ratha I, 35 F.4th at 1177. “Rather, a plaintiff must plead facts establishing that a
defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff was being trafficked or regarding
a specific trafficking enterprise.” S.B.C., 800 F. Supp. 3d at 1143 (citation modified).
District courts have also held that “the TVPRA ‘does not address commercial sex activity
generally.’” A.B. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1027 (D. Or.
2021) (citation modified). “[I]t is not enough to establish a defendant’s knowledge of
general commercial sex taking place at its property . . . A plaintiff must allege that
defendants knew or should have known of a venture that involved sex trafficking by force,
threat of force, [fraud,] or coercion.” Christina T. v. Bellagio LLC, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1185,
1195 (D. Nev. 2025) (collecting cases); see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (prohibiting “means of
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force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . to cause the person to engage in a commercial
sex act.”).
Plaintiff argues that Scottsdale Inn had constructive knowledge that its renting of
rooms and providing services (e.g., Wi-Fi, towels) facilitated sex trafficking because: (1)
Plaintiff displayed signs that she was trafficked while at the hotel; (2) it was generally
known that sex trafficking occurred in the Hotel’s vicinity; and (3) Scottsdale Inn failed to
implement policies or trainings that would have enabled staff to detect sex-trafficking.
(Resp. II at 13–16.)
The Court first addresses the signs that Plaintiff herself displayed while at the Hotel.
According to Plaintiff, she was limited in her movement while at the Hotel, which was an
indicator of being controlled. (ASOF II ¶ 42.) But the portion of Plaintiff’s deposition she
cites to support this argument demonstrates that, when she was working alone at the Hotel,
she could leave her hotel room to get food, go to the store, pay the front desk for another
night, and walk through the hotel for ice or vending machines. (Doc. 155-2 at 16–17.) Even
in viewing these facts in a light favorable to Plaintiff, the Court can draw no inference that
Hotel staff would or could observe that she was “limited” in her movement, as these are
the very behaviors expected of a hotel patron who may, from time to time, walk about the
hotel or leave and return with food or store items.
Plaintiff also argues that she appeared “anxious because of J.’s digital monitoring,”
and this is a “red flag” of sex-trafficking. (Resp. II at 13; ASOF II ¶ 39.) Assuming that
Plaintiff was anxious, the evidence in the record does not show that the Hotel staff could
have observed it. Plaintiff declares that J.’s communications with Plaintiff involved her
meetings with the “johns,” (see 155-3 ¶ 3), and those meetings took place in the privacy of
the hotel room (SOF II ¶ 48; CSOF II ¶ 48). And while Plaintiff avers that she would have
to “immediately” answer J.’s phone calls, there is no evidence that Plaintiff took those
phone calls around Hotel staff. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony does not support that she
was generally “anxious,” either. At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she believed J.
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“was always around” even though he was never physically present at the Hotel, but she
“didn’t feel anything” about it. (Doc. 155-2 at 16.)
Plaintiff points out other signs of her sex trafficking, including that she paid with
cash or prepaid card, rented on a day-to-day basis, used the “Do Not Disturb” sign,
interacted with hotel staff at the door of the room, possessed sex paraphernalia in the room,
had visitors throughout the day and night,6 was “young looking” in appearance, showed
signs of drug use and sleep deprivation, and lacked personal belongings.7 (Resp. II at 13–
14.) The Court will assume, for the moment, that Scottsdale Inn knew of or should have
been aware of these signs. Viewing all these facts together in a light favorable to Plaintiff,
the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that Plaintiff was engaged in commercial
sex activity. But “the TVPRA ‘does not address commercial sex activity generally.’”
Wyndham Hotels., 532 F. Supp. 3d at 1027, and “it is not enough to establish a defendant’s
knowledge of general commercial sex taking place at its property.” Christina T., 806 F.
Supp. 3d at 1195. This, after all, makes sense, because the TVPRA prohibits “a venture
that involved sex trafficking by force, threat of force, [fraud,] or coercion.” But none of the
facts above would notify Hotel staff that Plaintiff was forced or coerced into commercial
sex activity.
There is a glaring difference between the facts of this case and those cases addressed
across the country where courts have found the hotel knew or should have known the rental
was engaged in trafficking. Here, the evidence shows that Plaintiff’s trafficker was never
present at the Hotel and never had any interaction with Hotel staff. Rather, Plaintiff acted
6 The parties present conflicting evidence about whether lobby staff could see activity in
the parking lot. (See, e.g., Doc. 142 at 118–19, Doc. 155-2 at 18). It is agreed, though, that
staff could see cars as they drove through the singular, north-facing entrance from the
street. Notwithstanding whether the staff had a limited view of the parking lot from the
lobby, Ms. Lewis testified that staff were often in or around the parking area during the
day shift and at least once every one to two hours during the night shift. (Doc. 142 at 136.)
7 Notably, only one of these signs is one that, according to Plaintiff’s own experts, would
indicate control, coercion, harm, fear, or disorientation, and that is the lack of personal
possessions. (See Doc. 155-7 at 11; Doc. 155-8 at 18.) The record demonstrates that
Plaintiff would arrive at the hotel “with a backpack,” which indicates that she did, in fact,
have personal possessions with her. While her possessions may have been minimal, the
Court doubts that this fact would lead a reasonable juror to believe that Scottsdale Inn must
have known that Plaintiff was being trafficked because is not uncommon that hotel guests
may have but a backpack of belongings when they check in for only one night.
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out her trafficker’s commands to pay for rooms, post advertisements, and meet with the
johns. Scottsdale Inn argues that J.’s absence is fatal to Plaintiff’s beneficiary liability claim
(Mot. at 12), while Plaintiff argues that “[a] hotel cannot escape liability merely because
the trafficker uses an intermediary or victim to pay for the room” (Resp. II at 8). The Court
cannot accept, as Scottsdale Inn urges, that a trafficker’s absence from a hotel property is
an absolute bar to § 1595(a) beneficiary liability claims. There is simply no overt
requirement for this in the statute or case law. As Plaintiff astutely points out, a victim can
be forced or coerced to engage in commercial sex even from a distance. (Resp. II at 16.)
The problem, though, is that this kind of distant, remote coercion and force is not
observable, or even deducible, by outsiders like hotel staff, even if they were trained in
identifying signs of coercion or force. Because the TVPRA does not prohibit general
commercial sex activity, beneficiary liability claims often turn on the extent to which a
hotel would or should have observed a trafficker accompanying the victim, surveilling the
victim or abusing the victim. None of these observations could have been made here on the
facts before the Court. What is left are general indicia that Plaintiff was engaged in
commercial sex activity, but not that she was forced or coerced into that activity.
There is also no evidence in the record that shows any specific sex trafficking
venture occurred at the Hotel such that staff would be on notice that trafficking occurred
there. See Doe (S.B.C.) v. Six Continents Hotels, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1146 (W.D.
Wash. 2025) (“[A] plaintiff must plead facts establishing that a defendant knew or should
have known that the plaintiff was being trafficked or regarding a specific trafficking
enterprise.”) Plaintiff points out that ----------------------------------------------------------------
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----------.8 (ASOF II ¶ 76; see Doc. 156-2 at 12.) Aside from this testimony, it is undisputed
that only one police call to the Hotel involved prostitution, and it involved Plaintiff who
was alone and admitted that “she was in Scottsdale to commit acts of prostitution.” (Doc.
155-9 at 5.) Plaintiff’s expert Ms. Keyhan opines that sex trafficking generally occurred
8 The Court redacts the above confidential information and simultaneously files an
unredacted version of this Order under seal.
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within the Wyndham brand and near the Scottsdale Inn, but there is no evidence, such as a
customer review or news article, that trafficking occurred at the Scottsdale Inn. (See Doc.
155-7 at 27–28). While Ms. Keyhan notes that the Hotel “sits at the eastern end of a well-
documented prostitution corridor that runs the length of Indian School Road from I-17 in
Phoenix into Old Town Scottsdale,” she cites to numerous articles that are about incidences
or events that occurred several years after Plaintiff stayed at the Hotel, and none of them
are specific to the Scottsdale Inn.9 According to the case law, this evidence is insufficient
to create constructive knowledge that a trafficking enterprise was occurring at the Hotel.
Ratha I, 35 F.4th at 1177 (evidence of trafficking in the defendant’s industry generally is
insufficient to meet the mens rea requirement); Wyndham Hotels, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 1026
(“[G]eneral knowledge of commercial sex activity occurring at hotels across the United
States is insufficient.”); Tyla D. v. MGM Resorts Int’l, No. 2:24-CV-00698-APG-BNW,
2024 WL 4839744, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2024) (“It is not enough to establish a
defendant’s knowledge of general commercial sex taking place at its property.”).
Plaintiff argues that, “[a]t the very least, the record supports charging Scottsdale Inn
with constructive knowledge based on its failure to exercise reasonable care in responding
to the known risk of sex trafficking.” (Resp. II at 14–15.) But whether Scottsdale Inn could
have adopted “preventative measures,” including hiring a security guard, monitoring
security cameras, or documenting or reporting signs of potential criminal activity, does not
change that, based on the facts and evidence provided by Plaintiff, Scottsdale Inn would
not have known that Plaintiff was being forced or coerced into the commercial sex activity,
or that there was a sex trafficking venture generally occurring there. To the extent that
Plaintiff suggests these measures could have thwarted Plaintiff’s trafficker from choosing
the Hotel as the situs for trafficking Plaintiff, the TVPRA does not impose a duty upon
hotels to police or prevent sex trafficking. Wyndham Hotels, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
. . .
9 Ms. Keyhan cites to only two articles that were about incidences of trafficking or
prostitution before Plaintiff stayed at the Hotel. One article noted a 2010 anti-prostitution
protest on Indian School Road, and the other was a case study referencing one child
trafficking incident at a different but nearby hotel in 2005. (See Doc. 155-7 at 30–31.)
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Based on these facts and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable
juror could not find that Scottsdale Inn would or should have known that Plaintiff was
being trafficked at the Hotel. Plaintiff having failed to meet her burden in producing
evidence supporting the third element of § 1595(a), summary judgment in favor of
Scottsdale Inn is appropriate. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
2. Wyndham
Wyndham argues that Plaintiff lacks evidence that Scottsdale Inn reported any sex
trafficking occurring at the Hotel, or that Wyndham or its subsidiary HJI inspected the
Hotel during the timeframe that Plaintiff stayed at the Hotel (Mot. I at 8–9). Wyndham also
argues that there is no evidence that data about Scottsdale Inn’s room reservations, guest
identification, payment information, and guest Wi-Fi usage, assuming Wyndham collected
and monitored that data, would have notified Wyndham that Plaintiff was being trafficked
at the Hotel. (Mot. I at 9.) What remains, according to Wyndham, is Plaintiff’s evidence
that Wyndham generally knew or should have known that sex trafficking occurred at its
subsidiary hotels. (Mot. I at 9.) Wyndham argues that such generalized knowledge is
insufficient to establish the mens rea element of § 1595(a). (Mot. I at 9–10.)
Plaintiff concedes that general knowledge of trafficking in hotels is not, on its own,
sufficient to satisfy the mens rea element. (Resp. I at 8–9.) She instead argues the Hotel
was “in an area with a heightened risk of trafficking, had frequent law-enforcement activity
on site, and its staff saw signs of commercial sex at the property.” (Resp. I at 5.) Assuming,
for the moment, that Wyndham knew these things, the TVPRA does not address
commercial sex activity, nor does it impose a duty on Wyndham to prevent or police
prostitution or sex trafficking even where there is a heightened risk for it.
Plaintiff next argues that Wyndham monitors online reviews, solicits guest
feedback, and inspects and visits hotel properties. (Resp. I at 10.) But Plaintiff presents no
evidence that guests complained of prostitution or trafficking taking place at the Hotel at
all, or that Wyndham had inspected or visited (or was required to inspect or visit) the Hotel
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during the time that Plaintiff stayed there such that Wyndham or its subsidiary would have
observed or been on notice that trafficking was occurring there.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments, that Hotel staff knew or should have known that
Plaintiff was being trafficked (Resp. I at 10) and that Wyndham should have ensured that
Hotel staff received anti-trafficking training or adopted policies that prevented sex
trafficking (Resp. I at 13–14), have each been addressed above and similarly fail.
In sum, Plaintiff fails to produce evidence that, when viewed in a light most
favorable to her, would establish the existence of the mens rea element necessary for a
beneficiary liability claim against Scottsdale Inn and Wyndham. Plaintiff’s only remaining
claim against Wyndham arises from a vicarious liability theory. The Court assumes for
purposes of analyzing the claim that Scottsdale Inn is an agent of Wyndham. A theory of
vicarious liability still fails because there is insufficient evidence supporting Scottsdale
Inn’s own liability under § 1595(a), see Restatement (Third) Agency § 7.03, or that
Wyndham owed a duty to or held a special relationship with Plaintiff that would, if present,
make Wyndham vicariously liable, see Restatement (Third) Agency § 7.05.
IT IS ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to file under seal the documents
currently lodged under seal at docket entries 145, 154, 156, 158, 162, and 163.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts,
Incorporated’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 120) and Defendant Scottsdale Inn
LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 124).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Defendant Scottsdale Inn’s Motion
to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert Rochelle Keyhan, Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert
Robert Cotto, and Motion for Rule 37(c)(1) Sanctions (Docs. 141, 143, 144).
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgement in
in favor of Defendants Wyndham Hotels & Resorts Incorporated and Scottsdale Inn LLC
and close this case.
Dated this 13th day of May, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
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