Dickson v. Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Wiliam Richard Dickson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of
America, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-23-01906-PHX-DJH
ORDER
On October 13, 2025, Defendant Travelers Property Casualty Company of America1
(“Defendant”) filed a Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 65). Plaintiff William Richard
Dickson (“Plaintiff”) did not file a response. As a result, Defendant filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition (Doc. 66) on December 15, 2025, requesting that its Motion for
Attorney Fees be summarily granted under LRCiv. 7.2(i). Plaintiff likewise did not file a
response to this Motion.
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) provides:
If a motion does not conform in all substantial respects with the requirements
of this Local Rule, or if the unrepresented party or counsel does not serve
and file the required answering memoranda, or if the unrepresented party or
counsel fails to appear at the time and place assigned for oral argument, such
non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the
motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.
LRCiv. 7.2(i). While the Court agrees that Defendant’s Motion can be summarily decided
given Plaintiff’s lack of response, it will briefly address a few points.
1 Defendant Travelers Property Casualty Company of America was erroneously named
“Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America.”
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Defendant seeks attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Under Arizona law, a trial
court may grant a discretionary award of attorney fees to a prevailing party “[i]n any
contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A); see
Assoc. Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (explaining
the “broad discretion of the trial court” to award attorney fees under § 12-341.01(A)). To
recover attorney fees under § 12-341.01(A), “(1) the moving party must be ‘the successful
party,’ and (2) the action must ‘aris[e] out of a contract.’ ” Rindlisbacher v. Steinway &
Sons Inc., 2021 WL 2434207, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2021) (quoting § 12-341.01(A)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant arise out the insurance policy Plaintiff
maintained with Defendant. Defendant successfully moved for partial summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claim as well
as Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. (See Doc. 61). And Plaintiff’s remaining claims
were later dismissed for failure to prosecute. (See Doc. 64). Based on these outcomes,
Defendant is the prevailing party. See Vasquez v. Ameriprise Ins. Co., 2022 WL 801715,
at *2 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“[Defendant] was successful in achieving full relief against
[Plaintiff] following the Court’s ruling on [Defendant’s] summary judgment and is thus
entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01.”); Harris v. Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (“We have held that when a
plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to prosecute, the defendant
may be considered the successful party for purposes of recovering costs pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 12–341.”). Moreover, Defendant established that all six of the factors considered in
awarding fees under § 12-341.01 militate in its favor (see Doc. 65 at 5–9), and Plaintiff
failed to refute any of Defendant’s assertions. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is
entitled to fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).
Once entitlement to fees is established, “the burden then shifts to the party
challenging the fees to show that the fees are unreasonable.” Best Western Intern., Inc. v.
Patel, 2008 WL 544820, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2008). Defendants properly submitted itemized
billing lists from its counsel. (See Doc. 65-2). It was then incumbent upon Plaintiff to
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object to the reasonableness of the rates or hours worked. Plaintiff failed to raise any such
objection. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant’s counsels’ rates and time worked were
reasonable.
In sum and pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(i), the Court finds that Defendant’s requested
fees of $88,938.002 and costs in the amount of $5,024.60 are reasonable and that Defendant
is entitled to these amounts under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 65) and Motion
for Summary Disposition (Doc. 66) are GRANTED. Plaintiff shall pay Defendant
attorney fees in the amount of $88,938.00 and costs in the amount of $5,024.60.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant accordingly.
Dated this 4th day of May, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
2 The Court recognizes that Defendant requested $88,948.00 in attorney fees. Defendant
noted that its total fees incurred were $105,444.00, and it subtracted $20,011.00 from this
amount in light of the fees already awarded to Defendant Brown. (See Doc. 65-1 at ¶ 16).
However, that math comes out to $85,433.00, not $85,443.00 as Defendant stated. In
consequence, when the $3,505.00 in fees for preparing the Motion for Attorney Fees is
added, the final total fees are $88,938.00, not $88,948.00.
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